Question 1

QUESTION I.


On the certitude by which the existence of God is known, and on the faith by which the Trinity of the same is believed.

ARTICLE I. Whether that God exists is an indubitable truth.


It is therefore asked first, whether that God exists is an indubitable truth? And that it is so, is shown by a threefold way. The first is this: every truth impressed upon all minds is an indubitable truth.

The second is this: every truth which every creature proclaims is an indubitable truth.

The third is this: every truth most certain and most evident in itself is an indubitable truth.

Concerning therefore the first way, we proceed thus, and it is shown both by authorities and by arguments that God's existence is impressed upon all rational minds.

1. Damascene, in the first book, chapter three: "The knowledge that God exists is naturally implanted in us."

2. Likewise, Hugh: "God so tempered the knowledge of himself in man, that just as what he wholly is could never be comprehended, so that he is could never be entirely unknown."

3. Likewise, Boethius: "There is implanted in the minds of men a desire for the true and the good"; but the affection for the true good presupposes knowledge of the same: therefore there is impressed upon the minds of men a knowledge of the true good and a desire for what is most desirable. But this good is God: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, Augustine in On the Trinity says in many places that the image consists in mind, knowledge, and love, and that the nature of the image is discerned in the soul by comparison to God: if therefore it is impressed upon the soul by nature to be the image of God, then it has naturally implanted within it a knowledge of God. But the first thing knowable about God is that God exists: therefore this is naturally implanted in the human mind.

5. Likewise, the Philosopher says that "it would be unfitting for us to possess the noblest dispositions and for these to be hidden from us": therefore, since that God exists is the noblest truth, most present to us, it is unfitting for that truth to be hidden from the human intellect.

6. Likewise, the appetite for wisdom is implanted in the minds of men, because the Philosopher says: "All men by nature desire to know"; but the wisdom most to be desired is eternal wisdom: therefore the appetite for that wisdom is most especially implanted in the human mind. But there is no love, as was said before, except of what is in some way known: therefore it is necessary that some knowledge, however slight, of that highest wisdom be impressed upon the human mind. But the first thing to be known is that God himself, or wisdom, exists: therefore, etc.

7. Likewise, the appetite for beatitude is so implanted in us that no one can doubt of another whether he wills to be happy, as Augustine says in many places; but beatitude consists in the highest good, which is God: therefore, if such an appetite cannot exist without some knowledge, it is necessary that the knowledge by which it is known that the highest good, or God, exists be implanted in the soul itself.

8. Likewise, there is implanted in the soul itself an appetite for peace, and so deeply implanted that it is sought even through its contrary, nor can this appetite itself be taken away even from the damned and the demons, as is shown in the nineteenth book of The City of God. If, therefore, the peace of the rational mind exists only in an immutable and eternal being, and appetite presupposes a notion or knowledge: then the knowledge of an immutable and eternal being is implanted in the rational spirit.


9. Likewise, there is implanted in the soul a hatred of falsehood; but all hatred has its origin from love: therefore much more strongly is there implanted in the soul a love of truth, and especially of that truth for which the soul was made. If, therefore, that is the first truth, it necessarily follows that the knowledge of the first truth is implanted in the rational mind.


That a hatred of falsehood is implanted in the human mind is apparent from the fact that no one wishes to be deceived, as Augustine says in the tenth book of the Confessions. — That furthermore hatred is caused by love, Augustine shows in the fourteenth book of The City of God: for no one hates anything except because he loves its opposite.


10. Likewise, there is implanted in the rational soul a knowledge of itself, because the soul is present to itself and is knowable through itself; but God is most present to the soul itself and is knowable through Himself: therefore a knowledge of its God is implanted in the soul itself. If you say that the cases are not similar, because the soul is proportionate to itself, whereas God is not proportionate to the soul in this way; on the contrary: the objection has no force:


because if proportionality were necessarily required for knowledge, the soul would never arrive at the knowledge of God, because it cannot be proportionate to Him, neither through nature nor through grace nor through glory.

By these reasons, therefore, it is shown that the existence of God is indubitable to the human mind, as something naturally implanted in it; for no one doubts except concerning that of which he does not have certain knowledge.

Likewise, this same thing is shown by a second way, as follows: every truth that every creature proclaims is an indubitable truth; but every creature proclaims that God exists: therefore, etc. — That every creature proclaims that God exists is shown from ten conditions and suppositions known through themselves.

11. The first is this: if there is a *posterior being,* there is also a *prior being,* because the posterior exists only from the prior: if, therefore, there is a totality of posterior things, it is necessary that there be a first being. If, therefore, it is necessary to posit that something is prior and posterior among creatures: then the totality of creatures necessarily implies and proclaims a first principle.

12. Likewise, if there is a *being from another,* there is a *being not from another:* because nothing brings itself from *non-being* into *being:* therefore the first reason of bringing forth must necessarily be in a first being that is not brought forth from another. If, therefore, *being from another* is called *created* being, and *being not from another* is called *uncreated* being, which is God: then all the differences of being imply that God exists.

13. Moreover, if there is a possible being, there is a necessary being: because the possible denotes indifference to being and non-being: but nothing indifferent to being and non-being can exist except through something that is wholly determined to being. If, therefore, a necessary being, having nothing whatsoever of possibility toward non-being, is none other than God, while every other thing has something of possibility, every difference of being implies that God exists.

14. Moreover, if there is a relative being, there is an absolute being: because the relative never terminates except at the absolute; but an absolute being depending on nothing cannot be other than that which receives nothing from elsewhere: and this is the first being, while every other being has something of dependence: therefore it is necessary that every difference of being implies that God exists.

15. Moreover, if there is a diminished being or being in a qualified sense, there is being in an unqualified sense: because being in a qualified sense can neither exist nor be understood unless it is understood through being in an unqualified sense, nor can diminished being be understood except through perfect being, just as privation is not understood except through possession. If, therefore, every created being is being according to a part, while only uncreated being is being in an unqualified sense and perfect: it is necessary that every difference of being implies and concludes that God exists.

16. Moreover, if there is a being for the sake of another, there is a being for the sake of itself, otherwise nothing would be good; but a being for the sake of itself is none other than that being than which nothing is better, which indeed is God himself: therefore, since the universe of other beings is ordered toward that being, the universe of beings implies God both according to being and according to understanding.

17. Moreover, if there is a being by participation, there is a being by essence: because participation is not spoken of except in relation to something essentially possessed by someone, since everything by accident is reduced to what is by itself; but any being other than the first being, which is God, has being by participation, while that alone has being by essence: therefore, etc.

