Question 2

QUESTION II.


Whether a trinity of persons can stand together with unity of nature.

Having supposed that God's being trine is a credible truth, it is consequently asked whether a trinity of persons can stand together with unity of nature. And concerning this, two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine being is supremely one.

Second, it is asked whether the supreme unity of nature can coexist with a trinity of persons.

ARTICLE I.


Whether the divine being is supremely one.

Concerning the first, we proceed as follows and it is shown that the divine being is supremely one. And that this is so, faith and divine Scripture sufficiently proclaim, Exodus twenty: Your God is one God; and Deuteronomy thirty-two: See therefore that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me; and David in the Psalm: There shall not be in you a new god, nor shall you adore a foreign god: and divine Scripture sufficiently preaches this.

And this very thing must be attempted to be demonstrated by reasons. For the mind of all who use reason supposes that God is that than which nothing greater or better can be thought, and therefore most excellent in nature and power, wisdom and goodness, influence and causality. For if He suffered defect in any of these, He would no longer be supreme, and therefore would not be God. Let these six things therefore be supposed as true and most certain.

1. From the side of the sublimity of nature, the argument proceeds thus. That which is borne above all things is more sublime than that which is not; therefore, if being borne above all things can belong to none but one, it is impossible that God be other than one, indeed it is impossible even to understand Him as such. For if several are understood, it is posited from this that one and the same is borne above another, and conversely: therefore if each is God, neither is God: therefore either God does not exist, or if He exists, He is one.

2. From the side of omnipotence, thus. Truly omnipotent is not only he who can do all things, but also he from whom is all power: but to be able to do all things and to cause all power can belong to one alone — for if it belonged to several, it would belong to neither — if therefore omnipotence belongs to God, it is impossible that God be other than one, indeed it is impossible even to understand Him as such: because if each is omnipotent, each can bring it about that every other power can do nothing: therefore if each is omnipotent, neither is omnipotent.

3. From the standpoint of supreme wisdom, the argument proceeds as follows. It belongs to the supremely wise to know all things: if therefore there were many gods, either each would be ignorant of the other, and so neither would be supremely wise, but rather truly foolish; or one would know the other, and this either through a likeness, or through essence, or through himself. But if through a likeness or through essence, he would receive something from the other and be informed by him; if through himself, he would be the principle of the other, and consequently either he or the other would not be God. Therefore supreme wisdom does not permit many gods to exist, and indeed does not even permit it to be supposed, because if many are thought of, they either have the same wisdom or diverse wisdoms. If diverse: then either one is superfluous, or each is imperfect. If the same: since each would be supreme wisdom, they would not then have a diverse nature; therefore they are not two.

4. From the standpoint of supreme goodness, the argument proceeds as follows. The supreme good is to be supremely loved and for its own sake: if therefore there are many supreme goods, then either one loves the other for its own sake, or not. If not: then neither is good. If so: then one beatifies the other; therefore neither is supreme. Therefore it is impossible that the supreme good be multiplied. Indeed this is even contrary to the understanding, because each is either a greater good or not. If not: then one is superfluous. If so: then neither is supreme. Therefore if many supreme goods are understood to exist, they are understood not to be supremely good.

5. From the standpoint of influence, the argument proceeds as follows. God influences all things most perfectly; therefore he gives the whole of being, not a part. But if there were many gods, either one would give nothing, and so would not be God; or each would give a part, or nothing, and so neither would be God; or each would give the same thing, and then each would simultaneously be in the same thing by essence, power, and presence. And because this follows upon supreme influence, either one would be in the other, or each would be circumscribed, and so neither would be God.

6. From the standpoint of supreme causality, the argument proceeds as follows. God is the first, ultimate, and most perfect cause, and consequently a cause in which there is a terminus in every mode, both according to the notion of effecting, exemplifying, and finalizing: therefore if there were many gods, each would be reduced to the other; therefore neither would be first, ultimate, and most perfect, and consequently neither would be God.

7. From the standpoint of all the foregoing, the argument proceeds as follows: because if there were many gods, they would either agree entirely in all the aforementioned conditions, or differ entirely, or partly agree and partly differ. If they agreed entirely: then there would not be many gods. If they differed entirely: then if one were God, the other would not be God. If however partly so and partly not: then in each there would be something and something else; therefore neither would be simple, and consequently neither would be God.

