Part 3

PART THREE. On the corruption of sin.

Chapter I.

On the origin of evil in general.

Having therefore briefly predetermined certain things concerning the Trinity of God and the creature of the world, it now remains to touch briefly upon some matters concerning the corruption of sin. Regarding this, it must be held in summary that sin is not some essence, but a defect and corruption, by which namely measure, species, and order are corrupted in the created will; and on this account the corruption of sin is contrary to the good itself, yet it does not have being except in the good, nor does it draw its origin except from the good, which is indeed the free choice of the will: and this itself is neither supremely evil, since it can will the good, nor supremely good, since it can decline into evil.

Now the reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: because the first principle, since it is a being from itself, not from another, it is necessary that it be a being for the sake of itself, and on this account supremely good, having absolutely no defect. Therefore there neither is nor can be anything that is the first and supremely evil, because the first principle denotes supreme completeness, and the supreme evil denotes the greatest defect. Since therefore the first principle, as supremely being and complete, can fail neither in being nor in operating: it is neither supremely evil nor is it any evil, nor can it in any way originate evil.

Yet because it is omnipotent, it can bring the good from non-being into being, even without the aid of any matter. And this it did when it fashioned the creature to which it gave being, living, understanding, and willing: which indeed, because it was from the supreme good according to the relation of a threefold cause, it was fitting that it should have in its substance and will measure, species, and order. It was therefore born to perform its works from God and according to God and for the sake of God, and this according to the measure, species, and order implanted in it.

But because it was from nothing and defectible, it could fail in acting for the sake of God, so as to do something for the sake of itself, not for the sake of God, and on this account neither from God nor according to God nor for the sake of God: and this is sin, which is destructive of measure, species, and order: which, because it is a defect, does not have an efficient cause but a deficient one, namely the defect of the created will.

But because it is a corruption, and only of the good, and every corruption exists in a corruptible thing: therefore it exists only in the good; and on this account, since the free will corrupts in itself measure, species, and order by failing from the true good, every sin insofar as it is such both is from the will as from its first origin, and is in the will as in its proper subject: which indeed the will does when, by its own defectibility, mutability, and convertibility, having spurned the unfailing and unchangeable good, it clings to a changeable good.

From which it is gathered that "sin is not the desire for evil things, but the abandonment of better things"; and therefore in the appetite of the will it is destructive of measure, species, and order, and consequently "so voluntary that if it is not voluntary, it is not sin."

With these things understood beforehand, the impiety of the Manichaeans, who posit a supremely evil first principle of all evils, manifestly collapses. It is also apparent what the origin of evil is, and what the subject of evil is.

Chapter II.

On the temptation of the first parents.

To understand, moreover, how the corruption of sin entered the world, it is necessary to consider the fall of the first parent, the transmission of original guilt, and the origin or root of actual sin.

Concerning the fall, therefore, of the first parent, these three things present themselves for our consideration, namely the diabolical temptation, the guilt committed, and the punishment inflicted.

Concerning the temptation, these things are to be held: that when God had established man in the happiness of paradise in both sexes, namely male and female, the devil, envying man, having assumed the form of a serpent, attacked the woman—first by questioning: Why has God commanded you not to eat? second by asserting: You shall not die at all: third by promising: You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil: wishing by this temptation to cast down the weaker woman and through her afterwards to overthrow the male sex; which indeed he did, the Lord permitting.

The reason, moreover, for understanding the aforesaid is this: because, just as the first principle is most powerful in producing, so also it is most upright in governing; and therefore "the things which He created, He so administers as nevertheless to allow them to exercise their own movements." Since, therefore, man had been so made that through victory in battle he might attain the reward of eternal rest, although God knew that man would succumb to temptation, He nevertheless ought to have permitted man to be tempted by one who knew how, was able, and wished to do so.

Since, therefore, the devil, who formerly was knowing and upright, by falling through pride became crafty and envious—and therefore through envy wished to tempt and through cunning knew how— he therefore tempted insofar as he was able, and God permitted it. That he assumed the serpentine form in tempting was of divine dispensation, so that not only could his craftiness be detected, but also from that figure the diabolical craftiness in tempting might become known to all the children of Adam.

Again, that he tempted concerning the precept of discipline was likewise of divine dispensation, so that whether he was conquered or conquered, the merit of obedience or the demerit of disobedience might become known to all.

