Collation 4

English

Latin

A. First Treatise on the First Vision, Which is by Means of Understanding Naturally Given

400 First Treatise on the First Vision, Which Is by Means of Understanding Naturally Given

COLLATIO IV DE VISIONE PRIMA, QUAE EST INTELLIGENTIAE PER NATURAM INDITAE TRACTATIO PRIMA

1. God Said to See Because Because He Makes Us See

2. Truth is the Light of the Soul

1. GOD saw that the light was good. God separated the light from the darkness, etc. After every one of the works of the six days, with the exception of the second, it is said: God saw that it was good. And at the end: God saw that all He had made was very good. God is said to see, because He makes us see. ¹ The first vision of the soul is by means of understanding naturally given. Hence in the Psalm: The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. And here all the difficulties of philosophy could be explained. The philosophers have offered nine sciences and promised a tenth: contemplation.! But many philosophers, while attempting to avoid the darkness of error, have themselves become involved in major errors. While professing to be wise, they have become fools. Because they boasted of their knowledge, these philosophers have become the likes of Lucifer. With the Egyptians was the densest darkness, but with Your saints was the greatest light. All those who properly followed the Law of Nature, the patriarchs, the prophets, and the philosophers, were the sons of light. Truth is the light of the soul. This light never fails. ² Indeed, it shines so powerfully upon the soul that this soul cannot possibly believe it to be non-existing, or abstain from expressing it, without an inner contradiction. For if truth does not exist, it is true that truth does not exist: and so something is true. And if something is true, it is true that truth exists. Hence if truth does not exist, truth exists! ³ As Esdras says, truth overcomes everything.

1. Vidit Deus lucem, quod esset bona, et divisit lucem a tenebris ¹ etc. In omnibus operibus sex dierum praeterquam secundae dictum est: Vidit Deus, quod esset bonum ² ; et in fine dicit: Vidit Deus cuncta, quae fecerat, et erant valde bona ³ . Videre dicitur Deus, quia videre nos facit. Prima visio animae est intelligentiae per naturam inditae. Unde dicit Psalmus: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine ⁴ . Et hic possent explicari omnes difficultates philosophiae. Philosophi dederunt novem scientias et polliciti sunt dare decimam, scilicet contemplationem. Sed multi philosophi, dum se voluerunt dividere a tenebris erroris, magnis erroribus se immiscuerunt; dicentes enim, se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt ⁵ ; superbientes de sua scientia, luciferiani facti. Apud Aegyptios densissimae tenebrae erant, sed Sanctis tuis maxima erat lux. Omnes, qui fuerunt in lege naturae, ut Patriarchae, Prophetae, philosophi, filii lucis fuerunt. -- Lux animae veritas est; haec lux nescit occasum. Ita enim fortiter irradiat super animam, ut etiam non possit cogitari non esse nec exprimi, quin homo sibi contradicat: quia, si veritas non est, verum est, veritatem non esse: ergo aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, verum est, veritatem esse: ergo si veritas non est, veritas est. Super omnia enim praevalet veritas ⁶ , ut dicitur in Esdra.

2. Now, this light sends out three primary radiations, hence in Ecclesiasticus: The sun, three times as much, burneth the mountains. There is, indeed, a truth of things, a truth of signs or words and a truth of behavior. The truth of things is indivision between existence and essence, the truth of words is equality between expression and understanding, the truth of behavior is the rectitude of a morally good life. And these three are the three parts of philosophy which the philosophers did not invent, since they are: but because they already existed in the order of truth, they became the concern of the soul, as Augustine explains. ⁴

2. Emittit autem haec lux tres radios primos; unde in Ecclesiastico: Tripliciter sol exurens montes ¹ . Est enim veritas rerum, veritas signorum seu vocum et veritas morum. Veritas rerum est indivisio entis et esse, veritas sermonum est adaequatio vocis et intellectus, veritas morum est rectitudo vivendi. Et istae sunt tres partes philosophiae, quas philosophi non invenerunt, ut essent; sed quia iam secundum veritatem essent, in anima adverterunt, secundum Augustinum.

3. This threefold radiation may be considered from the viewpoint of the originating principle, from that of the receiving subject, and from that of the object in which it terminates. For it concerns the originating principles in terms of the three causes: the primary (efficient), the exemplar (formal), and the final: For from Him and through Him and unto Him are all things. Hence truth indicates that our mind is carried by a natural inclination to the supreme Truth in that it is the cause of being, the reason of understanding and the norm of life. ⁵ From the cause of being comes forth the truth of things; from the reason of understanding, the truth of words; from the norm of life, the truth of moral behavior.