18. Moreover, if there is a being in potency, there is a being in act: because potency is never reducible to act except through a being in act, nor would there be potency unless it were reducible to act: if, therefore, the being that is pure act, having nothing of possibility, is none other than God; it is necessary that everything other than the first being implies that God exists.

19. Moreover, if there is a composite being, there is a simple being: because the composite does not have being from itself, therefore it is necessary that it receive its origin from the simple: but the most simple being, having nothing of composition, is none other than the first being: therefore every other being implies God.

20. Likewise, if there is mutable being, there is immutable being: because, as the Philosopher proves, motion proceeds from a being at rest and for the sake of a being at rest: if therefore the wholly immutable being is none other than that first being, which is God, while other created things, by the very fact that they are created, are mutable: it is necessary that God's existence be inferred from any difference of being whatsoever.

From these ten necessary and manifest suppositions, therefore, it is inferred that all the differences or parts of being imply and proclaim that God exists. If therefore every such truth is an indubitable truth: then it is necessary that God's existence be an indubitable truth.

This same thing is shown by a third way as follows. Every truth which is so certain that it cannot be thought not to be is an indubitable truth: but that God exists is of this kind: therefore, etc. The first is self-evident; the second is shown in multiple ways.

21. For Anselm, in chapter four of the Proslogion: "Good Lord, I give thanks to you, because what I formerly believed by your gift, I now so understand by your illumination, that even if I were unwilling to believe that you exist, I could not fail to understand it."

22. Likewise, Anselm proves this same thing as follows: God is that than which nothing greater can be thought: but that which is such that it cannot be thought not to exist is more truly than that which can be thought not to exist: therefore, if God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, God cannot be thought not to exist.

23. Likewise, a being than which nothing greater can be thought is of such a nature that it cannot be thought unless it exists in reality; because if it exists in thought alone, then it is not a being than which nothing greater can be thought: therefore, if such a being is thought to exist, it is necessary that such a being exist in reality, such that it could not be thought not to exist.

24. Likewise, Anselm: "You alone are whatever it is better to be than not to be"; but every indubitable truth is better than every dubitable truth: therefore, to God it must be attributed to exist indubitably rather than dubitably.

25. Likewise, Augustine says in the Soliloquies that no truth can be seen except through the first truth: but the truth through which every other truth is seen is the most indubitable truth: therefore, that God exists is a truth not only indubitable, but also than which nothing more indubitable can be thought: therefore, it is such a truth that it cannot be thought not to be.

26. Likewise, he proves this same thing as follows: whatever can be thought can be stated: but in no way can it be stated that God does not exist without its being stated, along with this, that God exists. And this is evident as follows: because if no truth exists, it is true that no truth exists: and if this is true, something is true; and if something is true, the first truth exists: therefore, it cannot be stated that God does not exist, nor thought.

27. Again, the more prior and universal a truth is, the more known it is; but this truth, by which the first being is said to exist, is the first of all truths both in reality and in the order of understanding: therefore it is necessary that it be the most certain and most evident. But the truths of axioms or common conceptions of the mind are so evident on account of their priority that they cannot be thought not to exist: therefore no intellect can think that the first truth does not exist, or doubt concerning it.

28. Again, "no proposition is truer than that in which the same thing is predicated of itself"; but when I say that God exists, being said of God is entirely the same as God, because God is His very own being: therefore no proposition is truer and more evident than that by which God is said to exist: therefore no one can think it to be false, or doubt concerning it.

29. Again, no one can be ignorant that this is true: the best is the best, or think it to be false; but the best is the most complete being, and every most complete being by that very fact is a being in act: therefore if the best is the best, the best exists.

Similarly it can be argued: if God is God, God exists; but the antecedent is so true that it cannot be thought not to be: therefore that God exists is an indubitable truth.

But on the contrary it is objected that God's existence can be thought not to be and that it is a dubitable truth. That it can be thought not to be is shown as follows.

1. The Psalm: The fool has said in his heart: there is no God; but to say in the heart is to think: therefore that God does not exist can be thought, at least by the fool.

2. Again, Damascene, in the first book, chapter three: "The pernicious malice of human nature has so prevailed as to lead some into the most irrational and worst of all evils, the abyss of perdition, so that they say that God does not exist": therefore at least by malicious men it can be thought that God does not exist.

3. Again, an idol is nothing, as is said in First Corinthians, chapter eight: therefore to think that God is an idol and that God does not exist is the same thing: but it is thinkable and is sometimes thought that God is an idol: therefore it is thinkable that God is nothing.

4. Again, what can be signified can also be thought: but it can be signified that God does not exist, as by this statement: God does not exist: therefore it can be thought.

5. Again, an objection is raised against Augustine's argument: when he proves that from this proposition "no truth exists," it follows that some truth exists. For if this proposition is true: "some truth exists," it therefore has a contradictory: but no contradictory entails or posits, but rather negates its contradictory: therefore from the claim that no truth exists, it is not concluded that some truth exists.

6. Item. It is objected against the argument of Anselm, by which he proves that God exists through the fact that the being than which nothing greater can be thought exists in thought: because by equal reasoning it can be thought, if someone thinks of an island than which nothing greater can be thought, that that island exists in reality: therefore if that argument is worthless, the argument which Anselm makes is therefore worthless.

7. Item, it is asked: in what sense is it said that God's existence cannot be thought not to exist? If because it can in no way fall into thought, that is manifestly false: if because it cannot be truly thought, then by equal reasoning every necessary truth will be such a truth.

Item, it is shown that God's existence is a dubitable truth.

8. Richard of Saint Victor: "We hold nothing more certainly than what we apprehend by faith"; but concerning those things which we apprehend by faith there can be doubt: therefore much more so concerning every other thing known.

9. Item, what is most hidden most admits of doubt: but God is most hidden, since He inhabits inaccessible light: therefore concerning Him and about Him it is most possible to doubt: therefore if concerning other things it is possible to doubt whether they exist, much more so concerning God.

10. Item, it is possible to doubt concerning those things which are below the soul and alongside the soul: but these are more accessible to the soul than those things which are above the soul: if therefore God's existence is a truth which is above the human intellect, it seems that concerning it one can most especially doubt.

11. Item, for God, that God exists and that He is just are the same: but it is possible to doubt concerning God whether He is just: therefore by equal reasoning it is possible to doubt whether He exists.

12. Item, in vain does one strive to prove that concerning which no doubt can arise: if therefore God's existence can be doubted by no one, in vain does one strive to demonstrate it: if therefore the Saints and doctors who demonstrated it did not strive in vain, it is established that concerning it one can doubt.

