Question 4

QUESTION IV.


Whether the trinity of persons is compatible with supreme immensity.

Consequently it is asked whether the trinity of persons is compatible with supreme immensity. And concerning this, two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine being is most infinite. The second is whether trinity and infinity can coexist.

ARTICLE I.


Whether the divine being is most infinite.

As to the first, we proceed as follows, and it is shown that the divine being is most infinite:

1. First, through the confession of faith in the Creed: "The Father is immense, the Son is immense, the Holy Spirit is immense, and yet there are not three immense, but one immense"; therefore there is one immensity in them; therefore it belongs to them by reason of the essence.

2. Likewise, Damascene: "It is to be believed that God is one, immortal, eternal, uncircumscribed"; if therefore these things belong only to what is infinite absolutely, the conclusion is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, Third Kings, chapter eight: If heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain you, how much more this house which I have built? If therefore the being of God can be contained by nothing and circumscribed by nothing, it must be acknowledged that it has entirely the character of the infinite.

4. Likewise, Damascene, book one, chapter four: "God is infinite and incomprehensible, and this alone is comprehensible about him, namely his infinity and incomprehensibility."

5. Likewise, Augustine, in the eleventh book of the City of God: "All infinity is in a certain ineffable way finite to God"; but everything to which infinite things are finite is absolutely infinite; if therefore the divine being is of this kind, then it has infinity in every way.

6. Likewise, by reason: it is a common conception of the mind that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, neither by himself nor by another; but something greater can be thought than anything finite; therefore truly and properly the divine being has the condition of the infinite.

7. Likewise, for anything finite, something can be understood to be made equal to it through doubling; but nothing can be made equal to the divine being, no matter how much it is understood to be doubled; therefore it is necessary that the divine being is infinite with every manner of infinity.

8. Likewise, every finite good can be multiplied by the addition of some other good; but the supreme good cannot be multiplied either in reality or in understanding by anything added; therefore it is not a finite good; and it is either finite or infinite; therefore, etc.

9. Likewise, the entity of God and eternity are the same; but eternity is infinite, because it lacks beginning and end; therefore the entity is also infinite; but if the entity is infinite, so is the being; therefore from the first, the divine being is altogether infinite, even according to itself.

10. Likewise, in God, power and being are the same on account of supreme simplicity; but the divine power is infinite, since he is omnipotent and has power over extremes infinitely distant, as is evident in production from nothing; therefore the divine being is absolutely infinite.

11. Furthermore, the power and knowledge of God is infinite, because one cannot posit so many possibles or knowables that He could not do or know more: therefore by equal reasoning, since God is never in so many creatures that He could not be in more: it is necessary that the divine being as being is infinite.

12. Furthermore, God is the most noble cause of things according to the account of effecting, exemplifying, and finalizing: but on account of His supreme nobility He is such an efficient cause that He is uneffected; such an exemplar cause that He is unexemplified: therefore He is such a finalizing cause that He is infinite: therefore just as the divine being is uneffected, so also is it infinite.

13. Furthermore, the principle of all limitation is matter or something material; but the divine being, since it is pure act, lacks every condition of matter: therefore it lacks all limitation and finitude: therefore it is infinite absolutely.

On the contrary: 1. The infinite is said privatively in respect to the finite, just as the unjust in respect to the just; but always a habit, if it is truly a habit, is nobler than a privation: therefore the condition of the finite is nobler than that of the infinite; but what is nobler must always be attributed to God: therefore etc.

2. Furthermore, in created things infinity comes from the side of matter, but finitude from the side of form; but "God is form without matter," as Boethius says: therefore it seems that He has nothing at all of the notion of infinity, but that He is most finite in Himself.

3. Furthermore, nothing is truly removed from something which essentially belongs to it; but God is the end completing and terminating the appetite of our mind: therefore in no way can the divine being be infinite, neither by the denial of end as it is a terminus, nor insofar as it is a complement.

4. Furthermore, "the finite and the infinite are properties of quantity"; but in God there is no true quantity to be posited, therefore neither true infinity: but if some quantity is posited, this is of power, which regards potency, not essence: therefore it is nothing to say that the essence is infinite.