But that he began with the woman was of his own craftiness, because it is easier to cast down the less strong; whence the cunning of the enemy attacks the city from its weaker side.

Similarly, the manner in which he proceeded in the temptation was of great cunning, because he proceeded by testing, impelling, and enticing. For he conducted his test through questioning, he impelled through assurance, and he enticed through promise. For first he questioned about the reason for the commandment, so that he might lead reason into doubt; second, doubt having been established—Lest perhaps we die—he gave assurance, so that he might lead the irascible power into contempt; third, he promised, so that he might lead the concupiscible power into desire, and thus by these three modes might draw the freedom of choice to consent, which faculty belongs to reason and will, embracing nonetheless the three aforesaid powers: the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible; with respect to which the devil enticed the woman through a threefold desirable object, namely through knowledge, which is desirable to the rational power; through excellence after the manner of God, which is desirable to the irascible power; through the sweetness of the tree, which is desirable to the concupiscible power. And thus he tempted everything that was temptable in the woman, through everything by which she could be led into temptation, which is the threefold desirable object of the world, namely the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life; according to which three things the origin of every temptation is discerned, whether from the world, or from the flesh, or from the devil.

Chapter III.

On the transgression of the first parents.

Concerning the fault of the first parents, these things are to be held: that the woman, consenting to the diabolic temptation, desired knowledge and excellence after the manner of God, and desired no less to experience the sweetness of the forbidden tree; and at length she fell into transgression of the precept. - Nor content with this, by offering the fruit of the forbidden tree, she led the man, who, unwilling to grieve his delights, did not correct the woman, but rather gave consent to her evil persuasion; and by tasting the offered fruit, he became a transgressor of the divine commandment.

Now the reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: since from the first principle, as was said above, there had been given to man a twofold sense and appetite with respect to the twofold book and with respect to the twofold good, so that according to the freedom of the will man could turn to either, the woman, having heard the exterior suggestion of the serpent, did not have recourse to the interior book, which renders itself legible to the right judgment of reason, but kept her sense fixed upon the exterior book and began to occupy herself with the exterior good. And because her sense did not approach the infallible truth, her appetite began to turn toward the mutable good. She therefore desired what the devil promised, and thus she consented to do what he suggested. By desiring excellent knowledge, therefore, she was raised up into pride; and raised up into pride, by this very thing she was enticed to gluttony; and through this she was thirdly cast down by disobedience. The first was in the mind, the second in sensuality, the third in action.

And just as the temptation, beginning from the lower part, reached all the way to the highest, since from hearing through desire it came to consent, so conversely the disorder, beginning from the higher part, reached all the way to the lowest and produced one consummated sin, which in human nature is the beginning of all sin and the origin of evils.

For the woman, having been enticed, enticed the man, who, similarly turned toward the exterior book and toward the mutable good, esteeming too highly the companionship of the woman and the solace of her society, was unwilling either to correct the woman or to grieve his own delights. And since he ought to have corrected her and did not correct her, therefore the sin of the woman is imputed to him. But because he was unwilling to grieve his own delights by repelling the woman from himself, he began to love himself excessively, and through this, withdrawing from divine friendship, he fell into gluttony and disobedience.

The transgression of the precept was therefore common to both, although from different causes, for it was not the man, but the woman who was deceived; in both, however, namely in the man and the woman, there was a disordering from the highest to the lowest, because first in the mind or in reason, then in sensuality, and lastly in deed. For each was prostrated through disobedience and enticed through gluttony, because each was raised up in pride: the woman indeed by desiring and pursuing what she had not yet received, the man by excessively loving and prizing what he already had; whence the woman believed she would be exalted by eating, but Adam, thinking himself something great and dear to God, believed he would be punished less severely. For he had not yet experienced the rigor of divine severity.

And thus each, while inordinately raising himself above himself, fell miserably below himself, from the state of innocence and grace to the state of guilt and misery.

Chapter IV.

On the punishment of the first parents.