13. Item, no one knows this principle: every whole is greater than its part, unless he knows what a whole is: therefore no one knows that God exists unless he knows what God is: if therefore it is dubitable what God is, it is therefore dubitable whether He exists.

14. Item, if there could be no doubt concerning this truth, that God exists, there would be no merit in believing it: but this is the principle of all merit, to believe that God exists, because it is said in Hebrews 11: He who approaches must believe that He exists, etc.: if therefore this falls under merit, it can also fall under doubt.

CONCLUSION.


That God exists is not dubitable, if by dubitable is understood some truth which lacks the reason of evidence either in itself, or in comparison to a proving middle term, or in comparison to the apprehending intellect. Nevertheless it can be doubted on the part of the one knowing, namely on account of a defect in the acts either of apprehending, or of comparing, or of resolving.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it should be noted that "indubitable" is said through the privation of "dubitable." Now "dubitable" is said in two ways: either through the discourse of reason, or through the defect of reason. In the first way it signifies something on the part of the knowable and of the knower; in the second way only on the part of the knower. In the first way some truth is called dubitable because the ground of evidence is lacking to it, either in itself, or in comparison to the proving middle term, or in comparison to the apprehending intellect. But in none of these ways is certitude lacking to that truth which is that God exists.

For it is certain to the one comprehending it, because the knowledge of this truth is innate to the rational mind insofar as it holds the character of an image, by reason of which there is implanted in it a natural appetite and knowledge and memory of him to whose image it was made, toward whom it naturally tends, so that in him it may be beatified.

It is also more certain in comparison to the proving reason. For all creatures, whether they are considered according to their completive properties or according to their defective ones, cry out with the strongest and loudest voices that God exists, whom they need on account of their defect and from whom they receive their completion. Whence, according to the greater and lesser completion that they have, some cry out with great voices, some with greater, and some with the greatest voices, that God exists.

That truth is also most certain in itself, because it is the first and most immediate truth, in which not only is the ground of the predicate enclosed in the subject, but the very being which is predicated is entirely identical with the subject which is subjected. Whence, just as the union of things supremely distant is entirely repugnant to our intellect, because no intellect can think that some one thing simultaneously is and is not, so the division of what is entirely one and undivided is entirely repugnant to it, and accordingly, just as for the same thing to be and not to be, to simultaneously supremely be and in no way to be, is most evident in its falsity, so that the first and highest being exists is most evident in its truth.

And therefore, if "indubitable" is taken insofar as it privates doubt through the discourse of reason, that God exists is an indubitable truth, because whether the intellect enters within itself, or goes outside itself, or looks above itself, if it reasons rightly, it knows with certitude and without doubt that God exists.

But if indubitable is said in the second way, insofar as it privates doubt which is through the defect of reason, so it can be conceded that on account of the defect of men it can be doubted by someone whether God exists, and this according to a threefold defect of the knowing intellect: either with respect to the act of apprehending, or with respect to the act of comparing, or with respect to the act of resolving.

As regards the act of apprehending, doubt arises when the meaning of this name God is not rightly and fully grasped, but only according to some condition of it: just as the pagans thought that whatever was above man and could foresee some future event was God: and therefore they believed idols to be gods and worshipped them as gods, because they gave some true responses about future things.

As regards the act of comparing, doubt arises when the comparison is made only in part, as for instance when the fool sees that manifest justice is not executed upon the wicked: he infers from this that there is no governance in the universe, and consequently that there is no first and highest ruler in it, who is God most high and glorious.

Similarly, as regards the deficiency in the act of resolving, doubt arises when the carnal intellect does not know how to resolve except up to those things which are evident to the senses, as are these corporeal things: for which reason some thought that this visible sun, which holds the primacy among corporeal creatures, is God, because they did not know how to resolve up to incorporeal substance nor up to the first principles of things.

And in this way, regarding the question of God's existence, doubt can arise from the deficiency of the intellect itself in apprehending, or comparing, or resolving: and according to this understanding it can be thought by some intellect that God does not exist, because the meaning of this name God is not sufficiently and fully grasped by it. - But by that intellect which fully apprehends the meaning of this name God, thinking God to be that than which nothing greater can be thought, not only can it not be doubted whether God exists, but it can in no way be thought that God does not exist. Hence the arguments proving this are to be granted.

1. 2. 3. To that which is first objected to the contrary from the Psalm and from Damascene, the response is already clear: because it proceeds from doubt which comes from a deficiency of reason, of the kind that exists in the foolish intellect, which, darkened by its own dimness, neither sufficiently resolves nor rightly compares nor fully apprehends the meaning of this name God. For the intellect itself has within itself sufficient light from its own condition, by which it could drive this doubt far away and free itself from foolishness. Hence in this defective consideration of the foolish intellect, it falls short voluntarily rather than by compulsion, not on account of a deficiency on the part of the object known, but on account of a deficiency on its own part.

And through this the response to the objection concerning the idol is clear. For the reason a pagan thinks that God is an idol is that his apprehension of God is defective: for he does not apprehend Him as the highest and best, but as something powerful that man cannot be; and hence there arises in him the error of deception and the wavering of doubt, into which error he casts himself by his own obstinacy, so that he becomes utterly inexcusable. Nor yet is he entirely deprived of the knowledge of God, because, although out of his own perversity he wills to worship an idol, he nonetheless has a natural instinct to worship God, against which he fights by casting himself into voluntary error.

4. To the objection that what can be signified can also be thought: it must be said that something can be thought in two ways: either by bare thought, or by thought with assent. By bare thought, what is false can be thought just as readily as what is true, and what is manifestly false just as readily as what is manifestly true. By thought with assent, nothing is thought except what is true or something similar to the true. The first kind of thought extends to whatever speech extends to; but the second kind of thought does not extend to as many things. And it is of this latter kind of thought that both Anselm and Augustine speak, and of this kind of thought it is said that God cannot be thought not to exist.

5. To the objection raised against Augustine's argument, that a contradictory does not entail its own contradictory: it must be said that this is true insofar as they are contradictories. But it must be understood that an affirmative proposition has a twofold affirmation: one by which it asserts the predicate of the subject, and another by which it asserts itself to be true. In the first, it is distinguished from a negative proposition, which removes the predicate from the subject; but in the second, it has something in common with it, because both a negative and an affirmative proposition assert themselves to be true. Contradiction is considered with respect to the first, not with respect to the second. Now when it is said: "no truth exists," this proposition, insofar as it denies the predicate of the subject, does not entail its opposite, which is that some truth exists. But insofar as it asserts itself to be true, it does entail that some truth exists; nor is this surprising, because just as every evil presupposes a good, so what is false entails what is true. And therefore this falsehood — that no truth exists — since on account of the removal of the predicate from the subject it destroys every truth, and on account of the assertion by which it asserts itself to be true it posits that some truth exists, includes both parts of the contradiction. Therefore both can be inferred from it: both that it is in itself false, and that it is unintelligible to an intellect rightly apprehending. And this is what Augustine means to say.