5. Furthermore, the infinite and the immense are the same: but the immense is said by recession from measure and from mode: therefore the infinite and that which lacks mode, that is, the immoderate, are the same: but what lacks mode lacks species and beauty: therefore since this does not befit the divine being, the conclusion is clear etc.

6. Furthermore, every infinite is said by opposition to the minimum and by recession from it: but the minimum is the most simple in each genus: therefore the infinite signifies recession from simplicity. But the divine being is most simple: therefore it is not infinite.

7. Furthermore, no infinite thing finalizes, because an opposite is not the cause of its opposite, and "nothing gives to another what it does not have"; but God finalizes all things as the most perfect end: therefore God is not infinite, therefore neither with respect to being nor with respect to anything of His.

8. Furthermore, nothing is infinite absolutely which is finite to the supreme truth, which judges all things as they are; but God is finite to Himself, otherwise He would exceed Himself: therefore the divine being is not infinite according to reality: therefore etc.

9. Again, if God could do one thing only, such that He could not do other things, the divine power would be called finite: since therefore the reasoning is similar concerning power and being, and the divine being is nothing but one alone: it follows that the divine being is finite.

10. Again, unity is most finite in itself, since it is the principle of all measurement according to number: if therefore the divine being is one, then it is measured, therefore finite.

11. Again, everything that is this particular thing and determinate is more finite than everything that is not this but common and indeterminate; but common being, namely universal being, is finite: therefore since the divine being is proper and determinate, it will be most finite.

12. Again, everything that is separated from something according to place is finite according to local existence: therefore by equal reasoning everything that is separated according to being is finite according to natural existence: but the divine being is most separated from all things according to being, since this belongs to the first and most complete mover: therefore the divine being is finite according to natural existence.

13. Again, in the divine things it is true that on account of the supreme simplicity what is said in the abstract is said in the concrete, and conversely: if therefore from "end" something is called finite, and this is true and proper: God is the end: therefore also this: God is finite: therefore this is false, that He is infinite.

14. Again, everything comprehensible is finite: but everything simple is comprehensible: therefore everything simple is finite: but the divine being is simple: therefore finite. The minor is proved, because everything that is known wholly is comprehended; but when a simple thing is known, it is known wholly, since it does not have part and part, and necessarily it is finite not only in itself but also to us.

15. Again, either something of God is finite, or nothing; if nothing of God is finite: therefore since by the finite nothing is known except under the aspect of the finite, nothing of God is therefore known by us: therefore we shall never be blessed. But this is a most grievous absurdity: therefore something of God is finite. Either therefore there is to be posited therein something and something, or it is necessary to say that nothing of God is finite in itself: therefore by no reasoning should God be said to be infinite.

CONCLUSION.


The divine being and power, because it is supremely simple, is infinite, insofar as infinite denies a limit with respect to the quantity of power.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that in a question in which there is a multiplicity of the name, one must first distinguish according to the art before asserting or denying anything. It must be understood, therefore, that infinite is said in two ways, namely privatively and negatively. Insofar as it is said privatively, it removes the act and leaves the aptitude, and in this way that is called infinite which is by nature meant to be finished, yet is not finished, and thus it connotes incompleteness.

But insofar as it is said negatively, it simply removes the end or finitude; but this must be understood in two ways according to the twofold meaning of end. For end is said as terminus, and end as completion: and therefore infinite is said in two ways: either by the negation of the end of completion, and thus evil is called infinite: or by the negation of the end of terminus, and this can be in two ways according to the twofold terminus. For there is a terminus according to material quantity, and there is a terminus according to spiritual quantity: the first is called quantity of mass, the second quantity of power. The infinite, therefore, by the negation of terminus with respect to quantity of mass always signifies some incompleteness in some way, either in act or in potency, because it signifies a departure from simplicity. For such a quantity does not stand together with simplicity in the same thing and according to the same respect, and such an infinite never exists in act but only in potency, while in act it is finite. But the infinite by the negation of terminus with respect to quantity of power does not signify any imperfection, but rather the highest perfection, because it does not conflict with simplicity; indeed, it cannot exist except in what is supremely simple; and in this way the authority of Scripture and the confession of faith posit infinity or immensity in God himself, who is most simple.

