Chapter 1
Chapter I.
The words of Ecclesiastes etc. This entire book is divided into three parts: into the title or proem and the treatise, which begins there: Vanity of vanities etc.; and the epilogue, which begins there: And since Ecclesiastes was most wise.
In the title the efficient cause is made manifest, in the treatise the material and formal causes, in the epilogue the final cause.
On the title.
(Vers. 1.). In the title, therefore, the author is made manifest with respect to wisdom, with respect to goodness, and with respect to royal power.
By reason of wisdom he says: The words of Ecclesiastes, supply: what follows are the words of Ecclesiastes; because Ecclesiastes means preacher, and one cannot be a preacher unless he is wise, because it is said in Proverbs twenty-six: "As if a thorn should grow in the hand of a drunkard, so unfitting is a parable in the mouth of fools"; whence Proverbs seventeen: "Eloquent words do not befit a fool."
With respect to goodness it is made manifest when it says: Son of David. For David was holy, and sons by imitation are holy; whence in Scripture it is a name of kindness and gentleness: Matthew fifteen: (Have mercy on me, Son of David."
With respect to royal power, when it says: King of Jerusalem, because Jerusalem was the most noble city and the capital of the whole kingdom, below: I, Ecclesiastes, was king of Israel in Jerusalem, because there he chiefly dwelt.
QUESTIONS.
I. Here a question arises: since Solomon composed three books, why is it that he prefixes a title to the book of Proverbs and to this one, in which his name is expressed, but does not prefix one in the Song of Songs?
I respond: it must be said that in the book of Proverbs Solomon himself is introduced speaking as a wise man to a disciple, whence he calls his hearer son: similarly here he is introduced as a man who has experienced various things; but in the Song of Songs it is the bride and bridegroom who speak. Lest
therefore it should seem that they were the words of Solomon to his wife,
but rather they are of Christ to the Church,
he does not prefix his name there. But here, because he was for the most part speaking in his own person, and in the book of Proverbs, therefore he prefixes a title in which his name is specified and disclosed.
II. Likewise it is asked why in the book of Proverbs he says parables, but here he says words.
If you say that there he speaks parabolically and figuratively, but here openly: then I ask, why here and there he employs a different manner of proceeding.
I respond: it must be said that there is a certain mode of speaking that is proper and open, and another that is parabolic: and this latter is twofold: one through parables and open similitudes, another through hidden and profound ones. Since therefore Solomon in the book of Proverbs speaks to the little ones and the unlearned, he therefore speaks parabolically and openly: but since in Ecclesiastes he speaks to those who are advancing, therefore openly and properly: but in the Song of Songs, since he speaks to the perfect, whose food is solid food, therefore parabolically and hiddenly.
III. The question is: why in the title of Proverbs does he call himself by his own name, but here he calls himself Ecclesiastes?
I respond: it must be said that, as Jerome says, Solomon had three names, which indeed suited him according to the threefold scripture which he produced. For he was called Solomon, called Ecclesiastes, and Jedidiah. Solomon, the peaceful one, because he possessed the entire kingdom in peace: whence he also handed down the teaching of proverbs to all. Ecclesiastes, the preacher, because he speaks in the persons of various people. Jedidiah means the same as beloved of the Lord.
Therefore he calls himself Ecclesiastes, because in this book he brings forward the opinions of various persons and accordingly persuades in diverse ways. He was called Jedidiah in the title of the Psalm Eructavit, which is about him according to the literal sense.
IV. Likewise it is asked: why here does he call himself son of David and king of Jerusalem, but in Proverbs he calls himself king of Israel?
I respond: one reason is taken from the side of the author, because, according to what the Hebrews believe, this book was written by Solomon when he was doing penance and humbling himself. And therefore in Proverbs he does not name himself from another,
but rather manifests the power of his entire kingdom: here however he humbles himself: therefore, naming himself from another, he indicates not the whole power but a part, and therefore etc.
Another reason was from the side of the work, because in Proverbs he leads to the knowledge of things to be done, but here to the contempt of present things. And because very many are those who wish more to be wise than to despise present things: therefore there he calls himself king of Israel, but here king of Jerusalem, because despisers of the world are citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem, who do not have here an abiding city, but seek the future one.
V. And from this the solution to that question which can be raised is clear: why here he does not express the end, as in Proverbs. Because the end of Proverbs is wisdom, which attracts one to listen: the end of this book is contempt of the world, about which few wish to hear.
From these things it is clear why he said words, why he said Ecclesiastes, why of the son of David, why king of Jerusalem, and why he also did not add anything about the usefulness of the teaching of this book, as in Proverbs.
There follows the treatment of this book.
(Vers. 2.). Vanity of vanities, said Ecclesiastes, vanity of vanities, and all is vanity.
Here begins the treatise: and because "the end imposes necessity upon those things which are ordered to the end," since the end of this book is the contempt of all things and the fear of God alone, therefore in all things he intends to show vanity. And because he proceeds as a preacher by persuading and proving,
therefore this treatise has three parts: because first he proposes what he intends to prove, namely that there is vanity in all things; second he proves it, there: What more does man have from his labor, etc.; third he concludes it as proven near the end: Vanity of vanities, etc.
