Collation 5

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Latin

A. Second Treatise on the First Vision, Concerning the Third Radiation, That is the Moral Truth, and Concerning the Truth of Contemplation

500 Second Treatise on the First Vision, Concerning the Third Radiation, That Is the Moral Truth, and Concerning the Truth of Contemplation

COLLATIO V DE PRIMA VISIONE TRACTATIO SECUNDA, QUAE EST DE TERTIO RADIO SIVE DE VERITATE MORUM ET DE SAPIENTIA CONTEMPLATIONIS

1. GOD saw that the light was good. God separated the light from the darkness, etc. It has been said that truth is intellectual light radiating over intelligence either human or angelical; and that it shines forth in a manner that cannot be stopped, for it cannot be thought of as non-existing. Now a thing may shine forth in three different ways: as the truth of an object, as the truth of an expression, or as proper behavior. As the truth of an object, it consists in conformity of existence with essence; as the truth of an expression, it is conformity of essence with thought; as proper behavior, it is righteous living. And this is clear on the part of the principle which sends forth light, of the subject which receives this light, and of the objective towards which it enlightens. As a cause of being, this light is powerful; as a reason of understanding, this light is clear; as an ordering of life, this light is good. And that is the reason why it is written: God saw that the light was good. Asa powerful light, it irradiates for the sake of understanding substances or essences, the quantities and natures of the world; as a clear light, it irradiates for the sake of understanding rational expressions, reasonings and proofs; as a good light, it suffuses the intelligence, or demonstrates matters of propriety, activity, or justice, As a means of understanding propriety, it points to the practice of good habits; as a means of understanding activity, it points to intellectual speculation; as a means of understanding justice, it points to political laws. First, it is necessary that propriety be acquired, then activity investigated, and finally justice exercised. And here is shown how a prelate should behave: being perfect in both action and contemplation, he must accept the laws. Where? On the Mountain of Contemplation, with Moses, so that he may act with propriety and industry, and not as a beast, for a beast cannot go up into the Mountain: a beast that touches the Mountain must be stoned.

1. Vidit Deus lucem, quod esset bona, et divisit lucem a tenebris ¹ etc. Dictum est quod intellectualis lux est veritas, quae est radians super intelligentiam sive humanam, sive Angelicam; quae inextinguibiliter irradiat, quia non potest cogitari non esse. Irradiat autem aliquid tripliciter: ut veritas rerum, ut veritas vocum, ut veritas morum: ut veritas rerum est indivisio entis et esse, ut veritas vocum est adaequeatio vocis et intellectus, ut veritas morum est rectitudo vivendi. Quod patet ex parte principii, quod irradiat; ex parte subiecti, quod irradiationem suscipit; ex parte obiecti, ad quod irradiat. In quantum haec lux est causa essendi, est lux magna; in quantum est ratio intelligendi, est lux clara; in quantum est ordo vivendi, est lux bona; vidit, inquit, Deus lucem, quod esset bona. -- Ut lux magna irradiat ad comprehensionem substantiarum sive essentiarum, figurarum et naturarum mundialium; ut lux clara irradiat ad comprenhensionem locutionum, argumentationum, persuasionum rationalium; ut lux bona irradiat super intelligentiam vel illustrat ad comprenhensionem modestiarum, industriarum, iustitiarum: ad comprehensionem modestiarum quantum ad exercitationes consuetudinales; ad comprehensionem industriarum quantum ad speculationes intellectuales; ad comprehensionem iustitiarum quantum ad leges politicas. Primo habenda est modestia, secundo industria inquirenda, tertio exercenda iustitia. -- Et hic ostenditur, praelatus qualis esse debet, scilicet perfectus in actione et contemplatione acci-. pere debet leges. Ubi? In monte contemplationis cum Moyse ² , ut sit modestus et industrius, non bestialis, quia talis in montem ascendere non potest; bestia enim, quae tetigerit montemy lapidabitur ⁰ .

B. Good Habits

2. First, then, this light of illumination serves to understand the practice of good habits. Hence the Philosopher establishes twelve middle states: fortitude in regard to fear and rashness, temperance in regard to pleasure and pain, generosity in regard to gifts of medium value, lavishness in regard to opulent gifts, magnanimity in the desire for major honors, reasonable wishing for honors not so great, patience as regards the manifestation of anger, truthfulness in the use of words, refinement in the enjoyment of play, friendship, and finally two middle states in affective matters: indignation and reprehension, which result in harming no one and being useful to someone. From among these, however, we choose the six most important as being first temperance, second munificence, third fortitude, fourth patience, fifth kindness, and sixth magnanimity,

2. Primo igitur irradiat sive illustrat ad comprehensionem quantum ad exercitationem consuetudinalium virtutum. Unde Philosophus ponit duodecim medietates: fortitudinem circa timores et audacias; temperantiam circa delectationes et tristitias; liberalitatem circa dona mediocria; magnificentiam circa dona magna; magnanimitatem circa honorum magnorum appetitum; philotimiam circa mediocrium; mansuetudinem circa iras; veritatem circa locutiones; eutrapeliam circa ludi delectationem; amicitiam et duo media passionum, scilicet verecundiam et ne- mesim, quae est nulli obesse et alicui prodesse. De his autem eligamus sex praecipuas, scilicet primo temperantiam, secundo munificentiam, tertio fortitudinem, quarto mansuetudinem, quinto benignitatem, sexto magnanimitatem.

1. Temperance

3. First, we should deal with temperance. This is a primordial and necessary virtue: for man is not immediately tempted by the fear of death, but as soon as he is born, he is tempted by the pleasure of taste: hence, the child desires what is sweet to the taste, and later what is agreeable to the touch. That is why we must first tame this passion which lasts as long as we do, for it begins with childhood and ends with old age. It comprises appetite and cupidity. For a boy begins by seeking food, then money: hence he rejoices greatly in it; and if you offer bread and money to a young man, he will accept the money and leave the bread. This is the death of men: they desire indeed to possess and to retain. Considering such things as the greatest good is wrong; considering them as the greatest evil is wrong.

3. Primo incipiendum a temperantia. Haec necessaria est in primis; non enim statim homo tentatur a timore mortis, sed statim, quando natus est, delectatione secundum gustum; unde puer appetit dulce secundum gustum et postea delectabile secundum tactum, quando magnus est. Hanc passionem contemporaneam nobis, quae incipit in pueris et terminatur in senibus, oportet primo domare; ista est concupiscentia, alia est cupiditas. Puer enim primo appetit manducare, postea pecuniam; unde mirabiliter delectatur in illa, et si puero offeras panem et denarium, accipit denarium et relinquit panem. Hoc inficit homines; concupiscunt enim habere et retinere. Appretiari haec ut felicissima malum est, aspernari ut exsecrabilia malum est.