The divine being, therefore, is infinite by the very fact that it is supremely simple and simply supreme.

For because it is supremely simple, it is supremely united in itself and in its power; and because it is supremely most united in itself, it has nothing contracting it, nothing limiting it, nothing determining it, and nothing enclosing it in a genus, and through this it is beyond all things and above all things.

Because, again, it is most united with respect to power, being and power are in it entirely the same, and therefore, wherever its being is, there also is its power: and where being is, there is the center and origin and fount of power itself: and where the fount and origin and center of power is, it can always go beyond: and therefore, wherever it has power, it always has greater power and power beyond, and through this, power and simultaneously being must necessarily possess infinity. With this accords that saying from the Book of Causes: "Every united power is more infinite," etc. This infinity, therefore, does not conflict with simplicity; rather, it is consonant with it in a wonderful and inseparable harmony.

Furthermore, because it is the highest simply, it is necessary that it be altogether immense. By this very fact nothing can be equal to it, neither by intensification nor by duplication, as Augustine says in the eighth book of On the Trinity: and it is necessary that it have in itself infinite nobility and goodness, since a finite good, however great it may be, can at some point be matched and equaled through the duplication of finite things, as he says.

Because it is also the highest simply, nothing can be greater, nothing better, either in being or in thought. But thought can surpass every finite thing; for if something is understood to have a limit, it is understood that something beyond it can at least be thought. And so, if the divine being, because it is supremely simple, is equally the highest simply, it is consequently necessary to call it altogether infinite, as the arguments conclude. For it cannot be granted that it is finite in essence and infinite in power, as some have said; for these in God are altogether one, and infinity in one necessarily posits and includes infinity in the other, since one cannot extend itself to anything without the other.

And again, since in spiritual things the same is the greater and the better: since essence and power are of equal goodness, they will necessarily also be of equal infinity.

From this statement we can be led by the hand to understanding how simplicity does not conflict with immensity. For if, as Augustine says, "the greater and the better are the same there"; just as it can be understood that the supremely simple is the best, so also the greatest; just as it can also be understood that the supremely simple is supremely powerful, so it can be understood that it is the most simple and the most infinite: just as it can be understood that it is present to all things through power, so also through essence: and just as all things compared to the divine power can do virtually nothing, so all things compared to the divine essence are virtually the least.

Whence in respect to the divine being this entire world is as something minimal. And this is what is said in Wisdom eleven: For as a grain in the balance, so is the whole world before you, and as a drop of morning dew that falls upon the earth: and in Isaiah forty: Behold, the nations are as a drop from a bucket and are accounted as a grain in the balance: and afterward: All nations are as though they were not, so are they before him, and they are accounted as nothing and emptiness. — It must be conceded, therefore, that not only the divine power, but also the divine being is infinite, as the arguments adduced for this position show.

1. To that which is objected, that infinite is said privatively: it must be said that, as has already been stated, although infinite in a creature denotes a privation with respect to the finite according to the thing and the mode of speaking, nevertheless, as it is posited in God, it denotes a most true position according to the thing, and it denotes a greater completion than that which is finite. For it is not said through the privation of complement, as has already been made clear, but through the privation of limitation and restriction, which denote a falling away from the state of most perfect complement. And therefore that argument does not conclude.

2. To that which is objected, that infinity comes from the part of matter: it must be said that this is true insofar as infinity is founded upon quantity of mass, which indeed draws its origin from the material principle. But it is otherwise when it is founded upon quantity of power, because active power draws its origin from form. But infinity is posited in God in this latter way, not in the aforementioned way. And therefore that objection does not proceed.