The proposition of the thing to be proven.
He therefore proposes a threefold vanity in things, namely of penality, of iniquity, of mutability. As to the vanity of penality: Vanity of vanities, said Ecclesiastes, that is, he proposed. Concerning this, below in the second chapter: All his days are full of labors, nor does his mind rest at night: and is this not vanity? — As to the vanity of iniquity he says again: Vanity of vanities; whence Jeremiah 10: Their works are vain and worthy of ridicule: in the day of their visitation they shall perish.
As to the vanity of mutability he says: and all is vanity, because all things are subject to mutability; Romans 8: The creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly; and below in the third chapter: All things are subject to vanity, and all go to one place. Therefore it is not a repetition of words when he says vanity three times, but a wondrous distinction of intelligible things.
And it should be noted that this threefold vanity follows in sequence, and one arises from another: because the vanity of iniquity arises from the vanity of mutability, although that is not the whole cause; but the vanity of penality arises from the vanity of iniquity. He therefore arranges these vanities in a reverse resolutory order, and pursues them in the opposite order in what follows. And because that twofold vanity has its origin from another vanity, but the third does not, therefore he says vanity of vanities twice, and afterwards only vanity.
It should also be noted that this threefold vanity is found in man, because he is the one upon whom falls punishment and fault: and on account of this it is said in the Psalm: Every living man is altogether vanity. For there is in him the vanity of nature, the vanity of fault, and the vanity of punishment. Concerning the vanity of nature, in the Psalm: Man is made like unto vanity; his days pass away like a shadow. Concerning the vanity of fault, likewise in the Psalm: The Lord knows the thoughts of men, that they are vain. Concerning the vanity of punishment, Job 14: Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries.
It should also be noted that Solomon himself speaks of himself as if of another, just as John, in the twenty-first chapter: This is that disciple who bears witness concerning these things; and similarly Moses. Now a threefold reason can be assigned for this: one is on the part of the first efficient cause, because the Holy Spirit himself is the author of Scripture, not Solomon or another; therefore, when he is introduced in sacred Scripture, Scripture ought to speak of him as if of another, just as Balaam said in Numbers, the twenty-fourth chapter: The hearer of the words of God said, etc.
Another reason is taken from the part of the immediate efficient cause: because Scripture shuns all pride and displays humility; and therefore no teacher in it ought to speak of himself as of himself, but for the sake of humility, as if of another. - The third reason: when Scripture intimates great and wondrous things, it ought to show them as if from afar; whence Hugh says: "This manner of speaking, as often as it is employed in Scripture, is done either for the sake of humility or of wonder. For we ought both to remove great things from ourselves on account of humility, and to show wondrous things as if from afar on account of wonder." An example is found in Paul and John.
Division of the entire proof.
What more does man have, etc. Above he proposed what he intends to prove; here he begins to prove it. And just as a threefold vanity was proposed to exist in things, so also a threefold vanity is proved to exist. Whence this part has three parts. For first he shows there to be in things the vanity of mutability; second, the vanity of iniquity, at: I saw under the sun, in the place of judgment, wickedness; third, the vanity of punishment, below in the seventh chapter: I have tried all things in wisdom. "The first is natural and fitting, as Hugh says; the second is culpable, because perverse; the third is penal and miserable."
Part I. The vanity of mutability is proved with respect to two things.
Now mutability in things is considered in two ways: in one way by reason of change, in another way in comparison to the measure of a definite time. First, therefore, the vanity of mutable nature is treated with respect to change; second, with respect to time, below in the third chapter: All things have their time.
First part, member I. The vanity of mutable nature is shown with respect to change. The first has two parts, because first he shows that there is mutability in things, and through this, vanity; second, from the knowledge of it he reproves his own curiosity, at: I, Ecclesiastes, was king, etc.
Article 1. Mutability is proved in the existence of creatures with respect to a twofold being.
Therefore mutability is first shown in the existence of creatures. And because creatures have a threefold being, namely in the Word, by reason of exemplarity; in the universe, by mode of materiality; in the human mind, by mode of abstraction—the first being is unfailing and immutable, whence it has no vanity; but in the others there is vanity. And therefore this part has two divisions: because first the vanity of mutability in things is noted according to the being which they have in the universe; second, with respect to the being which they have in the human mind, at: All things are difficult, etc.
The vanity of mutability according to the being of things in the universe is proved, and this in three ways.
The first part has three divisions according to three kinds of creatures, in which he shows mutability: because first he shows it in the rational creature; second, in the celestial, at: The sun rises; third, in the elemental, at: Traversing all things, etc.
(Vers. 3. 4.). Therefore, as to the rational creature, namely man, he shows there to be mutability, from which one can be delivered by no labor; on account of which he says: What more does man have from all his labor, with which he labors under the sun? Supply: except vanity and mutability, as if to say: nothing. Concerning this labor it is said in Job 5: "A bird is born to fly, and man to labor"; and Genesis 3: "Cursed is the earth in your work; in labor you shall eat from it all the days of your life."