6. To that which is objected concerning Anselm's argument about the island, than which none better or greater can be thought: it must be said that the case is not similar, because when I say a being than which nothing greater can be thought, here there is no repugnance between the subject and the implication; and therefore it can reasonably be thought. But when I say an island than which none better can be thought, here there is repugnance between the subject and the implication. For "island" denotes a defective being, but the implication is of a most perfect being; and therefore, because there is an "opposition in the adjunct," it is irrationally thought, and the intellect contradicts itself in thinking it; and therefore it is not surprising if it cannot be inferred that what is so thought exists outside in reality. But it is otherwise with being or with God, to whom such an implication is not repugnant.

7. To that which is asked: in what sense is it said that God's existence cannot be thought not to be? The response is already clear: not because what "is said by the name" cannot be thought, that is, the signification of this statement "God does not exist"; but because it is so evident in itself and certain to the one who knows it, that if one wills to consider rightly, there is nothing by which one can be torn away from this truth. For it is a most evident and most present truth, which is absent from no place, no time, no thing, no thought; nor is this so of other created truths.

8. To that which is objected, that nothing do we hold more certainly than what we comprehend by faith: it must be said that this is true of the certitude of adherence, not of the certitude of understanding, as is apparent to one who considers it manifestly.

9. To that which is objected, that this is a hidden truth, and therefore maximally doubtable: it must be said that although God is simple and uniform in himself, nevertheless in a certain way he is hidden and in a certain way is manifest, as the Apostle intimates in Romans 1: What is known of God is manifest in them. For to some the trinity of appropriated attributes is manifest, to whom the trinity of persons is not manifest; and to someone the unity of essence is manifest, to whom the trinity of appropriated attributes is not manifest; and to someone the very trinity of God is manifest, to whom the very unity of essence is not manifest. But this is what is first manifest concerning God, namely his very entity, and in this respect it does not lie hidden but lies open; and therefore it is not doubtable but indubitable.

10. To that which is objected, that the soul doubting about things below it and beside it, etc.: it must be said that this does not hold, because although that God exists is above the soul according to nature, it is nevertheless within the soul according to knowledge and outside according to representation and persuasion, which every creature makes to it, because this truth is enclosed and understood in every truth.

11. To the objection that for God, to be and to be just are the same: it must be said that this does not follow, because, although it is the same in itself and according to itself, it is nevertheless not the same according to the apprehending reason and according to the representing effect: and therefore it is possible for one to be evident while the other is not evident.

12. To the objection that one strives in vain to prove that about which no one doubts: it must be said that, as is already clear, this truth does not need proof on account of a defect of evidence on its own part, but on account of a defect of consideration on our part. Hence reasonings of this kind are rather certain exercises of the intellect than arguments giving evidence and manifesting the very truth that is proved.

13. To the objection that no one knows principles unless he knows the terms: it must be said that this is true; but the knowledge of certain terms is hidden, while of others it is manifest. And again, concerning the signification of a term, knowledge can be had that is full, fuller, and fullest. According to this it must be understood that what God is can be known perfectly and fully and by way of comprehension, and thus He is known only by God alone; or clearly and perspicuously, and thus He is known by the Blessed; or in part and in an enigma, and thus it is known that God is the first and highest principle of all worldly things; and this, as far as it is in itself, can be manifest to all: because, since anyone knows that he has not always existed, he knows that he has had a principle, and by equal reasoning so also concerning other things; and because this knowledge offers itself to all, and once this is known, it is known that God exists: therefore it is indubitable to all, as far as it is in itself.

14. To the objection that to believe what is beyond doubt is not meritorious: it can be said that to believe that God exists, considered in itself, is not meritorious except insofar as it is subordinated to the belief that God is triune, or to other articles of faith, since these are founded upon it; and by reason of those articles it can become meritorious, because if it is believed nakedly by itself, it is not efficacious for meriting. The Apostle, moreover, speaks of the belief that God exists insofar as it is the foundation of other things to be believed; and this foundation is implanted in man by nature, lest, if the human intellect knew nothing of God from its own nature, it could excuse itself through ignorance. And this is what Master Hugh says: "Therefore God from the beginning of nature willed to be neither wholly manifest to human conscience nor wholly hidden, lest, if He were wholly manifest, faith would have no merit, nor would infidelity have any place: for infidelity would be convicted by what is manifest, and faith would not be exercised concerning what is hidden. But if He were wholly hidden, faith would not be aided by knowledge, and infidelity would be excused by ignorance. Wherefore it was necessary that God reveal Himself as hidden, lest, if He were wholly concealed, He would be utterly unknown, and again that He hide Himself though to some extent revealed and known, lest He be wholly manifest: so that there might be something known that would nourish the ingenuity of man, and again something hidden that would provoke it."

ARTICLE II. Whether that God is triune is a credible truth.


1. That truth without belief in which there can be no salvation is a truth most worthy of belief; but that God is triune is of this kind; therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Athanasius in the Creed: "Now the catholic faith is this, that we worship one God in Trinity and the Trinity in unity"; and shortly before this is prefaced: "Which unless each one shall have kept whole and inviolate, he shall without doubt perish eternally": therefore, if without this faith there can be no salvation, the same conclusion as before follows.

3. Likewise, Augustine, in the first book On the Trinity, chapter three: "When the unity of the Trinity is sought—of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit—nowhere is error more dangerous, nor is anything sought with more labor, nor is anything found with more fruit"; but everything of this kind is most worthy of belief, in which there is danger in erring and salvation in rightly holding: since therefore that God is triune is a truth of this kind, the same conclusion as before follows.

4. Likewise, Augustine, in the first book of the Hypognosticon, chapter three, says that "no one can be saved without faith in the Mediator": therefore it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Mediator; but the Mediator cannot be known unless the distinction of persons is known: therefore to believe the distinction of persons is necessary for salvation. But this distinction of persons is in the Trinity: therefore that God is triune is a truth which it is necessary to believe for salvation.

5. Likewise, no one can be saved in whom the Trinity does not dwell: for the entire Trinity dwells simultaneously in a person through grace: but the Trinity does not dwell except in one who believes: therefore no one can be saved unless he believes the most blessed Trinity. The major is manifest: the minor is proved thus through that which is said in John fourteen, that the Spirit of truth the world cannot receive, because it does not see him nor know him: but you shall know him, because he shall abide with you and shall be in you.