From these things it is argued that the divine being cannot be multiplied either in reality or in estimation.

To the contrary, it is argued first against the aforesaid arguments: 1. Because they do not seem to conclude what is true. For since that God is one is an article in which pagans, idolaters, infidels, and heretics have erred, all of whom have the use of reason: not only can it be thought, but it can also be estimated and believed that there are many gods; or if the contrary cannot be estimated, it is not an article of faith.

2. Likewise, they do not seem to conclude necessarily: because by the same arguments it can be proved that there are not in the divine being many persons, as is clear to one who examines the matter, whether from the standpoint of the sublimity of nature, or of power, or of wisdom, or of goodness, or of influence, or of causality. But if the arguments proceed from the same middle terms to conclude what is false, then they do not conclude necessarily.

3. Likewise, if from the aforesaid arguments it is necessarily demonstrated and proved that God is one: since "faith has no merit where human reason provides proof": therefore the merit of faith seems to be emptied: therefore they will be either fragile or useless.

From themselves objections are raised against them:

4. And first from sublimity. It is of greater sublimity to be exalted above things of a similar nature than of a dissimilar nature, and above great things than small things: if therefore the creature is not of a similar nature with God and in comparison to God is as nothing, God is not understood as supreme and most excellent if He is exalted only above created being. Therefore it seems to pertain to the divine excellence to posit many uncreated natures and again one above the rest.

5. From the standpoint of omnipotence, thus. "It belongs to perfect power, as Hilary says, that the nature of the maker can do what the word of the speaker can signify"; and again, reason dictates that so much power extends to so much, and greater power to the greater, and the greatest to the greatest: but God is most omnipotent: therefore since we can signify that there are many gods, God can make it so that they exist; and since He can make the lesser to exist, He can make the greater and the greatest: therefore He can make another besides Himself as great as He Himself is: therefore it accords with omnipotence that there be many gods.

6. From the standpoint of wisdom, thus: because it belongs to the highest wisdom to know something other than itself, and wisdom is so much more perfect as what is knowable is more perfect: if therefore nothing is altogether perfect except the being that is God, and the divine wisdom eternally knows something other than itself, and this with the most perfect knowledge: it seems that eternally there was something other than God which nevertheless was God: therefore the divine wisdom does not exclude but rather posits many divine essences.

7. From the standpoint of goodness, the argument proceeds as follows. "The good is maximally self-diffusive," and "more goods are to be preferred to fewer"; both of these are self-evidently true. But the supreme diffusion of the divine being cannot be in a creature; therefore it is in another uncreated nature, and once this is posited, the whole divine essence is better, because there will be more goods. Therefore, if everything better is to be attributed to God by reason of supreme goodness, it seems that supreme goodness does not exclude but rather requires multiple divine natures.

8. From the standpoint of supreme influence, the argument proceeds as follows. The perfection of influence necessarily requires that influence not be without divine essence, presence, and power; therefore, by equal reason, it cannot be multiplied without the multiplication of essence, power, and presence; therefore, since there are many divine influences, there are also many essences.

9. From the standpoint of causality, the argument proceeds as follows. The first cause is most perfect, is first and immediate, and therefore also proper. But when the effect is multiplied, it is necessary that the proximate and proper cause be multiplied; therefore it is necessary that multiplication be posited in the first cause, since multitude is posited and exists in the effects caused by it.

10. Likewise, from all these considerations an objection is raised against all the foregoing: because the most perfect sublimity in nature and power, wisdom and goodness, influence and causality is the reason for positing multitude in caused effects; therefore, if the same thing is not the cause of opposites, it seems that these considerations lead rather to positing multitude than unity on the part of the efficient cause, and thus tend rather toward the opposite than toward the proposition.

CONCLUSION.


That God is one is a truth not only believable but also intelligible.

I respond: It must be said that this truth, that God is one, is a truth not only believable, but also intelligible: since it is necessary and certain not only from the testimony of Scripture and the illumination of grace, which is found in faith; but it is also certain from itself and from the testimony of creatures.

From itself, therefore: because the divine being, on account of its singular sublimity and sublime singularity, possesses unity in every way. For since God has every perfection in himself, and this in the highest degree and most excellently, he is shown to be one not only from the sublimity of nature and wisdom, power and goodness and influence and causality, but indeed from all his conditions and noble properties that are attributed to him in the highest degree. Hence all conditions attest to the unity of the supreme essence.