4. Now, some people say: The totally poor do not keep the middle way. I answer: On the contrary, they truly keep it. For this middle way is not a matter of things, but of the soul's desire. For if you desire these things in order to be sustained by them, be they your own or those of others, you keep the middle way. If you overestimate them as if happiness were to be found in them, you are at one extreme; if you spurn them as being wicked, you are at the other. So did the Manichees believe in the wickedness of intercourse with a woman, be she wife or whore. Likewise, they taught that no man could own anything. And Augustine ¹ teaches that this was never a command, although the Lord said to the apostles: "Take nothing for your journey." The middle way, then, consists in being sustained either by your own goods or by those of another.

4. Dicunt quidam: totaliter pauperes non tenent medium. Respondeo: immo vere tenent medium. Haec enim medietas non est circa res, sed circa appetitum animae. Si enim appetis haec, ut sustenteris tuis vel alienis, medietatem tenes; sed si appretias, ut felicitas sit in eis, unum extremum est; si aspernaris ut profanum, alterum extremum est, sicut Manichaei profanum putant cum muliere iacere, sive cum uxore, sive cum alia. Similiter dicebant, quod nihil potest homo habere. Et dicit Augustinus, quod hoc non fuit praeceptum, licet Apostolis dixerit Dominus: Nihil tuleritis in via*. Medium ergo est sustentari sive suis, sive alienis.

5. Blessed Francis said that "it is easier for the poor man to be generous than for the rich: for when the rich gives something he has, he is deprived of it and upset. But if he does not give what he has, although he would have been willing to give, had it not been for the privation, his will is good, but he receives no credit for it as he would if he had given in fact: for he still holds the thing. The poor, on the other hand, who has nothing, if he wishes to give to another poor something he does not have — if, for instance, he would like to build a hospital, but lacks the means —his intent is credited to him as would have been the fact." ² As to what they say—that the excessively poor do not keep to the middle way—it is similar to the statement of a certain physician named Frederic who declared that a man who abstains completely from woman is not virtuous and does not stay on the middle road, from which it follows that if to know all women and to know no women are the extremes, to know half of all women is the middle way.

5. Et dicebat beatus Franciscus, quod «pauper magis potest esse largus quam dives: quia dives, si dat quidquid habet, deficiet et confusus est; si vero non dat, cum habeat, licet vellet dare, si sibi non deficeret; voluntas bona est, sed non reputatur sibi pro facto, quia adhuc habet substantiam. Sed pauper, qui nihil habet, si vellet dare pauperi, et nihil habet, quod det; et vellet aedificare hospitalia, non tamen habet unde; voluntas pro facto reputatur». -- Quod autem dicunt, quod nimis pauperes non tenent medium; simile est illi quod dicebat quidam medicus Frederici, qui dicebat, quod ille qui abstinebat ab omni muliere, non erat virtuosus nec tenebat medium. Et ad hoc sequitur, quod si omnem mulierem cognoscere et nullam mulierem cognoscere extrema sunt; ergo medietatem omnium mulierum cognoscere medium est.

2. Munificence

6. Such cupidity! must be tamed by munificence, which includes generosity and magnificence. It is the fountain which pours out water: for the fountain does not keep water within. According to the Philosopher, ³ it is hard to be completely cured from cupidity, for cupidity is delightful in that it makes a man imagine himself to be great, and makes others believe that he is. If a man indulges in excesses, his brain suffers: but a man rejoices in riches because they lead to presumption and [false] reputation. And so, such cupidity infected Giezi, and he became a leper because he ran after Naaman. Even today those who practice simony consider it quite the right thing. Simon [Magus] came to Peter and said to him: "Accept some money: I have enough. Grant that I may give the Holy Spirit through the laying of hands." But Peter did not consider it right, nor did he have any patience [with this man]: "Thy money," he said, "go to destruction with thee." 6. Such cupidity must be tamed by munificence, which includes generosity and magnificence. It is the fountain which pours out water: for the fountain does not keep water within. According to the Philosopher, ³ it is hard to be completely cured from cupidity, for cupidity is delightful in that it makes a man imagine himself to be great, and makes others believe that he is. If a man indulges in excesses, his brain suffers: but a man rejoices in riches because they lead to presumption and [false] reputation.^ And so, such cupidity infected Giezi, and he became a leper because he ran after Naaman. Even today those who practice simony consider it quite the right thing. Simon [Magus] came to Peter and said to him: "Accept some money: I have enough. Grant that I may give the Holy Spirit through the laying of hands." But Peter did not consider it right, nor did he have any patience [with this man]: "Thy money," he said, "go to destruction with thee." 7. The third middle way is fortitude, which is concerned with fears and acts of valor. A man needs it in order to be neither fainthearted nor rash, but that he be able to bear frightful trials and even death. For some men do fall into cowardice and faintheartedness. Hence, in Job: "Have I the strength of stones, or is my flesh of bronze?" And so, fortitude is in the soul, not in the flesh. Better is the patient spirit than the lofty spirit. And Proverbs say: A patient man is better than a warrior, and he that rules his temper, than he who takes a city. Hence a spiritual man must take great care to avoid dejection.

6. Haec cupiditas domari debet per munificentiam, quae comprehendit in se largitatem et magnificentiam. Iste est fons, qui aquas refundit; fons non retinet in se aquas. Secundum Philosophum difficile est ab hac perfecte curari, quia hoc valde delectabile est, quia reputat se homo magnum, et alii reputant. Si homo luxuriatur dolet cerebrum; sed in divitiis homo delectatur, quia est ibi praesumptio et reputatio. -- Unde haec cupiditas infecit Giezi ⁵ , et leprosus factus est, quia cucurrit post Naaman; istud simoniaci hodie reputant magnam curialitatem. Venit Simon Magus et dixit Petro: Accipias de pecunia; satis habeo; et da mihi, ut per impositionem manus possim dare Spiritum sanctum; sed Petrus non reputavit curialitatem nec habuit patientiam: Pecunia tua, inquit, tecum sit in perditionem ⁶ .

3. Fortitude

7. The third middle way is fortitude, which is concerned with fears and acts of valor. A man needs it in order to be neither fainthearted nor rash, but that he be able to bear frightful trials and even death. For some men do fall into cowardice and faintheartedness. Hence, in Job: "Have I the strength of stones, or is my flesh of bronze?" And so, fortitude is in the soul, not in the flesh. Better is the patient spirit than the lofty spirit. And Proverbs say: A patient man is better than a warrior, and he that rules his temper, than he who takes a city. Hence a spiritual man must take great care to avoid dejection.

7. Tertia medietas est fortitudo, quae est circa timores et audacias. Haec est necessaria homini, ut non sit pusillanimis, vel temerarius, sed sustineat terribilia et etiam mori sit paratus. Aliqui enim cadunt in ignaviam et pusillanimitatem. Unde Iob: Numquid fortitudo lapidum fortitudo mea, aut caro mea aenea est? ¹ . Fortitudo enim in anima est, non in carne. Melior est patiens arrogante ⁸ ; et in Proverbiis: Melior est patiens viro forti, et qui dominatur animo suo, expugnatore urbium ⁹ . Unde spiritualis homo multum debet cavere a moestitia.

