Collation 6

English

Latin

600 SIXTH COLLATION601 Third Treatise on the First Vision, Concerning the First Exemplary Cause of the Virtues, and the Exemplary and Cardinal Virtues Flowing from It

COLLATIO VI DE PRIMA VISIONE TRACTATIO TERTIA, QUAE EST DE PRIMA VIRTUTUM CAUSA EXEMPLARI, DE VIRTUTIBUS EXEMPLARIBUS ET DE CARDINALIBUS INDE FLUENTIBUS

A. Third Treatise on the First Vision, Concerning the First Exemplary Cause of the Virtues, and the Exemplary and Cardinal Virtues Flowing from It

1. GOD saw the light that it was good; and He divided the light from the darkness, etc. The passage, God saw the light, is quoted on account of the first vision of the intelligence, which is infused by nature. It means that God made it possible to see. This has been covered in the two preceding collations by considering the sciences, in that the light shines as the truth of things, the truth of words, and the truth of moral acts. And nine parts were distinguished in the doctrine, of which the three principal are radiations proceeding, according to Augustine, ¹ from the decree of the eternal light. It was also established that God saw, that is, made it possible to see, through wisdom-procuring contemplation, through the enlightenment of the soul seen in itself as in a mirror, seen in the intelligence (s) and in a conveying medium, and in the uncreated light as in its fountainhead, in accordance with the six conditions which this light impresses upon the mind. And in accordance with these, the soul rises up in the said light by means of reasoning, testing, and understanding, as it has been said. And the philosophers—at least the most worthy among them—and the ancients have come to this point: that there exists a beginning and an end and an exemplary reason.

1. Vidit Deus lucem, quod esset bona, et divisit lucem a tenebris ¹ etc. Propter primam visionem intelligentiae per naturam inditae sumptum est verbum illud: Vidit Deus lucem, id est videre fecit. De hoc supra in duabus collationibus dictum est, et per considerationem scientialem, pro eo quod radiat lux ut veritas rerum, ut veritas vocum, ut veritas morum. Et fuerunt distinctae novem partes doctrinae, quarum tres principales sunt radii, et sunt ex dictamine lucis aeternae, secundum Augustinum. -- Item, quod vidit, id est, videre fecit per contemplationem sapientialem, illuminando animam in se tanquam in speculo, in Intelligentia tanquam in medio delativo, in luce increata tanquam in obiecto fontano, secundum illas sex conditiones, quas imprimit menti; et secundum has consurgit anima in illam lucem ratiocinando, experiendo, intelligendo, ut dictum est. Et ad hoc venerunt philosophi et nobiles eorum et antiqui, quod esset principium et finis et ratio exemplaris.

1. Philosophers Following Darkness

2. God. .. divided the light from the darkness in order that what had been said of the angelsf ² could also be said of the philosophers. But why have some of them followed darkness? Because of this: although all could see the first cause as the universal principle and universal end, they had different opinions concerning the means. £ For some denied that exemplars of things existed in this cause: the leader of these seems to have been Aristotle ³ who, in the beginning and the end of his Metaphysics, and in many other places, strongly condemns the ideas of Plato. Wherefore he says that God knows only Himself, and does not need the knowledge of any other thing, and produces [not as an Idea, but] as the desired and loved [Reality]. But this supposes that He knows nothing, or no particular thing. Therefore Aristotle is the principle assailant of Platonic ideas in his "Ethics" ⁴ where he says that the supreme good cannot be an Idea. And the reasons he adduces are worthless, and the commentator answers them.

2. Divisit tamen Deus lucem a tenebris, ut, sicut dictum est de Angelis, sic dicatur de philosophis. Sed unde aliqui tenebras secuti sunt? Ex hoc, quod licet omnes viderint primam causam omnium principium, omnium finem, in medio tamen diversificati sunt. Nam aliqui negaverunt, in ipsa esse exemplaria rerum; quorum princeps videtur fuisse Aristoteles, qui et in principio Metaphysicae et in fine et in multis aliis locis exsecratur ideas Platonis. Unde dicit, quod Deus solum novit se et non indiget notitia alicuius alterius rei et movet ut desideratum et amatum. Ex hoc ponunt, quod nihil, vel nullum particulare cognoscat. Unde illas ideas praecipuus impugnat Aristoteles et in Ethicis, ubi dicit, quod summum bonum non potest esse idea. Et nihil valent rationes suae, et Commentator solvit eas.

