Question 5

QUESTION V.

Whether the trinity of persons is compatible with supreme eternity.

Next it is asked whether the trinity of persons is compatible with supreme eternity. And concerning this, two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine being is eternal. The second is whether trinity and eternity are compatible.

ARTICLE I.

Whether the divine being is eternal.

Concerning the first, we proceed as follows. And that the divine being is eternal:

1. The authority of Scripture demonstrates this, Exodus 15: The Lord shall reign forever and ever; and Romans 1: His eternal power also and divinity.

2. The truth of the faith also demonstrates this: " Eternal the Father," it says in the Athanasian Creed, "eternal the Son, eternal the Holy Spirit."

3. Likewise, the necessity of reason concludes this same thing. For Richard argues thus: Everything that is from itself is eternal; but the divine being, since it is first, is from itself: therefore, etc. The major is manifest; because if it were not eternal, at some point it would not have existed, and then it would never have given being either to itself or to others, and consequently it would never exist. The minor is evident through itself.

4. Likewise, everything that is its own being is eternal; for being cannot not be, therefore it can neither begin nor cease, and thus it lacks a beginning and an end: if therefore God, since he is most simple, is his own being, indeed is simply being itself; therefore he is altogether eternal.

5. Likewise, everything that is truth itself is eternal; but the divine being is truth itself: therefore, etc. The minor is evident: Augustine proves the major in the Soliloquies: For truth can neither be thought nor declared not to be: indeed it follows that if there is no truth, some truth exists, because if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth, or that it does not exist: therefore being cannot in any way be removed from truth: therefore it always was, is, and will be.

6. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme infinity is eternal; for if it had begun, it would be of finite duration; but the divine being is infinite: therefore it is necessary that it be eternal; otherwise, if it lacks eternity, it also lacks immensity.

7. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme immortality is eternal; "for what begins from change tends toward change"; but in the divine being there is supreme immortality, since it is life itself through essence, or living itself: therefore it is necessary that the divine being possess eternity.

8. Again, everything in which there is supreme happiness, is eternal; but the divine being is of this kind, since it is most perfect: therefore etc. The major is proved, because that happiness which lacks beginning and end is greater than that which took its origin from elsewhere: if therefore the divine being is most happy, it follows necessarily that it is eternal. And again, all happiness implies the absence of an end : therefore the most perfect happiness implies the lack of every beginning.

9. Again, everything in which there is supreme simplicity, is eternal; the divine being is of this kind: therefore etc. The minor is manifest: the major is proved: because in whatever there is supreme simplicity, first, middle, and last do not differ, and nothing of this kind has past and future, but only an abiding present: but everything of this kind is eternal: therefore etc.

10. Again, since being is divided into the eternal and the aeviternal and the temporal, the aeviternal is nobler than the temporal, and the eternal is nobler than both; but what is nobler must always be attributed to the noblest being: therefore supreme eternity must be attributed to God.

11. Again, everything flowing is reduced to something permanent: therefore a flowing duration is reduced to a permanent duration, and therefore a present passing into the past is reduced to an ever-abiding present: but such a present does not exist in a defective thing: therefore it is necessary that it exist in the creative essence: therefore it is necessary that the divine being be eternal.

12. Again, the true concerning the future was true without a beginning, and the true concerning the past is true without an end: but the future and the past are necessarily reduced to the present: therefore it is necessary to posit a true that is always present without end and without beginning. But this is eternal, nor can it be posited in anything other than in relation to the first principle: therefore necessarily the divine being is eternal.

To the contrary: 1. Eternity is a measure; but nothing immeasurable has a measure, for if it has a measure, it is not immeasurable: therefore etc.

2. Again, a measure is equal to the measured; but nothing can be equal to the divine being: therefore there is no duration of eternity in God.

3. Again, eternity is the lack of end and beginning; but nothing lacks that which it is: if therefore God is the beginning and end of all things, then the divine being does not have a lack of these: therefore it cannot be eternal.

4. Again, the lack of completion implies a defect: beginning and end express completion: therefore in God there is no positing a privation of these: but eternity expresses a privation of these: therefore it ought not to be posited concerning the divine being.

5. Again, eternity is the lack of past and future; but God truly was and is and will be: therefore the divine being does not have the character of the eternal.

6. Again, let A be past time, B future; it is true to say that God was in A and will be in B, and false conversely: therefore A has truly passed away in relation to God, and B is truly future: therefore the divine being has a past and a future: therefore it is not eternal.

7. Again, where there is eternity, there is interminability, because according to Boethius "eternity is the possession of interminable life"; where there is interminability, there is circularity; but the circular is posterior to the straight, and nothing but what is absolutely first is to be attributed to the divine being: therefore neither is the duration of eternity.