And that he has nothing more than vanity, he shows when he adds: A generation passes away, and a generation comes. Therefore there is change and succession both in man and in his works. Sirach 14: "Some things are generated, and others are cast down; so is the generation of flesh and blood: one ends, and another is born," according to what is said in James 4: "What is your life but a vapor appearing for a little while"? But when they are corrupted, they do not pass into nothing, but into something, because into earth; whence it was said to Adam: "You are dust, and to dust you shall return." Therefore he adds: But the earth stands forever, as it were the matter into which dissolution takes place. Psalm: "Who founded the earth upon its stability"; and Proverbs 8: "When he was weighing the foundations of the earth."
(Vers. 8. 6.). The sun rises and sets, etc. Here secondly he shows mutability in the celestial nature, as is evident in the sun, which never rests, but when it rises, it tends toward setting, whence it does not remain in its rising. Therefore he says: The sun rises and sets, so that it does not remain in the place of rising nor even in the place of setting; thence he adds: And it returns to its place. Nor does it remain there, whence he also adds: And there being born again it circles
through the south. Nor does it remain even in the middle place; therefore he adds: And it bends toward the north.
This can be explained with respect to the diurnal motion, or also the annual. With respect to the diurnal, Hugh says: "The sun rises daily, when it is presented to human sight. It sets when, descending to the lower parts, it withdraws itself from our eyes. It returns to its place, because, driven by the rotation beneath, it again returns to its place. But rising again it circles through the south, because by an oblique course it ascends from the east to the meridian line; then it turns toward the north, because, descending toward the west, it again inclines toward the north by an oblique progression."
With respect to the annual motion, thus: "The sun rises when through the vernal equinox it ascends to our pole. It sets when, passing through the autumnal equinox, it descends to the lower regions. It circles through the south when it lingers in the winter signs. It turns toward the north when it revolves in the summer signs, which are nearer to the northern pole." And thus the sun does not stand still by nature, but only by miracle, as is read in Joshua 10: "Sun, stand still over Gibeon, and moon, over the valley of Ajalon," etc.
(Vers. 6.). Surveying all things. Here is touched upon thirdly the mutability in elemental nature, and first with respect to air, and second with respect to water, at the words: All the rivers enter into the sea.
With respect to air, he touches upon the mutability in spirit or in wind, which is either the motion of air according to some philosophers, or according to Aristotle the motion of vapor in the air, by whose motion the air is also moved. On account of which he says: Surveying all things, the spirit goes about in a circuit, that is, the wind circuits by surveying all things. Spirit is said to mean wind: Exodus 15: "Your spirit blew, O Lord, and the sea covered them"; and in the Psalm: "Fire, hail, snow, ice, the spirit of storms."
This goes about in a circuit, because it arises from the four regions of the earth: Zechariah 2: "Flee from the land of the north, for I have scattered you to the four winds of heaven"; and Ezekiel 37: "Come from the four winds, O spirit," etc. For there are four principal winds and eight collateral ones.
And it returns to its circuits, because the wind ceases when that vapor comes to rest and returns to the earth whence it arose. And because that cause is hidden, therefore it is said in the Psalm: "Who brings forth winds from his treasuries," that is, from hidden places.
Or, as the Gloss explains, this can be understood of the sun with respect to the annual motion, which surveys all things and returns in the circles of the zodiac; and the sun is called spirit because it is the principle and cause of all life, whence it causes all other things to breathe.
(Vers. 7.). All the rivers etc. Here mutability is touched upon with respect to visible elemental nature, namely water, because there is no stability there: for all waters move toward the sea; whence he says: All the rivers enter into the sea, namely the great ocean, concerning which it is said in Job thirty-eight: "Who shut up the sea with doors, when it burst forth, as if proceeding from a womb"? And this motion is not terminated, because the sea is not filled: therefore he adds: And the sea does not overflow. And because this seems wonderful, therefore he gives the cause of this: To the place whence they go forth, the rivers return, not so that they may rest there, but so that they may flow again. The rivers go forth secretly, they return openly, because they go forth through subterranean channels and certain filtrations. And thus all things are carried in a circuit and are subject to vanity. Hugh: "Behold how all things are carried in a circuit and are subject to vanity: and we know that a circle has no end: those things therefore that run in a circuit run indeed, but do not arrive at an end. What rest therefore can be hoped for, where there can be no stability? And therefore it is said of the impious: 'The head of their circuit'; and again: 'The impious walk in a circuit'; and again: 'My God, make them like a wheel.'"
Spiritually it should be noted who this sun is, who this surveying spirit is, what are the rivers that go around and return.