3. Upon this error, there follows another, that is, that God has neither foreknowledge nor providence, since He does not have within Himself a rational justification of things by which He could know them. They also say ⁵ that there are no truths concerning the future except that of necessary things. And from this it follows that all things come about either by chance or by necessity. And since it is impossible that things come about by chance, the Arabs conclude to absolute necessity, that is, that these substances that move the globe are the necessary causes of all things. From this it follows that truth is hidden, that is, the truth of government of worldly things in terms of pain and glory. If, indeed, these substances are inerrant movers, nothing is supposed concerning hell or the existence of the devil: neither did Aristotle ever suppose the existence of the devil, nor happiness after this life, as it appears. Here, then, there is a threefold error: a concealment of exemplarity, of divine providence and of world government.

3. Ex isto errore sequitur alius error, scilicet quod Deus non habet praescientiam nec providentiam, ex quo non habet rationes rerum in se, per quas cognoscat. -- Dicunt etiam, quod nulla veritas de futuro est nisi veritas necessariorum; et veritas contingentium non est veritas. -- Et ex hoc sequitur quod omnia fiant a casu, vel necessitate fatali. Et quia impossibile est fieri a casu; ideo inducunt necessitatem fatalem Arabes, scilicet quod illae substantiae moventes orbem sunt causae omnium necessariae. -- Ex hoc sequitur veritas occultata, scilicet dispositionis mundialium secundum poenas et gloriam. Si enim illae substantiae movent non errantes, nihil ponitur de inferno, nec quod sit daemon; nec Aristoteles unquam posuit daemonem nec beatitudinem post hanc vitam, ut videtur. Iste est ergo triplex error, scilicet Occultatio exemplaritatis, divinae providentiae, dispositionis mundanae.

4. From this follows a threefold blindness or darkness, that is, concerning the eternity of the world, which seems to be Aristotle's thesis according to all the Greek doctors, for instance Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, the Damascene, Basil ⁶ and the commentators of all the Arabs, who say that Aristotle holds this opinion, and his words are seen to mean it. Never will you find that he said that the world had a principle or a beginning: he even argues against Plato ⁷ who seems to have been the only one to suppose that time began. And this [opinion of Aristotle] is contrary to the light of truth. From this follows blindness concerning the existence of a single intellect, for if the world is supposed to be eternal, one of these hypotheses must be true: that souls are infinite in number since there would be an infinite number of men; or that the soul is corruptible; or that it is transmitted from body to body; or that there is only one single intellect in all [rational beings], an error attributed to Aristotle by his commentator. ⁸ From these two propositions it may be concluded that after this life there is neither happiness nor pain.

4. Ex quibus sequitur triplex caecitas vel caligo, scilicet de aeternitate mundi, ut videtur dicere Aristoteles secundum omnes doctores Graecos, ut Gregorium Nyssenum, Gregorium Nazianzenum, Damascenum, Basilium, et commentatores omnium Arabum, qui dicunt, quod Aristoteles hoc sensit, et verba sua sonare videntur. Nunquam invenies, quod ipse dicat, quod mundus habuit principium vel initium; immo redarguit Platonem, qui solus videtur posuisse, tempus incepisse. Et istud repugnat lumini veritatis. Ex isto sequitur alia caecitas de unitate intellectus, quia, si ponitur mundus aeternus, necessario aliquod istorum sequitur: vel quod animae sunt infinitae, cum homines fuerint infiniti; vel quod anima est corruptibilis; vel quod est transitio de corpore in corpus; vel quod intellectus sit unus in omnibus, qui error attribuitur Aristoteli secundum Commentatorem. Ex his duobus sequitur, quod post hanc vitam non est felicitas nec poena.

5. These men, then, fell into error and were not separated from darkness: and these are the worst errors. And they are not yet closed by the key of the bottomless pit. ⁹ These are the obscurities of Egypt: although a great light had been seen in these things through earlier forms of knowledge, yet all light was put out by these errors. And some men, seeing that Aristotle had been so great in other matters and had expressed the truth so well, could not believe that in this he had not said the truth.

5. Hi ergo ceciderunt in errores nec fuerunt divisi a tenebris; et isti sunt pessimi errores. Nec adhuc clausi sunt clave putei abyssalis ² . Hae sunt tenebrae Aegypti ³ ; licet enim magna lux videretur in eis ex praecedentibus scientiis, tamen omnis extinguitur per errores praedictos. Et alii videntes, quod tantus fuit Aristoteles in aliis et ita dixit veritatem, credere non possunt, quin in istis dixerit verum.