6. Likewise, it is impossible for anyone to be saved who is not a member of Christ: but one cannot be a member unless one is connected: and one cannot be connected except through faith, hope, and charity: therefore no one can be saved without faith in Christ. But faith in Christ includes faith in the eternal generation, and according to that the distinction of the Trinity is discerned: therefore without faith in the Trinity it is impossible for anyone to be saved.

7. Likewise, it is impossible for anyone to be saved who does not believe that God is a creative principle; for unless this is believed about God, God is in no way rightly worshipped and venerated by man: but it is nobler to be a generative principle than a creative principle, because the begotten offspring is nobler than the made creature: therefore no one can be saved who does not believe that God is a generative principle, and by equal reasoning also a spirative principle, and through this, unless he believes that God is triune.

8. Likewise, it is impossible for anyone to be saved who does not love and honor him who is to be supremely loved and honored: but the Son and the Holy Spirit are to be supremely loved and honored, just as the Father, according to that which is said in John five: He who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father, who sent him: therefore no one can be saved who does not love and honor the Son and the Holy Spirit, just as the Father. But no one loves and honors unless he in some way knows and believes: therefore etc.

From these things it is manifestly shown that to believe that God is triune is necessary and due for salvation.

Likewise, that it is fitting is shown.

9. A right affection adheres more to the supreme goodness than to itself: therefore also a right intellect assents more to the supreme truth than to itself. If therefore our intellect is rectified by believing, it is necessary that some truth be proposed to it which exceeds its judgment: but the first among true and credible things proposed is that God is triune and one: therefore although it lies hidden from the human intellect, it is rightly and fittingly proposed for belief.

10. Likewise, just as charity captivates the affection into the service of Christ, so faith captivates the intellect; but it would not captivate unless it made one assent to some truth that exceeds its judgment: therefore it is fitting that the first among credible things proposed exceed the human intellect.

11. Furthermore, "that which seems so to all, or to most, or to the wise, by that very fact that it seems so, is rendered probable": therefore that which is believed by most, or by the wise, by that very fact that it is believed, is rendered credible: but that God is triune is believed by most and by the wise: therefore it is fitting to believe that He is triune.

12. Furthermore, it is more unreasonable to hold that an innumerable multitude believes something incredible than to hold that what is believed by a multitude is credible: but it is most certain that God being triune is believed by a multitude: therefore it is reasonable to believe thus.

13. Furthermore, just as understanding is owed to reason, so believing is owed to authority; but nothing is more authoritative than sacred Scripture, which has its stability not only from its assertion of truth and its antiquity, but also from miracles and prophecies: if therefore the divine Scriptures commonly attest this truth, it is fitting and reasonable to believe that truth, namely that God is one in Trinity.

14. Furthermore, since there is a threefold kind of credible thing according to Augustine: "For some things are believed and at the same time understood, some things are first believed and afterward understood, and some things are believed and never understood, as is the case with human history running through past deeds"; that which is so believed that it can be understood by reason is more credible than that which cannot: but that God is triune is of this kind: therefore, since certain historical facts narrated by authoritative Scripture are credible — for it is not incredible that "Abraham begot Isaac"; indeed it is very credible: so also concerning other similar things — therefore it is credible that God is triune and one.

On the contrary: 1. Everything whose contrary all reason dictates is incredible to reason: but all reason dictates the contrary of this, namely that one thing is really three: therefore it is incredible to reason.

2. Furthermore: Everything whose contrary created nature displays is incredible to reason; but every created nature displays the contrary of this, namely that one thing is multiplied in supposits without the form being multiplied: for in any created nature, when the supposit is multiplied, the form is multiplied: therefore if our intellect is led by the hand through creatures to knowing God whether He exists, as is said in First Corinthians thirteen: We see now through a glass in an enigma: since every created nature has a contrary indication to this truth, that God is triune: it is necessary that this be an incredible truth.

3. Again, everything that is believed is believed either by reason or beyond reason: if therefore that God is triune is a believable truth, then either from reason or beyond reason: but if from reason, then it is no longer meritorious, because "faith has no merit where human reason furnishes proof." If beyond reason: but what is believed by one having the use of reason beyond reason is believed irrationally and is not a believable truth: therefore it is believed irrationally, therefore that God is triune is an incredible truth.

4. Again, everything that is believed is believed either for its own sake or for the sake of another: if therefore that God is triune is a believable truth, then either in this way or in that. If for the sake of another: then it is not the object of right faith itself: if for its own sake: but nothing is lovable for its own sake unless it of itself suffices for the affections: therefore nothing is believable for its own sake unless it is of itself evident to the intellect. But that God is triune is not of itself evident to the intellect: therefore it is not a believable truth.

5. Again, virtue is consonant with nature, because, as Cicero says, and Augustine approves, "virtue is a habit consonant with reason in the manner of nature": therefore what is incredible to natural virtue is incredible to the virtue of faith: but that God is triune is not believable by nature itself: therefore neither is it believable by a virtue superadded to nature.

6. Again, grace is the perfection of nature, and perfection does not conflict with the perfectible but is in harmony with it: if therefore that God is triune is not believable through nature, then neither through superadded grace.

7. Again, "the Creator of nature does nothing contrary to nature as cooperator": therefore the teacher and inspirer of nature does nothing contrary to the natural dictate of reason: if therefore that God is triune is not believable through the natural dictate of reason, then it is not believable through superadded inspiration.

8. Again, the principle of scientific knowledge ought to be the easiest thing to know, as is evident in the principles of demonstrations, which are known to the intellect through themselves: therefore the principle of faithful knowledge ought to be the easiest thing to believe: but that God is triune is not the easiest thing to believe, indeed it is very difficult, as is evident in those who do not yet have faith: therefore it is not the first among believable things: nor is it a middle one nor the last, as is apparent: therefore it is in no way believable.

By these reasons it seems possible to show that God's being triune is not believable as fitting to be believed.

Again, it is shown that it is not believable as owed to be believed.

9. No one is bound to that which he cannot do, because Jerome says: "Let him be anathema who says that God has commanded the impossible"; but to believe that God is triune is not in our power, because having faith is a gift of God: therefore if no one is obligated to that which is not in his power, no one is obligated to believe that.

10. Moreover, if we are obligated to believe this, it is either according to the law of nature, or of Scripture, or of grace. Not according to the law of nature, because that law is impressed upon the hearts of men and is most known to all; but this is a hidden truth, concealing itself from human effort. Not according to the law of Scripture, because this truth was believable before Scripture began: furthermore, if it were believable only on account of Scripture, it would not pertain to every age nor to all persons. Not even according to the law of grace, because faith in this existed before the law of grace began: and moreover, the law of grace is a law that is not burdensome: if therefore believing this is difficult, we are not obligated to it according to the law of grace; nor according to the law of nature nor of Scripture, as has been shown: therefore we are in no way bound to believe it.