From the testimony of creatures also: because every creature, just as it has natural goodness, so also is shown to have unity. " For nothing can exist unless it is one," as Boethius and Augustine say,

and as sense and intellect teach. Therefore, just as every creature by its goodness proclaims that in God there is true and supreme goodness, so by its unity it proclaims that the cause of all things is one in itself.

Nor does the diversity of things stand against this testimony. For every diversity of things is comprehended within one universe, which in itself is indeed finite and limited and perfect. But this would not be so unless that plurality were reduced to something in which there would be a stopping point: and therefore it is necessary that all things be reduced to one ultimate end and one first principle, otherwise there would be a regress to infinity. Therefore the very universe of things testifies that God is one: whence, just as it is impossible for one circumference to have, nor can one rationally conceive, any but one center, from which lines flow and to which they are reduced as to a terminus: so in one universe one cannot posit or understand anything but one God alone.

This is therefore necessary and known, and so well known that no one having the use of reason doubts it, if he knows "what is signified by the name." For if by this name God is signified the first and highest principle of all things; since in this the whole universe is enclosed, whoever understands this consequently affirms that God is one. Whence, just as principles are self-evident, because they are immediately known through knowledge of their terms; so to everyone understanding the signification of the terms it is indubitably certain that God is one.

Many, however, have erred concerning the number of gods: for ignorance of the signification begot deception concerning the supposit, and this introduced the heresy of the plurality of gods. For because men supposed that to be God which surpasses human power, or human knowledge, and they saw that demons could do this; therefore they believed them to be gods: and they erred and were blinded and bent toward the worship of idols: which indeed is most absurd, and no wonder, because "a small error in the beginning is great in the end." From this error philosophy rescues, but much better the Christian faith: which commonly concur in this, that the divine being is supremely one.

Whence the arguments that show this are to be conceded, because they conclude what is true and through a necessary middle term.

1. To that which is objected concerning the falsity of the conclusion, on the grounds that many have supposed there to be many gods: the response is now clear: because they use the supposit and signification of this term God otherwise than its institution warrants: and therefore there is no contradiction there. Whence, just as this name God according to its proper institution has no plural, although it does have one according as it is taken nuncupatively; so also in the present matter it is to be understood: and because on account of the blindness of the mind the false was frequently taken for the true, therefore the illumination of faith was necessary. - It could nevertheless be said that God is one can be proved by reason, insofar as His unity is considered absolutely: but the illumination of faith is necessary insofar as it is compared to the plurality of persons.

2. To the objection that they could similarly conclude regarding the persons: it must be said that it is not similar, because in all the persons there is one nature and power and wisdom and goodness and influence and causality; but it would not be so if there were diverse divine natures: and therefore multiple persons are in no way repugnant to these.

3. To the objection that the merit of faith is emptied: it must be said that this would be true if one assented to this truth solely on account of reasons: but now, since one does not assent principally on account of reasons, but on account of the truth itself, therefore it can have merit on account of faithful assent. For nothing prevents the same thing from being known and believed under different respects and considerations.

4. To the objection concerning sublimity with respect to great and similar beings: it must be said that this would hold if something accrued to the divine sublimity from the subjection of others; but this is not true, because God is just as sublime in Himself and existing alone as if He were lord over a thousand worlds.

Furthermore, it would not contribute to His sublimity if something of a similar nature had a servile condition: whence even if such sublimity might in some way seem to contribute to exaltation, nevertheless in truth it contributes to diminishment.

5. To the objection concerning power, it must be said that each statement can be understood regarding that which indeed to be able belongs to power. For a certain ability is rather of weakness than of sublimity: for to be able to have a nature equal to oneself yet differing from oneself, this belongs to the dignity of limited power, and thereby is repugnant to omnipotence; therefore, although it can be said in speech, it nevertheless cannot be attributed to God: nor is the magnitude of divine power measured according to the magnitude of this possible, but according to the dignity of His proper act, which is immense, inasmuch as His power is immense.