2. Eternal Light, Examplar of All Things

6. But I say that the eternal light is the exemplar of all things, and that the mind, once lifted up as was the mind of others among the noble philosophers of antiquity, is able to reach it. And in the same light, the first thing to come to the mind is the exemplar of the virtues. As Plotinus ¹⁰ writes, "it is absurd that the exemplars of other things be in God, and not the exemplars of the virtues."

6. Dico ergo, quod illa lux aeterna est exemplar omnium, et quod mens elevata, ut mens aliorum nobilium philosophorum antiquorum, ad hoc pervenit. In illa ergo primo occurrunt animae exemplaria virtutum. «Absurdum enim est, ut dicit Plotinus, quod exemplaria aliarum rerum sint in Deo, et non exemplaria virtutum».

7. First to appear, then, in the eternal light, are the exemplary virtues, or the exemplars of the virtues, that is, the height of purity, the beauty of clarity, the strength of power and the straightness of diffusion. Philo, "the most learned of the Jews," writes of these as a philosopher: "Vapor is from the power of God and is a certain pure emanation from the clarity of the omnipotent God; and therefore nothing sullied is found in it." Behold, the height of purity. "Brightness is from eternal light, a spotless mirror of God's majesty and an image of His goodness." And below: "This light, then, is more beautiful than the sun, and its brilliance is incomparably superior to any pattern of stars." Behold, the beauty of clarity. But where there is a mirror and an image and brightness, there is necessarily representation and beauty. "Beauty is nothing else but harmonious proportion." ¹¹ And here, there are proportionate relationships retraced to unity. And because this light is most beautiful, it reaches everywhere on account of its purity.

7. Apparent ergo primo in luce aeterna virtutes exemplares sive exemplaria virtutum, scilicet celsitudo puritatis, pulcritudo claritatis, fortitudo virtutis, rectitudo diffusionis; de quibus Philo, «disseruimus Iudaeorum», loquens ut philosophus. -- Sapientiae septimo: Vapor est enim virtutis Dei et emanatio quaedam est claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera; et ideo nihil inquinatum in eam incurrit ⁴ ; ecce celsitudo puritatis. -- Candor est enim lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula Dei maiestatis et imago bonitatis illius ⁵ . Et infra: Est enim haec speciosior sole, et super omnem dispositionem stellarum luci comparata invenitur prior ⁶ ; ecce pulcritudo claritatis. Ubi enim est speculum et imago et candor, necessario est repraesentatio et pulcritudo. «Pulcritudo nihil aliud est quam aequalitas numerosa»; ibi autem sunt rationes numerosae ad unum reductae. Et quia est speciosissima, ideo attingit ubique propter suam munditiam.

8. From this it follows that it is also the most powerful. Hence, it is said: Wickedness prevails not over Wisdom. Indeed, she reaches from end to end mightily. Behold, the strength of power. It reaches from the summit or the supreme unto the infinite, from the intrinsic unto the extrinsic, from the first unto the last, for the center ¹² of its might is everywhere: and that is the very reason why its power is infinite.

8. Ex quo sequitur, quod sit fortissima; ideo dicitur: Sapientiam non vincit malitia. Attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter ¹ ; ecce fortitudo virtutis; attingit a summo vel supremo usque ad infimum, ab intrinseco usque ad extrinsecum, a primo usque ad ultimum, quia ubique est centrum suae potentiae: ideo virtus eius est infinita.

3. Cardinal Virtues

9. And because of this, it enjoys straightness of diffusion. Behold, justice. Hence, it is written that it governs all things well. And since the author expresses himself as a philosopher and as a lover of Wisdom, he writes: Her I loved and sought after from my youth; I sought to take her for my bride and was enamored of her beauty — not only in itself, but also because, coming from her, similar properties are flowering in me. Wherefore he continues: For she teaches moderation and prudence, justice and fortitude, and nothing in life is more useful for men than these.

9. Et ex hoc habet rectitudinem diffusionis; ecce iustitia; et ideo dicit: Disponit omnia suaviter ⁸ . -- Et quia loquitur ut philosophus et ut amator sapientiae; ideo dicit: Hanc amavi et exquisivi a iuventute mea et quaesivi sponsam mihi eam assumere et amator factus sum formae illius ⁹ ; non solum propter se, sed quia ab illa in me consequenter fiunt consimiles proprietates. Unde statim post sequitur: Sobrietatem enim et prudentiam et iustitiam et virtutem docet, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus ¹⁰ .