This sun is Christ, concerning whom Malachi four: "The Sun of Justice shall rise upon you who fear my name." This sun rises in the nativity to illuminate: Isaiah sixty: "Arise, be illuminated, Jerusalem": and John one: "He was the true light, which illuminates every man." - This sun sets in the passion to redeem: Amos eight: "The sun shall set at midday," that is, in the vehement love of charity. - This sun returns to its place in the ascension: Luke nineteen: "A certain man went into a far country" etc. - This sun circles through the south, that is, in the fervent love of the Saints: Song of Songs one: "Show me, O you whom my soul loves, where you feed, where you lie down at midday": and John fourteen: "If anyone loves me" etc., afterwards: "We will come to him and make our abode with him." - This sun turns to the north in the final judgment: Jeremiah one: "From the north shall all evil be spread" etc.
This surveying spirit is the Holy Spirit, who
is therefore said to survey, because he makes us search all things: First Corinthians two: "The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God."
He is said to go
in a circuit, because he makes us go around: whence Wisdom chapter seven: "The spirit of wisdom is mobile"; likewise also going around, because he makes us consider the circuit of misery: Job chapter one: "Naked I came forth from my mother's womb, and naked shall I return thither." Likewise the circuit of grace, concerning which John chapter sixteen: "I came forth from the Father and came into the world, and again I leave the world and go to the Father." Likewise of glory, Ezekiel chapter one: "This was the appearance of splendor round about, and this was the likeness of the glory of the Lord." The Spirit of God makes one consider this: Second Corinthians chapter three: "We with unveiled face shall behold the glory of the Lord," etc.
This circuit consists in the consideration that all things are from God and unto God. And Dionysius says that the Angels are moved circularly around the throne.
The rivers: These are the rivers of graces, concerning which John chapter seven: "He who believes in me, as the Scripture says, rivers shall flow from his belly."
The sea, from which the rivers have their origin, is the immensity of divine generosity, which is neither increased nor diminished: "For great is our Lord and great is his power, and of his wisdom there is no number."
To this sea the rivers of thanksgiving return, so that they may flow again: John chapter four: "Whoever drinks of this water which I shall give him, it shall become in him a fountain of water springing up unto eternal life." From this they go forth: James chapter one:
"Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above." And just as rivers cease to exist and dry up when they cease to flow and are still, so also with the gifts of graces: the Psalm: "You broke open fountains and torrents," through generosity; "you dried up the rivers of Ethan," through the severity of judgment.
Questions.
1. The question is asked here first concerning what he says: What more does man have, etc.?
1. This seems to be a heretical opinion and to agree with that which says that vain is everyone, who serves God.
2. Likewise in the Psalm it is said: The patience of the poor shall not perish in the end: therefore something, etc.
3. Likewise Proverbs chapter twelve: He who works his land shall be satisfied with bread: therefore it is good to work and to labor.
I respond: as Hugh says, emphasis must be placed
on this, that he says: In which he labors under the sun: "for it is the same as if he were to say: under time."
On account of which it should be noted that certain things come to be with time, such as those whose origin time did not precede, as the angelic nature and prime matter. Certain things come to be in time, which began after the origin of time but do not have their setting in time, such as the soul of Peter. Certain things come to be in time and under time, which begin after the origin of time and are terminated in time, of which kind are mutable things. And such things are twofold: for some come to be for time and under time, and such things pass away in act and in fruit; some for eternity, and such things pass away in act but remain in root and in fruit, because the good will remains to be rewarded for eternity.
When therefore he says that man has nothing but vanity from all his labor with which he labors under the sun:
this is understood insofar as labor is under time with respect to act and intention; and then it has no place among good things.
II. Likewise, there is a question concerning what he says: The earth stands forever.
To the contrary: 1. Matthew twenty-four: Heaven and earth shall pass away: therefore the earth does not stand.
2. Likewise, Apocalypse twenty-one: I saw a new heaven and a new earth, therefore the earth grows old: therefore it does not stand, etc.
I respond: it must be said that the earth standing is twofold: either with respect to substance, or with respect to figure or disposition; I say that the earth stands forever with respect to substance, but passes away with respect to figure: First Corinthians seven: The figure of this world passes away. But men are generated and corrupted with respect to substance, so that they are rightly called not men but the dead.
Or eternal is said in multiple ways: in one way, that which does not have an end prescribed in Scripture: thus the land of promise was given to the children of Israel as an eternal possession. In another way, that which has an end, but not in time: thus time is said to be eternal. In the third way, that whose signification is never ended. In the fourth way, that whose substance is never ended. In the fifth way, that whose substance neither ends nor began.
In this last way, God alone; in the fourth way it applies to the earth with respect to substance, in the third way with respect to signification, in the first two ways with respect to figure.
And thus the response to that is clear in two ways.
III. Likewise, there is a question concerning what he says: The sun rises and sets.
For since other luminaries likewise rise, it is asked why he speaks more of the sun than of others?
2. Likewise, he seems to proceed in a disordered manner, because he says that it sets before he says that it circles through the south: for it circles before it sets.
I respond: to this it must be said that once mutability has been established in the sun, which is the noblest and most luminous among the heavenly bodies, it is sufficiently given to be understood in the others.