Concerning the punishment inflicted upon the first parents, this must be held: that the man and the woman immediately after their fault felt the penalty of rebellion and shame in the flesh; and therefore to cover their shameful parts they made for themselves loincloths. - Afterwards, by divine judgment, the man incurred the penalty of labor and anguish, the penalty of hunger and want, the penalty of death and dissolution into dust, as Scripture says: Cursed is the earth in your work, etc. - But for the woman the punishment was doubled, because there was inflicted upon her the penalty of manifold hardships in conception, the penalty of pains in childbirth, and also the penalty of subjection to the man in married life; and through this, as it appears, that sin was punished quite severely—namely, the eating of the forbidden tree—even though it was easily committed.

The reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: since the First Principle is most provident in governing and most upright in presiding, it leaves nothing whatsoever disordered in the universe; and since fault is rightly ordered through punishment, therefore immediately in the first parents the disgrace of sin was followed by the dignity of judgment, so that what was disordered by falling from the order of nature might fall immediately into the order of justice. For this twofold order so embraces all things that what falls from the one relapses into the other.

Since therefore each parent, by being proud in mind and tasting in the flesh, was disobedient to their superior, by the just judgment of God it came about that their inferior became disobedient to them, especially with respect to those parts according to which there is the union of both sexes, which are the members serving the generative power. And because this was in them not from nature but from their own fault, therefore they were ashamed and covered themselves.

Again, because the man, having despised the supreme delectable, sought to delight in the flesh, therefore by the just judgment of God there was inflicted upon him labor and the want of hunger and thirst.

Finally, because on account of the good of the flesh he chose to be separated from the good of the mind, therefore by the just judgment of God the soul is unwillingly separated from the flesh through death and incineration—and through this, just as God had given to man according to the order of nature a body subject to the soul, capable of propagation without lust, capable of sustenance without failing, incapable of change without death intervening, so, when man sinned, according to the order of justice it came about that He withdrew all the aforesaid and inflicted their opposites: so that fault might not remain unpunished and disordered, which divine providence ought in no way to permit.

And since from the woman sin took its beginning, therefore her punishment is doubled. For because she was proud in mind, she incurred subjection; because she saw and desired the tree as sweet to eat, she incurred pain; finally, because she broke the yoke of obedience, she incurred the bond and burden of manifold hardship.

And thus it is clear with what order the manifold punishments were inflicted by divine providence upon the man and doubled in the woman, so that "the disgrace of sin would not be without the beauty of justice."

Chapter V.

On the corruption of original sin.

After the fall of the first parent, some things must be said about the transmission of original sin. Concerning which, first the mode of corruption must be considered, second the mode of transmission, third the mode of healing.

The mode by which the human race is corrupted through original sin is as follows. For everyone begotten through intercourse is born by nature a child of wrath, because deprived of the rectitude of original justice; on account of whose absence we incur with respect to the soul a fourfold penalty, namely weakness, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence; which four are inflicted on account of original sin: which spiritual penalties are indeed accompanied in the body by manifold suffering, manifold deficiency, manifold toil, manifold disease, and manifold pain. To these penalties follows the penalty of death and reduction to ashes, the penalty of the lack of the vision of God and the loss of heavenly glory, not only in adults, but also in unbaptized children: who indeed are punished with "the mildest penalty" among all the rest, because they have only the penalty of loss without the penalty of sense.

The reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: because, since the first principle does all things from itself and according to itself and for itself, it is necessary that it be most good and most upright, and thereby most merciful and most just: and hence it is that all his ways are mercy and truth, or judgment. But if God had from the beginning created man in such great miseries, there would be neither mercy nor justice, namely that he would oppress his own work with such great misery, with no preceding fault. Similarly, if he were to fill us with such great miseries, or permit us to be filled, without fault, divine providence would govern us neither mercifully nor justly. If therefore it is most certain that the first principle is most upright and most clement both in producing and in providing: it is necessary that he so made the human race that from the beginning there was in it neither fault nor misery; it is also necessary that he so governs that he does not permit misery to be in us except on account of some preceding fault. Since therefore it is most certain that from our origin we contract manifold misery of punishment, it is certain that we are all born by nature children of wrath, and thereby deprived of the rectitude of original justice, which privation we call original fault.

And because every fault denotes a withdrawal from the unchangeable good and an approach toward the changeable good: and to withdraw from the unchangeable good is to withdraw from the highest power, truth, and goodness: but to approach the changeable good is to tend toward it through love more than is due: hence it is that one who loses original justice incurs weakness, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence.