11. Moreover, if we are bound to believe it, it is either because it is true, or because it is a truth falling under a precept. Not because it is true, because then by equal reasoning we would be bound to believe every truth: if because it falls under a precept, then either a moral or a sacramental one; not because it falls under a sacramental precept, that is evident: nor because it falls under a moral precept, since all moral precepts are reduced to the ten precepts of the Decalogue, in none of which is it commanded to believe God is triune: therefore we are in no way bound to it.

12. Moreover, if we are bound, it is either because it is a truth seen, or a truth heard, or a truth inspired. Not because it is seen, because no wayfarer has seen this: not because it is heard, because then no one would be bound to believe it except one who had heard it: if because it is inspired: but everyone to whom it is inspired believes: therefore no one is bound except one who believes. But this is false: therefore so is the first premise.

13. Furthermore, I ask what moves a Christian to believe that this is true. If you say that divine Scripture moves you: therefore if divine Scripture did not teach this, you would not believe it: but to the contrary: suppose that the whole of Scripture were burned, the Church and the Christian soul would still not depart from faith in the Trinity: therefore the principal reason moving us to this belief does not reside on the part of Scripture. - Furthermore, if you say that miracles move you: to the contrary: "Faith has no merit where human reason provides proof"; and such faith, which comes from miracles, is rather extorted than voluntary: therefore belief of this kind would not be meritorious. - If you say that grace moves you: to the contrary: no one knows whether he has grace, therefore no one knows whether he ought to believe that truth; but concerning a credible thing, to the belief of which we are bound, we are certain that we ought to believe it: therefore we are not moved to believe this by reason of grace. - If you say that eternal truth itself moves us to believe this; but to the contrary: truth moves to belief in nothing unless it is truth that has been seen: therefore since this truth has not been seen by the soul, it seems that it is moved to believe from some other source than from eternal truth itself.

The question therefore is: if this is a credible truth, by what are we moved to believe it, and by what are we bound to believe it?

CONCLUSION.


That God is triune is a credible truth, because to believe this is fitting, due, and worthy.

I respond: It must be said that that God is triune is a credible truth as being fitting and due and worthy to be believed.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that since this credible truth is the foundation of the entire Christian faith, in order that this foundation may remain unshaken, it has a threefold testimony, through which we are led by the hand, bound, and elevated to believe it. This threefold testimony is considered according to the threefold book, which is the book of creatures, the book of Scripture, and the book of life. The first book gives efficacious testimony, the second gives more efficacious testimony, and the third most efficacious.

For the first book, which is the book of the creature, which I therefore call first because it is first presented to our senses, gives a twofold testimony, so that in the mouth of two witnesses every word may stand. For every creature is either a vestige of God only, as is corporeal nature, or is an image of God, as is intellectual creature. Each of these testifies to the Trinity, but that which holds the character of a vestige, as it were from afar. For every creature has mode, species, and order, or unity, truth, and goodness, or measure, number, and weight: which by appropriation correspond to the trinity of persons and through which it is testified that God is triune. And this is what Augustine says in the book of Eighty-Three Questions: "Everything that exists has one thing by which it subsists, another by which it is distinguished, another by which it is fitting. Therefore the whole of creation shows its threefold cause: by which it exists, and by which it is this particular thing, and by which it is in harmony with itself: but we call the cause of the creature, that is, its author, God. Therefore there must be a Trinity, than which perfect reason can find nothing more excellent, more intelligent, and more blessed." From this Augustine shows that the creature holds the character of a vestige, which testifies that God is triune.

But that creature which holds the character of an image, namely the intellectual creature, testifies that God is triune as it were from nearby, because an image is an expressed likeness. For the intellectual creature has memory, understanding, and will, or mind, knowledge, and love: mind after the manner of a parent, knowledge after the manner of offspring, love after the manner of a bond proceeding from both and connecting both; for the mind cannot fail to love the word which it generates. In these, moreover, not only is origin and emanation observed, through which there is distinction in them, but also equality and consubstantiality and inseparability, from which by express testimony it is proclaimed that God is triune. For since He is spirit and intellect, He cannot lack a begotten Word and a proceeding Love, in which there is distinction by reason of the origin and emanation of one from another, together with equality and consubstantiality and inseparability. And this is what Augustine intends to establish in the ninth book of On the Trinity to the end, namely how through the created image testimony is rendered to the eternal Trinity.

Now this twofold testimony of the book of nature was efficacious in the state of nature as created, when neither was that book obscure nor had the eye of man grown dim. But when through the sin of man the eye grew dim, that mirror became enigmatic and obscure, and the ear of interior understanding became deaf to hearing that testimony. And therefore divine providence dispensatively provided the testimony of another book, namely the book of Scripture, which indeed was produced according to divine revelation, which never has been lacking nor will be lacking from the beginning of the world until the end.

Now this book testifies in a twofold manner that the Trinity exists, according to its twofold part: in the Old Testament indeed it testifies implicitly, but in the New Testament it testifies explicitly.

For testimony is given in the Old Testament concerning the Trinity both in figures and in words. Among the figures, however, that one was especially authoritative which was shown to the father of our faith, Abraham: of whom it is said in Genesis eighteen, that when three men appeared to him, he indeed saw three, but adored one, whence he spoke to the three as to one, in this understanding in himself and intimating to others the mystery of the Trinity.

In words, however, that appears especially efficacious for testifying which David, the most excellent of the Prophets, said in the Psalm: By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of His mouth all their power, where the trinity of persons is simultaneously intimated, such that two persons are named explicitly under the name of Spirit and Word, and one implicitly under the name of Lord. Moreover in many places, indeed in nearly all places of the Old Testament, although implicitly, nevertheless through figures and words testimony is rendered to the eternal Trinity.

In this same manner also in the New Testament testimony is given, but explicitly, both in Sacraments and in express teachings. For the first of the Sacraments, which is baptism, according to what is written in the last chapter of Matthew, must be performed in the express invocation of the divine Trinity. For there it is said: Teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit: on account of which in that foundational Sacrament the character of the Trinity is imprinted. The words also testify to this same thing, among which, although many there be, that one statement is express which the friend of the Bridegroom wrote in First John five: There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one. Now this testimony is so efficacious and express that it not only makes the aforesaid truth credible, that is, fitting to be believed, but also makes it obligatory, inasmuch as it binds and constrains us to believing it.