10. These are impressed upon the soul by the said exemplary light, and they go down into the cognitive, the affective and the operative faculties. The sincerity of temperance is marked by the height of purity; the serenity of prudence, by the beauty of clarity; the stability of constancy, by the strength of power; the sweetness of justice, by the straightness of diffusion. These are the four exemplary ¹³ virtues with which the whole of Scriptures is concerned; and Aristotle felt nothing about them, in contrast with ancient and noble philosophers.

10. Haec imprimuntur in anima per illam lucem exemplarem et descendunt in cognitivam, in affectivam, in operativam. Ex celsitudine puritatis imprimitur sinceritas temperantiae; ex pulcritudine claritatis, serenitas prudentiae; ex fortitudine virtutis stabilitas constantiae; ex rectitudine diffusionis suavitas iustitiae. -- Hae sunt quatuor virtutes exemplares, de quibus tota sacra Scriptura agit; et Aristoteles nihil de his sensit, sed antiqui et nobiles philosophi.

11. The same virtues are called cardinal in a threefold sense: either because through them an entrance is made toward acquiring all virtues;! or because they are principal since all virtues are contained within them; or again because it pertains to every rational aspect of human life to be directed and regulated by them in the four directions of the cardinal points of this lesser world, in imitation of the higher world, in matters of action and contemplation.

11. Cardinales dicuntur tripliciter: vel quia per ipsas est ingressus ad acquirendum omnes virtutes; vel quia sunt principales, in quibus integratur omnis virtus; vel quia omnis ratio vitae humanae habet dirigi et regulari per eas in quatuor cardinibus mundi minoris, ad similitudinem mundi maioris, quantum ad activam et contemplativam.

12. The Philosopher ¹⁴ says that "virtue is an intermediate point between two extremes, as the wise man will prescribe." It consists, indeed, in the quality of intermediateness. According to Augustine, in his book on Ethics, virtue is nothing else than a proper measure. Prudence finds this proper measure, so that you do not go too far in anything, but remain close to the center. Hence prudence is the driver ¹⁵ of the virtues. Wherefore prudence says: I have found the proper measure; and temperance acts as a watchman and says: I too wanted this; and justice acts as a distributor, willing not only for itself, but also for the other; and because many adversities occur after that, fortitude acts as a defender, lest the proper measure be lost.

12. Philosophus dicit, quod «virtus est medium duarum extremitatum, secundum quod sapiens determinabit»; est enim in medietate consistens. Virtus enim secundum Augustinum, in libro De moribus, non est aliud quam modus. Hunc modum prudentia invenit, ut in omnibus non excedas, sed circa centrum consistas. Unde prudentia auriga est virtutum. Unde dicit prudentia: ego inveni modum; et temperantia custodit et dicit: et hoc volebam ego; iustitia distribuit, ut non tantum velit sibi, sed et alteri; et quia postmodum multiplices adversitates eveniunt, fortitudo defendit, ne perdatur modus.

13. Again, these virtues are called cardinal in the second place because in terms of action the integrating virtues are received [from them]. They consist in modifying, through the addition of circumstances; rectifying—for there is a right reason which leads to the end and is coequal with the laws, ¹⁶ ordinating, and stabilizing. A virtue! is so called because it is the strength of the mind for the performance of good and the avoidance of evil. Temperance modifies, prudence rectifies, justice ordinates, and fortitude stabilizes. And each one of them is dependent upon the others. For temperance must be prudent, justice strong, while prudence must be sober, just and strong, etc. Gregory ¹⁷ writes: "How can a man be strong unless he is prudent?" Foolhardy is he who attempts what is beyond his strength. And so, the virtues are interrelated.

13. Item, secundo dicuntur cardinales, quia secundum actus accipiuntur integrantes virtutes, qui sunt quatuor: modificare per appositionem circumstantiarum, rectificare -- est enim recta ratio ducens in finem, coaequans legibus --, ordinare, stabilire. Ab hoc dicitur virtus, quia est robur mentis ad bonum faciendum et malum evitandum. Temperantia modificat, prudentia rectificat, iustitia ordinat, fortitudo stabilit. Et omnes se circumincedunt. Oportet enim, quod temperantia sit prudens, iustitia fortis; item, quod prudentia sit sobria, iusta et fortis etc. Gregorius: Quomodo potest esse fortis, nisi sit prudens? Temerarius est enim qui aggreditur quod super vires est; et ideo virtutes sunt connexae.