8. This virtue gives nobility to the soul. But because at times a man may be indignant at another, there is need for gentleness, which is the remedy against irascibility and anger —not that man should never be angry at all, but that he should be so only in the right circumstances of place and time. Hence, he must have both the face of a man and the face of a lion. At times, however, you believe a man to be kind when he remains silent while knowing of another's sin. Such is not kindness. Listen, therefore: it is said of Jesus that He was troubled, and that He made a kind of whip. Hence, in the First Book of the Machabees, it is written: Woe is me! Wherefore was I born to see the ruin of my people and the ruin of the holy city? Jesus is the Lamb and the Lion.8. This virtue gives nobility to the soul. But because at times a man may be indignant at another, there is need for gentleness, which is the remedy against irascibility and anger—not that man should never be angry at all, but that he should be so only in the right circumstances of place and time. Hence, he must have both the face of a man and the face of a lion. At times, however, you believe a man to be kind when he remains silent while knowing of another's sin. Such is not kindness. Listen, therefore: it is said of Jesus that He was troubled, and that He made a kind of whip. Hence, in the First Book of the Machabees, it is written: Woe is me! Wherefore was I born to see the ruin of my people and the ruin of the holy city? Jesus is the Lamb and the Lion.

8. Haec virtus facit animam nobilem; sed quia fortis aliquando dedignatur contra alios, ideo necessaria est mansuetudo, quae est contra irascibilitates et iracundias, non ut homo penitus non irascatur, sed ubi debet et quando debet. Unde debet habere et faciem hominis et faciem leonis. -- Tamen aliquando putas hominem mansuetum, qui tacet, alio peccante, hoc non est mansuetudo. Audi igitur: dicitur de Iesu, quod turbavit semetipsum ¹⁰ et fecit flagellum de funiculis ⁿ . Unde in primo Machabaeorum: Vae mihi, ut quid natus sum videre mala gentis meae et sanctorum? ¹¹ . Unde Christus est agnus et leo ¹³ .

4. Kindness

9. The fifth middle way is kindness, either in the form of the re-establishment of justice or in that of friendship, which has nothing of malice, but through which a man seeks someone else's good; and here it is necessary that reason be guided. Although the Philosopher says it is fitting to do good to friends and evil to enemies, ⁴ Christ recommends that every man be loved, and that all men be given another poor something he does not have —if, for instance, he would like to build a hospital, but lacks the means —his intent is credited to him as would have been the fact." ² As to what they say—that the excessively poor do not keep to the middle way—it is similar to the statement of a certain physician named Frederic who declared that a man who abstains completely from woman is not virtuous and does not stay on the middle road, from which it follows that if to know all women and to know no women are the extremes, to know half of all women is the middle way.9. The fifth middle way is kindness, either in the form of the re-establishment of justice or in that of friendship, which has nothing of malice, but through which a man seeks someone else's good; and here it is necessary that reason be guided. Although the Philosopher says it is fitting to do good to friends and evil to enemies, ⁴ Christ recommends that every man be loved, and that all men be given things that are useful to them, and not damaging. If I love you and grant you some favor or freedom which you will misuse as soon as you receive it, I am not being kind, but rather malicious: and so, in order to be kind, I will not give it to you. I have a friend, and I have an enemy: the friend will badly use some position of power or some dignity, damaging both himself and the common good. If I give them to him, I am not kind. On the contrary, my enemy will use it well: I will give it to him and turn his wickedness into good. A father does not flatter his son, nor does he speak to him in sweet words, lest he become proud. The world in our days is ignorant of this form of kindness, hence the whole world is in the power of the evil one, for man loves nothing but his own personal good.

9. Quinta medietas est benignitas, sive nemesis, sive amicitia, quae nihil habet malignitatis, sed homo vult bonum alii homini; et oportet, quod hic ratio dirigatur. Etsi dicat Philosophus, quod oportet amicis benefacere, inimicis malefacere; Christus tamen dicit, ut omnis homo diligatur, et ut omni homini conferantur utilia, non nociva. Si ego te diligo et do tibi vel dignitatem vel libertatem, et tu male uteris ea, si dem tibi; benignus non sum, sed potius malignus; et ideo non dabo tibi, ut sim benignus. Habeo amicum, habeo inimicum; amicus male utetur aliqua praelatione vel dignitate ad damnum suum et reipublicae; si dem sibi, benignus non sum. Inimicus meus e contrario bene utetur; sibi dabo et faciam bonum meum de malo suo. Pater non blanditur filio suo nec dicit verbum dulce, ne superbiat. Mundus hodie ignorat istam benignitatem; unde totus mundus in maligno positus est ¹⁴ , quia homo non diligit nisi bonum privatum.

5. Magnanimity

10. The sixth middle way is magnanimity, through which great things are appreciated and vile things despised. This is humility which despises the appearance of greatness and appreciates what seems to be small, but is great in reality. The Philosopher says that a man is magnanimous in that he desires honor. ⁵ Whatever he says, it is not the teaching of truth, unless to the word "honor" there be added "of eternal things." On the contrary, some men have a great taste for another's praise, while truth is telling them in their own mind that they are the worst, and good for nothing: and so, they extol themselves!

10. Sexta medietas est .magnanimitas, ut appretientur magna, et despiciantur vilia. Haec est humilitas, quae despicit apparentia magna et appretiat ea quae videntur esse parva, sunt tamen magna vere. Philosophus dicit, quod magnanimus est in appetitu honoris; quidquid dicat ipse, hoc non docet veritas, nisi cum honor est aeternorum. Sed econtra quidam appretiant unam vilissimam laudem alicuius, cum tamen veritas dicat in mente sibi, quod ipse est pessimus et nequam; et inde effert se!

11. These six middle ways are enough: there are yet a number of others that are without name. The Philosopher clearly indicates them, ⁶ and in these matters reason must bow before the truth of faith. These middle ways remove both carnal and spiritual vices: for instance, temperance does away with gluttony and luxury; munificence, with avarice, cupidity and rapacity; fortitude, with spiritual disgust, sloth and laziness; meekness, with anger, hatred and impatience; kindness, with envy; magnanimity, with pride, arrogance, vanity and pretense.

11. Hae sex medietates sufficiunt; aliae enim quaedam innominatae sunt. Has autem Philosophus manifeste ponit, et in his veritati fidei ratio substernitur. Hae medietates removent vitia sive carnalia sive spiritualia, ut temperantia gulam et luxuriam, munificentia avaritiam, cupiditatem, rapacitatem; fortitudo accidiam, ignaviam, pigritiam; mansuetudo iracundiam, odium, impatientiam; benignitas invidiam; magnanimitas superbiam, arrogantiam, vanitatem, iactantiam.

