Part 1
PART ONE. On the Trinity of God.
Chapter I.
On those seven topics with which theology deals, in summary.
In the beginning it must be understood that sacred doctrine, namely theology, which principally treats of the first principle, that is, of God three and one, treats of seven topics in all, namely: first, of the Trinity of God; second, of the creature of the world; third, of the corruption of sin; fourth, of the Incarnation of the Word; fifth, of the grace of the Holy Spirit; sixth, of sacramental medicine; and seventh, of the state of the final judgment.
The reason for this truth is as follows: since sacred Scripture, or theology, is a science giving sufficient knowledge of the first principle according to the state of the wayfarer, insofar as is necessary for salvation; and since God is not only the principle of things and the effective exemplar in creation, but also the restorative in redemption and the perfective in retribution: therefore it treats not only of God the Creator, but also of creation and creature. And because the rational creature, which is in a certain way the end of all things, did not stand firm, but by its fall needed to be restored, therefore it treats of the corruption of sin, the physician, health, and medicine, and finally of the perfect cure, which will be in glory, with the impious cast into punishment.
And therefore it alone is a perfect science, because it begins from the first, which is the first principle, and arrives at the last, which is the eternal reward; it begins from the highest, which is God most high, the creator of all things, and arrives at the lowest, which is the punishment of hell.
It alone is also a perfect wisdom, which begins from the supreme cause, as it is the principle of things caused, where philosophical knowledge terminates; and passes through it, as it is the remedy of sins; and leads back to it, as it is the reward of merits and the end of desires. And in this knowledge is perfect savor, life, and the salvation of souls; and therefore the desire of all Christians ought to be inflamed to learn it. From these things it is clear that although theology treats of so many and such varied matters, it is nevertheless one science, whose subject, as that from which all things come, is God; as that through which all things come, Christ; as that to which all things tend, the work of restoration; as that around which all things center, the unique bond of charity, by which heavenly and earthly things are connected; as that about which all things contained in the canonical books treat, the credible as credible; as that about which all things in the books of the expositors treat, the credible as intelligible, according to Augustine in On the Usefulness of Believing, for "what we believe, we owe to authority; what we understand, we owe to reason."
Chapter II.
What must be held concerning the trinity of persons and the unity of essence.
First, therefore, concerning the Trinity of God, three things must be considered: namely, how the unity of substance and nature stands together with the plurality of persons; second, how it stands with the plurality of apparitions; third, how it stands with the plurality of appropriations.
Concerning the plurality of persons in the unity of nature, right faith dictates that this must be held: namely, that in the unity of nature there are three persons, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, of whom the first is from none, the second is from the first alone through generation, the third is from the first and second through spiration or procession:
so that the trinity of persons does not exclude from the divine essence the highest unity, simplicity, immensity, eternity, immutability, necessity, and also primacy; but rather includes the highest fecundity, charity, liberality, equality, kinship, conformity, and inseparability: all of which sound faith understands to be in the most blessed Trinity.
Now the reason for this truth is this: because faith, since it is the principle of the worship of God and the foundation of that doctrine which is according to piety, dictates that one must think of God most highly and most devoutly. But one would not think most highly if one did not believe that God could communicate Himself in the highest degree; one would not think most devoutly if one believed that He could but would not; and therefore, in order to think most highly and most devoutly, faith declares that God communicates Himself in the highest degree, by eternally having a beloved and a co-beloved, and through this, that God is one and three.
Now to this faith, insofar as it dictates that one must think most devoutly of God, the whole of sacred Scripture bears witness, which is called the doctrine according to piety: because it confesses that God has offspring, whom He loves in the highest degree, a Word coequal to Himself, which "He begot from eternity, in whom He disposed all things"; through which He produced and governs all things; through which also, made flesh, out of the highest kindness He redeemed man by His most precious blood and nourished the redeemed; through which also at the end of the world, bestowing the highest mercy, He will free from all misery, so that through Christ all the elect may be sons of the most high Father, in whom will be the consummation of all piety, both of God toward us, and conversely.