8. Again, according to the order of understanding and the order of nature, the circumference is posterior to the center; but what the circumference is to the center, this is what eternity is to time: therefore time is far more properly to be attributed to God than eternity: therefore if it is unfitting to attribute temporality to God, then also eternity.

9. Again, where there is eternity, there is also totality; which is evident from the definition of Boethius: "Eternity is the whole and simultaneous possession of interminable life"; but where there is totality, there is partibility and divisibility; but this cannot be in God, since He is supreme simplicity: therefore, etc.

10. Again, nowhere is continuity of extension to be found without partibility: therefore nowhere does it happen that continuation of duration is found without true totality, and therefore without divisibility; hence an impartible being does not have the character of duration nor is it said to be whole and simultaneous: therefore, etc.

11. Again, where there is eternity, there is simultaneity, by definition; but where there is simultaneity, there is distinction, because simultaneity implies a relation, and relation implies distinction; but the divine being is altogether without distinction: therefore it is not eternal.

12. Again, if in the divine being there is complete simultaneity, then being, having been, and going to be are simultaneous: but in those things that are simultaneous, what accompanies one of them also accompanies the other: if therefore the aeviternal always accompanies the divine going-to-be, then by equal reason also its having-been: therefore just as it lacks an end, so also a beginning. But this is impossible: therefore it is impossible to posit in God the perfect duration of eternity: therefore it is not to be posited that the divine being is eternal.

13. Again, either eternity adds something beyond the now of eternity, or nothing. If nothing: then whatever coexists with the now of eternity is eternal; but the now of time coexists with the now of eternity: therefore it coexists with all of eternity, therefore it is eternal. If something: then eternity is composite: therefore it does not befit God.

14. Again, although a point is the beginning, middle, and terminus of extension, nevertheless it is impossible for extension to be understood within a point: therefore by equal reason neither can duration be understood within a now: therefore if eternity implies duration, it implies something beyond the now of eternity: therefore it is repugnant to supreme simplicity: therefore it is impossible that it should pertain to God's being, which is most simple.

15. Again, the divine being and the divine power, knowledge, and will or foreknowledge are measured by the same measure; but the divine foreknowledge is not measured by eternity, since God ceases to foreknow certain things: therefore neither is the divine being measurable by eternity.

16. Again, the divine being and operating are measured by the same measure, because in God substance, power, and operation are the same: if therefore the divine being is measured by eternity, then so also is the divine creating: therefore God creates from eternity and eternally, and consequently the creature is eternally created; but this is false: therefore so also is that from which it follows.

17. Again, every truth is measured by time, or by aeviternity, or by eternity; but that the world was to be created was true in God before the constitution of the world; therefore it is measured either by eternity, or by time: not by time, because time did not then exist: therefore by eternity. But this truth ceased to be true: therefore it seems that eternity has a terminus: but the divine being is without terminus: therefore eternity cannot be posited concerning the divine being.

CONCLUSION.

The divine being is eternal, because it is at once simple and infinite.

I respond: It must be said that the divine being is eternal, by the very fact that it is simple and infinite.

For because it is infinite, it lacks beginning and end: for if it had either of these, it would certainly have termination and limitation on that side, and thus would not be of supreme immensity. But because it is simple, it lacks before and after, which necessarily introduce diversity and some composition. Supreme simplicity therefore posits complete simultaneity: while supreme immensity posits complete interminability: and these two joined together constitute eternity. For eternity is nothing other than "the interminable and wholly simultaneous possession of life"; and because in no other is it possible to find these two together, namely immensity and simplicity, except in God alone: therefore the condition of eternity cannot be communicated to any other than God. - Furthermore, because these two are above our imagination and estimation, the duration of eternity can rightly be understood by no one unless all imagination is set aside. Let these two therefore be joined together, so that the duration of the divine being may be understood as most infinite and most simple, and thereby a true permanence, lacking inception and interruption or extension and division or termination, and utterly lacking all succession. And this reasoning necessarily concludes through the two aforesaid conditions joined together, although it may seem contrary to our imagination.

Moreover, a likeness of this can be found in God. For just as God, simple and immense, is wholly in distant places, which places although they are distant from one another, yet existing here and there He is not distant from Himself on account of His supreme unity and simplicity; so the divine being, which is eternal, even though it is in diverse times on account of its immensity: although those times have distance and extension, it itself is nonetheless undistant from itself on account of its supreme simplicity. And just as the divine uncircumscribability has all places present to itself, and is not itself extended through them, although they are truly extended: so the divine eternity has all times present to itself, nor does it itself undergo succession with them, although they truly succeed one another.