12. Second, the radiation of truth enlightens for the sake of understanding activity by means of intellectual speculation. This is of five kinds: knowledge, art, prudence, wisdom and understanding. ⁷ Now speculation is either self-contained, or it passes into the affective and effective. The first does not pertain to the moral order, but is rather a matter of logic. But the second does pertain to the moral order because it is a matter of virtue. And therefore because what is speculative easily becomes practical, the virtuous easily arises out of the speculative.

12. Secundus radius veritatis illustrat ad comprehensionem industriarum secundum speculationes intellectuales. Hae sunt quinque: scientia, ars, prudentia, sapientia, intelligentia. -- Speculatio autem aut est consistens in se, aut transit in affectum et effectum. Primus modus non pertinet ad moralem, sed magis logici est; secundus autem spectat, quia virtuosus; et ideo, quia faciliter speculativus fit practicus, facile ex speculativo fit virtuosus.

13. Now knowledge passing over into the affective field is wisdom, which is "knowledge of the highest causes and through the highest causes." ⁸ But knowledge passing into extrinsic effect is art, which is "a disposition containing a principle of making," ⁹ and here the knowledge and the making are combined, and yet, they are preceded by affective desire. The intermediate step is choice, which is joined to the affective desire and ordained toward the work. For whatever someone chooses, he loves, and he chooses it in view of the work: and such is prudence, which is an intermediate between wisdom and art. But understanding consists in going up from prudence to wisdom, and wisdom itself is the knowing of principles and certain rules. Likewise, it is necessary to go down to art through knowledge. For a surgeon, unless he possess the practice of the physician, will kill his patient, for instance, if he operates on a man who has a disposition to fever. He spoke also of a certain mathematician, who made excellent bells according to musical proportions, obtaining these proportions from a musician who gave him measures both of size and thickness and indicated the right dimensions of the hammer that was to pound the bells. Now from what has been said —that some virtues are intellectual, and others a matter of habit ¹⁰ —it should not be understood that therefore virtues are to be found in some part other than the rational, for the essence of every virtue is in the rational part. Yet some virtues are in this part by their very nature in so far as reason is speculative, others are in it in so far as reason is the ruler of the exterior man.

13. Notitia igitur transiens in affectum est sapientia, quae est «cognitio causarum altissimarum et per causas altissimas». -- Notitia autem transiens in effectum extrinsecum est ars, quae est «habitus cum ratione factivus», et hic iungitur notitia cum faciente, praevia tamen affectione. Medium inter haec est electio, quae iungitur affectui et ordinatur ad opus. Quod enim quis eligit amat et eligit ad opus; et haec est prudentia, quae est media inter sapientiam et artem. Intelligentia autem est in ascendendo a prudentia ad sapientiam, quae est cognitio principiorum et regularum certarum. -- Necesse est similiter descendere ad artem per scientiam. Chirurgus, nisi habeat regulam medici, interficit hominem, ut si incidat eum qui est dispositus ad febrem. -- Dicebat etiam de quodam mathematico, qui faciebat campanas optimas, et illas faciebat secundum proportiones musicales; tamen istas habuerat a quodam musico, qui dederat sibi formam et longitudinis et spissitudinis et martellum proportionatum ad putandum. -- Nec est intelligendum, propter hoc quod dicitur, quod virtutes quaedam sunt intellectuales, quaedam consuetudinariae, quod propter hoc virtutes sint in parte aliqua alia nisi in rationali, quia essentia omnis virtutis est in rationali; sed quaedam sunt in rationali secundum se et secundum quod est speculatrix; quaedam autem, secundum quod est exterioris hominis gubernatrix.

Acts of Righteousness

14. Thirdly, the radiation of truth enlightens for the sake of acts of righteousness, according to the dictates of political laws. Here I do not have to speak as a theologian or jurist, but as a philosopher. Now, this enlightenment comprises four points. Although no single philosopher has ever given them, something of them appears from a compilation of the works of many. This enlightenment may be considered from the viewpoints of the rite of worship, the form of common life, the proper rule of leadership, and the right of judicial opinion. The right of judicial opinion is not attained except through the proper rule of leadership; nor is the proper rule of leadership attained except through the form of common life; nor again is the latter attained except through the first.

14. Tertius radius veritatis illustrat ad morales iustitias secundum dictamen legum politicarum. Hic non debeo loqui sicut theologus nec sicut iurista, sed sicut philosophus loquitur. Haec comprenhensio est circa quatuor. Nullus autem philosophorum dedit hanc, sed si fuerit collecta ex multis, aliquid proveniet. -- Attenditur autem quantum ad ritum colendi, quantum ad formam convivendi, quantum ad normam praesidendi, quantum ad censuram iudicandi. Ad censuram iudicandi non pervenitur nisi per normam praesidendi; nec ad normam praesidendi nisi per formam convivendi; nec ad istam nisi per primam.

15. All true philosophers worshiped a single God. That is why even Socrates ¹¹ was killed: in his reverence for one God, he forbade sacrifices to Apollo. It is true that Plato argued with him to flee. "May it never happen," answered Socrates, "that I deny a truth I have asserted!" And so Plato did not interfere with his execution: he even blushed for having suggested flight. The worship of God is the dutiful expression of faith. Hence Tullius ¹² says that propriety consists in the cult of the gods. It is not fitting that he say "of the gods." The angels are not called gods in Scriptures, lest they be venerated as gods, but men are called gods: God hath stood in the congregation of gods, that is, of men, not of angels. Now, the worship of God consists in praise and sacrifice.

15. Omnes veri philosophi unum Deum coluerunt. Unde etiam Socrates, quia prohibebat, sacrificium fieri Apollini, interfectus fuit, cum coleret unum Deum. Verum est, quod Plato suasit sibi fugam. «Absit, inquit Socrates, ut negem veritatem, quam asserui»; et ideo Plato non interfuit morti eius, erubescens, quod suasisset sibi fugam. Cultus Dei pietas est fidei. Unde dicit Tullius, quod pietas consistit in cultu deorum. Non placet, quod dicit deorum. Scriptura nunquam vocat Angelos deos, ne venerentur sicut dii, sed homines dicuntur dii: Deus stetit in synagoga deorum ¹⁵ , id est hominum, non Angelorum. Cultus autem Dei consistit in laude et sacrificio.

16. The manner in which sacrifice was introduced is seen in the fact that Abel offered a sacrifice by faith, and so did Noah, of whose offering it is said: The Lord smelled the sweet odor. And these sacrifices represented that which Christ offered on the cross. Hence it is said, the Lord smelled: God was appeased by the death of His only Son. By contrast, the demons, because of their pride, seek to be worshiped as God Himself, in order to obtain on earth the honor they could not have in heaven, and because men are farthest removed from God. ¹³ A man who makes such sacrifices offers the blood of Christ, in that it was shed in order to appease the Father.