Again, because one who abandons the unchangeable good for the sake of a changeable good becomes unworthy of both: hence it is that by reason of the lack of original justice, the soul loses temporal rest in the body through manifold corruption and death, and at last is separated from the vision of eternal light, losing the felicity of glory both in soul and in body.

Finally, because the lack of this justice in those being born is not through a movement of their own will nor through actual delight: hence it is that to original sin there is not owed after this life a punishment of sense in hell, for the reason that divine justice, which is always accompanied by superabundant mercy, does not punish above what is deserved, but below it.

This must be believed to have been the view of blessed Augustine, although his words outwardly, on account of his detestation of the error of the Pelagians, who granted them some measure of felicity, may seem to sound otherwise. For in order to lead them back to the mean, he inclined more abundantly toward the extreme.

Chapter VI.

On the transmission of original sin.

Now the mode of transmission of original sin is this: that although the soul is not from propagation, nevertheless original guilt passes from the soul of Adam to the souls of his posterity through the medium of the flesh generated through concupiscence, so that, just as the flesh of Adam was infected by the sinning soul and made prone to lust, so the flesh, sown through lust and carrying with it the vitiated infection, infects and vitiates the soul; which infection in the soul is not only punishment, but also guilt. And thus the person corrupts nature, and corrupted nature corrupts the person, divine justice being preserved in all things, to which the infection of the soul can in no way be imputed, although He infuses it by creating and by infusing unites it with infected flesh.

Now the reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: because, since the first principle made man in His own image for the expression of Himself, He so constituted him on the part of the body that all men would be propagated from the first man as from one radical principle; and so on the part of the soul, that on account of the expressed likeness, both in being and enduring as well as in understanding and loving, all rational spirits would emanate immediately from God Himself as from the first and immediate principle. And since the spirit, as the more excellent, approaches nearer to the first principle, God so constituted man that the spirit would preside over the body, and the body would be subject to the created spirit, so long as it obeyed the uncreated Spirit; and conversely, if the spirit did not obey God, by the just judgment of God his body would begin to rebel against him: which indeed happened when Adam sinned.

Therefore, just as, if Adam had stood firm, his body would have been obedient to the spirit, and he would have transmitted such a body to his posterity, and God would have infused a soul into it, so that, united to an immortal body obedient to it, it would have possessed the order of justice and immunity from all punishment: so, from the time that Adam sinned and the flesh was made rebellious to the spirit, it is necessary that he transmit such flesh to his posterity, and that God infuse the soul according to the primary institution; but the soul, when it is united to rebellious flesh, incurs a defect in the order of natural justice, by which it was bound to rule over all inferior things. And because the soul is united to the flesh, it is necessary that it draw the flesh, or be drawn by it; and because it cannot draw the flesh as rebellious, it is necessary that it be drawn by it and incur the disease of concupiscence. And thus it incurs at once the lack of due justice and the disease of concupiscence; from which two, as from aversion and conversion, original sin is said to be constituted, according to Augustine and Anselm.

Since therefore it was most well-ordered that human nature should be so created, and that once created it should be so propagated, and that once sinning it should be so punished, as was said before, such that in creation the order of wisdom is preserved; in propagation, the order of nature; in punishment, the order of justice: it is clear that it is not against divine justice if fault is transmitted to posterity.

Again, because original fault could not be transfused into the soul unless the punishment of rebellion in the flesh preceded; and there would be no punishment unless fault had preceded; nor did fault proceed from an ordered will, but from a disordered one, and thereby not from the divine will, but from the human: it is therefore clear that the transfusion of original sin is from the sin of the first man, not from God, not from created nature, but from the vice committed. And thus what Augustine says is true, that "original sin is not transmitted to posterity by propagation, but by concupiscence."

Chapter VII.

On the cure of original sin.

Finally, the manner of the cure of original sin is this: that the fault is so cured that temporal punishment remains, as is evident in baptized infants; it is so cured with respect to the guilt of eternal punishment that it remains with respect to the act and movement of concupiscence; it is so cured in the parent that nonetheless original sin is transmitted to the offspring by him who has been cured through baptism; the stain of original sin is so removed that the aftermath remains, against which one must fight as long as we live in this life, because concupiscence is utterly extinguished in no one through common grace—which I say on account of the most blessed Virgin, in whom it was extinguished at the conception of the Son of God through a singular grace.