3. To that which is objected, that God is an end, therefore He is not infinite: it must be said that God is an end that terminates, not a terminated end, because He is an end not as an intrinsic terminus of a thing, but as terminating every appetite of a beatifiable thing. Therefore infinity is not opposed to the terminating end, but only to the terminated end as an intrinsic terminus. And therefore that objection does not proceed.

4. To that which is objected, that finite and infinite are passions of quantity: it must be said that although in God there is no quantity of mass, there is nevertheless quantity of power; moreover, this quantity of power is not only attended to in the power operating externally, but quantity of power is also called excellence of value, whether in absolute or in relative things. Hence it can be posited concerning everything about which a degree of excellence with respect to another can be posited. And such is not only the divine power, but also the divine being. And therefore the notion of infinity befits both.

5. To that which is objected, that infinite and immense denote a departure from measure and from mode: it must be said that in a limited nature, departure from mode and measure denotes a defect. But in a nature that is above every restricting limit, it denotes absolutely no defect, because, according to Augustine, "God is mode without mode." This indeed is said because His immensity is His mode, which is not restricted by the limits of any measure. And in this way, the lack of mode does not induce a lack of species or beauty, but rather the excellence of both.

6. To that which is objected, that infinite is said through opposition to the minimum: it must be said that this is true of the infinite founded upon a quantity repugnant to simplicity, such as quantity of mass, but not of that which is founded upon quantity of power, because this supremely accords with simplicity, as has been said.

7. To that which is objected, that nothing infinite terminates: it must be said that the infinite, insofar as it lacks the notion of completion, does not terminate with the termination of completion; the infinite, also insofar as it lacks the notion of a terminus, does not terminate as a terminus within; nevertheless it can terminate as completing and beatifying: because the appetite of a beatifiable thing is never quieted except in a thing that has immense goodness, where it can desire nothing beyond.

8. To that which is objected, that nothing is infinite which is finite to the highest truth: it must be said that something being finite to the highest truth can be understood in two ways: in one way, because the highest truth judges that thing to be finite to the highest truth, and in this way that proposition has truth; in another way, because it does not exceed the judgment of the highest truth, which, because it is immense in itself, can comprehend every immensity in itself: and in this way it does not follow that what is finite to it is finite absolutely, but rather there is here the fallacy of the qualified and the absolute.

9. To that which is objected, that if God could do only one thing, such that He could not do other things, the divine power would be called finite: it must be said that it is not similar, because power is directed outward and toward created effects, which are finite; hence if He could do only one thing, it would follow that His power would not extend except to what is finite, and thereby that it would be finite. But it is otherwise with the divine being, because that is absolute and as it were directed inward: and although it is one alone, nevertheless that one is immense, both because that being has no limitation within itself, and because it is the font of all being, and because nothing can exist without the divine being. Whence, because the divine essence is in all things, just as the divine power, and if per impossibile infinite things were posited to exist, God would be in all of them: hence it is that the divine being has infinity in itself, just as also the divine power.

10. To that which is objected, that unity is maximally finite, etc.: it must be said that this has truth concerning that unity which enters into the constitution of a thing or of number in the manner of a part, a terminus, or a completion; and this is an aggregable unity, which joined with another induces a greater numerosity, and such a unity draws its origin from the limitation which form attributes to matter itself: and therefore it is the principle of measuring in the genus of discrete quantity. But the divine unity is not of this kind, because it can neither enter into the constitution of another as a part, since it is most perfect, nor does it draw its origin from elsewhere, since it is first: therefore it is neither limited nor measured, but rather immense, because neither restricting nor restricted, neither by another nor by itself.

11. To the objection that what is this is more finite: it must be said that this something is properly said by distinction from what is something of a certain quality, and that is here and now, because it has the contraction of place and time. For the individuation of a thing existing in a genus, accidental properties necessarily accompany it, the collection of which is not to be found in another. But it is not so with the divine being: for although the divine being is called this on account of its supreme completeness and distinction from every other being, it is nevertheless not in a genus: therefore neither is it said to become this through contraction or through the addition of either matter, or essential property, or accidental property; and therefore it is this in such a way that it is not contracted to here and now, but is always and everywhere, far more excellently than any universal, which depends on particular being and by reason of that admits some contraction. And therefore, although universal being is finite, nevertheless nothing prevents the divine being from being infinite.