16. Quomodo autem sacrificium introductum sit videtur, quod per fidem Abel obtulit sacrificium ¹⁶ et Noè, de quo dicitur: Odoratus est Dominus odorem suavitatis ¹¹ . Et significabant haec sacrificia sacrificium Christi, quod in cruce fecit; et ideo dicitur Dominus odorare, ut Deus placaretur per mortem Unigeniti. -- Daemones autem propter superbiam suam volunt coli ut Deus, ut habeant in terra quod habere non potuerunt in caelo; et quia maxime alienantur homines a Deo. -- Sanguinem Christi offert qui facit talia sacrificia, eo quod effusus fuit ad placandum Patrem.

17. But the sacrifice of praise ¹⁴ imposes upon the heart something naturally related to judgment: it is concerned with a command of nature; and in this all true philosophers agree. Hence he [Aristotle] says that "whoever doubts whether parents are to be honored and God is to be venerated, is deserving of punishment." ¹⁵

17. Sacrificium autem laudis ¹⁸ in corde naturale iudicatorium dictat, et est de dictamine naturae; et in hoc consenserunt omnes veri philosophi. Unde dicit ille, quod «qui dubitat, utrum parentes honorandi sint, et Deus venerandus, poena dignus est».

1. Form of Common Life

18. The second element is the form of common life, expressed thus: See thou never do to another what thou wouldst hate to have done to thee by another. This is written in the heart by eternal law. From this natural law come other laws and rules as beautiful sprouts. But why do you refuse to be hung, and hang the thief? The answer: better to hang the thief than to damage the community. As for Jonas, he condemned himself to be thrown into the sea.

18. Secundus modus est forma convivendi, ut: «Quod tibi non vis fieri, ne facias alteri» ¹⁹ . Hoc in corde scriptum est per legem aeternam. Ex hac naturali lege emanant leges et canones, pullulationes pulcrae. Sed quid? Tu non vis suspendi, et latronem suspendis? Dicendum, quod latro prius debet suspendi, quam ut respublica laedatur; Ionas ²⁰ contra se dedit sententiam, ut proiiceretur in mare.

2. Proper Rule of Leadership

19. The third element is the proper rule of leadership, that is, how a leader must behave in relation to his followers, and conversely. And this right rule derives from the first truth: that the people must help the one who is punishing and avenging; while the leader must not seek his own good, but that of the community. The Philosopher ¹⁶ says that in this does the tyrant differ from the leader: that the tyrant seeks his own good, as did Herod who, when his throne was threatened, massacred children; while the true leader strives toward the common good. And yet, today, there is a great abomination prevailing among those who command: for no helmsman is allowed on a ship unless he knows how to steer. Why then is a man placed at the head of a state when he does not know how to govern? That is why the state is poorly ruled when its leaders are appointed by heredity. David was most holy; Solomon, although extremely addicted to the pleasures of the flesh, was yet wise; but Roboam was a fool, for he divided the kingdom. It is through the devil's doing that the Romans chose Diocletian. They were to elect a man eating from an iron table, and they found him eating from a ploughshare; but later he committed many evil deeds. Hence, as often as the Romans elected their leaders, they chose the most wise,{ and then the state was properly governed; but after they had established succession by heredity, everything was ruined.

19. Tertia est norma praesidendi, id est qualiter princeps ad populum debet se habere, et e converso. Et haec emanat a veritate prima: quia populus debet assistere punienti et vindicanti; princeps non debet suam utilitatem quaerere, sed rei publicae. Philosophus dicit, quod differt tyrannus et princeps: tyrannus quaerit propriam utilitatem, sicut Herodes ²¹ , qui, timens privari regno suo, saevit in pueros; princeps autem communem utilitatem intendit. Tamen hodie magna abominatio est in his qui praesunt, quia in navi non ponitur rector, nisi habeat artem gubernandi; quomodo ergo in republica ponitur ille qui nescit regere? Unde quando per successionem praesunt, male regitur respublica. David fuit sanctissimus; Salomon, etsi lubricissimus, tamen sapiens; Roboam stultus, quia divisit regnum ²² . Romani per artem diaboli elegerunt Diocletianum. Debebant eligere comedentem super mensam ferream et invenerunt comedentem illum super vomerem; qui postmodum multa mala fecit. Unde quamdiu Romani illos qui praeessent, elegerunt, sapientissimos elegerunt; et tunc bene gubernata est respublica; sed postquam ad successionem venerunt, totum fuit destructum.

20. The final element is the right of judicial opinion, so that a man may know how to judge about any matter, as regards persons, things and actions. All these judgments flow from the first truth.

20. Ultimum est censura iudicandi, ut homo sciat, quid de quacumque re sit iudicandum, quod spectat ad personas, ad res, ad modum agendi. Haec omnia manant a veritate prima.

21. But in all these things, reason went on a rampage, metaphysics ran riot: for some philosophers ¹⁷ supposed an eternal world, reasoning that an eternal cause implied an eternal effect: and they were mistaken about the first cause. Likewise, mathematicians were originally concerned with numbers, but later came to study the influences and secrets of the heart. Scientists knew about bodies and minerals and said: "Art imitates nature," ¹⁸ and we know the secrets of nature, and so we will make for you gold and silver. Likewise, grammarians held the whole world spellbound with their poems and fables, until such time as the saints came to refute them. In the same fashion, logicians made the whole world mad with their sophistries and false statements. Again, orators became so delighted with the color of their speech that they claimed God's kingdom was made of nothing else: and yet, eloquence is soon taken out of this world. But the moral art was not so abused because it does not depend upon speculation alone; and yet jurisprudence went wild because of avarice, and lawsuits that were supposed to be concluded according to right, are stretched out endlessly through legal pretexts and subtleties, while the intention of justice had been to bring them to a close.

21. Sed in his omnibus luxuriata est ratio; luxuriata est metaphysica: quia quidam posuerunt, mundum aeternum, quia, si causa aeterna, et effectus aeternus; et isti male senserunt de causa prima. Similiter mathematici primo sciverunt numeros et postea ad influentias et secreta cordium venerunt. Naturales sciverunt et de corporibus et mineralibus et dixerunt: «Ars imitatur naturam»; et nos scimus secreta naturae: ergo nos faciemus vobis aurum et argentum. Similiter gram- matici poésibus et fabulis suis tenuerunt totum mundum, quousque venerunt Sancti contra eos. Similiter logici cum suis sophismatibus et suis facibus positionibus fecerunt mundum insanire. Similiter rhetores ita delectabantur in colore sermonis, ut non aliud esse regnum Dei dicerent: tamen sublata est modo de medio. Ars moralis non ita luxuriata est, quia non in sola speculatione stat; sed scientia iuris multum luxuriatur propter lucrum; et causae, quae deberent terminari per ius, modo per allegationem et subtilitatem iuris fiunt immortales, cum tamen intentio iuris sit causas rescindere.