14. Finally, they are called cardinal in the third sense, for the whole of human life is directed along these four axes. Likewise, the sun has four aspects related to four parts of the world, East, South, North and West, in which it has four properties. Indeed, all life proceeds from the sun: in the East, it purifies, in the South, it gives light, in the North, it stabilizes, and in the West, it reconciles. So also the Sun of Justice places the sincerity of temperance in the East of the soul, the clarity of prudence in the South, the stability of constancy in the North and the sweetness of justice in the West. And in the Apocalypse, John explains in the same way the four sides of the city in relation to the four [cardinal] virtues; ¹⁸ and so also were the tribes arranged around the Meeting Tent.

14. Item, tertio modo dicuntur cardinales, quia omnis vita hominis his quatuor cardinibus gubernatur; sicut sol habet quatuor aspectus ad quatuor partes mundi, scilicet orientem, meridiem, aquilonem, occidentem, in quibus habet quatuor proprietates. A sole autem omnis vita: in oriente purificat, in meridie illuminat, in aquilone stabilit, in occidente conciliat. Sic Sol iustitiae in oriente mentis ponit sinceritatem temperantiae, in meridie claritatem prudentiae, in aquilone stabilitatem constantiae, in occidente suavitatem iustitiae. -- Et hoc modo in Apocalypsi Ioannes describit quatuor latera civitatis ¹¹ secundum quatuor virtutes cardinales; et ordinabantur etiam tribus iuxta tabernaculum.

a. Temperance

15. Temperance, which is from the East, is described as follows by Tullius: ¹⁹ "Temperance is firm and measured dominion of reason over passion and over other movements of the soul that are not righteous." Its parts are sobriety as regards taste, chastity as regards touch, and modesty as regards the other senses. The theologians call this modesty "discipline."

15. Temperantia, quae est ab oriente, sic describitur a Tullio: «Temperantia est rationis in libidinem aliosque animi motus non rectos firma et moderata dominatio». Partes eius sunt sobrietas in gustu, castitas in tactu, modestia in ceteris sensibus; quam modestiam vocant theologi disciplinam.

b. Prudence

16. The serenity of prudence, which is from the South, is described as follows: "Prudence is the knowledge of good and evil things, and the distinction between them. Its parts are memory, intelligence and providence." ²⁰ For prudence is concerned with present, past, and future things.

16. Serenitas prudentiae est a meridie, quae sic describitur: «Prudentia est bonorum et malorum scientia et utrorumque discretio, cuius partes sunt memoria, intelligentia, providentia». Prudentia enim est de praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris.

c. Fortitude

17. Fortitude, which is from the North, is thus described: "Fortitude consists in attacking dangers, or confronting them, and enduring them with constant effort." Its parts are confidence, patience, and perseverance. Confidence in attacking, patience in confronting, and perseverance in enduring.

17. Fortitudo ab aquilone, quae sic describitur: «Fortitudo est aggressio periculorum vel susceptio et eorundem constans et laboriosa perpessio». Cuius partes sunt fiducia, patientia, perseverantia: fiducia in aggrediendo, patientia in sustinendo, perseverantia in perseverando.

d. Justice

18. Finally, in the West is the sweetness of justice, which consists in showing reverence—for the laws tend to mitigate punishments. Hence, the purpose of justice is not severity but kindness. It is described as follows: "Justice is a disposition which attributes to each one his deserts, once the common good has been served." According to Tullius, its parts come from law, nature, and custom. From our viewpoint, the first establishes order in regard to superiors, the second in regard to inferiors, and the third in regard to equals.

18. Item, in occidente suavitas iustitiae, quae est in exhibitione pietatis -- volunt enim leges, poenas mitigari; unde finis iustitiae non est severitas, sed benignitas -- quae sic describitur: «Iustitia est habitus, communi utilitate servata, suam unicuique tribuens dignitatem». Partes eius secundum Tullium sunt ex lege, a natura, ex consuetudine; secundum nos una ordinat ad superiores, alia ad inferiores, tertia ad pares.

19. All this accords with the rule of reason; and as the sun gives life while going about the twelve zodiac signs, so also the sun of wisdom, radiating over the hemisphere of our mind and passing on, ordains our life through these twelve aspects of the virtues; and whatever other sciences a man may possess, if he have no virtue, neither does he have life; as also, whatever be the number of stars you possess, if you have no sun within the twelve signs, you have no day.