12. To the objection that everything which is separated from something according to place is finite: it must be said that the case is not similar, because what is separated from something according to place is so separated from it that it is not in it, and therefore by this very fact is contracted and limited and finite. But what is separated according to essential difference from something can nevertheless be in it: just as God is essentially distinguished from the creature, He is nevertheless in every creature by power, presence, and essence. And therefore from such a mode of separation of forms, finitude and limitation cannot be inferred, as from the mode of separation according to position.

13. To the objection that in the divine things abstract terms are said concretely, and conversely: it must be said that the abstract of what is finite, which is said concretely, is finitude, not end: for the concrete term taken from end is not called finite, but limiting, just as finite is said from finitude; and therefore that argument does not hold.

14. To the objection that everything comprehensible is finite: it must be said that the divine being is not comprehensible to a finite power, although it is simple, because simplicity and immensity are rooted in the same thing insofar as it has infinity according to virtual quantity, as was shown above. And therefore, just as it cannot be known according to part and part, because it is supremely simple, so neither can it be totally comprehended on account of its supreme immensity.

15. To the last objection, that either something of God is finite or nothing: it must be said that whatever belongs to God as existing in God — since it is God Himself, not a part of God — necessarily possesses the character of the infinite; because nevertheless "everything that is received in something is received not according to the mode of the thing received, but according to the mode of the receiver," and the power of the created intellect is finite: hence it is that it knows Him finitely, and from this very fact it has its beatification in Him. Nor however is this intellect false, because it places the mode of finitude around itself as knower and around its own cognition, not however around God as known, since it understands Him as infinite, although it is by no means able to comprehend His infinity, as was shown more fully in the question concerning the comprehension of the soul of Christ.

ARTICLE II.


Whether trinity and infinity can stand together.

Next it is asked whether trinity and infinity or immensity can stand together. And that they are incompossible is shown as follows.

1. Because a creature is finite, whatever is in it is finite: therefore since the divine being is immense, whatever is in it is actually infinite: but in the divine there is number or plurality of persons: therefore it is necessary that it extend itself to infinity: therefore it does not stand at trinity.

2. Likewise, since there is a twofold infinity, namely virtual and numerical, it is impossible for the divine being to lack infinity of power: therefore by equal reasoning, if we posit in God a true plurality, just as also a true power; therefore it is necessary that it have infinity.

3. Likewise, a power altogether infinite, when it emanates according to every mode of its potency and infinity, emanates infinitely through every mode: but the divine power is thus infinite and emanates according to every mode of its infinity in the production of persons: therefore the same as before.

4. Likewise, a person producing two either can produce more, or cannot. If it cannot: therefore by producing it loses its power; if however it can: therefore either it is not of supreme liberality, or it is necessary to produce such that there is no standing still.

5. Likewise, if the light of the sun were immense, it would generate from itself infinite splendors: therefore since the eternal light is immense, and the splendor proceeding from it is a true person; it is necessary that there be an infinity of persons there: therefore trinity and infinity do not stand together.

6. Likewise, either the production of persons attests to power, or it does not. If it does not: therefore it ought not be posited in one who is supremely powerful: if it does: therefore a greater multiplication attests to a greater power, and the greatest to the greatest, and an infinite to an infinite: therefore trinity does not stand with infinity.

7. Likewise, if the divine power were in its every-way actuality with respect to the production of creatures, it would be necessary that it produce infinite creatures: therefore since it is thus with respect to persons, it is necessary, if it is infinite, that it produce infinite persons.

8. Likewise, because the divine intellect is infinite, it is necessary that it understand infinite things: therefore since the divine speaking is infinite, it is necessary that it speak infinite things: but as many as the things spoken, so many are the words: as many the words, so many the persons: therefore infinite.