But because not all obey the Gospel, and that truth is above reason; therefore divine wisdom has provided an eternal testimony, which indeed is the book of life. Now this book of life, of itself and in itself, explicitly and expressly gives irrefragable testimony to the eternal Trinity to those who with unveiled face see God in the homeland, but on the way it gives testimony according to the influence of light, of which the soul is capable in the state of the way — for as it is said in John 1: The life was the light of men, because this book of life is the true light, which enlightens every man coming into this world. Now it illuminates in a twofold manner, namely through the implanted light and through the infused light, from the concurrence of which lights the habit of faith is elicited as an argument for believing that God is triune, and consequently every truth that pertains to the worship of the Christian religion.

And this is evident as follows. For through the light naturally implanted in man by God and signed as the light of the divine countenance, each one's own reason dictates that concerning the first principle one must think most highly and most piously: most highly, because from none; most piously, because all other things from him. And in this Christians, Jews, and Saracens, and even heretics agree: But that God can and wills to produce one equal and consubstantial to himself, so that he may have an eternal beloved and co-beloved; and that indeed to think this concerning God himself is to think most highly and most piously — because if it is thought that he cannot, one does not think most highly of God; if it is thought that he can but does not will it, one does not think most piously of God — that, I say, it is so and is so thought, this the implanted light does not dictate of itself, but the infused light, from which together with the implanted light it is gathered that one must think of God that he begets and spirates one coequal and consubstantial to himself, so that one may think of God most highly and most piously: and to think this of God is to honor, venerate, and worship God most greatly. And from this it is apparent how faith in the Trinity is both the foundation and root of divine worship and of the entire Christian religion.

From this root, however, by which we believe that one must think of God most highly and most piously, and through this that he himself is triune and one, it is consequently elicited that one must believe God to be the creator of all things, the punisher of the wicked, the rewarder of the good, and the reliever of the wretched. For because he is most high, it therefore befits his dignity to do great and just things. But because he is most pious, it befits his dignity to regard the lowly and raise up the fallen. And hence it is that we believe him incarnate and to have suffered out of supreme piety, and that he will at last judge the world in supreme loftiness and equity.

From what has been said, therefore, it is gathered what the root of the Christian faith is, what its testimonies are, and what also are the things credible from it, and that the principle and first of all credible things which pertain to divine worship is to believe that God is triune and one.

And because the highest and greatest worshipper of all was Jesus Christ, therefore He first commanded that this truth be preached clearly and openly throughout the whole world, thereby binding all to believe it. Whence, since before His coming they were not bound to believe in the Trinity except implicitly, now after the promulgation of the New Testament all are bound to believe it explicitly, so that it is now not only credible because worthy of belief, or fitting from the testimony of creation, but also obligatory through the promulgation of evangelical truth, whose promulgation had its beginning from the Savior, as is said in Hebrews 2, where the Apostle, speaking of the Christian faith, says thus: Having received its beginning to be declared through the Lord, it was confirmed unto us by those who heard, with signs and wonders and various powers and distributions of the Holy Spirit according to His will.

If therefore it is asked: what moves one to believe this, whether namely Scripture, or miracles, or grace, or the eternal truth itself? it must be said that what principally moves to this is illumination itself, which is begun in the implanted light and consummated in the infused light, which indeed causes us to think of God not only loftily, but also piously: and this because illumination proceeds from the eternal light itself, in whose service it captivates our intellect, and by captivating, while it subjects the intellect to God, it worships and venerates Him and renders the intellect apt to believe whatever things pertain to divine honor and worship, even if they are above our reason. This is evident through experience, if anyone should have recourse to the secrets of his own mind.

The motives, however, as supporting and in a certain way inducing, are very many: because the authentic testimonies of Scripture move us, the examples and martyrdoms of the Saints move us, the arguments of the Doctors and the judgment of the universal Church itself move us, and the irrefragable miracles themselves move us. Whence Richard, in the first book On the Trinity, chapter two: "We hold nothing more firmly than what we apprehend by faith: for these things were revealed from heaven to the Fathers and divinely confirmed by signs and wonders so many and so great, so wondrous, that to doubt in these matters even slightly would seem to be grave madness. Innumerable miracles, therefore, and other things which can only be done by divine power, produce faith in these matters and do not permit doubt. We therefore use signs as arguments and wonders as proofs in their attestation and even confirmation. Would that the Jews would attend, would that the pagans would attend, with how great a security of conscience we shall be able to approach the divine judgment on this account! Can we not say to God with all confidence: Lord, if this is an error, we have been deceived by You: for these things have been confirmed in us by such great signs and wonders, and of such a kind, that they can only be done through You. Certainly they have been handed down to us by men of the highest sanctity and proven with the highest and most authentic attestation, with You Yourself 'cooperating and confirming the word with signs following.'"

And through this the response to those four objections which were last raised is clear: what is it that moves the faithful to believe that God is triune and one?

1. To the first objection, therefore: everything whose contrary all reason dictates, etc.; it must be said that one can speak of reason in three ways: either of reason defective, or sound, or elevated. When therefore it is said that everything whose contrary all reason dictates is incredible: if this is understood particularly of defective reason, it is false, because there can be something repugnant to defective reason which nevertheless accords with sound or elevated reason. But if it is understood universally of reason according to its threefold state, then the first proposition is true and must be conceded; but the minor premise is false and must be rejected: because, although defective reason dictates the contrary of that which is the truth, namely that God is triune and one, sound reason nevertheless dictates something which is consonant with this; while elevated reason dictates this very thing, as is clear from what has been said.

2. To that which is objected, that everything whose contrary all created nature exhibits is incredible: it must be said that created nature can exhibit something in two ways: either in itself, or in its cause. For created nature exhibits that it is temporal and mutable and composite, but that its cause is eternal and immutable and most simple. In this same way, although in a creature the unity of form cannot stand together with a trinity of supposits, since supposits in a creature are distinguished by matter and by form appropriated to matter itself; in the Creator, in whom there is absolutely no matter and there is true fecundity, while one form and substance remains, there is distinction in supposits by reason of origin. Therefore, since the creature does not universally exhibit the contrary of this, namely that God is trine, but rather rightly and conformably exhibits the very same: it is therefore more credible than incredible.

3. To that which is objected, that everything which is believed is believed either from reason or beyond reason: it must be said that to believe something from reason is twofold: either from mere reason, or from aided reason. Therefore, although that God is trine is not credible from mere reason, it is nevertheless credible from reason aided by grace and light infused from above. And what is thus credible is not irrationally believed, because grace and light infused from above directs reason rather than perverts it.