22. These are the nine luminaries enlightening the soul, to wit, the truth of things, words and actions: of things, that is, of essences, of figures, and of natures: in their "suchness" referring to hidden differences, in their quantity referring to manifest proportions, in their nature referring to mixed properties. — The truth of words is threefold, in regard to expressions, arguments, and persuasions: first, in regard to expressions concerning mental concepts; second, in regard to arguments drawing rational agreement; third, in regard to persuasions producing inclinations of the heart. The first is the object of grammar, the second of logic, and the third of rhetoric. The truth of actions is threefold: in regard to proprieties, activities, and lawful relationships. Proprieties are concerned with the observance of conventions; activities depend upon intellectual speculations; relationships are based on civil law. Philosophers offered these nine sciences and gave examples of them. But God has manifested it to them. Later, they sought to reach wisdom, and truth was leading them: and they promised to procure wisdom, that is, beatitude, that is, an intellect having attained its goal. They promised it, I mean, to those who would follow them.

22. Haec sunt novem lumina illustrans animam, scilicet veritas rerum, vocum, morum: rerum, scilicet essentiarum, figurarum, naturarum quantum ad quidditatum differentias occultas, quantum ad quantitatum proportiones manifestas, quantum ad naturarum proprietates mixtas. Primo metaphysica, secundo mathematica, tertio naturalis seu physica. -- Veritas vocum tripliciter: quantum ad locutiones, argumentationes, persuasiones; primo, quantum ad locutiones indicantes mentis conceptus; secundo quantum ad argumentationes trahentes mentis assensus; tertio, quantum ad persuasiones inclinantes mentis affectus; prima grammatica, secunda logica, tertia rhetorica. -- Veritas morum tripliciter: quantum ad modestias, industrias, iustitias: modestas, quantum ad exercitationes consuetudinales; industrias, quantum ad speculationes intellectuales; iustitias, quantum ad leges politicas. Prima virtus consuetudinalis, secunda virtus intellectualis, tertia virtus iustitialis. -- Has novem scientias dederunt philosophi et illustrati sunt. Deus enim illis revelavit ² Postmodum voluerunt ad sapientiam pervenire, et veritas trahebat eos; et promiserunt dare sapientiam, hoc est beatitudinem, hoc est intellectum adeptum; promiserunt, inquam, discipulis suis.

D. Light Separated from Darkness

23. Now the fourth consideration is this: how did they come to the point at which light was separated from darkness? Indeed, by separating themselves from darkness, they turned toward light. But this comes about in such a way that the soul turns itself first toward itself, then toward spiritual intelligences, and finally toward eternal reasons.

23. Quarta ergo consideratio est, quomodo venerunt ad hoc, in quo lux separata est a tenebris ²⁴ ; separando enim se a tenebris, converterunt se ad lucem. Sed hoc ita fit, ut anima convertat se primo super se; secundo, super Intelligentias spirituales; tertio, super rationes aeternas.

1. Animal Potency

24. First, then, a man needs to consider himself, not as with the material eye that sees itself only through some reflection from a mirror, but as with the mental eye that first sees itself and then sees other things. But for this there is necessarily a turning toward potencies and toward acts. Now, the soul has three potencies, animal, intellectual and divine, corresponding to the threefold eye, of the flesh, of reason and of contemplation. The first watches, the second is obscured, and the third is completely blind. ¹⁹ The animal potency has two aspects: it considers either the objects of the particular and the common senses, or sensible imaginings, and so it consists in senses and imagination. The intellectual potency, likewise, has two aspects: it considers either universal abstract reasons, abstracting for instance from place, time and size; or it is lifted up to separate spiritual substances. And so there are two powers, reason and understanding: through reason, the soul gathers; through understanding, it knows itself and the spiritual substances; and then it becomes interior to these intelligences, it enters their aeviternity. Similarly, the divine operation or potency is twofold: the one which turns itself toward the vision of divine displays, the other, to the savoring of divine favors. The first is brought about through understanding, the second, through the unitive power, which is secret and of which they knew little or nothing.

24. Primo ergo oportet se considerare, non sicut oculus carnis, qui non videt se nisi per quandam reflexionem a speculo, sed sicut oculus mentis, qui primo videt se et postmodum alia. Sed ad hoc oportet, ut convertat se super potentias et super actus. Habet enim anima tres potentias: animalem, intellectualem, divinam, secundum triplicem oculum: carnis, rationis, contemplationis. Primus viget, secundus caligat, tertius excaecatus est. -- Potentia animalis duplex est: vel in obiecta sensuum particularium et sensus communis, vel in phantasmata sensibilium, et sic est sensus et imaginatio. -- Intellectualis etiam est duplex: aut ut considerat universales rationes abstractas, ut abstrahit a loco, tempore et dimensione; aut ut elevatur ad substantias spirituales separatas; et sic sunt duae potentiae, scilicet ratio et intellectus: per rationem confert, per intellectum cognoscit se et substantias spirituales; et tunc ingerit se Intelligentiis, et tunc intrat aeviternum ipsarum. -- Similiter operatio vel potentia divina duplex est: una, quae se convertit ad contuenda divina spectacula; alia, quae se convertit ad degustanda divina solatia. Primum fit per intelligentiam, secundum per vim unitivam sive amativam, quae secreta est, et de qua parum vel nihil noverunt.

25. Hence, there are three powers and six operations; and when the soul sees all these objects, thus returning upon itself, there comes about a certain mirror most beautiful and pure, in which it sees something pertaining to lightning and splendor, as in a polished mirror the image may be seen. But for this there is need of opacity, either natural or artificial, natural as in a steel mirror, artificial as in a glass mirror with a backing of lead. Second, there is need of polishing through which the mirror receives the form or image. Third, there is need of brightness, for at night a mirror gives no reflection. Likewise, in the soul there are lesser virtues whose function is to retain light, lest it run through; there are intermediate virtues that act like polishes; and there are higher virtues like crowning brightnesses: and in this sense the soul is a mirror.

25. Ergo triplex est potentia, et sex sunt operationes; et quando haec omnia obiecta videt anima, sic rediens super se, fit speculum quoddam pulcherrimum et tersum, in quo videt quidquid est fulgoris et pulcritudinis, sicut in speculo polito videtur imago. Sed ad hoc requiritur opacitas naturalis, vel artificialis: naturalis, ut in speculo de chalybe; artificialis, ut in plumbo supposito vitro; secundo requiritur politio, per quam formam vel imaginem recipit; tertio requiritur splendor, quia in nocte speculum nihil reddit. Similiter in anima sunt virtutes inferiores tanquam tenentes lumen, ne defluat; mediae sunt sicut politiones; supremae sunt sicut splendores supervenientes: et sic est anima speculum.