9. Likewise, for the intellect to be perfect, it does not suffice that it understand itself, but also that it understand itself understanding: therefore for the intellect to be of infinite completeness, it is necessary that it reflect upon itself with infinite reflections; but by understanding itself it generates a word: therefore by a second reflection a second word, and so on to infinity: therefore if infinity is to be posited in God, then not a trinity.

10. Likewise, either God can understand more than three persons, or he cannot. If he cannot: then his intellect is finite and limited: if he can understand more: but nothing is understood that does not exist in some way either in itself or in its proximate or remote principle: therefore it is necessary either that the divine understanding be limited, or that more than three persons be posited regarding the divine being, either actually or potentially.

On the contrary: 1. Supreme immensity does not take away the supreme perfection of the producing power, neither by way of nature nor by way of will or liberality, therefore neither the supreme perfection of production: but the perfection of production necessarily requires a limit both on the part of the principle and on the part of the terminus: but there would be no limit if it proceeded to infinity: therefore the supreme infinity of divine being does not posit infinity in persons.

2. Likewise, infinity in God does not take away the perfection of order — for it does not follow that if God is infinite, he is on that account disordered — but the order of perfection necessarily posits a first, a middle, and a last; but where these are, there is not innumerability, but only a trinity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, infinity in God does not take away the perfection of connection, for this contributes to supreme love: but perfect connection cannot exist unless one person proceeds immediately from another, otherwise there is not supreme kinship: but this does not proceed beyond the number three: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, immensity in God does not take away the perfection of beatitude: but knowledge of each person belongs to the essence of beatitude: therefore if a creature cannot simultaneously and at once know infinite persons, it is impossible for any soul ever to be blessed in God: if therefore immensity is compatible with the perfection of beatitude, it is compatible with a plurality of persons. But no plurality is more fitting for the soul capable of beatification than a trinity: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the infinity of divine being does not exclude the unity of essence; for God is one and immense: if therefore unity recedes more from immensity than any plurality however small: if immensity can stand with unity, much more can it stand with trinity.

6. Likewise, the immensity of the divine being does not exclude the simplicity of nature: if therefore complete simplicity is more repugnant to immensity than any plurality whatsoever, if infinity stands with simplicity, much more strongly will it stand with trinity.

7. Likewise, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude the property of the person, therefore neither the true distinction of the same: therefore it does not posit confusion; but where there is infinite numerosity, there is confusion: where there is confusion, there is indistinction: but if this is not to be posited in the divine being, therefore the plurality of persons stands in a finite number: therefore infinity does not conflict with trinity in God.

8. Likewise, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude causality according to the threefold genus of cause, namely efficient, formal, and final; nor does the infinity which is in him posit more modes of causality in God: therefore if it can stand with the threefold genus of cause, it can equally stand with the trinity of person, especially since there is a correspondence of these to one another according to the appropriation of power, wisdom, and goodness, which correspond to the three persons and the threefold mode of causing.

9. Likewise, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude the conformity of Creator and creature according to a twofold representation, namely of vestige and image: if therefore in the image there is a representation of the distinction and origin of the divine persons, according to the correspondence of the persons: if in the Trinity there were infinite persons, there ought to be infinite persons in the image; but if this is impossible, it remains that the trinity of persons does not conflict with the divine immensity.

10. Likewise, the immensity of the divine being does not exclude the inhabitation of God in the mind through the gift of the Holy Spirit; but if there were infinite persons producing and produced, since every producing person sends and gives the produced person, then therefore in the gratification of one soul it would be necessary that infinite persons would fall between the gratified soul and the person first sending or gratifying. If therefore it is not possible to traverse an infinity, it would be impossible that the soul through gratification would return to the first principle, if there were an infinity of persons: since therefore the immensity of God stands with the inhabitation of grace, in which the Son, who is the image of the Father, through the gift and bond of the Holy Spirit leads us back to the Father; therefore the immensity itself concerning the divine being stands with the trinity of persons.

CONCLUSION.


In God the highest infinity stands together with the trinity of persons.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt the highest infinity and the plurality of persons stand together in God: and this is evident as follows.