Insofar as faith dictates that we must think most highly concerning God, not only does sacred Scripture bear witness to this, but also every creature, according to what Augustine says in the fifteenth book On the Trinity, chapter four: "For not only does the authority of the divine books proclaim that God exists, but the whole universal nature of things itself, which surrounds us and to which we also belong, proclaims that it has a most excellent Creator, who gave us a natural mind and reason, by which we judge living things preferable to non-living things, things endowed with sense to things without sense, intelligent things to non-intelligent things, immortal things to mortal things, powerful things to powerless things, just things to unjust things, beautiful things to deformed things, good things to evil things, incorruptible things to corruptible things, immutable things to mutable things, invisible things to visible things, incorporeal things to corporeal things, and blessed things to miserable things. And through this, since we without doubt set the Creator above created things, it is necessary that we confess him both to live supremely and to perceive and understand all things, and to be unable to die or be corrupted or changed, and not to be a body, but a spirit most omnipotent, most just, most beautiful, most good, and most blessed." - Behold, in these twelve are included the most exalted perfections of the divine being. But afterwards, as he himself shows, these twelve are reduced to three, namely eternity, wisdom and beatitude: and these three to one, namely to wisdom, in which are included the begetting mind, the Word as offspring, and love binding both together, in which faith dictates the most blessed Trinity to consist. And since the highest wisdom posits the Trinity, it no less posits all the most noble conditions previously established, namely unity, simplicity, and the other consequent ones: it is necessary that all the aforementioned perfections of the divine being stand together with the most blessed Trinity.
Ch. III.
On the sound understanding of this faith.
For the sound understanding of this faith, sacred doctrine teaches that in the divine there are two emanations, three hypostases, four relations, five notions, and from these only three personal properties.
Now the reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: since the first and highest principle, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple, and by the very fact that it is highest, is most perfect, it therefore communicates itself most perfectly, because it is most perfect, and preserves complete indivision, by the very fact that it is most simple. And therefore, with the unity of nature preserved, there are therein perfect modes of emanating. Now the perfect modes of emanating are only two, namely by way of nature and of will. The first is generation, the second is spiration or procession, and therefore these are therein.
And because by two substantial emanations two hypostases must necessarily emanate, it is also necessary to posit that the hypostasis that first produces does not emanate from another, lest there be an infinite regress: therefore there are therein three hypostases.
And because to each emanation there corresponds a twofold relative relation, therefore there are therein four relations, namely paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession.
Now through these relations the divine hypostases become known to us; and besides this, that hypostasis also in which there is the first principle of originating becomes known because it is not produced — for this is a mark of nobility in it — therefore there are five notions, namely the four aforesaid relations together with innascibility.
And because each of the persons has one property through which it is principally known, therefore there are only three personal properties, which are expressed properly and principally by these names, namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit.
For since it is proper to the Father to be innascible or unbegotten, to be a principle not from a principle, and to be the Father: innascibility makes him known by way of negation, although consequently by way of position, because innascibility in the Father posits a fontal fullness; principle not from a principle, by way of position with negation; to be the Father, by way of position and relation, properly, completely, and determinately.
Similarly, since the Son is image, word, and son: image names that person as an expressed likeness; word, as an expressive likeness; son, as a hypostatic likeness. Again, image names him as a conformed likeness; word, as an intellectual likeness; son, as a connatural likeness.
In this manner, since it is proper to the Holy Spirit to be a gift, to be the bond or charity of both, and also to be the Holy Spirit: gift names him as given voluntarily: charity or bond, as given voluntarily and preeminently; Holy Spirit, as given voluntarily, preeminently and hypostatically.
Hence it is that through these three names, which are Father and Son and Holy Spirit, the personal properties of the three persons are intimated.
These things, therefore, must be held for a sound understanding of faith in the Trinity.
Chapter IV.
On the Catholic Expression of This Faith.
For the catholic expression of this faith, it must also be held, according to the teachings of the holy Doctors, that in divine things there are two modes of predicating, namely by way of substance and of relation; three modes of suppositing, namely of essence, person, and notion; four modes of signifying substance, namely by the name of essence, substance, person, and hypostasis; five modes of speaking, namely quis, qui, quot, quod and quid; and three modes of differing, namely according to a different mode of existing, according to a different mode of being related, and according to a different mode of being understood.