3. Haec triplex veritas consideratur ex parte principii originantis, ex parte subiecti suscipientis et ex parte obiecti terminantis. Respicit autem originans principium in ratione triplicis causae: originantis, exemplantis et terminantis; nam ex ipso, per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia*. Ergo veritas indicat, quod mens nostra fertur naturali inclinatione ad Veritatem, secundum quod est «causa essendi, ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi»: secundum causam essendi, veritas rerum; secundum rationem intelligendi, veritas vocum; secundum ordinem vivendi, veritas morum.

4. On the part of the soul [the receiving subject], every radiation of truth over our power of understanding comes about in one of three ways: it shines upon it absolutely, and then refers to things to be seen; or in relation to the interpretative faculty, and then consists in the truth of words; or in relation to the affective or motive faculty, and then it is the truth of things to be done.

4. Ex parte autem animae omnis irradiatio veritatis super intelligentiam nostram fit tripliciter: aut fit super ipsam absolute, et sic pertinet ad notitiam rerum speculandarum; aut in comparatione ad interpretativam, et sic est veritas vocum; aut in comparatione ad affectivam et motivam, et sic est veritas operabilium.

5. It is the same as regards the object. Everything that exists depends upon essence, reason, or will. The first leads to the knowledge of things, the second to the knowledge of words, and the third to the knowledge of behavior. Hence, in relation to the principle, to the subject, and to the object, there is in the soul a threefold radiation of truth through which the soul may be lifted up to eternal matters and also to the cause of all. But if the spice of faith is „ added, things become easier: the cause of being is then attributed to the Father, the reason of understanding to the Son, and the norm of life to the Holy Spirit.

5. Ex parte obiecti sic. Omne, quod est, aut est a natura, aut a ratione, aut a voluntate. Secundum primam est notitia, quae est de rebus, secundo modo de sermonibus, tertio modo de moribus. -- Ergo secundum principium, subiectum et obiectum est triplex radius veritatis in anima, per quem anima possit elevari ad perpetua, et etiam ad causam omnium; sed si addatur condimentum fidei, tunc facilius; ut causa essendi attribuatur Patri, ratio intelligendi Filio, ordo vivendi Spiritui sancto.

6. In so far as the vision of understanding naturally given is turned toward things, it is truth. But the soul wants the whole world to be described within itself. ⁶ Now the world may be considered in three ways: in terms of essence, quantity, and nature. And so this radiation leads to the study of hidden differences between quiddities, to the manifest proportions of numbers, and to the properties containing a mixture of both which are found in natures. The consideration of natures is mixed, for at times it concerns causes, which are hidden, for instance, why is fire warm, why is this herb spicy, for they have such qualities from their species which is hidden. At other times, it concerns quality, or again quantity and the influence of other bodies which are sometimes visible and at other times hidden.

6. Visio ergo intelligentiae per naturam inditae, ut convertitur ad res, est veritas. Vult autem anima totum mundum describi in se. Mundus consideratur tripliciter: quantum ad essentiam, figuram et naturam. Iste autem radius dirigit ad quidditatum differentias occultas considerandas, ad figurarum proportiones manifestas, ad naturarum proprietates ex utroque permixtas. Naturalis permixta est consideratio, quia modo de causis, quae sunt occultae, ut quare ignis calidus, quare haec herba calida, quia hoc habent a specie sua, quae occulta est; modo de qualitate, item de quantitate et influentia corporum, quae aliquando patent, aliquando latent.

3. Six Ways of Dividing

7. There are at present six ways of dividing according to hidden differences in the quiddities: that is, into substance and accident, universal and particular, potency and act, one and many, simple and composite, cause and caused. These are six lights that prepare the soul for knowledge and valid perception.