26. But it is fitting that we have a second level, to correspond to beautiful forms, those with an inner analogy to the heavenly lights, such as the angels: for if [the soul] were to raise itself immediately to the divine splendors, it would be sent right back. But the angels are both light and mirror: ²⁰ and in order to contemplate them, the soul is lifted up in three ways. For the angels have lesser powers by which they regulate the movements of higher bodies and exert their influence upon worldly matters: and this is the opinion of philosophers. ²¹ — Indeed, it is a fact that "a cause is higher than its effect," and also that the living or animate being comes about or is engendered with regard to the influence of heavenly beings: so also is the soul. If, then, the animate being is superior to the inanimate, it necessarily follows that the former has a cause other than these bodies: and this cause is the influence of angels, combined with that of the heavenly bodies. Hence, this results from the governing power of the intellectual substance exerting its influence upon the motion of the globe which it rules. — For others, angels were as many as the number of motions because of a natural inclination toward motion. ²² — Others again supposed only ten intelligences, drawing from the consideration of their influence: and they produced insanities and controversies. An angel can well exist without motion.

26. Sed oportet, ut habeamus secundum gradum, quod apponatur pulcris formis, scilicet luminibus caelicis sibi proportionatis, ut Angelis, quia, si statim se elevaret ad divinos fulgores, reverberaretur. Angeli autem sunt et lumina et specula; ad quos contemplandos tripliciter elevatur anima. -- Habent enim Angeli virtutes infimas, per quas regulant motus nobilium corporum et influunt in mundialia; et hoc est positio philosophorum. Constat enim, quod «causa nobilior est suo effectu»; et constat, quod ad influentiam corporum caelestium fit vel generatur vivum et animatum: ergo et anima. Si ergo animatum nobilius est non animato: ergo necesse est, ut habeat aliam causam quam illa corpora. Et illa est influentia Angelica cum influentia corporum caelestium. Unde per regimen substantiae intellectualis, influentis super motum orbis, quem regit, fit hoc. -- Alii posuerunt, quod Angeli essent numerati secundum numerum motuum propter inclinationem naturalem ad motum. -- Alii posuerunt decem Intelligentias solum, considerantes earum influentias; et fecerunt insanias et contentiones. Angelus bene potest esse sine motu.

27. Again, there are in angels some virtues related to rational souls through which they govern men. Indeed, they are the conveyors of light and the uplifters of intelligences so that illuminations may be received. And so there is in them a conveying power, because they are a certain light and a certain transparency, and they temper the divine light within themselves for our sake, so that it may be proportioned to us. Secondly, there is in them an uplifting power through which they make us able, by condescending to us and raising us up, to receive this particular radiation, and yet not as achieving it themselves. ²³ Finally, there is in them a supreme power through which they turn themselves to God in the act of receiving splendors, and the eternal light they love; and all things lead back to this light in order that they may tend toward God through love and praise. Hence in Job: ²⁴ Where were you ... while the morning stars sang in chorus and all the sons of God shouted for joy? And all this corresponds with the philosophers' opinions. Again, by this very fact, the angels are to give thanks. When the soul sees all this, it becomes interior to the angels, and it enters their world.

27. Item, sunt virtutes in Angelis ad animas rationales, per quas regunt homines. Sunt enim delatores luminum et elevatores intellectuum ad suscipiendas illuminationes. Est ergo in eis virtus delativa, quia sunt quaedam lumina et quoddam pervium, et contemperant in se nobis divinum radium, ut proportionetur nobis. -- Secundo modo est in eis virtus elevativa, qua nos aptant per condescensionem et sublevationem ad illum radium suscipiendum, non tanquam perficientes. -- Item, est in eis virtus suprema, qua se ad Deum convertunt in susceptione splendorum et aeternae lucis, quam amant; et omnia reducunt ad ipsam, ut tendant in Deum per amorem et laudem. Unde in Iob: Ubi eras, cum me laudarent astra matutina, et iubilarent omnes filii Dei? ²⁵ . Et hoc totum senserunt philosophi. Item, Angeli sunt ex hoc gratias acturi. -- Quando hoc videt anima, ingerit se Angelis et intrat saeculum ipsorum.

28. The third level consists in this, that the intellect itself, considering the conditions of being in the light of the relationship between cause and caused, moves itself up from the effect to the causes and passes over to eternal reasons. Now, the cause is different from the caused effects: because the first cause is the first being and the caused thing is a produced being; the first cause is a simple being and the caused thing a composite being; the first cause is pure act, and the caused thing a mixed being; the first cause is a fixed being, and the caused thing a. variable being; the first cause is the absolute being, and the caused thing a contingent being; the first cause is a perfect being, and the caused thing a diminished being. All these statements are most certain.

28. Tertius gradus est, quod ipse intellectus, considerans conditiones entis secundum relationem causae ad causatum, transfert se ab effectu ad causas et transit ad rationes aeternas. Differt causa a causatis: quia prima causa est ens primum, causatum ens productum; causa prima est ens simplex, causatum compositum; causa prima est ens purum, et causatum permixtum; causa prima est ens fixum, et causatum variatum; causa prima est ens absolutum, et causatum alligatum; causa prima est ens perfectum, causatum diminutum. Haec ergo sunt certissima.

29. But intelligence is led to this light in a threefold manner: by reasoning, testing, and understanding; rationally, experimentally, and understandingly. Through the rational way, ²⁵ as follows: if there is a produced being, there must be a first being, for an effect supposes a cause. If indeed there exists a being which is dependent upon another, in the likeness of another, and for the sake of another, then there must exist a being that is of itself, according to itself, and for itself. — If a composite being exists, there must exist a simple being from which it has being, for as soon as being is removed from simplicity, it falls into composition. — If a mixed being exists, there must exist a pure being, for nothing created is pure. — If a being with intrinsic variation exists, there must exist a fixed being, for the movable is led back to the immovable. For when the hand moves, the arm is motionless; and when the arm moves, the shoulder is motionless: and so whatever moves is always moved by something fixed. ²⁶ — If we suppose a contingent being, there must exist an absolute being: for every creature is dependent upon one genus from among the predicaments; but when things are dependent, they cannot give being to each other: and so there must be an absolute being from which they receive being. — If a diminished being exists, there must exist a perfect being. And along this road the Philosopher ²⁷ proceeds to demonstrate that the world is eternal, arguing that local circular motion, being perfect, precedes any movement or change. But I answer: it should be said that the perfect must exist before the diminished only if we speak of the unqualifiedly perfect, and not of the perfect within a genus, which is the case with local motion. Thus intelligence is carried along in the act of rational thought.