The reason for the aforesaid is this: since the first principle is at once most perfect and most simple, all things that belong to perfection are said of it properly and truly; but those things that belong to imperfection either are not said of it, or if they are said, they are said according to the assumption of human nature, or by way of transference. Since therefore there are ten categories, namely substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, where, when, position, and having; the last five properly pertain to corporeal or mutable things; therefore they are not attributed to God except in a transumptive and figurative manner. But the other five preceding ones are attributed to God, according to that which they express of perfection, yet in such a way that they do not impede the divine simplicity. All these categories, therefore, are the very same thing as that of which they are predicated; and thus, by comparison to the subject in which they inhere, all are said to pass into substance, with the exception, however, of relation: which, since it has a twofold comparison, namely to the subject in which it inheres, and to the term toward which it tends, in the first way passes over, lest it produce composition, and in the second way remains, so that it may produce distinction. And hence it is that "substance contains unity, and relation multiplies trinity"; and therefore there remain therein only these two different modes of predicating.
Concerning which the following rule is given: that those things which are said according to substance are said of all both singly and together and in the singular; but those things said according to relation either are not said of all, or if of several, in the plural, as related, distinct, similar, equal, on account of intrinsic relation. The name of Trinity, however, comprehends both.
And since there can be multiple relations in one person, just as there are multiple persons in one nature, therefore distinction in notion does not bring about a rending apart of person, nor does distinction of person bring about a multiplication of nature. And for this reason, not whatever belongs to the essence belongs to the notion or person, nor conversely. And hence it is that there are three modes of suppositing, concerning which the following rule is customarily given: when the essence is supposited, neither the notion nor the person is supposited; and when the notion is supposited, neither the essence nor the person is supposited; and when the person is supposited, neither the essence nor the notion is supposited, as is clear through examples.
And since there is true distinction in the supposits of substance, while the essence remains one, therefore it is necessary that substance be signified there in multiple ways, namely as communicable and incommunicable. As communicable, by the mode of abstraction through the name of essence, and by the mode of concretion through the name of substance; but as incommunicable, either as distinguishable through the name of hypostasis, or as distinguished through the name of person.
Or otherwise, namely as distinguished in any way whatsoever, and thus hypostasis; or notably and perfectly, and thus person.
Examples of these four are found in creatures: humanity, man, some man, Peter: the first designates essence, the second substance, the third hypostasis, and the fourth person.
And because in the person who is distinguished, one must consider not only the one who is distinguished, but also that by which he is distinguished—and this is the property or notion—therefore it is necessary that in the divine there be five modes of speaking and likewise of inquiring, namely who [quis], by reason of person; who [qui], by reason of hypostasis, because it designates a supposit of substance indistinctly; how many [quot], by reason of notion; what [quod], by reason of substance; what [quid] or by which [quo], by reason of essence.
And since all these modes are rooted in the unity of essence, because whatever is in God is God Himself, one and alone, they therefore do not posit any difference there, neither according to essence nor according to being. And for this reason there are only three modes of differing, namely according to modes of being or emanating, as one person differs from another person; according to modes of being related, as person and essence differ — because one person is referred to another, and therefore is distinguished, but essence is not referred to another, and therefore is not distinguished — and according to modes of understanding, as one substantial property differs from another, such as goodness and wisdom. — The first difference is the greatest that can be found in the divine: for it is in the supposits, such that one is not predicated of the other. — The second difference is lesser, because it is in the attributes: for although one can be predicated of the other, as person of essence, nevertheless something is said of the one that is not said of the other, as: person is distinguished and referred, but essence is not. — The third difference is least, because it is in the connotated. For although one is predicated of the other reciprocally, and the same thing can be said of both, nevertheless the same thing is not connoted in each case, nor is the same thing given to be understood through each. — From the first mode of differing arises the plurality of persons; from the second mode, the plurality of substantial and relative predications; from the third, the plurality of essential properties and notions, whether from eternity or from time, whether properly or transumptively, whether commonly or by appropriation. Examples of the things said are manifest. — With these things understood, it is sufficiently clear both what is to be held and how one ought to speak concerning the supreme Trinity of the divine persons.
Chapter V.
On the unity of the divine nature in the multiformity of apparitions.
Second, concerning the plurality of apparitions, divine doctrine teaches that this is to be held: that although God is uncircumscribable, invisible, and immutable, nevertheless he specially dwells in holy men, appeared to the Patriarchs and Prophets, descended from heaven, and also sent the Son and the Holy Spirit for the salvation of the human race.