7. Secundum quidditatum differentias occultas fit divisio sex modis ad praesens: in substantiam et accidens, in universale et particulare, in potentiam et actum, in unum et multa, in simplex et compositum, in causam et in causatum. Haec sunt sex lumina, quae disponunt animam ad sciendum et bene sentiendum.

a. Substance and Accident

8. The division into substance and accident is obvious. ⁷ But what are the things that may be included in it? Here there is the greatest error. For one man says that creation does not exist. Why? Because it is impossible that accident precede substance. Now creation is an accident. Hence, etc. I say that creation, in so far as it is the receiving of an effect is not an accident, because the relation of the creature to the Creator is not accidental, but essential. Likewise, the potency of matter is not an accident of matter, but is essential to it, for "by the very fact that it exists, it does so with a disposition toward something else." ⁸ Likewise, differences may be reduced to the genus, as mere privations to their fulfillment.

8. Divisio substantiae et accidentis patet; sed quaedam sunt quae reducuntur ad ista, et in his est maximus error. Dicit ille: creatio non est. Quare? Quia impossibile est, accidens praecedere substantiam; creatio autem accidens est: ergo etc. Dico, quod creatio, quae est passio, accidens non est, quia relatio creaturae ad Creatorem non est accidentalis, sed essentialis. Similiter, potentia materiae non est accidens materiae, sed essentialis, quia «hoc ipso, quod est, ad alterum est». Similiter differentiae ad genus reducuntur, ut merae privationes ad suos habitus.

b. Universal and Particular

9. The second division is into universal and particular; and here again there is a major error. For some philosophers say that the universal is nothing, except in the spirit. Plato stated that it existed only in God; others, that it existed only in the soul. I say that there is a universal oneness related to multiplicity, another existing in multiplicity, and yet another exceeding multiplicity. The universal oneness related to multiplicity is found in the potency of matter, which is not fulfilled; the universal oneness existing in multiplicity is the common nature found in particular individuals; and the universal oneness that exceeds multiplicity exists in the soul. And so, the one related to the many, the one in the many, and the one exceeding the many exist in Eternal Art; and by means of this Art and for this reason oneness exists in reality. For it is clear that two men are similar, but not a man and a donkey; hence it is necessary that this likeness be founded and stabilized in some stable form: and not in some form existing in another individual, since it is particular; hence it must exist in something universal. ⁹ Now the universal principle is not contained exclusively within the soul, but exists in the object according to the process of passing from genus into species, so that we communicate first with the substance as with the most general principle, then with the other principles, until we come in contact with the final (individual) form of a man.

9. Secunda divisio est in universale et particulare; et circa hoc est magnus error. Aliqui dicunt, quod universale nihil est nisi in anima; Plato posuit, quod esset solum in Deo; alii quod solum in anima. Isti nimis abstrahunt. -- Dico ergo, quod est universale unum ad multa, unum in multis, unum praeter multa. Unum ad multa est in potentia materiae, quod non est completum; unum in multis, ut natura communis in suis particularibus; et unum praeter multa in anima. Unum autem ad multa et unum in multis et unum praeter multa in arte aeterna sunt; per illam enim artem et rationem consistit in re. Planum est enim, quod duo homines assimilantur, et non homo et asinus: ergo necesse est, ut illa similitudo fundetur et stabiliatur in aliqua forma stabili, non quae est in altero, quia illa est particularis: ergo in aliqua universali. Ratio autem universalis non est tota in anima, sed in re secundum processum generis ad speciem, ut, communicamus primo in substantia ut in generalissimo, deinde in aliis usque ad formam hominis ultimatam.

c. Potency and Act

10. The third division is into potency and act, and here there are many errors. For some philosophers say that act adds nothing to potency except a manner of being, that it stands in the same relationship to it as complete stands to incomplete. We are not speaking here of purely passive potency, but of that which proceeds to act. For since in every creature there is both active and passive potency, these two potencies must be founded on different principles within the object. ¹⁰ Now this is the power of that potency which is the seminal reason: sometimes it adds a part of being or essence, as for instance over and above the principle "body" it adds "living" in relation to a given object, but in such a way that, while the attribute "living" is something in itself, it is ordained to sensitivity. And so, over and above "living," the seminal reason or potency adds "sensible," and so forth until the level of individual man is attained. It is the same with the potencies of the soul: for as the quadrangle has one more angle than the triangle, and the pentagon one more than the quadrangle, so "sensitive" is added to "vegetative" and "rational" to "sensitive." ¹¹ But sometimes the seminal reason adds nothing more than a manner of being, if for instance it turns oneness in potency into oneness in act; it adds only a manner of being, for the "one" is not joined to matter unqualifiedly, but to matter having life rooted in itself as a potency, Hence it is unsound to propose that the final form is added to prime matter without something that is a disposition or potency towards it, or without any other intermediate form 4