Infinity is posited in God not by way of defect, but by way of excess, excess, I say, not of superfluity, but of perfection and nobility. Because, therefore, infinity in God posits neither superfluity nor diminution, but supreme perfection, therefore in the emanation of the divine persons one must posit immensity with respect to the producer and the product and the mode of producing, but not infinity with respect to number. For if the persons in the divine were infinite according to number, this infinity would necessarily introduce defect or superfluity. For since there are two noble modes of emanating — by way of nature and by way of liberality — either the two persons emanating by these modes would not perfectly receive the entire immensity of the producer's power, and thus would be imperfect; or if they did receive it, the others would be superfluous. But if in the divine being, by the very fact that it is immense, it is impossible for anything to be superfluous or diminished, then it is necessary to posit God as triune and immense.

Again, because the infinity of the divine being posits immensity on the part of the producer and the product and the mode of producing: just as the divine being, because it is immense, cannot be doubled but is one alone, so it is necessary that in the divine there be one sole paternity, one sole filiation, one sole procession, and thus one sole Father, one sole Son, one sole Holy Spirit; and through this it is necessary to posit God as immense and triune. Moreover, just as if there were many gods, neither would have in itself the immensity of the whole divinity, but rather a part of omnipotence and nobility: so if there were many fathers, neither would have the immensity of paternity; if many sons, none would have the immensity of filiation, but only according to a part. For if each one had the entire fullness and immensity of paternity, there could be in them only one paternity, just as in many persons there can be only one deity. It remains, therefore, that if in the divine being there is true infinity and true plurality, the plurality cannot be extended by infinity beyond the Trinity, according to what the pious faith asserts.

Finally, because that infinity bespeaks every manner of completion, it follows that it does not exclude the perfection of power, of order, of connection, of beatitude, of representation, and of indwelling. And since all these things necessarily give to understand a Trinity in three persons, as is evident from what was previously objected, it is manifest that supreme immensity in no way conflicts with, but accords with, the eternal Trinity.

And therefore the arguments for this position are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that just as in a creature, because it is finite, whatever is there is finite, so it ought to be in God that whatever is in Him by reason of infinity ought to be infinite; it must be said that, as has already been touched upon, to the divine being belongs infinity of power and dignity, not of mass or numerosity: and such infinity is found both in the essence and in the persons, whether producing or produced, whether in themselves or in their emanations; all of which is found perfectly and integrally in the three persons: and therefore it is not necessary that they be extended to an infinity of numerosity by reason of the infinity of divine being .

2. To that which is objected, that God cannot lack infinity of power, etc., it must be said that the case is not similar with this infinity and with that one: because, since greatness of power signifies rather an approach to simplicity than a departure from it, while multitude of numerosity signifies a departure from the one and the simple; and God and the divine being is so immense that together with this it is simple and supremely one: it follows that infinity of power belongs to Him, but not of personal numerosity .

3. To that which is objected, that a power altogether infinite, since according to every mode of potency it emanates infinitely, diffuses itself through every mode: it must be said that since perfection together with infinity remains in God, that holds true of every mode of emanation and diffusion which belongs to supreme perfection; but this is according to a twofold mode of producing what is perfect, namely of nature and of liberality, each of which must be unique in itself, not doubled nor repeated twice or thrice, much less proceeding to infinity, because this would introduce superabundance and defect, as was shown in the preceding arguments.

4. To that which is objected, that the person producing two either can produce more or cannot; it must be said that not being able to produce beyond those two does not indicate a defect of power, but rather its complement: because in those two productions the productive power manifests itself most perfectly and most infinitely, both with respect to the immensity of the persons produced, and with respect to the actuality of the productions themselves; because in the same mode and not otherwise the generative and spirative power in the Father has actuality in generating and spirating, in the same mode by which it has had actuality from eternity. For just as splendor continuously flows from the sun, so the Son, who is the splendor of the Father , indeed much more excellently continuously flows from the Father.