29. Intelligentia autem fertur in hanc lucem tripliciter: ratiocinando, experiendo, intelligendo; rationabiliter, experimentaliter, intelligentialiter. -- Per viam rationis sic. Si est ens productum: ergo est ens primum, quia effectus ponit causam. Si enim est ens ab alio, secundum aliud et propter aliud: ergo est ens a se, secundum se et propter se. -- Item, si est ens compositum, necesse est, esse simplex, a quo habet esse, quia esse, quod recedit a simplicitate, cadit in compositionem. -- Item, si est ens permixtum, necesse est, esse ens purum, creatum autem nullum purum. -- Item, si est ens secundum se variatum, necesse est, esse fixum, quia mobile reducitur ad immobile. Mota enim manu, stat cubitus; et moto cubito, stat humerus; et sic semper quod movetur movebitur per aliquod fixum. -- Item, si est dare alligatum: ergo et absolutum; omnis enim creatura alligata est alicui generi praedicamentorum; sed quod alligatum est, unum non dat alteri esse: ergo necesse est, absolutum esse, a quo recipiant esse. -- Item, si est ens diminutum, necesse est, esse ens perfectum. -- Et hac via procedit Philosophus ad ostendendum mundum aeternum, quia omnem motum et mutationem praecedit motus localis circularis, quia perfectus est. Sed respondeo: dicendum, quod verum est, quod perfectum est ante diminutum, loquendo de perfecto simpliciter, sed non de perfecto in genere, qualis est motus localis. -- Et sic fertur intelligentia ratiocinando.

30. Likewise, it is carried along in the act of testing, as follows: the product is defective in regard to its origin; and so is the composite in regard to the simple; and again, the mixed in regard to the pure, and so also with the others; and hence they are called privations. But "privations are not known, except through their dispositions." ²⁸ ! "By means of the straight line, we know both itself and the curved." And if "every knowledge proceeds from a pre-existing knowledge," it necessarily follows that intelligence is perceived in itself, and that it possesses a certain light through which it knows the first being.

30. Fertur similiter experiendo sic: productum respectu primi defectivum est; similiter compositum respectu simplicis; similiter permixtum respectu puri, et sic de aliis; ergo dicunt privationes. Sed «privationes non cognoscuntur nisi per habitus suos». «Iudex enim est rectum sui et obliqui». Et si «omnis cognitio fit ex praeexistenti cognitione»: ergo necessario intelligentia experitur in se, quod habeat aliquod lumen, per quod cognoscat primum esse.

31. And so, these principles being presupposed, the intelligence understands and says that the first being exists, and that the notion of being properly fits nothing but the first being, and that all things receive being from it, because this predicate is found in none but the first being. Likewise, simple being is unqualifiedly perfect being: hence it follows that nothing better can be understood. Wherefore God cannot be conceived as non-existing, as Anselm proves.^ ²⁹

31. Sic igitur, his praesuppositis, intellectus intelligit et dicit, primum esse est, et nulli vere esse convenit nisi primo esse, et ab ipso omnia habent esse, quia nulli inest hoc praedicatum nisi primo esse. Similiter simplex esse est simpliciter perfectum esse: ergo est quo nihil intelligitur melius. Unde Deus non potest cogitari non esse, ut probat Anselmus.

32. When the soul sees this in a more familiar way, first through reasoning, then through experiencing and finally through understanding, it may come to rest at this point. And so, by reasoning, inferences are drawn from opposites: if there is a later being, there is a first; if there is a composite, there is a simple, etc. By experience [conclusions are drawn], because privations are not known except by positing their cause, and these six [arguments] are brought about by the method of defect and privation. By understanding, because the existence of such things as first being and simple being cannot be hidden to the soul. ³⁰ Again, the soul considers this being as having substance, power and operation, respectively first, most pure and most simple, and likewise with the other six; as containing within itself oneness, truth, and goodness, respectively first, most pure, and most absolute, and likewise with the other six; as having constancy, beauty and goodness, respectively first, most pure, and most absolute; as having memory, intelligence, and will, according to these six; as having life, wisdom, and joy, according to these six: and then it understands that it is good in its very essence, and that all things are led to beatitude through it, and hence that it is supremely desirable and must be supremely desired: and in doing such a thing, the soul comes to rest with this same being.

32. Quando anima videt hoc familiarius, primo ratiocinando, secundo experiendo, tertio intelligendo; ibi potest quiescere. Unde ratiocinando infert per oppositum; si est posterius, est prius; si est compositum, est simplex etc.; experimentaliter, quia privationes non cognoscuntur nisi in positione causae, et illa sex dicuntur per modum defectus et privationis; intelligentialiter, quia non possunt latere animam, ut primum esse est, simplex esse est etc. -- Item, considerat illud esse, ut habet substantiam, virtutem et operationem, ut primam, purissimam, simplicissimam, et sic de aliis sex; ut est in eo unitas, veritas, bonitas, ut prima, ut purissima, ut absolutissima, et sic de aliis sex; ut habet firmitatem, speciositatem, bonitatem, ut primam, purissimam, et absolutissimam; ut habet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, secundum illa sex; ut habet vitam, sapientiam, iucunditatem, secundum illa sex; et tunc intelligit, quod est bonum per essentiam, et omnia per illud beatificantur, et ideo summe appetibile et summe debet appeti; et hoc faciendo conquiescit.

33. And so, first the soul sees itself as a mirror, then it sees the angels or intelligences as luminaries and conveying media. In other words, it sees within itself as in a mirror, and within intelligence(s) as in a medium which conveys the eternal light and leads to contemplation. Finally, it looks upon eternal light as the original fountainhead, in the six manners explained above, and this, through reason, experience, and understanding.! And while it sees this and rises to divine contemplation, it declares itself in possession of an intellect having reached its goal, which the philosophers had promised: and this is the objective toward which truth leads. Yet, it is through the virtues that we must reach it, as the philosophers did. When they discovered it was impossible to attain such a high summit except through the virtues, they turned to the teaching of these same virtues, as did Socrates. Wherefore a man is reputed as having spoken not so well of these when he is content with speaking only: but Socrates acted them out because he saw that the intellect could not reach this point unless the soul had been cleansed. ³¹

33. Primo ergo anima videt se sicut speculum, deinde Angelos sive Intelligentias sicut lumina et sicut medium delativum; sive videt in se sicut in speculo, in Intelligentia sicut in medio delativo lucis aeternae et contemperativo; deinde in luce aeterna tanquam in obiecto fontano, quantum ad illas sex conditiones dictas, et rationabiliter et experimentaliter et intelligentialiter. -- Dum haec igitur percipit et consurgit ad divinum contuitum, dicit, se habere intellectum adeptum, quem promiserunt philosophi; et ad hoc veritas trahit. -- Sed tamen per virtutes oportet devenire, sicut fecerunt philosophi; quando viderunt, quod tam alte non posset perveniri nisi per virtutes, converterunt se ad docendum illas, ut fecit Socrates; unde reputatur minus bene dixisse, eo quod tantum de illis dixit; sed hoc fecit, quia videbat, quod ad illum intellectum non potest perveniri, nisi anima sit purgata.