10. Tertia divisio est potentiae et actus; et hic sunt multi errores; Dicunt quidam, quod actus nihil addit super potentiam nisi modum essendi secundum completum et incompletum. Non loquimur hic de potentia pure passiva, sed de illa quae procedit ad actum. Necesse est enim, cum in omni creatura potentia activa sit coniuncta potentiae passivae, quod illae duae potentiae fundentur super diversa principia rei. De potentia, quae est ratio seminalis, haec est vis: quia potentia talis super actum aliquando addit partem essendi, vel essentiae, ut, super rationem corporis addit animatum secundum rem, pro eo quod animatio aliquid est, ordinatum tamen ad sensibile; et super animatum addit sensibile, et sic usque ad hominem. Sic similiter de potentiis animae, quod sicut tetragonus addit unum angulum ad trigonum, et pentagonus ad tetragonum; sic sensitivum ad vegetativum, et rationale ad sensitivum. -- Aliquando autem addit solum modum essendi, ut, si de uno in potentia fiat unum in actu, addit solum modum essendi, quia unum non coniungitur materiae simpliciter, sed materiae habenti vitam in potentia radicali. -- Unde insanum est dicere, quod ultima forma addatur materiae primae sine aliquo, quod sit dispositio vel in potentia ad illam, vel nulla forma interiecta.

d. One and the Many

11. The fourth division is into the one and the many, and there are here a number of errors. Some philosophers claim that everything is one: as there is one matter, there is also one radical form, which is then multiplied and varied only through different manners of being. ¹² And this is nothing more than to say that the proposition: man is a donkey is true in itself but false by accident. Hence you should understand that rational and irrational differ not only accidentally, but also essentially.

11. Quarta divisio est in unum et multa, et de illa multi sunt errores. Quidam dixerunt, quod omnia sint unum; ut, sicut una est materia, ita una forma radicalis, et postmodum multiplicatur secundum modum essendi et variatur. Sed hoc nihil aliud est dicere, quam quod illa propositio: homo est asinus, sit vera per se, falsa per accidens. Unde intellige, quod rationale et irrationale non solum differunt per accidens, sed etiam essentialiter.

e. Simple and Composite

12. The fifth division is into simple and composite, and here also there are many errors, as for instance to claim that a certain creature is simple, for then it would be pure act, which is an attribute of God alone, and it is most dangerous to attribute to a creature what belongs to God. Hence, it is less dangerous to say that an angel is composite, even if it is not true, than to say that it is simple: for I attribute composition to the angel because I refuse to attribute to it what belongs to God, and this out of respect for the reverence I have toward God. But, in truth, it does seem to be composite, for Boethius says: "Form cannot be a subject." ¹³ So if the angel be pure form, nothing can happen to it in the accidental order, neither joy nor sadness.

12. Quinta divisio est in simplex et compositum; et hic etiam sunt multi errores, ut dicere, quod aliqua creatura sit simplex; quia tunc esset purus actus, quod est solius Dei; et attribuere quod est Dei creaturae periculosum est. Minus ergo est periculosum dicere, quod Angelus sit compositus, etiam si verum non sit, quam quod sit simplex; quia hoc ego attribuo Angelo, nolens ei attribuere quod est Dei, propter pietatem, quam habeo ad reverentiam Dei. Sed secundum veritatem sic videtur, quia dicit Boethius: «Forma subiectum esse non potest»: ergo Angelo nihil accideret tunc, nec laetitia nec tristitia.

f. Cause and Caused

13. The sixth division is into cause and caused, and here once more there are a multiplicity of errors. For some philosophers say that the world has existed from all eternity. Wise men agree that a thing cannot be made out of nothing, ¹⁴ and exist from all eternity. Indeed, it is necessary that, as when a being falls into nothingness, it ceases to be, so also when it comes forth from nothingness, it begins to be. But some thinkers are seen to suppose uncreated matter: and from this it would follow that God made nothing: He did not make matter since it was uncreated, and He did not make form, for it is made either out of something or out of nothing. It is not made out of matter, for the essence of the form cannot be made out of the essence of matter; nor out of nothing, since they suppose God cannot make anything out of nothing. But perish the thought that God's power depends upon a foundation of matter! These then are the foundations of faith which every man should examine.