6. To the objection concerning wisdom, that He knows another: it must be said that although God knows another than Himself eternally, and this befits supreme wisdom, nevertheless it does not befit Him to know another through another, but through Himself; and this can only be if the other is something born to proceed from God Himself, which is in Him as in its originating principle. For even if evil is known by God, this is through the idea of the good opposed to it. Whence for the perfection of divine knowledge it is not required that the knowable be a being in act: nor is it required that it be a supreme being, since He knows earthly things most nobly and most perfectly through Himself. That, however, holds for knowledge which takes its origin from things, which kind of knowledge God does not have.

7. To that which is objected, that supreme diffusion and a multitude of goods belong to the supreme good: it must be said that supreme diffusion into something outside does not belong to it, according as supreme is said absolutely: but within, supreme communication does belong to it. For there ought to be only one supreme good, which indeed cannot be increased by a multitude of goods. Hence what is said, that the supreme good is supremely diffusive: this must be understood as having truth according as that supremely determines diffusive by reason of power, not by reason of act. And to what is said, that many goods are more to be chosen: it must be said that this has truth in finite goods, of which one adds to another, and of which each one lacks something of the good, which is supplied through the adjoined good.

8. To that which is objected concerning influence, that it cannot exist without God, therefore neither can it be multiplied: it must be said that this does not hold, nor is it similar: because it belongs to the perfection of the agent that the effect cannot exist without its presence, because it depends totally upon it, and the agent acts more nobly by acting immediately than through a medium. But it is not so concerning number and multitude. For it does not belong to the perfection of the agent that it be multiplied according to the multitude of effects, but rather its contrary, namely that remaining one in itself it be the cause of diverse things.

9. To that which is objected concerning the proximate and immediate cause, that it is multiplied: it must be said that this has truth in a cause acting by way of nature, whose power is also limited, and thus is a proper cause, but not a universal one. But the first cause acts by way of art and will in the production of creatures: and therefore it is a most free cause, limited to nothing, and at once both universal and proper, because whatever nobility is in the creature must necessarily be posited in the creative essence.

10. To that which is objected, that those are means for proving multitude and diversity: it must be said that they do not prove just any diversity in creatures, but diversity with order and connection and inclination toward unity, and thus diversity in unity, and by reason of that unity they infer unity in the cause; nor yet are they a way to opposites, because unity in the cause does not conflict with multitude in things caused, as is evident in unity, from which proceed infinite species of numbers. So also supreme wisdom and power and goodness, although they are one, yet because they are not sufficiently manifested through one effect, therefore they bring about diversity in effects caused by it. - And thus the response to all the objections is clear.

ARTICLE II.


Whether unity of nature can stand simultaneously with a trinity of persons.

Supposing that the divine being is supremely one, it is consequently asked whether unity of nature can stand simultaneously with a trinity of persons. And that they are incompossible is shown as follows.

1. That which is one in both form and supposit is more one than that which is one in only one of these: therefore if the divine being is one in form and not in hypostasis, it seems that it is not supremely one.

2. Likewise, that which is one in both substance and property is more one than that which is one in only one of these: but trinity cannot stand without a plurality of properties: therefore it necessarily diminishes from the notion of the one: therefore these two cannot stand together.

3. Likewise, something is the more one, the more it is undivided, by the definition of the one: therefore in the supremely one there is indivision in every way, therefore also indistinction in every way, therefore no plurality: therefore either there is no trinity there, or there is no supreme unity there.

4. Likewise, that which is one both in reality and in notion is more one than that which is one only in reality: but the trinity of persons cannot stand with unity of notion: therefore something diminishes from the perfection of supreme unity, therefore they cannot stand together.

5. Likewise, it is a rule that "whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other," if that one thing is absolutely one: therefore either the divine substance is not supremely one, and the persons do not share in it: or one person does not differ from another: but given either of these, trinity and unity are incompatible.

6. Likewise, it is a rule that when things are so related that one is formally predicated of the other, when one is multiplied, the other is also multiplied, as is clear in the case of man and animal, and whiteness and color; but formally a person is an essence: therefore if there are many persons, there are also many essences; and thus the same conclusion as before returns.

7. Likewise, the syllogistic form does not fail in propositions that are true per se, in which no accident is to be found; but these propositions are true per se: every person is distinguished, every person is an essence: therefore the essence is distinguished, therefore it is numbered, therefore it is not one in the trinity of persons.