Now the reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: because, just as the infection is derived in all from a created principle, from which the propagation of bodies comes about, and this from the lower part, namely the flesh, so the cure must come about from an uncreated principle, from which the infusion of souls comes about, and this from the higher part, namely the mind. Since therefore from the part of the mind there is distinction among human beings, such that according to it one is not propagated from another, but proceeds immediately from God, curative grace, infused by God into our mind, regards each one insofar as he holds the character of a singular and individual person, not insofar as he holds the character of a producer according to the power of nature. Because therefore original sin is a disease infecting the person equally and nature—the person in the will, nature in the flesh—therefore the original stain is so cured in the mind that the infection and aftermath remain in the flesh.

And because man generates not insofar as he is cured in mind, but insofar as he is corrupted in flesh, not insofar as he is spiritual, but insofar as he is carnal, hence it is that although he is baptized and thus cleansed from original sin in himself, he nonetheless transmits original sin to his offspring.

Again, because the guilt of eternal punishment regards the deformity of the mind and person, while the movement regards the inclination of the flesh and nature, therefore original sin passes away through baptism with respect to guilt and remains with respect to act.

Lastly, because temporal affliction regards the condition on the part of the flesh, since the flesh always remains subject to a certain infection, it must always remain subject to penality: and therefore, just as penality and corruption are not removed from the flesh through grace, so that consequence, namely concupiscence and the languor of the members, can coexist with curative grace. And therefore, although it is gradually diminished, yet because the root is not removed, it is never entirely taken away in the wayfarer except in the most blessed Virgin through a singular grace. For because the Virgin conceived him who was the expiation of all fault, therefore a singular grace was given to her, by which all concupiscence was extinguished in her at the root, so that she might conceive the Son of God without any stain and corruption of sin. "For it was fitting that that Virgin should shine with a purity than which no greater beneath God can be conceived, to whom God the Father so disposed to give his only Son—whom, begotten from his own heart and equal to himself, he loved as himself—that he would be by nature one and the same Son common to God the Father and the Virgin; and whom the Son himself chose to make substantially his mother; and from whom the Holy Spirit willed and was about to bring it about that he from whom he himself proceeded would be conceived and born."

Chapter VIII.

On the origin of actual sins.

After what has been said concerning the transmission of original sin, some things must be said concerning the origin of actual sin.

Concerning the origin therefore of actual sin, these things are to be held in summary: that actual sin draws its origin from the free will of each person through suggestion, delight, consent, and action, according to that passage in James 1: Each one is tempted, being drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence; then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; and sin, when it is consummated, begets death.

If, however, suggestion and delight stop short of consent, it is a venial sin. — But if consent and action follow in those things which are prohibited by divine law, the sin is a consummated mortal sin.

But if it happens in a middle way, such that there is consent without action, either because one wills to proceed to action but cannot — then the will is reckoned as the deed, nor is one less culpable than if one were caught in the very act; or because one does not will to proceed to action, but wills to take inward pleasure in the delight — and then the woman eats, but not the man: and although the sin is not fully consummated, it is nevertheless to be counted among mortal sins, because when the woman eats, the whole man deserves to be condemned; which is to be understood especially in carnal sins.

Now the reason for understanding the aforesaid is this. Since sin denotes a withdrawal of the will from the First Principle, insofar as the will is made to be moved by Him, according to Him and for His sake; every sin is a disorder of the mind or will, around which virtue and vice are naturally found. Actual sin, therefore, is an actual disorder of the will. Now this disorder is either so great that it destroys the order of justice; and in this way it is called mortal sin, because it is apt to take away life, by separating the soul from God, through whom the just soul is given life; or it is so slight that it does not destroy that order, but disturbs it in some respect; and then it is called venial sin, because from it we can quickly obtain pardon, since through it grace is not taken away, nor is divine enmity incurred. Now the order of justice is that the unchangeable good be preferred to the changeable good, that the virtuous good be preferred to the useful, that the will of God be preferred to one's own will, and that the judgment of right reason preside over sensuality. And since the law of God commands this order and forbids the opposite; when the changeable good is preferred to the eternal, and the useful good is preferred to the virtuous, and our will is preferred to the divine will, and the sensual appetite is preferred to right reason: then mortal sin is committed, of which Ambrose says that it is "a transgression of the divine law and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Now this is committed whether what the divine law commands is omitted or what it forbids is done: from which arises a twofold kind of sin, namely omission and commission.