13. Sexta divisio est in causam et causatum; et hic sunt multi errores. Quidam enim dicunt, mundum ab aeterno fuisse. In hoc conveniunt sapientes, quod non possit aliquid fieri de nihilo et sic ab aeterno; quia necesse est, quod sicut, quando res cedit in nihilum, esse desinit; sic, quando fit de nihilo, incipit esse. Sed aliqui videntur posuisse materiam ingenitam; et sic sequitur, quod Deus nihil facit: quia materiam non facit, quia ingenita; nec formam, quia aut fit de aliquo, aut de nihilo; non de materia, quia essentia formae non potest fieri de essentia materiae; nec de nihilo, ut supponunt, eo quod Deus nihil potest facere de nihilo. Sed absit, quod potentia Dei fulciatur fundamento materiae. -- Haec igitur sunt fundamenta fidei, quae omnia examinat.

14. The second radiation of understanding naturally given consists in the consideration of the manifest proportions of quantities, and these are very clear because they offer themselves to the senses, and man willingly acts upon them, for they fall under the imagination, and imagination is strong within us while reason is obscured. Therefore man is very much involved in these things. This knowledge is most certain, ¹⁵ because it is obvious to the eye, whereas all other sciences are, so to speak, occult.

14. Secunda irradiatio intelligentiae per naturam inditae est ad considerandas quantitatum proportiones manifestas; et istae sunt valde manifestae, quia offerunt se sensui; et libenter homo negotiatur circa ista, quia cadunt in imaginatione; et imaginatio est fortis in nobis, et ratio obscuratur: et ideo homo multum in his detinetur. Ista scientia certissima est, quia ad oculum patet. Unde omnes aliae scientiae praeter istam quasi sunt occultae.

15. Mathematical consideration covers six branches: mathematics, concerned with numbers in themselves, music concerned with numbers as sounds, geometry concerned with continuous quantity and general measurable proportions, perspective, which adds the line of sight, astrology which concerns both and also numeral and substantial distinctions, or continuous and discrete quantity. The latter is twofold, comprising astronomy which studies bodies in regular motion, and astrology properly so-called which is concerned with influences: and this science is partly safe and partly dangerous. It is dangerous because of the judgments that follow upon it, and because it gives birth to geomancy and necromancy and other kinds of divination. ¹⁶

15. Haec consideratio mathematica est circa sex: aut circa numeros in sua puritate, et sic est arithmetica; aut circa numeros, ut considerantur in sonis, et sic est musica; aut in quantitate continua et circa proportiones dimensivas generaliter, et sic geometria; aut per additionem de linea visuali, et sic perspectiva; aut secundum quantitatem utramque et secundum discretiones numerales et substantiales, vel continuas et discretas, et sic astrologia, et illa est duplex: una de corporibus regulatis per motum, et sic astromonia; alia de influentia, et haec partim est secura et partim periculosa, et haec est astrologia. Periculosa est propter iudicia, quae sequuntur; et ab hac fluit geomantia, vel nigromantia et ceterae species divinationis.

16. Now these sciences prepare for the understanding of Scripture, as is clear in the case of perfect numbers, and of the decreased and increasing number, ¹⁷ as it appears with the perfection of the number six, which is perfect of itself. Augustine explains: "The number six is not perfect because God created the world in this number of days; but God created the world in this number of days because it is perfect." ¹⁸ Likewise, concerning the two first cubic numbers, 8 and 27: twice two times two equal 8, and three times three times three equal 27, and they can be related through no other numbers than 12 and 18, for 12 is to 18 as 18 is to 27, in the proportion of one and a half, which contains the whole and its intermediate. The same is clear of the triangle, how it leads to the knowledge of the Trinity, for it is certain that as great as the Son is, so great is the Father, and as great as the Father is, so great are the Holy Spirit and the Son. Hence, consider the triangle each angle of which encloses the total area. Likewise, in perspective, in the case of the direct radiation of sight which is stronger and compares with the throwing of a stone: if you throw it straight down, the sound is louder; if you throw it obliquely, it is less. The reflected radiation comes from a clean and polished body, by virtue of its polish, and there it receives the species. The diffracted radiation is penetration into a transparent body.