In creatures, however, although a complete likeness cannot be found on account of their deficiency, nonetheless something is found with some deficiency, which indeed, with that deficiency circumscribed by the intellect, leads by the hand to understanding eternity in the divine being. Moreover, this can be noticed in some way both in the image and in the vestige. For in the soul, which is the image of God, there is memory of past things, understanding of present things, and foresight of future things; and these indeed are simultaneously in the soul, so that in the soul, which is a spiritual substance, those things which succeed through diverse times are simultaneously gathered together and conjoined: because, however, it is itself limited and receives something from a thing outside, it falls short of that perfect simultaneity. But God receives nothing at all nor is He in any way limited: and therefore all things must be understood as present to Him, and this without beginning and end; and this is to understand eternity.

In time, however, which is the vestige of eternity, there is present, past, and future, so that what was future afterwards becomes present and finally past, because it is rooted upon mutable and fluid being, or upon motion itself. If therefore the present is understood to be rooted upon immutable and fixed being, which has neither beginning nor end, that will be understood as eternal.

And thus, if anyone by right consideration ascends from creatures to the Creator, removing what belongs to incompleteness and retaining what belongs to completeness: he will be able to arrive in some measure at understanding the eternity of the divine being, not however perfectly, as long as we are in the flesh: because while we live here, "our understanding is not without continuity and time," and through this it is greatly distanced from eternity, unless perhaps it is raised higher by a special gift: for as Augustine says, "when we grasp something eternal with the mind, we are not in this world." - It is evident therefore that the divine being is assuredly eternal, and what the necessary reason of this is, and how our consideration can grasp it. And the arguments proving that eternity is in the divine being are to be conceded.

1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected to the contrary, that eternity is a measure, it must be said that although eternity, according to the mode of understanding, speaks under the notion of measure, according to reality and truth it says nothing other than the being of the divine substance; and just as that being is immeasurable, so also eternity is immeasurable: and therefore it is said to be equal to it, not through co-termination, because the immeasurable has no boundary, but through the privation of mutual excess. - And through this the response is clear to what is objected first and second concerning the notion of measure: because those arguments proceed from a measure that differs from the thing measured, that is bounded and bounds, and on this account exists only with respect to a finite thing; all of which fail with respect to divine eternity, nor nevertheless is it falsely called a measure according to the mode of understanding, inasmuch as it signifies divine being through the mode of duration, which duration indeed, even though it infinitely exceeds every creature, nevertheless with respect to divine being itself is neither exceeded nor exceeds.

3. To that which is objected, that eternity is the lack of a beginning and an end: it must be said that beginning and end, according as they are taken in the notion of eternity, are the same as the initial and final boundary in the duration of a thing; and these boundaries indeed exist only with respect to a thing that begins to be and ceases to be. When therefore I say that God is the beginning and the end, the notion of beginning and end is used equivocally there. Whence there is a twofold defect in that argument: both because God is the beginning and end with respect to things outside, and because He is the beginning and end according to the notion of causing. But when it is said that eternity is the lack of a beginning and an end, beginning and end are taken as within and according to the notion of enduring.

4. To that which is objected, that the lack of these, namely of a beginning and an end, sounds like a defect, since they themselves denote completeness, etc.: it must be said that beginning and end, according as they denote a boundary, even though they seem to denote completeness, they nevertheless denote limitation with deficiency; and therefore conversely, although the lack of these may seem to be a privation according to the mode of understanding, it is nevertheless a true positing on the part of the thing: for a duration that lacks a beginning and an end is so truly real that it has nothing of non-being.

5. To that which is objected, that eternity is the absence of past and future: it must be said that past and future are attributed to something in two ways: either such that it is by way of a disposition of the thing understood, or of the one understanding. Similarly, when something is said to have been in the past, or to be in the future: this can be understood in two ways: either by way of whenness and inherence, or by way of simultaneity and coexistence. When therefore it is said that eternity is the absence of past and future: it must be said that this is true insofar as past and future denote a disposition of the thing which is said to have passed away, such that by measuring it, it left in it a certain affection or disposition which is called when, according to what is said elsewhere, that " when is in everything that began to exist." But when God is said to have been and to be going to be, the past is not there a disposition of the thing understood, but of the one understanding; nor is this said by way of commensuration, whenness, and inherence, but by way of duration, a certain simultaneity, and coexistence. Hence all those expressions have a certain impropriety; for we stammer about eternity through various tenses, because our intellect does not ascend to understanding eternal things unless it is led by the hand through temporal things, as long as we are on the way.