But when the changeable good is loved more than is due, yet is not preferred to the unchangeable; and utility is not preferred to virtue; and our will is loved more than is due, yet not preferred to the divine will; and the flesh desires inordinately, yet is not preferred to the judgment of right reason: then it is not mortal but venial, because, although this is beside the law, it is not directly against the law. Now the sensual appetite is not preferred to right reason unless reason consents to it: and therefore mortal sin is not committed without consent.

If, however, sensuality is moved in a disordered way, since that disorder inclines toward evil, even though reason does not consent: it is still some sin, because in some way it injures the order of justice. — And because in the state of innocence sensuality was not moved except according to the motion of reason: therefore, while man stood upright, there could be no venial sin there. — But now, because sensuality rebels against reason, whether we will it or not: therefore we necessarily commit some venial sin through first movements, which, although they can be avoided individually and one by one, nevertheless cannot all be guarded against; because they are sins in such a way that they are also punishments of sin: and therefore they are rightly called venial, because by this very fact they are worthy of pardon.

But because reason is not compelled to consent to these things, if after the sense of delight there is consent to the deed: then there is full consent, and thereby sin is consummated, because it has reached the man, that is, the supreme part of reason, upon which the fullness of consent depends.

But because there is consent not only to the deed, but also to the delight, in which the inferior portion follows sensuality: therefore, if in sensual delight reason succumbs to sensuality, the woman obeys the serpent, and thereby there occurs a subversion of right order, and thus a subversion of justice; on account of which mortal sin is committed, although less grave, which is imputed not only to the woman, but also to the man, by whom the woman ought to have been restrained and held back, lest she obey the serpent. - And thus it is clear that in the perpetration of every actual sin there occurs a certain imitation of the first sin, according to the explanation of the preeminent Doctor, namely Augustine, in the twelfth book of On the Trinity.

Chapter IX.

On the origin and distinction of the capital sins.

Next we must descend to the origin of sins in particular: among which some are capital, some penal, some final or irremissible, as if first, middle, and last.

Concerning the origin of the capital sins, this is to be held in summary: that of actual sins there is one beginning, a twofold root, a threefold fuel, and a sevenfold head or capital sin.

There is one beginning, namely pride, according to what is written: The beginning of all sin is pride: a twofold root, namely fear wrongly humbling and love wrongly inflaming: a threefold fuel, according to the three things that are in the world, namely the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life; and a sevenfold head, namely pride, envy, wrath, sloth, avarice, gluttony, and lust. Among which the five preceding are spiritual sins, while the last two are carnal.

Now the reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: because, since mortal sin is an actual departure from the First Principle, and departure from the First Principle cannot occur except through contempt of Him, either in Himself or in His commandment, and contempt of the First Principle is pride: it is therefore necessary that every mortal fault or offense take its beginning from pride.

But because no one despises the Supreme Principle, or His commandment in itself, except by reason of something else that he either wishes to acquire or fears to lose: hence it is necessary that every actual sin draw its origin from a twofold root, namely fear and love; which are roots of evils, though not equally primary.

For every fear has its origin from love: for no one fears to lose something unless he loves to have it; and therefore fear is nourished by those things by which love too is nourished. Now disordered love regards a changeable good: and since that is threefold: interior, namely excellence: exterior, money: inferior, carnal wantonness: hence it is necessary that there be three radical fuels of actual sins, which were touched upon above, toward which when the soul is carried in a disordered manner, all actual sins arise.

And because this happens according to a sevenfold manner, therefore there are seven capital sins, from which the universality of vices is generated. For our will is either disordered because it desires what is not to be desired, or because it shuns what is not to be shunned.

If one desires what is not to be desired, namely a good as of now, or a changeable or apparent good: it is either interior, and thus it is private excellence, which pride loves; or it is exterior, and thus it is sufficiency, which avarice loves; or inferior, and thus either delectable because it serves the conservation of the individual, and thus it is nourishment, which is delectable according to taste and is desired by gluttony; or because it serves the conservation of the species, and thus it is sexual union, which is delectable according to touch and is desired by lust.