5. 6. To that which is objected, that if the light of the sun were immense, it would generate from itself infinite splendors: it must be said that the case is not similar, because the splendor emanating from the sun is neither entirely perfect nor equal to its origin; and therefore it does not contain within itself from a single production the entire power and clarity of irradiating light, but rather according to degrees of proximity and distance it partakes of and receives more or less from the fullness of the fontal light. But it is otherwise in the Son, who is the Word of the Father and the most perfect splendor, in all things equal to the Father, receiving from the Father everything that the Father has within Himself; and therefore, just as the infinity of the eternal light does not remove the equality with the eternal splendor emanating from it, so it does not introduce an infinite multiplication of splendors, since the single splendor contains that entire immensity within itself.

7. To that which is objected, that if the divine power were in its every mode of actuality with respect to creatures, it would produce infinite creatures, etc.: it must be said that the case is not similar, for a twofold reason: both because the creature is finite, and therefore none corresponds equally to the producing power; and because the creature is essentially distinguished from the producer, and also from other creatures according to a distinction in its intrinsic principles and co-attached accidents. But it is not so in the divine persons: both because the produced is infinite, just as the producer, and because they are not distinguished by essence, but by origin; and therefore, since there are only two distinct and distinctive origins, there are and can be understood only two emanating persons, in whom the immensity of the fontal productive power shines forth most sufficiently.

8. To that which is objected, that the divine intellect understands infinite things, since it is infinite: it must be said that although God understands infinite things, He comprehends all things by His own single self, because by understanding Himself He understands all things; so also, although He speaks many things, yet He speaks all things in one Word. For by the same Word by which the Father speaks Himself, He speaks whatever He speaks; for the Father, by understanding Himself with the most complete and singular act of understanding, in which the intellect is equated to the one understanding, and conversely, generates the Word, which is the likeness of the Father in all things equal to Him. Whence, just as the Father by understanding Himself understands whatever He can understand, so by speaking the Word He speaks whatever He can speak and whatever can be spoken in the Godhead. Whence neither can He Himself speak another word, nor can any person in the Trinity, because by that Word is spoken whatever can be spoken.

And if you object that just as God has infinite reasons with respect to intelligible things, He ought similarly to have infinite words: it must be said that the case is not similar, because reason and idea denote a relation and likeness to intelligible things to be created and produced, or capable of being produced, which are capable of being multiplied in manifold and innumerable ways; but word denotes a relation to the one speaking and to the first object understood and the supreme principle, of which it is the hypostatic likeness; and therefore in no way, neither in reality nor in understanding, does multiplicity befit it, just as neither does it befit the first principle primarily and principally understood by itself.

9. To the objection that an intellect of infinite completeness reflects upon itself with infinite reflections, etc.: it must be said that in the divine intellect to understand and to understand that one understands are the same, even if understanding were iterated a thousand times and infinitely, because in God the one understanding, the thing understood, and the act of understanding are the same; and therefore that first act itself by which God the Father understands Himself is most actual and most complete, as is also the Word corresponding to it; and therefore it is not necessary on this account to introduce a plurality of words in the divine persons. But it is otherwise in the created intellect, whose act and operation differs from the one understanding and the thing understood, and therefore it can be multiplied, iterated, and enumerated more and more by the frequent turning of the intellect upon itself as understanding and upon its own act of understanding, and also upon things other than itself.

10. To the last objection, that either God can understand more persons, or He cannot: it must be said that not being able to understand more persons can be understood in two ways: either on account of a limitation of the intellect in the act of understanding, or on account of the rectitude of judgment and the impossibility of declining from the way of truth. In the first way it does not befit the divine intellect, since it is immense, but in the second way it does. Whence, that He cannot understand more persons means this: because such an understanding, although it might seem powerful in the act of understanding, nevertheless in reality declines from truth by understanding this and falls into error. Whence, just as the immensity of truth is entirely unmixed with falsity, so also the immensity of the light of understanding renders the divine intellect utterly free from all error; on account of which the divine intellect grasps neither something greater than itself, nor another God, nor a plurality of persons beyond the number three—not because it is limited, but because it is most perfectly infinite.

And from these things the solution to the whole question is clear.