16. Hae scientiae disponunt ad intelligentiam Scripturae, ut patet de numeris perfectis, diminuto, excrescente; ut patet de perfectione senarii, qui de se perfectus est. «Non enim, ut dicit Augustinus, senarius ideo perfectus est, quia in eo numero Deus fecit mundum; sed ideo fecit mundum in illo numero, quia perfectus est». Similiter de duobus numeris cubicis primis, scilicet 8 et 27, quia bis duo bis sunt 8; ter tria ter sunt 27, qui ligari non possunt minus quam per duos numeros, scilicet 12 et 18. Sic enim se habent 12 ad 18, ut 18 ad 27, quia in sexquialtera proportione, quae tenet totum et eius medietatem. -- Similiter patet de triangulo, quomodo ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis. Certum est enim, quod quantus est Filius, tantus est Pater; et quantus est Pater, tantus est Spiritus sanctus et Filius. Et inde triangulum considera, quod quilibet angulus totam superficiem includit. -- Similiter in perspectiva de radio directo, qui fortior est, sicut, si tu proiicias lapidem directe deorsum, magnum sonum facit; si autem ex obliquo, non tantum. Reflexus radius est a corpore terso et polito virtute tersionis, et ibi accipit speciem; radius fractus est in introitu alterius perspicui.

17. The third radiation of understanding naturally given consists in searching the mixed properties of natures, that is, those that are partly hidden and partly manifest. For the Philosopher considers all things through motion: he studies motion as such, the principles and causes of motion, as for instance place and time. ¹⁹ He studies the natures of heavenly bodies, that is, the ethereal and the meteorical; he studies bodies as elementary, vegetative, sensitive, and rational. The heavenly bodies he considers in the book "On Heaven and the World," where he reduces all motion to perfect motion, that is, to local motion. ²⁰ Now this local motion is of three kinds: either around the center, in which case there is no opposition, and this is circular motion; or away from the center, and this is the motion of light bodies; or again toward the center, and this is the motion of heavy bodies, or straight motion. The meteoric bodies he considers in the book "On Meteors," where he speaks of impressions and minerals. Concerning now the elementary bodies, he studies them in the book "On Generation and Corruption"; and the vegetative beings, he studies in the book "On Plants" where there are some marvelous considerations. Finally, he considers sensitive beings in the book "On Animals," which we do not have in full, and rational beings in the book "On the Soul" and its appendices, "On Sense and the Sensible," "On Memory and Reminiscence," "On the Spirit and the Soul," "On Sleep and Wakefulness," "On Life and Death."

17. Tertia irradiatio intelligentiae per naturam inditae est ad investigandum naturarum permixtas proprietates, scilicet partim occultas et partim manifestas. Philosophus enim considerat omnia per motum; considerat enim de motu, de principiis motus et causis, ut locus et tempus; considerat autem naturas corporum caelestium, sive corpora aetheralia, meteoricalia; elementaria, vegetabilia, sensibilia, rationabilia. -- Caelestia in libro De caelo et mundo, ubi reducit omnem motum ad motum perfectum, scilicet localem; iste autem localis est triplex: aut circa medium, ubi non est contrarietas, et sic circularis; aut a medio, et sic est levium motus; aut ad medium, et sic motus gravium, sive motus rectus. Meteorica, ut in libro Meteororum, ubi dicit de impressionibus et mineralibus. -- Si de elementaribus, sic in libro De generatione et corruptione. Si de vegetabilibus, sic in libro De plantis, ubi sunt mirabiles considerationes. -- Si autem de sensibilibus, sic in libro De animalibus, quem totum non habemus; aut de rationabilibus, ut in libro De anima cum suis appendicibus, scilicet De sensu et sensato, et De memoria et reminiscentia, De spiritu et anima, De somno et vigilia, De morte et vita.

18. The second radiation of truth provides information for the consideration of speech, arguments and methods of rational persuasion, so that by this means a man may enjoy the art of speech that properly represents the concepts of the mind, of arguments that draw the assent of every mind, and of persuasive methods that incline the dispositions of the mind. For reason thinks of making whatever is in itself to exist in another, and whatever is in another to exist within itself: and this cannot be done except by means of speech. Whatever is contained in the soul, then, is there either as a concept, as an assent, or as an affective disposition. And so, to indicate concepts, there is grammar, to induce assent, there is logic, and to move affective dispositions, there is rhetoric.