2. To that second objection it must be said that he does not arrange them according to progression, but according to dimensions or the limits of dimensions. Therefore, because east and west are opposites, they are immediately ordered together; likewise, because south and north are opposites, they are similarly placed immediately in the manner of a cross.
IV. But 1. there is a doubt about what he says: It returns to its place, because in the firmament no one place of the sun is more its place than another.
If you say that it returns to the place from which it began its course: this is manifestly false, because the sun is always moved by its own motion either ascending or descending; therefore it never returns to the same place.
2. Likewise, what does he mean when he says: Turning toward the north. For if the sun is moved by diurnal motion with the motion of the firmament, and the firmament moves uniformly and similarly, then it does not turn more toward the arctic pole than toward the antarctic, or conversely.
If you say that this is understood of its proper motion: but the sun according to its proper motion ascends and descends in the zodiac, and when it ascends, it approaches the north; when it descends, it draws near to the south; therefore it does not turn more toward the north than toward the south.
I respond: it must be said that one can speak of the motion of the sun as diurnal and annual. If we speak of the annual motion, it is true that the sun returns to its place, because it began to move from there. But if we understand this of the diurnal motion, it does not return to its place from which it began to move according to the truth, but according to our estimation, since it does not make a sphere but a spiral.
2. To the second it must similarly be said that if we speak of the annual motion, it holds true according to the four seasons, as was said above, because it rises in spring, sets in autumn, circles through the south in winter, and turns toward the north in summer. — But if you understand this of the diurnal motion, this does not hold true except according to our estimation. For we see the firmament moving, and we imagine its poles to the right and to the left; but it is not so, rather one pole is as if above our heads, namely the northern; the other as if beneath our feet. When therefore the sun revolves according to the poles of the firmament, it does not go directly above our heads and beneath our feet, but as if transversally; and because we see according to the level plane, it seems to us that by day it inclines toward the south and by night toward the north.
V. Likewise there is a question about what he says: The rivers go forth from the sea.
Against: The sea is bitter, and rivers are sweet; but contraries do not have their origin from one principle, nor one from another; therefore neither does the sea come from rivers, nor rivers from the sea.
I respond: it must be said that all water by nature is sweet or tasteless, as the Philosopher says; but it becomes bitter accidentally, either through the evaporation of the subtle parts, with the earthly parts remaining, or through the admixture of earthly parts. Conversely, that water, just as it was accidentally made bitter, can return to sweetness through refinement, as is shown by the experiment of an earthen vessel placed in the sea. Since therefore rivers, even though they return to the sea in great abundance, nevertheless flow out secretly and underground and through a certain filtration, the water is refined and turned to sweetness.
As to the objection, then, that one of two contraries does not have its origin from the other: it must be said that water is not contrary to water; and if it has a contrary disposition, it has this not by nature but by accident, as is evident in hot and cold water. Nor is the origin of rivers from the sea by reason of property, because sweetness is prior by nature in water, but with respect to outflow, as the drawing of wine from a cask: because that place contains an abundance of waters, from which emanation ceaselessly occurs.
Second, the vanity of the mutability of things is considered according to the being which they have in the human intellect, and this is proven by a threefold argument.
All things are difficult etc. Above, the vanity in things was determined according to the being, which they have in the universe: here vanity is determined according to the being, which they have in the human intellect: and vanity is shown in them in three ways: first, because they are not evident: second, because they do not satisfy, at: The eye is not satisfied with seeing: third, because they do not endure, at: There is no remembrance of former things. They are not evident for interpreting or teaching; they do not satisfy so as to refresh and quiet the learner; they do not endure for remembering. And these three correspond to a threefold power in us: the interpretive, the cognitive, and the memorative.
(Vers. 8.). First, therefore, it is noted that they are not evident for explaining; thus he says: All things are difficult, namely for discovering their reason; whence Wisdom 9: "With difficulty we estimate the things that are on earth, and we find with labor the things that are before us"; below in chapter 8: "I understood that man can find no reason for the works of God" etc.; and therefore, because they are difficult, man cannot explain them in speech: Job 38: "Who shall declare the reason of the heavens"? Sirach 43: (We shall say much and shall fall short in words: the consummation of words is he himself".
(Vers. 8. 9.10.). Is not satisfied etc. Here in the second place it is touched upon that they do not fill so as to refresh the learner; and because we learn most by two senses, namely sight and hearing, he shows that in neither is there satiety; and therefore he says: The eye is not satisfied with seeing: Proverbs twenty-seven: "For the eyes of men are insatiable." Nor is the ear filled with hearing, since there is an itching to hear new and curious things: Second Timothy four: "They will heap up to themselves teachers according to their own desires, having itching ears." And the reason for this is that that in which there is true satiety, neither has the eye seen nor has the ear perceived: First Corinthians two: "Neither has the eye seen, nor has the ear heard" etc.