19. Hoc totum est per regulam rationis; et sicut sol transiens per duodecim signa dat vitam, sic sol sapientialis, in nostrae mentis hemisphaerio radians et transiens, per has duodecim partes virtutum ordinat vitam nostram; et quantumcumque homo habeat alias scientias, nisi habeat virtutes, non habet vitam; sicut, quantumcumque habeas stellas, nisi habeas solem in duodecim signis, non habebis diem.

4. Virtues Correspond To:

a. Four Principal Effects of Light

20. These are of such high nobility that the disposition of the world corresponds to them. Indeed, the virtues correspond to the four effects of light, the four properties of the elements, the four actions of the causes, and the four conditions of a healthy life. First, they correspond to the four principal effects of light. Light cleanses, illumines, perfects, and stabilizes. Temperance cleanses, prudence illumines, justice reconciles, and fortitude confirms.

20. Hae sunt tantae nobilitatis, quod dispositio mundi his correspondet. Virtutes enim configurantur quatuor lucis influentis, quatuor elementorum proprietatibus, quatuor causarum efficaciis, quatuor vitae salubritatibus. -- Primo, quatuor lucis principalibus influentis: lux purgat, illuminat, perficit et stabilit; temperantia purgat, prudentia illuminat, iustitia conciliat, fortitudo roborat.

b. Four Properties of the Elements

21. Again, they correspond to the four properties of the elements: on the earth, there is dryness and adornment; in the water, translucency with vividity of light; in the air, subtlety with softness; in fire, efficacy in action. The first is temperance, which dries and yet adorns and decks with flowers. Prudence corresponds to the translucency of water which is almost embodied with light. Justice matches the sweetness of air: for air goes up and down and moves right and left. Fortitude is comparable to the power of fire. Hence the author of the Canticle, speaking of fortitude, says: For love is strong as death, jealousy as hard as hell. The lamps thereof are fire and flames.

21. Item quatuor elementorum proprietatibus: in terra est ariditas adornata, in aqua perspicuitas cum intensione lucis, in aere Subtilitas cum mulcebritate, in igne virtuositas in actione. Prima est temperantia, quae aridum reddit, et tamen ornat et vestit floribus. Prudentia respondet aquae perspicuitati, quae quasi incorporata est luci. Iustitia respondet aeris mulcebritati; aer enim ascendit et descendit, ad dexteram et sinistram movetur. Fortitudo respondet vigori ignis; unde ille loquens de fortitudine dicit: Fortis est ut mors dilectio; dura sicut infernus emulatio; lampades eius lampades ignis atque flammarum ¹² .

c. Four Actions of the Causes

22. Once more, they correspond to the four actions of the causes: things are constituted ²¹ by their efficient, formal, final, and material causes. The efficient cause needs fortitude, the formal cause needs prudence, the final cause needs justice, and the material cause needs temperance, lest it overflow.

22. Item, quatuor causarum efficaciis: efficiens, forma, finis et materia integrant rem. Fortitudo debetur efficienti, prudentia formae; iustitia fini; temperantia materiae, ne defluat.

d. Four Conditions of a Healthy Life

23. Finally, they correspond to the four conditions of a healthy life: temperance, to subtlety of spirit; prudence, to vivacity of the senses; fortitude, to virile strength, and justice, ²² to the proper balance of qualities.

23. Item quatuor vitae salubritatibus: subtilitati spirituum, temperantia; vivacitati sensuum, prudentia; robori virium, fortitudo; coaequatum qualitatum, iustitia.

24. These virtues flow from eternal light in the hemisphere of our mind and they retrace the soul to its origin, as the vertical or direct ray also returns by that same path by which it had come down. And such is blessedness. And so, the first of these virtues are political, the second are for cleansing, and the third, for the soul already cleansed. The political virtues consist in action, the cleansing in contemplation, and those for the soul already cleansed, in the vision of light.

24. Hae virtutes fluunt a luce aeterna in hemisphaerium nostrae mentis et reducunt animam in suam originem, sicut radius perpendicularis sive directus eadem via revertitur, qua incessit. Et haec est beatitudo. Unde primo sunt politicae, secundo purgatoriae, tertio animi iam purgati. Politicae sunt in actione, purgatoriae in contemplatione, animi iam purgati in lucis visione.

25. And, as Origen ²³ writes, it is with these that Solomon is concerned; with the political, in Proverbs, with the cleansing, in Ecclesiastes, and with those for the soul already cleansed, in the Song of Songs. And noble philosophers attained the knowledge of them. Hence Macro- bius, ²⁴ quoting Plotinus, writes as follows: "Those who believe that philosophers alone are virtuous declare that none but philosophers are blessed. Since they see wisdom properly so called only in the acknowledgment of the divine, they declare wise only those who seek higher things with the fine point of their mind, understand them through inquiring with clear-sighted diligence, and express them as well as a perceptive life allows: and they say that the practice of the virtues consists in this alone.