18. Secundus radius veritatis informat ad considerationem locutionum, argumentationum, persuasionum rationalium, ut homo habeat artem per eum ad locutiones congrue indicantes mentis conceptus, ad argumentationes trahentes omnis mentis assensus, ad persuasiones inclinantes mentis affectus. Ratio enim cogitat facere quidquid in se est in alio, et quidquid est in alio facere in se; hoc autem non fit nisi per sermonem. Quidquid ergo est in anima aut est per modum conceptus, aut per modum assensus aut per modum affectus. Ad indicandum conceptum est grammatica; ad inducendum assensum est logica; ad inclinandum affectum rhetorica.

19. According to the grammarian, every part of speech signifies a concept of the mind. For it has a part that signifies substance or quality, and that is the noun [and adjective] ; it has a part that signifies the mood, and that is the verb, which tells of dispositions as in the indicative mood related to the rational power, the imperative mood related to the irascible power, the optative mood related to the concupiscible power, the subjunctive mood signifying both parts, and the infinitive mood which is almost material. And according to Priscian, it is to these differences that all moods are reduced. ²¹ Likewise, the grammarian establishes the rules of the letter and syllable, of discourse and speech. For as in different languages there are different manners of signifying and terminating—as, for instance [in Latin] the terminal a generally indicating the feminine and us the masculine, and so forth—the grammarian is concerned with the rules of letters; but he cannot go down to this level except by means of the syllable. Finally, he is concerned with the interrelationship of expressions, likewise with the rules of prosody and syntax. For he expresses all things through the eight parts of speech. And so he studies the letter through the syllable, then prosody and rhythm, and these are then referred to the first. He also considers number and case, as for instance that a [singular] nominative is used with a singular verb, so that we cannot say: a man run, for from a single substance there can come but a single action. Again, he sees to it that after a transitive verb there be placed, not a noun in the nominative, but one in the accusative, which indicates something toward which the action is directed, not a principle of action as would the nominative. Hence a grammarian draws the nature from things, nor can he be a good grammarian unless he knows things.

19. Secundum grammaticum omnis pars orationis significat mentis conceptum. Habet enim partem significantem substantiam et qualitatem, et sic est nomen; habet partem significantem modum, et sic est verbum, quod dicit inclinationes, scilicet indicativa, ut in rationali; imperativus, ut in irascibili; optativa, ut in concupiscibili; subiunctivus, partem utramque; infinitivus, quasi materialis. Et ad has differentias omnes reducuntur secundum Priscianum. -- Similiter determinat de littera, syllaba, dictione, oratione. Quia enim varii sunt modi significandi et terminanda secundum diversas linguas -- ut terminatum in a, feminini generis ut in pluribus, in us, masculini generis, et sic de, aliis -- de littera determinat; sed ad hanc non potest descendere nisi per syllabam. -- Ultimo considerat de connexione dictionum. Determinat similiter de prosodia et dyasynthetica. Exprimit autem omnia per octo partes orationis. Ad litteram ergo descendit per syllabam, sed postea de prosodia et metrica, et huiusmodi referuntur ad primum. Considerat similiter modos et accidentia, ut quod nominativus construatur cum verbo singularis numeri, ut non dicatur: homo currunt, quia ab una substantia non egreditur nisi actus unus; similiter, ut post verbum transitioni non ponatur nominativus, sed accusativus, qui dicit terminum, non principium actus, ut nominativus. -- Unde grani matica a rebus naturam trahit, nec potest esse bonus grammaticus, nisi sciat res.

20. Another aspect is that which explains arguments leading to the assent of the mind. This is accomplished by a solid argumentation such as: things which are equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other. This type of argument has both a general and a special form and treat of things which are necessary and well established. Therefore we have the First Analysis and the Second Analysis which are concerned with the syllogism simply considered. They treat of the necessary syllogism which results in conclusions because of correct inference^ as in the First Analysis (or Solution), and in the Second Analysis (Solution) because of a correct inference based on the order of being. Since there cannot always be an induction based on necessary arguments, we have manners and forms of proof based on things which are probable, such as the topical proof. And then because there is room for error in such matters, there are added the sophistic manners of proving so that a man might know how to refute them. Thus one who refutes such arguments is not himself a sophist but is truly giving a response. Because these modes of argument take their origin from the nature of things (for instance, "There is smoke, therefore there was a fire" — which is a proof from effect) there are added the ten predicaments and also a treatment of statements.!