And that one cannot be refreshed in these earthly things, he shows, because the eye and ear wish to perceive new things; but nothing remains in newness; therefore the ear and eye are filled by nothing. He supposes the major premise, and it is made manifest in Acts seventeen: "The Athenians spent their time in nothing else but either saying or hearing something new"; but here he proposes the minor, because nothing has newness, neither with respect to being nor with respect to becoming. Therefore he says: What is it that has been? He asks and he himself responds: The same that shall be; therefore by simple conversion: what shall be has been. Similarly it follows: What is it that has been done? He responds: The same that is to be done; therefore by simple conversion: what is to be done has been done. — And from this he concludes: Nothing is new under the sun, nor can anyone say: Behold this is recent; therefore neither to say nor to hear anything new. And he repeats the proof: For they have already gone before in the ages that were before us: Second Peter three: "Since our fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they are."
(Vers. 11.). There is no remembrance of former things. In the third place it is touched upon here that things do not endure so as to be remembered, because all things are delivered to oblivion; whence he says: There is no remembrance of former things, namely among us who come after: Wisdom two: "Our name shall receive oblivion through time, and no one shall have remembrance of our works." And so it is in things past and in things future; whence he adds: But neither indeed shall there be remembrance of those things that are to come hereafter among those who shall be in the last time, that is: later generations shall not be mindful of former things, and this on account of time, which brings on oblivion; below in chapter two: "Future times shall cover all things with oblivion."
Questions.
I. It is asked concerning what he says: All things are difficult.
On the contrary: 1. There are many things whose knowledge is common to us and to brutes; therefore it is not difficult for man to know what a beast knows.
2. Likewise, there are certain things in which it does not happen to err, as in the knowledge of sensible things
because the sense is not deceived regarding its proper object
and of intelligible principles, such as axioms, and such things are easy to know.
3. Likewise, what does he mean when he says: Man cannot explain them in speech? It is easier for man to speak than for any creature to operate easily; therefore if it is easy for any creature to operate, then it is easy for man to explain its operation.
I respond: it must be said that there is knowing incompletely, as when something is known according to its accidents, or according to some operation. There is again knowing perfectly, and he knows perfectly who fully knows the substance, power, and operation, and the causes and reasons of these. And because power is hidden, and substance is remote from the senses, therefore all things are difficult for us.
1. As to the objection that we know some things in common with brute animals, this is true in a certain way, as that this is bitter; but a brute animal knows nothing fully.
2. Similarly the second is clear: because insofar as something is sensible, it is manifest.
3. Through this the following is also clear: because to say something and to explain it differ: for to explain is to draw out hidden reasons that are inwardly wrapped up; and no one can do this unless he understands; and this is arduous and belongs to few.
II. Likewise, there is a question about what he says: The eye is not satisfied with seeing, etc.
1. It is asked why he does not adduce the other senses, since it is similarly possible to know through them?
2. Likewise, what does he mean when he says: Is not satisfied? For one is said to be satisfied when he no longer desires more of what he was desiring; but it sometimes happens that a man does not want to see or hear more, but rather to rest: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, if it is not satisfied, then their desire never rests; therefore since a desire that has no rest is frustrated of its end, and every such thing is vain, therefore the desire of sight is vain.
I respond: it must be said that he mentions only these two senses because he speaks of the senses insofar as they are a way into knowledge and are referred to sensual delight. And the word by which we recognize all things is twofold: namely the divine word and the human word. The divine word is every creature, because it speaks God: this word the eye perceives. The human word is the uttered voice, and this the ear perceives.
Or because knowledge is twofold: through discovery and teaching; for the first regards sight, while the second regards hearing.
1. 2. As to the objection about satisfaction: I say that he speaks of the satisfaction of these insofar as they are organs of the heart and of the will or appetite; and because the heart is not satisfied, neither are these two senses. Hence Hugh: "All beauty, all delight, all sweetness of created things can affect the human heart, but cannot satisfy it—only that sweetness alone, for which it was made, can satisfy it."
3. As to the objection about being frustrated: this is false, because it is terminated elsewhere.
2. As to the objection that one does not want more: this is because one grows weary and is disgusted, not because one is satisfied.
Likewise, there is a question about what he says: Nothing is new under the sun.
The contrary seems to be the case: 1. Jeremiah thirty-one: The Lord will make a new thing upon the earth.
2. Likewise, Apocalypse twenty-one: I saw a new heaven and a new earth.
3. Likewise, from this statement the error seems to be confirmed that there is a circulation in things according to procession, such that the same things exist which formerly existed, and this through the following text: it has already preceded in the ages that were before us; and thus that error seems to be verified which posits that after the great year, which contains fifteen thousand years, all things are renewed.
I respond: it must be said that there is an operation of creation, of conservation, of reparation, and of glorification. Each of these operations is above nature, and therefore will not be under the sun or under time, but above it, except for propagation; hence he understands only of this.
And thus the other objections are clear.
On this it should be noted that he calls new that whose likeness has not preceded; and thus there is nothing new according to propagation, because there always like comes from like. But the objector objects as if he were speaking of the numerically same thing; and that is impossible to understand in this way, because if every form that is corrupted and generated again differs numerically, it cannot be understood of the numerically same thing.