25. Et de his agit Salomon, ut dicit Origenes, de politicis in Proverbiis, de purgatoribus in Ecclesiaste, de animis iam Purgatis in Cantico canticorum. Et in notitiam istarum pervenerunt nobiles philosophi. Unde Macrobius, narrans sententiam Plotini, dicit sic: «Qui aestimant nullis nisi philosophantibus inesse virtutes, nullos praeter philosophos beatos esse pronuntiant. Agnitionem enim rerum divinarum sapientiam proprie vocantes, eos tantummodo dicunt esse sapientes, qui superna acie mentis requirunt et quaerendi sagaci diligentia comprehendunt, et quantum vivendi perspicuitas praestat, imitantur, et in hoc solo dicunt esse exercitia virtutum».

26. "And this is how they distribute the functions of these virtues: To prudence, it pertains to despise this world and everything in it, through contemplation of the divine, and to direct every cognitive power of the soul toward the things of God. To temperance, it pertains to give up, as much as nature allows, all those things the use of the body demands. To fortitude, it pertains not to let the soul be terrified as it recedes in a certain way from the body under the leadership of philosophy, nor horrified by the loftiness of the perfect ascent toward things on high. To justice, it pertains to conform the service of each virtue to the single path of one's intention thus explained. And so, because of the precipice of this so rigid definition, political leaders cannot be blessed, or at least, not totally.

26. «Quarum sic officia dispensant: prudentiae esse mundum istum et omnia, quae in mundo sunt, divinorum contemplatione despicere omnemque animi cognitionem in sola divina dirigere; temperantiae, omnia relinquere, in quantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis, non terreri animam a corpore quodam modo ductu philosophiae recedentem nec altitudinem perfectae ad superna ascensionis horrere; iustitiae, ad unam sibi huius propositi consentire viam uniuscuiusque virtutis obsequium. Atque ita fit, ut secundum hoc tam rigidae definitionis abruptum rerum publicarum rectores beati esse, vel omnino esse non possint».

5. Plotinus: 4 Categories

27. "But Plotinus, a leader with Plato among the teachers of philosophy, offers in his work 'On Virtues' ²⁵ an orderly gradation of these virtues arranged according to a true and natural method of division. He says there are four genera of the fourfold virtues. Among these, the first are called political, the second are for cleansing, the third for the soul already cleansed, and the fourth are called exemplary.

27. «Sed Plotinus, inter philosophiae professores cum Platone princeps, in libro De virtutibus gradus earum vera et naturali divisionis ratione compositos per ordinem digerit. Quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum genera virtutum. Ex his primae politicae vocantur, secundae purgatoriae, tertiae animi iam purgati, quartae exemplares».

a. Political Virtues

28. "The political virtues are concerned with man, for he is a social animal. The good men in the government take counsel from them, and guard the cities; by these they venerate their parents, love their children, and are kindly to their neighbors; by these, they take care of the welfare of the citizens; by these, they protect their companions through careful foresight, attract them by a just generosity, and through these, 'they make others remember them for their merit.' ²⁶

28. «Et sunt politicae hominis, quia sociale animal est. His boni viri reipublicae consulunt, urbes tuentur; his parentes venerantur, li- beros amant, proximos diligunt; his civium salutem gubernant; his socios circumspecta providentia protegunt, iusta liberalitate devincunt, hisque "sui memores alios fecere merendo"».

29. "And it pertains to political prudence that a man direct all things to the norm of reason — his thoughts and whatever he does —and that he will or do nothing besides what is right, but that he attend to human acts as by divine judgments. In prudence are included reason, intellect, circumspection, foresight, docility and care. "Fortitude lifts the spirit above the fear of danger, is afraid of nothing besides evil, and sustains adversity and prosperity with equal strength. Fortitude implies magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, tolerance, and firmness. "Temperance consists in desiring nothing liable to remorse, never exceeding the law of moderation, and taming cupidity under the yoke of reason. The followers of temperance are modesty, shame, abstinence, chastity, decency, measure or moderation, parsimony, sobriety and pudicity. "Justice consists in attributing to each man what is his; and from justice come forth innocence, friendship, concord, devotion, religion, kindness, and humanity. "By means of these virtues, the good man becomes the ruler first of himself and then of the state, justly and providently ruling human affairs while respecting those of God.