If, however, the will is disordered because it flees what is not to be fled, this can occur in three ways, according to the threefold mode of fleeing. For it either flees according to the perverse instinct of the rational power, and thus it is envy; or according to the instinct of the irascible power, and thus it is wrath; or according to the instinct of the concupiscible power, and thus it is sloth. Whence, because there are four principal objects of desire and three powers according to whose instinct there is flight, therefore the capital sins are seven in number.

Furthermore, because the perception of a desirable thing is accompanied by delight, while the perception of a thing to be fled is accompanied by pain, it follows that four have joined to them joy, while the other three have joined to them sorrow and suffering; yet all are called capital because they are principal disorders and principles that in their own way give rise to many other disorders. Whence, although some of these principally regard flight, they nevertheless also have their own delights. For envy wishes to possess a private good without a companion, and thus integrally; wrath without an adversary, and thus imperturbably; sloth without any labor, and thus indefatigably. And because they do not easily obtain this, they therefore drag with them a great army of vices for attaining those things which they desire, or for avoiding those things which they reject, in respect of which they are called capital sins, as it were heads, from which very many others flow.

Chapter X.

On the origin and quality of penal sins.

Concerning penal sins, this must be held: that although the evil of fault and the evil of punishment are different species of evil, nevertheless certain things are sins in such a way that they are also the punishment of sin.

For in a special manner, those are called sins and punishments of sin which have joined to them sorrow and sadness, such as envy, sloth, and the like.

Less specially, those are so called which have joined to them either the mere depravation of nature or disgrace, as are those with respect to which the sinner is said to be given over to a reprobate mind.

But generally, sins which "are between the first apostasy and the final punishment of hell can be called both sins and the punishment of sin," according to what Gregory says, that crimes are punished by crimes.

Although the same thing may be called both sin and the punishment of sin, it must nevertheless be held that every punishment insofar as it is punishment is just and from God; but no fault is just nor from God, but only from the free choice of the will.

Now punishment which is merely punishment is inflicted by God; but that which is fault, or inclining toward fault, is either contracted or committed.

The reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: since evil denotes a departure from the first principle by the fact that it harms the good, and it does not harm the good except by taking something away from the good, and the good consists in measure, species, and order, there is no evil that is not corruptive of measure, species, and order. Now order is twofold, namely the order of nature and the order of justice. The order of nature is in the natural good, the order of justice in the moral good; and because the natural good is in every nature, while the moral good must consist in the will, therefore the order of nature is in every nature, but the order of justice consists in the elective will. And because the will "is an instrument moving itself," while nature is not at all, hence it is that the order of justice is an order not only made but also making; while the order of nature is an order made. Since, therefore, evil can deprive the order of justice and the order of nature, hence it is that evil is twofold, namely of fault and of punishment.

Again, because the order of justice is a voluntary order, hence it is that "the evil of fault is a voluntary condition, while the evil of punishment is an involuntary condition."

Finally, because the order of justice, which is in the will, is an order that is making, therefore "the evil of fault, which is its privation, is the evil that we do, and the evil of punishment is the evil that we suffer." And because there is no suffering unless action naturally precedes it, nor any action which some suffering does not follow, hence it is that there is no punishment without a preceding merit of fault, nor is there any fault that is not accompanied by some punishment.

And since what we do is from ourselves, while what we suffer can be from ourselves and from others, namely from a superior or an inferior cause: therefore, although every fault is from ourselves, not every punishment is from ourselves; rather, some is enacted by us, some inflicted, and some contracted.

And because it is just that he who does what he ought not should suffer what he ought, therefore every punishment insofar as it is punishment is just and from divine providence, because it is ordered to fault and is itself the ordering of that fault.

But because that suffering can be through the removal of a natural good, or of a moral good together with a natural one: hence it is that some punishment is merely punishment, while some is both punishment and fault: because a moral good, which is justice, is not removed except through injustice, which is fault.

The first punishment, therefore, is from God both insofar as it is punishment and insofar as it is what it is: from God, I say, not as instituting, but as vindicating. The second, however, since it is fault, insofar as it is what it is, is not from God, but only with respect to its ordering. And this itself is either enacted, if it follows upon actual sin, or contracted, if it follows upon original sin.