8. Likewise, it is a rule that when the thing defined is multiplied, the definition and the defining elements are multiplied; but substance and nature fall within the definition of person: therefore if there are many persons, there are also many essences, substances, and natures: therefore the plurality of persons cannot be compatible with supreme unity regarding the divine nature.

9. Likewise, person is said either according to substance, or according to relation. If according to relation: then to say many persons would be the same as saying many relations: if according to substance: then the multiplication of person is a multiplication of substance and nature: therefore unity in nature is incompatible with trinity in persons.

10. Likewise, when I say: person is one, essence is one: either by the same unity, or by another. If by another: then there are many unities, and therefore not supremely one: if by the same: then if one is multiplied, so is the other: and if one is not multiplied, neither is the other: therefore trinity and supreme unity are incompatible.

11. Again, production does not belong to a person except by reason of nature; but there is no plurality in the divine except by reason of production: therefore if production plurifies the person, it will equally plurify the nature: therefore plurality here cannot stand together with the supreme unity of nature.

12. Again, the supreme simplicity of God excludes composition not only in nature, but also in person: therefore since unity relates to plurality as simplicity relates to composition, if there is supreme unity in the divine nature, there cannot be plurality, neither in nature nor in person.

13. Again, either in the divine being there is no distinction, or there is the most perfect distinction: but the most perfect distinction is that which is considered according to form: since therefore this cannot stand together with supreme unity, it remains that either there is not supreme unity there, or there is not plurality there.

14. Again, unity and truth reflect upon themselves, to whatever nature they are attributed: if therefore in the divine there is true plurality, then there is plurified truth there, therefore multiple truths, and consequently multiple entities: therefore not true unity; and thus the same conclusion returns as before.

15. Again, that the Father generates, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds are two true things, if there is a trinity in the divine, therefore two truths: therefore if a plurality of truths is repugnant to supreme unity, it remains that so also is a plurality of persons.

16. Again, in that trinity there is either a repetition of the same unity, or of another. If of the same: then there is no plurality according to reality, therefore it is a nugation and superfluity; if of another: then since the multiplication and aggregation of diverse unities is repugnant to supreme unity, the conclusion is evident, etc.

17. Again, every plurality is reducible to unity; but in God nothing is to be posited that is reducible to something else: therefore, etc.

18. Again, many in many express supreme distinction, therefore one in one expresses supreme unity, by the argument from opposites: therefore if in God there is supreme unity, it follows that there is no plurality there.

19. Again, God has nothing except from himself: therefore whatever person is God, whatever it has it has from itself; but only one person can be from itself: therefore with the unity of the divine being plurality on the part of person cannot stand.

20. Again, where there is plurality, there is diversity: and where there is diversity, there is a diminution of identity: and where there is a defect of identity, there is not supreme unity: therefore, etc.

But it is objected to the contrary by authority and by reason; by authority thus.

1. 1 John 5: Three are they who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one; I say one absolutely, which I say with no addition: therefore they are one absolutely: therefore the trinity does not take away unity.

2. Again, Bernard says to Eugene: "Among all unities, the unity of the Trinity holds the citadel"; but that which holds the summit among certain things has being in the highest degree: therefore the unity of the Trinity is the highest unity, therefore a true trinity and a highest unity stand together.

3. Again, a plurality of individuals is not repugnant to the unity of the species, indeed they stand together: therefore if nature names the common form, and person names the individual or supposit, a trinity of persons in no way derogates from the unity of essence.

4. Again, a plurality of natures is not repugnant to the unity of a person, indeed they stand together, as is evident in man: therefore by converse reasoning, a plurality of persons in the divine is not repugnant to the unity of essence or nature: therefore they can stand together without diminution.

5. Again, we find in one person one nature, as in an angel, and we find in one person three most diverse natures, as in Christ: therefore it seems that it is not only possible, but most fitting, to find in one nature a trinity of persons; and this in God: therefore etc.

6. Again, that unity is more excellent which remains one in many than that which cannot preserve its unity except in one person; but the divine unity is most excellent: therefore it is necessary that it stand with a plurality of persons: therefore it has no opposition.

7. Again, as the Philosopher says, "the one generating does not generate another except on account of matter"; but in the divine there is no matter: therefore the one generating is not other than the one generated. Nor however can the same generate itself: therefore if in the divine there is generation and without matter, therefore there is a plurality of persons without a multiplication of form.