20. Alia directio est, quae illustrat ad argumentationes inducentes mentis assensum, quod fit per solidam argumentationem, ut, «quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, necessario Inter se sunt eadem». Haec argumentatio habet formam generalem et specialem in materia necessaria, solida; et ideo est prima analysis et secunda analysis de syllogismo simpliciter. De syllogismo necessario, id est resolutorio in causam inferendi, ut in prima analysi, id est resolutione, et in secunda analysi, id est resolutione in causam inferendi et essendi. -- Et quia semper non potest esse inductio per necessariam argumentationem, ideo inveniuntur loci et habitudo localis, quae procedit per probabilia, ut loci topici; et quia in his cadit deceptio, adduntur loci sophistici, ut sciat homo dissolvere. Unde dissolvens non est sophisticus, sed verus respondens. Et quia isti modi trahunt originem a natura rerum -- ut patet: fumus est: ergo ignis fuit; locus ab effectu -- ideo adduntur decem praedicamenta, adduntur etiam enuntiationes.

21. The third direction is that by which the mind is enlightened for the sake of persuading or inclining the spirit: and this is achieved by means of rhetoric. Hence it is fitting that the orator provide for social good, since there may be danger in this area on account of the disagreement of minds. He proceeds by means of three attributes, of a threefold method: demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial.

21. Tertia irradiatio est, qua mens illustratur ad persuadendum vel inclinandum animum; hoc fit per rhetoricam. Unde rhetor oportet quod provideat civili utilitati, ubi potest esse periculum propter dissensionem animorum. Procedit autem secundum tria attributa et triplex genus causae, scilicet demonstrativum et deliberativum et iudiciale.

22. The demonstrative is concerned with the person; it may praise or blame. Praise may be addressed to the goods of the soul which are three in number, virtue, understanding, and truth; or to the goods of the body, beauty, strength, etc.; or again, to the goods of status, for instance wealth, parenthood and citizenship.

22. Demonstrativum personae, ut ad laudem, vel vituperium: ergo vel est laus quantum ad bona animae, quae sunt tria, scilicet virtus, scientia, veritas; vel est laus quantum ad corpus, scilicet, pulcritudo, fortitudo, etc.; vel de bonis fortunae, ut divitiae, parentela, patria.

23. The deliberative is concerned with something that needs to be done: a man is persuaded to act if there is security, usefulness, honesty; he is dissuaded if there is damage, danger, or dishonesty.

23. Deliberativum est respectu rei faciendae, et tunc persuadetur, si adest securitas, utilitas, honestas; vel persuadetur non fieri, si sequitur damnum, periculum, inhonestas.

24. The judicial corresponds to a thing that is done, as seen from the viewpoint of the legitimacy of its foundation, conjecture, or reasonable doubt. A legitimate juridical foundation consists in this: "Did you do it?" — "I did not do it." It is what some people call a lawsuit. A legitimate juridical conjecture supposes the calling of a witness for the sake of proof. A legitimate juridical doubt consists in this: when the fact of a case is admitted, but the indictee claims he is not guilty, or was permitted to act because of a mandate from his superior, or was obliged to act.

24. Genus iudiciale respondet rei factae, quae habet constitutionem, coniecturam, dubitationem legitimam. Iuridicialis constitutio est: «Fecisti? Non feci»; quae apud alios litis contestatio vocatur. Coniecturalis, cum aliquid adducitur ad probandum. -- Legitima dubitatio iuridicialis est descriptio iuridicialis, quando factum conceditur; sed defendit se, quod non sit reus, vel quia potuit facere de mandato domini, vel quia debuit.

25. For a man to be a powerful orator, he must first capture the audience's good will with an opening that is neither too long, nor obscure, nor excessively refined. He must then tell the story to expose the facts and to make his point — and he must avoid an excessive number of subdivisions. Then he must strengthen his point with arguments, then refute his adversary and show that the arguments of the opposition are worthless. Finally he must draw the conclusion. It is necessary for him to have inventiveness, organization, a good elocution, a reliable memory and clear diction.

25. Ad hoc autem, quod sit potens orator, necesse est, ut habeat exordium ad captandam benevolentiam non nimis prolixum, non obscurum, non exquisitum; quod habeat narrationem, ut factum narret; postea, ut negotium distinguat; et caveat multitudinem partium. Postea partem suam confirmet per rationes; postea adversarium confutet et rationes eius ostendat frivolas; postea concludat. Item, necesse est, ut habeat inventionem, dispositionem, elocutionem, memoriam et pronuntiationem.