IV. Likewise, there is a question about what he says: There is no remembrance of former things.
On the contrary: It is said in the Psalm: I remembered your works, O Lord.
I respond: to this some say that it is understood of evil things, not of good things.
But this is still false, because many evil things are also in memory.
And therefore it must be said that this proposition is not to be understood as universally true, but as true in most cases, because there is more forgetfulness than remembrance; nevertheless, very many of the things that have been done are in our memory.
Art. 2. From the consideration of the twofold vanity of things, he manifests and reproves his own curiosity.
I, Ecclesiastes, was king, etc. Above he showed the vanity in things; here from the consideration of the mutability of things he reproves his own curiosity. And this part has two sections, because first he manifests his curiosity; second, he reproves his curiosity on account of vanity, in the second chapter: And when I turned myself to all the works.
First he manifests his curiosity, first indeed in the works of prudence.
The first has two parts, because first it treats of curiosity in the works of prudence or philosophy; second, of the curiosity of opulence or mechanical art, at: I magnified my works.
The first has two parts: because first it treats of curiosity with respect to the consideration of natural things or speculative science; second, with respect to the consideration of moral things or practical science, at: I spoke in my heart, etc.
The curiosity of philosophy is described, first indeed with regard to the consideration of natural things, and this for a fourfold reason.
He therefore describes curiosity in the works of nature, or in the consideration of divine works, in this order. First is indicated the suitability of the one considering, second the curiosity itself, third the severity of divine judgment, fourth vanity is concluded.
(Vers. 12.). First, therefore, the suitability of the one considering is noted, when he says: I, Ecclesiastes: because in him there was wisdom, therefore he calls himself Ecclesiastes, that is, a preacher; there was also power, whence he says: I was king; there was also peace, whence he adds: in Jerusalem, which is interpreted as "vision of peace": Ecclesiasticus forty-seven: "Solomon reigned in days of peace": First Chronicles twenty-two: "The son who shall be born to you shall be a peaceful man"; and because he possessed this, therefore nothing held him back from consideration.
(Vers. 13.). And I proposed in my mind, etc. Here the second point is touched upon, namely curiosity itself, because he wished to know all things and to investigate them subtly. Therefore he says: And I proposed in my mind to seek, namely from another, and to investigate wisely, by myself; and this is curiosity; Romans twelve: "Not to be wise more than it behooves one to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety"; whence Proverbs twenty-five: "You have found honey; eat what is sufficient for you, lest perhaps being sated you vomit it up." Concerning all things that are done under the sun. Behold, a greater curiosity, because concerning all things: Ecclesiasticus three: "Do not search into superfluous things in many ways, and do not be curious about his many works; for many things beyond the understanding of men have been shown to you."
This most wretched occupation, etc. Here the third point is touched upon, namely the severity of divine judgment: because by divine judgment, on account of the sin of the first parent, it came about that our rational faculty so readily indulges itself in the knowledge of earthly things. On account of which he says: This most wretched occupation, because it is not only blameworthy but also penal; God gave to the sons of men, that is, he permitted it to be given; or by reason of its penal character he gave it in a just manner; that they might be occupied in it, and thereby be forgetful of their salvation.
Whence it should be noted that there is an evil occupation, which is from weakness: concerning this, Ecclesiasticus forty: "A great occupation is created for all men, and a heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam, from the day of their going out of their mother's womb even to the day of their burial into the mother of all."
There is a worse occupation, which is from ignorance, concerning which Job three: "Let darkness and the shadow of death obscure it; let a mist occupy it, and let it be wrapped in bitterness."
The third is from curiosity, and this is the worst, and of this he speaks here.
And it should be noted that "occupation, as Hugh says, is a distraction of the mind which turns away and distracts and ensnares the soul, so that it cannot think about the things that pertain to salvation." Curiosity, however, is the lustful prostitution of the human intellect, indiscriminately embracing any truth whatsoever and committing adultery with it, because the First Truth alone is the spouse.
(Vers. 14.15.). I saw all things that are done etc. Here is touched upon fourthly the discovered vanity, because he profited nothing more, except that in his consideration he found vanity. And therefore he says: I saw all things that are done under the sun, that is, I considered all things. And behold, all is vanity, that is, vanity openly appears in them, because, as the Apostle says in Romans 8, "the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly"; and not only vanity, but indeed also affliction of spirit.