And although in God the nature, power, and operation of the Trinity are undivided, nevertheless the mission or apparition of one person is not the mission or apparition of another. Although there is also supreme equality there, nevertheless it belongs to the Father alone to send and not to be sent; to the Holy Spirit it belongs only to be sent with respect to the divine persons, unless perhaps he may be said to send the assumed man; but to the Son it belongs to send and to be sent, as can be gathered from the Scriptures.
The understanding and reason of the aforesaid is this: because, although the first principle is immense and uncircumscribable, is incorporeal and invisible, is eternal and immutable, it is nevertheless the principle of spiritual and corporeal things, of natural and gratuitous things, and thereby also of mutable, sensible, and circumscribed things, through which, although he himself is immutable, insensible, and uncircumscribable, he renders himself manifest and known. He renders himself manifest and known generally through the universality of his effects emanating from him, in which he is said to be by essence, power, and presence, which extends to all created things.
He also renders himself specially known through certain effects which lead specially to him, by reason of which he is said to dwell, to appear, to descend, to be sent, and to send.
For to dwell denotes a spiritual effect with acceptance, such as the effect of sanctifying grace, which is deiform and leads back to God and makes us possess God, and God be possessed by us, and thereby also to dwell in us. And because the effect of grace is common to all persons, therefore one person does not indwell without another; rather, the whole Trinity dwells simultaneously.
But to appear denotes a sensible effect with express signification, as the Holy Spirit appeared in a dove. And since, just as the divine persons are distinct, so they can be distinctly signified both by signs and by names, therefore any person can appear by itself, and apparition can belong to all, whether together or to any one by itself. Whence that the Holy Spirit is said to have appeared in tongues of fire and in a dove, this is not on account of a new bond or a special effect, but on account of the union which exists between the thing signified and the sign specially and by manner and origin assigned to it.
To descend, however, denotes either of the aforesaid effects together with inception. For God is always present to the most blessed Angels in the heavens, because He always inhabits and appears in them. But to sinners on earth He is, as it were, absent, both as regards grace and as regards knowledge; and therefore, when He begins to appear or to inhabit, from being present in the heavens and as it were absent from us, He becomes present on earth; and therefore, although He is not changed in Himself, He is nevertheless said to descend with respect to us.
To be sent, however, denotes the aforesaid effects together with eternal production. For the Father sends the Son when, by making Him present to us through knowledge or grace, He indicates that He proceeds from Him. And because the Father proceeds from no one, He is nowhere said to be sent. But because the Son both produces and is produced, He both sends and is sent. But because the Holy Spirit is eternally produced, yet does not produce except temporally, it properly belongs to Him to be sent, while to send does not belong to Him except with respect to a creature.
From this it is clear that the following statements are improper and require explanation: "The Holy Spirit sends Himself"; "The Holy Spirit sends the Son"; "The Son sends Himself" — unless it be understood in the sense that He was born of the Virgin.
It is also clear why to send and to be sent do not belong to all Persons: because, although it denotes an effect in a creature, it nevertheless denotes an intrinsic relation, such that to send denotes authority, and to be sent denotes subauthority, by reason of the eternal production implied within.
Chapter VI.
On the unity of the divine nature in the multiplicity of appropriated attributes.
In the third place, concerning the plurality of appropriated attributes, Sacred Scripture teaches that this must be held: that although all essential attributes belong equally and indifferently to all the persons, nevertheless unity is said to be appropriated to the Father, truth to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit. - And according to this is taken the second appropriation of Hilary, namely "eternity in the Father, beauty in the Image, use in the Gift." - According to this is taken the third, namely in the Father the principle of originating, in the Son the principle of exemplifying, in the Holy Spirit the principle of completing.
And according to this is taken the fourth, namely omnipotence to the Father, omniscience to the Son, and will or benevolence to the Holy Spirit. - These, however, are said to be appropriated, not because they become proper, since they are always common; but because they lead to the understanding and knowledge of what is proper, namely of the three persons.