4. To that which is objected, that everything which is believed is believed either on account of itself or on account of another: it must be said that that God is trine is believed on account of itself, because it is the highest and first truth pertaining to divine worship.

And to that which is objected, that every such thing credible through itself is evident to the believer: it must be said that this is true of a believer who does not have an obstacle, but rather has a disposition enabling him to assent to uncreated truth itself; and this is the case in the matter at hand, because a true Christian believes this truth proposed to him without any additional persuasion.

5. 6. To that which is objected, that virtue is consonant with nature: it must be said that this is understood of political virtue; or if it is understood of gratuitous virtue, it is not true that it is consonant with nature insofar as it is fallen, but insofar as it is reformed and elevated, which comes about through divine grace infused from above.

And through this the response is clear to that which is consequently objected concerning grace, that grace is the perfection of nature. For grace is a perfection of nature not only enabling, but also reforming and elevating. By reforming moreover and elevating, it does not destroy nature itself, nor anything which belongs to nature itself, but rather the defect surrounding nature.

7. To the objection that the Author of nature does nothing against nature, it must be said that nature is said in two ways: either the natural course, or the natural obedience of the creature. In the second way He does nothing against it, but in the first way He frequently does, as in works which are above nature or contrary to it, such as miraculous works. In this way also one must understand concerning natural intelligence, that there are two ways of speaking about it: either insofar as it is naturally disposed to reason according to its own light, or insofar as it is naturally disposed to subject itself under the eternal light. In this latter way He dictates nothing against intelligence; but in the first way He dictates something which, although it may seem to be contrary, after the infused light becomes consonant: because what previously seemed to reason impossible or difficult to believe, afterwards becomes most easy to believe, so much so that the true believer says to the eternal Teacher Himself: Your testimonies have been made exceedingly credible.

8. To the objection that the principle of scientific knowledge is the easiest to know, etc., it must be said that knowledge according to faith is knowledge according to piety, as is said in Titus 1. And although to the intellect proceeding according to the aridity of speculation it may seem most difficult to believe that God is triune and one, nevertheless to the intellect full of piety it is most easy to hold this concerning the supreme Father: that He has an Only-begotten, whom He loves as He loves Himself, and whom He also delivered for the salvation of men.

9. To the objection that no one is bound to that which he cannot do, it must be said that although man of himself cannot do so sufficiently, he can nevertheless do so with divine assistance, which is at hand for him if he does what is in his power; and because he can do that by which, once done, he can believe, therefore he is judged as capable, and to this he ought to be bound, especially when neither interior nor exterior admonition is lacking — which is indeed the case in the time of revealed grace.

10. To the objection that we are bound either according to the law of nature, or of Scripture, or of grace, it must be said that properly according to the law of grace, in which we are obligated and bound to believe this distinctly. Nevertheless, also in the law of nature and in the law of Scripture there was an obligation to believe, at least implicitly. For at every time whoever would pertinaciously deny that God is triune would be regarded as alien from the truth and from divine worship; but now especially in the time of grace, when this truth has been revealed and preached and approved in manifold ways and expressly. — And if you object that this ought not to be so, because the law of grace should be easy, it must be said that just as loving one's enemy is not easy for anyone whatsoever, but for one having charity, so believing God to be triune, although it may seem difficult to the unbeliever, is nevertheless easy for one having faith.

11. To the objection that if we are bound to believe this, it is either because it is true, or because it is a truth falling under a precept, it must be said that it is because it is a truth falling under a precept.

And if you ask: under which precept? I say that under the first, in which indeed it is said: Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one God. You shall adore the Lord your God and Him alone shall you serve. In this precept indeed we are obligated expressly to believe that God is one, but implicitly to believe that God is triune. And this is evident as follows: because by this precept we are bound to worship God with the worship of latria, which is there called service. Now to worship in spiritual matters is according to a transumption from material things: in material things, however, to cultivate a field is to bring forth the shoots proceeding originally from the earth itself. In this same manner, to worship God is to profess by heart and mouth and deed that He is the principle, such that He is not perfectly worshipped unless we confess that He is the principiating principle not only effective in creation, but also restorative in redemption and perfective in glorification: nor yet perfectly, if He is believed to be a principle from time, unless He is believed to be a principiating principle from eternity: nor yet, unless He is believed to be a principle principiating one who eternally principiates: which we believe when we believe that the Father eternally generates the Son, who together with Him spirates the Holy Spirit, so that eternally in God there is a principle from a principle, and a principle not from a principle.

For the perfect worship of God, therefore, it is necessary to hold and believe that He is a principle eternally principiating one who principiates, so that thus there may be a manifestation of the eternal emanations: it is also necessary to believe that He is a creative and re-creative and retributive principle, so that thus there may be a manifestation of the temporal emanations: and whoever is deficient in any of these is not a perfect worshipper of God. And since in the time of grace it is revealed not in just any manner, but perfectly: therefore all these things must be believed explicitly, if we wish to be counted among the number of divine worshippers: and to this we are bound by the very precept of the divine law: which indeed before the coming of Christ bound implicitly, but now explicitly, because it is the time of worshipping God perfectly.

12. To that which is objected, that we are either bound to believe it because it is a truth seen, or because heard, or because inspired: it must be said that we are bound to it because it is a truth most pertaining to divine worship and publicly preached; and therefore a person is not excused by a defect of hearing, nor by a defect of interior light, because he can do that by the doing of which he is inspired.

From these things it is clear why sacrifices were pleasing to God in the time of the written law, and pertained to divine worship, for the reason that all of them were signs professing and prefiguring the restoration of humanity, which was accomplished through the offering of the immaculate lamb and the shedding of the blood of Jesus Christ.

It is also evident why in the state of the law of grace no figurative sacrifice is offered, but Jesus Christ himself in his flesh and blood, because it is the time of worshiping God truly and perfectly: and therefore it is fitting that the truest and most perfect sacrifice be offered, which indeed is unique and sole, namely Jesus Christ himself.

It is also evident why unbelievers are justly condemned. For if he who takes away from an earthly king one small part of his kingdom greatly dishonors that king, and through this is deservedly made worthy of being expelled from the kingdom; much more does he who denies that God is the principiating principle of all things from time, or eternally principiating within, dishonor the eternal majesty and is worthy not only of being expelled from the kingdom of God, but also of being cast down into infernal punishment with the devil and his angels.

It is also evident why we worship God by faith. For by thinking of God in the manner in which the Christian faith thinks, we hold of him that he is the most high and most pious principle; and therefore he is to be feared and loved, by which two things man is called back from evil and inflamed toward every good: and this is perfect justice, which he who possesses is worthy of the eternal inheritance.