29. «Et est politicae prudentiae ad rationis normam quae cogitat, quaecumque agit, universa dirigere, ac nihil praeter rectum velle vel facere, humanisque actibus tanquam divinis arbitriis providere. Prudentiae insunt ratio, intellectus, circumspectio, providentia, docilitas, cautio. -- Fortitudinis est animum supra periculi metum agere, nihilque nisi turpia timere, tolerare fortiter vel adversa vel prospera. Fortitudo praestat magnanimitatem, fiduciam, securitatem, magnificentiam, constantiam, tolerantiam, firmitatem. -- Temperantiae est nihil appetere poenitendum, in nullo legem moderationis excedere, sub iugum rationis cupiditatem domare. Temperantiam sequuntur modestia, verecundia, abstinentia, castitas, honestas, moderamen vel moderatio, parcitas, sobrietas, pudicitia. -- Iustitiae est servare unicuique quod suum est; et de iustitia veniunt innocentia, amicitia, concordia, pietas, religio, affectus, humanitas. His virtutibus vir bonus primum sui atque inde reipublicae rector efficitur, iuste ac provide gubernans humana, divina non deserens».

b. Cleansing

30. "The second category [of virtues], which are called cleansing, pertains to man as fit for God, and are useful only to the spirit of the man who has decided to cleanse himself of the contagion of the body, and to enter, through some kind of flight from human matters, into nothing but the things of God. These virtues belong to free individuals who have cut themselves away from political activities. What each one of them is intended for, we have explained above ²⁷ when speaking of the virtues of philosophers, which some believed to be the only virtues.

30. «Secundae, quas purgatorias vocant, hominis sunt, qui divini capax est, solumque animum eius expediunt, qui decrevit se a corporis contagione purgare et quadam humanorum fuga solis se inserere divinis. Hae sunt otiosorum, qui a rerum publicarum actibus se sequestrant. Harum quid singulae velint, superius expressimus, cum de virtutibus philosophantium diceremus, quas solas quidam aestimaverunt esse virtutes».

c. Simply and Purely Washed of Every Stain of This World

31. "The third category [of virtues] pertains to the soul that is already purged and cleansed and is simply and purely washed of every stain of this world. In this regard, the role of prudence is not only to prefer divine things as the result of a choice, but to know nothing but them, and to look upon them as upon nothing else. The role of temperance is not only to repress earthly cravings, but to forget them completely; that of fortitude, to ignore passions instead of overcoming them, so that a man be incapable of anger and desire nothing; that of justice, to have such mental intercourse with high and divine things that a perpetual alliance be preserved with them by imitating them.

31. «Tertiae sunt purgati iam defaecatique animi et ab omni mundi huius aspergine presse pureque detersi. Illic prudentiae est divina non quasi in electione praeferre, sed sola nosse et haec tanquam nihil sit aliud, intueri; temperantiae, terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci; fortitudinis, passiones ignorare, non vincere, ut nesciat irasci, cupiat nihil; iustitiae, ita cum superna et divina mente sociari, ut servet perpetuum cum ea foedus imitando».

d. Exemplary

32. "The fourth category [of virtues] represents the exemplary, which exist in the mind of God, called vous as we said, and from the example of which all the others derive in an orderly manner. For if it is a matter of faith that the ideas of other things are found in the mind of God, much more so the ideas of the virtues. In this regard, prudence is the very mind of God; temperance, the fact that this mind is turned upon itself by a perpetual intention; fortitude, the fact that it is always the same and is never changed in anything whatsoever; justice, the fact that by an eternal law, it is not deflected from the continuation of its sempiternal operation. "These are the genera of the virtues, four times four in number, which, more than in any other way, are distinguished in the passions, "

32. «Quartae sunt exemplares, quae in ipsa divina mente consistunt, quam diximus mun vocari, a quarum exemplo reliquae omnes per ordinem defluunt. Nam si rerum aliarum, multo magis virtutum ideas esse in mente divina credendum est. Illic prudentia est ipsa mens divina; temperantia, quod in se perpetua intentione conversa est; fortitudo, quod semper idem est nec aliquando mutatur; iustitia, quod perenni lege a sempiterna operis sui continuatione non flectitur. -- Haec sunt quaternarum quatuor genera virtutum, quae praeter cetera maximam in passionibus habent differentiam sui». Hucusque Plotinus.