The understanding and rationale of the foregoing is this. Because the first principle is most noble and most perfect, therefore the most noble and most general conditions of being are found in it in the highest degree. These, moreover, are the one, the true, the good, which do not contract being according to supposits, but according to intelligible character. For the one names being as countable, and this it has through its indivision in itself; the true, insofar as it is knowable, and this it has through its indivision from its proper form; the good, insofar as it is communicable, and this it has through its indivision from its proper operation. And because this threefold indivision is ordered with respect to the intelligible character of understanding, such that the true presupposes the one, and the good presupposes the one and the true: hence it is that these are attributed to the first principle in the highest degree, because they are perfect and general; - and they are appropriated to the three persons, because they are ordered: and therefore the supremely one to the Father, who is the origin of the persons; the supremely true to the Son, who is from the Father as Word; the supremely good to the Holy Spirit, who is from both as Love and Gift.
And because the supremely one is supremely first, because it lacks all beginning; and because the supremely true is supremely equal and beautiful; and because the supremely good is supremely useful and beneficial: hence arises the second appropriation of Hilary, which is eternity in the Father, because he has no beginning but is altogether first; beauty in the Image, that is, in the Word, because supremely beautiful; use in the Gift, that is, in the Holy Spirit, because supremely beneficial and communicative. Which Augustine intimates in other words thus: "In the Father unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality."
Again, because the supremely one and first holds the notion of principiating and originating; the supremely beautiful and fair holds the notion of expressing and exemplifying; the supremely beneficial and good holds the notion of finalizing, because "the good and the end are the same": hence arises the third reason for appropriating efficiency to the Father, exemplarity to the Son, and finality to the Holy Spirit.
Again, because from the first and supreme principle flows all power, from the first and supreme exemplar all knowledge, and toward the supreme end tends all willing; therefore it is necessary that the First be most omnipotent, most all-wise, and most benevolent. But the first and supreme Unity, returning upon itself with a complete and perfect return, is most omnipotent; so also Truth is most wise, and Goodness most benevolent: and these are appropriated because they suggest an order. For will presupposes cognition, and will and cognition presuppose power and strength, because "to be able to know is a certain power."
From these it is apparent what things are appropriated and to whom and for what reason. These last, however, namely power, wisdom, and will, are most especially those by which in the Scriptures the supreme Trinity is praised. And therefore something must be said about these briefly and in summary.
Chapter VII.
On the Omnipotence of God.
Concerning the omnipotence of God, according to sacred doctrine these things are to be held: that God is omnipotent, yet in such a way that there are not attributed to Him culpable acts, such as lying and willing evil; nor penal acts, such as fearing and grieving; nor corporeal or material acts, such as sleeping and walking, except perhaps metaphorically; nor unfitting acts, such as being able to make something greater than Himself, or another God equal to Himself, or something actually infinite, and the like: "because, as Anselm says, any unfitting thing, even the least, is impossible for God." Although He cannot do these things, He is nevertheless truly, properly, and perfectly omnipotent.
The understanding and reason of the aforesaid is this: because the first principle is powerful by a power that is power simply; and therefore the distribution added to it distributes for those things which to be able is to be able simply. These, however, are those things which proceed from a complete and ordered power. - By complete power I mean that which cannot fail, nor can it succumb, nor can it be in need. But power in sinning fails, in suffering succumbs, and in corporeal actions involves indigence. But divine power, because it is the highest and most perfect power, is therefore neither from nothing nor under anything nor in need of anything else, and through this it can do neither culpable nor penal nor material things; and this is because omnipotence is complete power.
Ordered power, however, can be spoken of in three ways: either according to act, or according to aptitude on the part of the creature, or according to aptitude on the part of the uncreated power alone. What is possible for power spoken of in the first way is not only possible but also actual: what is possible in the second way and not the first is possible simply, although not actual; what is possible in the third way, but not the first or second, is possible for God, but impossible for the creature. But what is possible in none of the aforesaid ways, such as that which directly conflicts with order according to the primordial and eternal reasons and causes, is simply impossible: such as that God should make something actually infinite, that He should simultaneously make something to be and in no way to be, that He should make what has been not to have been, and other such things; to be able to do which is against the order and completeness of the divine power.
From these things it is clear with respect to what the divine power extends: it is also clear which things ought to be called simply possible, and which simply impossible, and that the impossibility of certain things is consistent with true omnipotence.
Chapter VIII.
On the wisdom of God, predestination, and foreknowledge.