8. Again, as Damascene says, "to generate is to produce a like from one's own substance"; but the divine substance is indivisible: therefore it is necessary that the one generating give the whole substance to the one generated: therefore they cannot be distinguished according to substance. And yet they are distinguished: and not by accident, because in the divine there is no accident: therefore by person: therefore the distinction in person remains together with an entire indistinction in nature.

9. Again, that unity is more perfect in which together with unity of nature there remains a unity of charity: but "charity tends toward another": therefore it includes a distinction between the one loving and the one loved: therefore if the divine unity is most perfect, it is necessary that it have an intrinsic plurality: for outside itself it has nothing that is supremely lovable.

10. Again, likeness and equality and identity simultaneously enclose in their concept both plurality and unity: which is evident, because "likeness is the same quality of different things": therefore since the highest likeness can exist both in reality and in the intellect: since the highest likeness and identity can neither exist nor be conceived without unity and with plurality: therefore either it is necessary that the highest unity and a true plurality stand together, or the highest likeness can neither be conceived nor exist, and consequently neither can any likeness whatsoever. But if these are impossible, it remains that in God the highest unity and a true plurality stand together.

CONCLUSION.


The highest unity and trinity in God do not have opposition, but a wondrous concord and harmony.

I respond: It must be said that in divine things the trinity and the highest unity do not have opposition, but a wondrous concord and harmony, according to what the most salutary faith declares; and this also the soul, in some measure purged and elevated through faith, can grasp; otherwise it is difficult and impossible that it should understand, unless it first assents.

The Christian faith therefore declares that the divine nature is one and supremely one: and yet there are there three persons, of whom one is from another and by another, and therefore they share in essence and form, but are distinguished by their own property. — These things, however, seem to unbelievers to be incompossible, but to believers they seem not to be opposed, but to be consonant. But in order that we may understand this, two things must be noted here: the first is how person and nature are defined; the second is how they are related to production. The first removes the opposition, while the second establishes the consonance.

It must be known, therefore, that, as Boethius says in On Two Natures and One Person, "nature is the specific difference informing each thing"; "person, however, is the individual substance of a rational nature," or, as Richard says, "an incommunicable existence." This, therefore, is the difference: that nature designates the very form by which each thing is what it is; person, however, designates the individual or incommunicable supposit.

On account of ignorance of these definitions, heretics said that in Christ there were two persons, just as two natures; others, that there was one nature, just as one person: because they did not see the difference between these, which if they had known, they would have seen how a plurality of natures could stand together with a unity of person, as is evident in any human being. If, therefore, a plurality of nature and a unity of person are not opposed, so far as concerns themselves, by equal reasoning, conversely, a plurality of person and a unity of nature are not opposed: if they are not opposed, therefore they can exist with respect to God.

Not only, however, do they have a diverse definition, but they are related in diverse ways to production. For since it belongs to the supposit to act through form, it belongs to the person to produce and to be produced, not to the nature, but it belongs to the nature to be communicated through production: because, therefore, the divine nature is impartible and without all matter, it is neither multiplied nor numbered by division or partition: it is therefore entirely one in the product and the producer. Since, however, no one can produce himself, it is necessary that there be a plurality on the part of the person. Since in the emanation of the persons, nature has the character of what is communicable, while person has the character of what produces: on account of this same emanation, it is necessary that there be plurality in the persons and unity in the nature, such that there is no opposition there, but the highest concord.

Since, therefore, neither does plurality divide unity nor does unity confound plurality, the divine being appears singularly admirable and admirably singular. For this belongs to it alone on account of its supreme simplicity, which does not allow the nature to have parts nor to be aggregated with matter; and therefore it belongs to it alone, and hence admirably, because nothing entirely similar can be found. To be, therefore, one in many without any multiplication and diversification of essence is properly proper to the divine nature and its singular privilege. And the first and supreme one ought to have this privilege: because it is first and supreme, therefore it is so one that it can in no way be formally multiplied; it is so one that it cannot be narrowed nor restricted to only one supposit; it is so one that the eternal character of being a principle with respect to what is coequal, coeternal, and most perfect is not taken from it. — Whence no one perfectly praises the divine unity unless he equally attributes trinity to it; nor does anyone perfectly worship one God unless he faithfully professes that he is trine. — Whence the arguments that demonstrate this are to be conceded.