But because not all see this, and because they thus labor in vain and do not perceive their affliction: to this tacit question he responds saying: The perverse etc. Because more are found wicked than good, more foolish than wise; therefore he says: The perverse are corrected with difficulty: whence Proverbs 18: "A fool does not receive words of prudence, unless you say those things which revolve in his heart." And the number of fools is infinite, namely on account of their multitude: and to consider this is not only vanity, but indeed also affliction: whence it is said in the Psalm: "I saw the transgressors, and I pined away"; and again: "My zeal has made me pine away." Man is perverted through evil thought: Wisdom 1: "Perverse thoughts separate from God: but proven virtue corrects the foolish." Through evil affection: Proverbs 17: "He who is of a perverse heart shall not find good, and he who turns his tongue shall fall into evil." Through evil speech: Proverbs 10: "The lips of the just consider what is pleasing, and the mouth of the wicked, perverse things"; Proverbs 2: "That you may be delivered from the man who speaks perverse things." Through wicked action: Proverbs 2: "They rejoice when they have done evil, and exult in the worst things"; Isaiah 1: "Cease to act perversely."
QUESTIONS.
I. But here it is first asked concerning what he says: This most wretched occupation etc.
Against: This is sin: therefore God gave sin.
If you say: He gave, that is, He permitted it to be given;
but similarly He permitted stealing: therefore it would be rightly said that God steals.
I respond: "sins that are midway between the first apostasy and the final punishment are both punishment and fault"; but some express more the character of fault, and some more the character of punishment: those which express more the character of punishment are attributed to the just judgment of God, and such is occupation and blindness of this kind.
II. Likewise, there is a question concerning what he says: The perverse are corrected with difficulty: because it is easy for someone to become perverted; but perversion is against nature; therefore, if it is most easy to return to nature, since vice is against nature, it is most easy to be corrected.
I respond: the reason is taken both from the side of the evil work,
because "good exists in one way, but evil in every way"; and from the side of the operating power, which is rendered weak through fault, and therefore cannot engage in strenuous work; and from the side of the opposition of good to evil according to privation, because it is most easy to recede from a habit to privation, but difficult, or altogether impossible, to return.
The curiosity of philosophy is described secondly with regard to the consideration of moral matters, and this in a fourfold manner.
I have spoken etc. He treated above of the consideration of natural things; here he similarly shows his curiosity in the consideration of moral matters; and indeed he does this in this order. For first is noted his transition from natural things to moral matters; second, the discovery of affliction; third, the turning to the enjoyment of delightful things; fourth, the return to the consideration of evils.
(Vers. 16. 17.). First, therefore, his transition to considering moral matters is intimated, and this after he had considered the natures of things. On account of which he says: I have spoken in my heart, namely through thought, saying: Behold, I have become great, in fame, and I have surpassed all in wisdom who were before me in Jerusalem; Third Kings, chapter four: "And the wisdom of Solomon surpassed the wisdom of all the Orientals and the Egyptians, and he was wiser than all men"; Ecclesiasticus, chapter forty-seven: "He was instructed in his youth, and was filled with wisdom as with a river." And he had this knowledge partly through revelation; whence he says: My mind has contemplated many things wisely, namely illuminated by God; and partly also through his own diligence; whence he adds: And I have learned; Proverbs, chapter four: "I was a tender son of my father and an only one in the sight of my mother, and he taught me"; Proverbs, the last chapter: "The vision with which his mother instructed him."
Considering therefore that he had this wisdom in the investigation of natural things, because "he discoursed from the cedar of Lebanon to the hyssop," according to what is said in Third Kings, chapter four, he wished to transfer himself to moral matters; whence he says: And I gave my heart to know prudence, with respect to things to be done, and learning, with respect to things to be known, and errors, against prudence, and folly, against learning; because nothing is known perfectly unless its opposite is known. And it is useful to know these things when they are investigated in the proper manner; whence Proverbs, chapter eight: "Receive instruction and not money; choose learning rather than gold."
(Vers. 17. 18.). And I knew etc. Here the second point is touched upon, namely the discovery of spiritual affliction in the consideration thereof: because the better a man knows good and evil, the more he is afflicted when he errs. On account of which he says: And I knew that in these things also there was labor and affliction of spirit, that is, in the knowledge of useful things: labor, namely in acquiring; Psalm: "I thought that I might know this, it is labor before me"; affliction of spirit, after acquisition, either on account of the detestation of fault, or because it is an occasion of pride and impatience, since "knowledge puffs up."
The following text agrees with both expositions, when it adds: Because in much wisdom there is much indignation, either of contrition, against fault, or of impatience from pride, because great clerics, when they do not have what they want, are most easily indignant: whence it is said (Job thirty-two) that Elihu was indignant, and this because he considered himself wise. And therefore it follows: He who adds knowledge adds also sorrow, because an impatient man sustains many sorrows, since there is no one for whom all things turn out according to his wish. And with this exposition agrees another translation of Jerome: "I knew that in these things there was a feeding on wind," and therefore rightly there is labor and affliction of spirit. Whence Hugh: "Curiosity drove it to inquiry, pride to ostentation: and therefore it was fitting that labor should press down the swollen, and occupation dissipate the curious."
It can also be understood of the affliction of contrition, because even where there is much wisdom, there is much indignation against sin: Jeremiah thirty-one: After you showed me, I struck my thigh. And he who adds knowledge adds also sorrow, namely of penance: Job last chapter: "Now my eye sees you: therefore I reprove myself and do penance in dust and ashes."