Concerning the wisdom of God, these things must be held: namely, that the divine wisdom itself most clearly knows all things good and evil, past, present, and future, actual and possible, and on this account is incomprehensible to us and infinite; yet in such a way that it is in no way diversified in itself, although it receives diverse names. - For insofar as it is cognitive of all possible things, it is called knowledge or cognition: insofar as it is cognitive of all things that come to pass in the universe, it is called vision: insofar as it is cognitive of all things that are done well, it is called approbation: insofar as it is cognitive of those things that are future, it is called foreknowledge or prevision; insofar as it is cognitive of those things that are to be done by God himself, it is called disposition: insofar as it is cognitive of those things that are to be rewarded, it is called predestination; insofar as it is cognitive of those things that are to be condemned, it is called reprobation.
And because it is not only cognitive, but is also the principle of knowing: therefore, insofar as it is the principle of knowing all things known, it is called light: insofar as it is the principle of knowing things seen and approved, it is called a mirror: insofar as it is the principle of knowing things foreseen and disposed, it is called an exemplar: insofar as it is the principle of knowing things predestined and reprobated, it is called the book of life. - Therefore the book of life regards things as returning; the exemplar, as going forth; the mirror, as proceeding; but light regards all things.
To the exemplar, moreover, pertain idea, word, art, and reason: idea, according to the act of foreseeing; word, according to the act of proposing; art, according to the act of carrying out; reason, according to the act of perfecting, because it adds the intention of an end. - But because all these are one in God, therefore one is frequently taken for another.
And although the divine wisdom receives diverse names by reason of the diversity of things known and connoted, it is nevertheless not diversified according to its intrinsic nature. For it knows contingent things infallibly, mutable things immutably, future things presentially, temporal things eternally, dependent things independently, created things in an uncreated manner, and things other than itself in itself and through itself.
And since it knows contingent things infallibly, freedom and changeability of the will stand together with predestination and foreknowledge.
Now the understanding and reason of the aforesaid is this: since the first principle, by the very fact that it is first and supreme, has knowledge that is at once most simple and most perfect: because most perfect, therefore it knows all things most distinctly under all the conditions that things have or can have; and for this reason it knows future things to be future, and present things to be present; and it knows that good things are to be approved, and evil things to be reprobated: hence it is that it receives diverse names, as has been said above.
But because the perfection of wisdom stands together with supreme simplicity, hence it is that all things other than himself he knows in himself and through himself; from which follows the second point, that he knows created things in an uncreated manner; from which follows the third, that he knows dependent things independently; from which arises the fourth, that he knows temporal things eternally; from which the fifth, that he knows future things presentially; from which the sixth, that he knows mutable things immutably; from which the seventh, that he knows contingent things infallibly.
And thus contingent things, while remaining contingent, are utterly infallible to the divine wisdom, both in contingent things that are subject to nature and in those subject to the freedom of the human will.
Whence whoever wishes to understand this truth, how the freedom of the created will stands together with the infallibility of eternal predestination, let him proceed by resolving from this last point through those seven degrees up to the first, namely that the first principle most perfectly knows all things through himself, which is a most certain truth; from which the rest of the aforementioned points are infallibly concluded by reasoning.
But just as the certitude of divine knowledge stands together with the contingency of things known, because the divine wisdom is at once most simple and most perfect: so unity stands together with the multiformity of reasons and ideas from the same cause. For because it is most perfect, therefore it knows all things and each thing most distinctly and represents all those things most distinctly and most perfectly: and therefore it is said to have reasons and ideas of individual things as likenesses of things most perfectly expressive.
But because it is most simple, therefore all those likenesses are one in it. Whence, just as God by one power produces all things in time according to the complete integrity of things, so by one truth he expresses all things sempiternally. And just as in the most high, omnipotent God there is one active operation in reality, yet there are said to be many productions of things by reason of the plurality of things produced: so there is one truth of one act of intelligence in God, yet there are said to be many likenesses, ideas, and reasons by reason of the plurality of things ideated, whether existing, or future, or possible. Now these reasons or ideas, although they are one truth and light and essence, are nevertheless not said to be one reason or idea. For a reason or idea is spoken of as relative to another according to the mode of understanding. For it names the likeness of the thing known, which really holds on the side of God, although according to the mode of understanding it seems to signify something on the side of the thing ideated.