1. To the first objection, it must be said that form is twofold: one which is multiplied in many supposits, and in such a form perfect unity and plurality of supposits cannot stand simultaneously. The other is a form which cannot be numbered in many supposits, of which kind is the form of the deity; and because such a form is in no way numbered through the plurality of supposits, therefore true plurality and supreme unity stand simultaneously with it, which the name of trinity intimates, in which the unity of nature is enclosed together with plurality.

2. To the objection that what is one in substance and property, etc., is more one, it must be said that property is twofold, namely absolute and respective. If it is understood of absolute property, it has truth; but if of respective property, it does not have truth, because plurality with respect to respective property does not posit diversity in the thing and nature, neither with respect to essence nor with respect to being, but only denotes a varied relation, which is not incompatible with supreme unity, as can be shown through examples in the point and unity.

3. To the objection that the more something is one, the more it is undivided, it must be said that indivision in the definition of the one excludes that division which is of a whole into parts. But the unity of the Trinity is not related to the plurality of persons as a whole to parts, because the entire deity is in each person most fully and most perfectly; and therefore personal distinction is not repugnant to the indivision which must be found in the supremely one.

4. To the other objection, that what is more one is that which is one in reality and in concept, etc., it must be said that concept is twofold: one, which adds something real differing from the thing, of which kind is the concept according to that which it is. Another concept does not add anything differing according to that which it is, but only by reason of that to which it is ordered; and in this way the proposed proposition does not hold true, because the plurality of such concepts diminishes nothing of the supreme unity of essence or nature.

5. To the objection that whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same among themselves, it must be said that this is understood of identity in the supposit; and hence it is that although the dignative unity which is in Christ is less than the unity of the Trinity which is in God, nevertheless man is predicated of God, and God of man, by reason of the unity of person; yet the Son is not predicated of the Father, nor the Father of the Son, by reason of the unity of nature, because the distinction of supposits prevents this. — Or it can be said that that maxim does not fail if it is understood of the same genus of unity, but if it is transferred to another genus of unity, neither rightly nor soundly is the meaning of that proposition taken. For it does not follow that if some things are one with something by identity of genus, that on account of this the persons are the same in number among themselves. In this way also in the matter at hand it must be understood that even if essence and person are one essentially, it does not nevertheless follow that they are one among themselves personally; but it suffices that they have essential unity among themselves.

6. To the objection that in formal predication, when the subject is multiplied, the predicate is multiplied, it must be said that this holds true when the multiplication of the subject occurs through formal addition or diversity; for then it is necessary that with the multiplication of the subject there occur a multiplication of the predicate. But it is not so in the matter at hand; for the plurification of persons is not a formal plurification nor through the addition of any absolute quality, but through origin and relative emanation alone.

7. To the objection that the syllogistic form does not fail in propositions that are true per se, it must be said that although in the divine there is no accident by inherence, nevertheless, because there are various modes of predication there: namely, according to substance and relation, such that "substance contains unity, and relation multiplies trinity": hence it is that in this regard one of these modes of predicating or speaking is extraneous to the other; and this suffices to introduce the fallacy of accident.

8. To that which is objected, that when the thing defined is multiplied, the defining elements are multiplied: it must be said that this holds true of those things which fall within the formal definition and in the nominative case; but nature falls within the definition of person in the oblique case, while substance, insofar as it falls within the definition of person, is the same as hypostasis, which is plurified in the divine persons without essential plurification.

9. To that which is objected, that person is said either according to substance, or according to relation, etc.: it must be said that person is nothing other than "a hypostasis distinguished by a property," and therefore is said according to an intrinsic relation and according to substance not common, but proper; and therefore it does not follow that there is only a plurality of relations there, nor that there is a diversity of natures on account of the plurification of the divine persons.

10. To that which is objected, that person and essence, since it is one, are either the same by the same unity, or other and other: it must be said that they are neither entirely the same nor entirely other, but the same in reality, not the same in rational account, because, as Augustine says, "God is God by one thing and Father by another," not because between the divinity and paternity there is a difference according to essence or according to being, but according to the rational account of how each is related, because Father is said in relation to another, but essence is not at all.