If, therefore, evil is taken properly, insofar as it is a privation of a natural good and an involuntary affliction and an evil that we suffer: thus it does not coincide with the evil of fault in the same subject, although it is annexed to it. But if it is taken broadly, so that whatever we suffer is called evil, whether from ourselves or from elsewhere, whether in nature or in the will: thus they coincide in the same subject, but not to the same end, or according to the same aspect: because what is fault in itself is called the punishment of a preceding fault; or: what is fault by reason of action is said to be punishment by reason of suffering.

And thus it is clear how, to what extent, and why something is simultaneously called sin and the punishment of sin.

Chapter XI.

On the origin of final sins, which are sins against the Holy Spirit.

Concerning final or irremissible sins, of which kind are sins against the Holy Spirit, the following must be held: that although every sin generally is against the triune and one God, yet by appropriation a certain sin is said to be against the Father, another against the Son, and another against the Holy Spirit.

Now this sin against the Holy Spirit is called irremissible in this age and in the age to come, not because it cannot be forgiven in this age, but because it is rarely or scarcely forgiven in this age with respect to guilt, and little or almost no remission is made for it in the future with respect to punishment.

Now there are six species of this sin, namely: envy of fraternal grace, opposition to acknowledged truth, despair, presumption, obstinacy of mind, and final impenitence.

The reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: since sin denotes a departure from the first principle who is triune and one, every sin deforms the image of the Trinity and defiles the soul itself with respect to its threefold power, namely the irascible, the rational, and the concupiscible; and it proceeds from free choice, which bears in itself the mark of the Trinity: of the Father, by reason of capacity; of the Son, by reason of reason; and of the Holy Spirit, by reason of will.

Although these three concur together in every fault, nevertheless each of them through its own defect can be the ground of disordering the others. Now the defect regarding capacity is impotence, regarding reason is ignorance, and regarding will is malice. And hence it is that since certain sins arise from impotence, certain from ignorance, and certain from malice — and power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and will to the Holy Spirit — certain sins are said to be against the Father, certain against the Son, and certain against the Holy Spirit. And since nothing is more in the will than the will itself, and the will itself is the origin of sin, no sin is so purely and entirely voluntary as that which proceeds from a corruption existing in the will.

For since the involuntary is said in two ways, namely through violence and through ignorance — the first through defect of power, the second through defect of knowledge — when the will by its own corruption alone, although it can resist and knows this to be evil, chooses something, then it is said to sin from deliberate malice; and such a sin proceeds purely from the wickedness of the will of free choice and directly assails the grace of the Holy Spirit.

And because it proceeds purely from freedom of choice, it therefore has no color of excuse, and for this reason little or almost nothing of the punishment ought to be relaxed for the one who is punished. Because indeed it directly assails the grace of the Holy Spirit, through which the remission of sin is accomplished, it is therefore called irremissible, not because it can in no way be remitted, but because, as far as it is in itself, it directly assails the medicine and remedy through which the remission of sin is accomplished.

And since the remission of sin is accomplished by God through penitential grace within ecclesiastical unity, the differences of this sin are taken according as they directly assail those three things. For they either assail penitential grace itself in itself; or in relation to God, from whom it is given; or in relation to the Church, in which it is received. If in relation to the unity of the Church: since the unity of the Church consists in faith and charity, that is, in grace and truth, there is thus a twofold sin, namely envy of fraternal grace and assailing of acknowledged truth.

If in relation to God who gives: since all His ways with respect to justification are especially mercy and truth, there is thus a twofold sin: one, namely, which assails mercy, and this is despair; another, which assails justice, and this is presumption of impunity. — But if it assails penitential grace itself in itself or according to itself, it is thus twofold: because penitential grace causes one to recoil from sins committed and to guard against sins to be committed. Against the first is obstinacy of mind; against the second is final impenitence, insofar as final impenitence means the resolution not to repent; for thus it is a species of sin against the Holy Spirit. But insofar as final impenitence denotes the continuation of sin unto the end, it is thus the consequence of all mortal sins that are not remitted in this life, and especially of all species of sin against the Holy Spirit.

And thus every sin takes its beginning from pride and has its consummation or end in final impenitence; and whoever arrives at this falls into hell, from which no one sinning mortally can be delivered unless the grace of Christ the Mediator intervenes. And therefore the whole company of those to be saved desired His incarnation — to which Mediator, our Lord, be all honor and glory forever and ever. Amen.