But if a likeness of this be sought in a creature, it must be said that this is proper to that exemplar: because, as has been said, it is at once simple and infinite and most perfect, which being understood beforehand, the rest become known consequently. For because that exemplar is most simple and most perfect, it is therefore pure act: but because it is infinite and immense, it is therefore beyond every genus. And hence it is that, being one, it can be the expressive likeness of many things.
Chapter IX.
On the will and providence of God.
Concerning the will of God, these things must be held: that it is so right that it can in no way be bent; so efficacious that it can in no way be impeded; so one that it nevertheless may be signified in manifold ways.
For the divine will, which is the will of good pleasure, is signified through the will of sign according to five differences of signs, which are precept, prohibition, counsel, fulfillment, and permission: according to which all things whatsoever that happen in the universe are disposed by the will of good pleasure. "For the will of God is the first and highest cause of all forms and motions. For nothing happens visibly and sensibly in this most ample and immense commonwealth, as it were, of the whole creation, that is not either commanded or permitted from the interior, invisible, and intelligible court of the supreme Emperor, according to the ineffable justice of rewards and punishments, graces and retributions."
And because this will, regulated by reason, is called providence: hence it is that all things that happen in the universe are directed and governed by divine providence, which in all things is irreproachable, because it commands, prohibits, or counsels nothing except justly; it does nothing except well; it permits nothing unjustly.
Now the understanding and reason of the foregoing is this. The First Principle, since it is supremely noble, both has a will and has it in a noble manner. Since therefore will of itself bespeaks that according to which in agents acting from purpose the rule of rectitude and the efficacy of operation are attended to, it is necessary that the will in God be most right and most efficacious: most right, because in God will and truth are the same; most efficacious, because in God will and power or might are entirely the same.
And because the divine will cannot lack truth, therefore it is not only right, but also the rule of rectitude. Because indeed it can in no way lack power, therefore it is not only efficacious, but also the font and origin of all efficacy; so that nothing can be accomplished without it, nothing can happen against it, nor is there anything by which it could be impeded.
And because it is most right, no one can be right unless he conforms to it; but no one can conform to it unless that will is made known to him: therefore it was necessary that the divine will, as the rule of rectitude, be made known to us. Now a certain rectitude is of necessity, and this consists in doing the necessary good and avoiding evil; a certain rectitude is of perfection, and this consists in going beyond what is owed: and accordingly it is made known to us through a threefold sign, namely precept, prohibition, and counsel: which indeed signifies that the divine good pleasure accepts as just what is done according to divine precept, what is avoided according to divine prohibition, and what is fulfilled according to divine counsel. These signs indeed are infallible signs of the divine will, insofar as it is the rule of rectitude.
Again, because it is most efficacious, in no way can anyone accomplish anything unless it operates and cooperates; no one can fail or sin unless it justly abandons. And accordingly there are two signs of it, namely fulfillment, which is a sign of the will as effecting: and permission, which is a sign of the will justly abandoning. Now it justly abandons, because it is just that it so govern the things it has established that it does not break the laws it has implanted: and that it so cooperate with the things it has created that it "allows them to act according to their proper motions": and therefore, if it allows free choice, which is turnable to either side, to fall into evil by the law of nature, it does not permit this except justly.
Again, if through grace it goes before and sustains, it does injury to no one; therefore it does not act unjustly nor entirely justly according to the requirement of merits, because merits do not suffice for this: but gratuitously and mercifully and in a certain way justly, insofar as befits its goodness. Therefore when it condemns and reprobates, it operates according to justice: but when it predestines, according to grace and mercy, which does not exclude justice. Because therefore all, insofar as they were of the mass of perdition, deserved to be condemned: therefore more are reprobated than chosen, so that it may be shown that salvation is according to special grace, but damnation according to common justice. Therefore no one can complain about the divine will, because it does all things most rightly; indeed in all things we ought to give thanks and honor the governance of divine providence.
But if anyone should ask why it bestows the gift of grace on one sinner rather than another, here it is necessary to impose silence on human loquacity and to exclaim with the Apostle: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments, and unsearchable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor, or who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? For from him and through him and in him are all things. To him be glory forever and ever. Amen.