11. To that which is objected, that production does not belong to a person except by reason of nature: it must be said that production regards the person as in the ratio of subject and principle and object or terminus, and therefore a true production necessarily causes the person to be plurified; but it regards nature as the reason for producing and as that which is communicated through the production; and because in that production everything that is possessed is given, and it is not lost when it is given, therefore although the person is plurified, nevertheless the nature is not multiplied.

12. To that which is objected, that supreme simplicity excludes composition in nature and person: it must be said that supreme simplicity excludes composition from other things and with another; and therefore it cannot stand together with composition either of nature or of person; but the supreme unity of nature excludes only essential diversity, and therefore it is not incompatible with personal plurality, and on account of this the cases are not similar on one side and the other.

13. To that which is objected, that in the divine being there must be either the most perfect distinction, or none: it must be said that distinction is called perfect in two ways: either intensively, or completely. In the first way it need not be posited in God, but in the second way it is; and thus it is there, because a thing is the more perfect the less it departs from unity. Since therefore that plurality does not depart from supreme unity, it follows that it alone is a plurality at once true and most perfect.

14. To the objection that unity and truth reflect back upon themselves: it must be said that this holds true in the singular, and not in the plural. But when truth is compared to plurality, and conversely, this is not singularly but plurally: and therefore there is no necessity of consequence there. For when a true plurality in the divine is spoken of, true says nothing other than the expression of plurality, which is in the supposits: but when conversely a plurified truth is spoken of, a multiplication in divine truth and essence itself is insinuated.

15. To the objection that it is one true thing that the Father generates, and another that the Holy Spirit proceeds: it must be said that if this is understood of the truth of the complex, such as is the truth of a proposition or statement, then there are many truths and many articles. But if one speaks of the truth of the incomplex, which is the truth of the thing: then, because for the Father to generate, and for the Son to be generated, and for the Holy Spirit to proceed is nothing other than for the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit to be, and there is one being in them: the truth is altogether unique according to the thing.

16. To the objection that either it is a repetition of the same unity, or it is not: it must be said that it is a repetition of the same unity, but not concerning the same one, rather concerning another and another, and therefore there is no nugation there nor an aggregation of unities; and therefore there is such a plurification there that there is no diminution of the supreme unity. And to this extent that word of Boethius on the Trinity must be understood, where he says that "God is thus trine, as if one were to say sun, sun, sun"; which is similar by reason of the iteration of that unity, but dissimilar, because the unity of the Trinity is iterated concerning another and another, but the unity of the sun concerns one alone; and therefore there is a real trinity in God, although none in the sun.

17. To the objection that plurality is reducible to unity: it must be said that plurality, which implies a defect from the supreme unity, is compared to that unity as to a principle and cause: and this is reduced to unity by a proper reduction, which is of an effect into its cause, and such plurality is not in the divine being. But plurality, which does not imply a defect from the supreme unity, does not need to be reduced, because it itself is the supreme unity: nevertheless, insofar as there is posited an emanation of the divine persons from the first as from a principle, so also in this way a reduction to that first as to the principle from which they are produced is not repugnant.

18. To the objection that several things in several subjects indicate the highest distinction or diversity: it must be said that although according to extrinsic reasoning a plurality of nature in a plurality of persons seems more repugnant to the highest unity, nevertheless according to reality and intrinsic reasoning a plurality of natures in one supposit, which is constituted from them, is more repugnant, since it is rendered composite and less one, than if in several supposits several natures were found, as is evident in the angelic and human nature. And therefore, because the highest unity is in God, it is posited in a nobler and more excellent way by this, that one nature is posited in several supposits without being multiplied, than if one nature were posited in one person.

19. To the objection that whatever God has he has from himself: it must be said that this is true, because the divine essence cannot be originated from any other; but from this it does not follow that whatever a person has he has from himself. Whence, just as it does not follow: the essence is not produced, therefore the person is not produced — so neither does the aforesaid argument conclude.

20. To the objection that where there is plurality, there is diversity: it must be said that, as is evident from what has been said above, that plurality does not properly introduce diversity which is attended to according to form, substance, and nature. And therefore it diminishes nothing of the highest unity and identity, which consists in this, that the three persons have the highest unity of essence and nature.