6. To that which is objected, that God is not said to have been in future time, nor to be going to be in past time: it must be said that this is not because there is some succession or variation in the divine being, but on account of the connotation of coexistence in past or future time, in which there is so great a variation that neither can the past be called future, nor can the future be called past. Hence, since He is not said to be future in the past nor past in the future, this is not because to have been and to be going to be denote another being, or another mode of being with respect to the divine being, but only with respect to created being.

7. 8. To that which is objected, that eternity is interminability: it must be said that this does not capture the whole notion of eternity, because it does not only signify interminability, but also simultaneity: and just as by way of interminability it signifies a certain intelligible circumference, lacking beginning and end, so by way of simultaneity it signifies simplicity and indivision after the manner of a center: and these two are posited simultaneously concerning the divine being, because it is at once simple and infinite, and therefore circularity is understood in eternity: nor does it posit posteriority with respect to the straight line, nor even with respect to the center. And through this the response is clear to that which is objected concerning time, that it holds the notion of a center with respect to interminable eternity. For just as the preceding argument, so also this one proceeds from what is insufficient: because it considers eternity only insofar as it is the measure of immense being, when it ought simultaneously to be understood that it is the measure of what is simple and indivisible, which can in no way be found in the measure of time.

9. To that which is objected, that where there is eternity, there is totality: it must be said that the totality which is posited in eternity is not understood according to quantity of mass, but according to quantity of power, in which the notion of magnitude and immensity stands simultaneously with the perfection of simplicity: and therefore it does not follow that where there is totality, there is divisibility: for this does not hold true except of that whole which is truly quantified, in which, because totality signifies true quantity, it necessarily posits part and part.

Or it could be said that whole simultaneously is said there rather according to the notion of perfection than according to the notion of distribution into parts of some integral whole.

10. To that which is objected, that nowhere is continuity of extension found without partibility: it must be said that it is not similar, because extension always signifies part outside of part, and through this corporeality, quantity, and partibility; but duration signifies being that is not interrupted, which indeed is found not only in composites, but also in simples.

11. To that which is objected, that eternity signifies simultaneity: it must be said that simultaneity is not said there by the positing of a gathering together and coexistence of diverse enduring things, but rather by the privation of succession in the continuity of the enduring thing: whence eternity is said to be whole simultaneously, because in it nothing whatsoever succeeds another, not because diverse and various things exist simultaneously in it. Whence simultaneity signifies nothing other than a supreme and simple and undivided presentiality, and this signifies no intrinsic diversity.

12. To that which is objected, that if to be, to be in the future, and to have been are the same in God, then a creature, just as it commeasures itself in its own way with the divine future being, so also with the divine past being: it must be said that the cases are not similar, nor ought one to be inferred from the other. And the reason for this is clear, because, although in God to lack a beginning and to lack an end are the same, in a creature, however, they differ greatly. For since a creature is from nothing, it is essential to it to have a beginning and an inception; but not to have an end and a termination does not conflict with created nature; nor is the opposite of this essential to it, because the appetite of a creature is toward contraries. And on account of this it does not follow that, if it can be assimilated to God according to that which is future being, it can likewise be assimilated according to that which is past being. For just as it does not follow—justice and immensity are the same in God, but a creature can be assimilated to God insofar as He is just, therefore also insofar as He is immense— so also the aforesaid mode of arguing neither concludes nor infers.

13. To that which is objected, that eternity either adds something beyond the now of eternity, or nothing: it must be said that since in eternity there is simultaneity and interminability, or simplicity and immensity, the now of eternity names that duration with respect to simple simultaneity, while eternity names it with respect to interminable immensity. Therefore, just as interminable immensity adds nothing in reality beyond the indivisibility of divine simplicity and simultaneity, but only according to the mode of understanding, so also does eternity add nothing beyond the now of eternity. And just as it does not follow that, because a creature comprehends God as most simple, therefore it comprehends God as immense, so it does not follow that, if something coexists with the now of eternity, it coexists with interminable eternity. For to those things which are the same in God there correspond in the creature various and diverse things, as is evident in goodness and wisdom, in justice and mercy, as was touched upon above.

14. To that which is objected, that although a point is the beginning and middle and terminus of extension, it is impossible to understand extension within it, it must be said that the case is not similar: because, although a point is the beginning of extension, it is nevertheless not the whole essence of extension nor even a constitutive part: but the now is the whole essence of duration, not only in eternal and aeviternal things, but even in the duration of time. And the reason for this is: because extension has all its parts simultaneously, and because "a point is a positioned substance," whence it necessarily implies position in matter: and therefore, since it is indivisible, it cannot be the essence of a whole divisible thing nor a constitutive part, since every part of a continuum is continuous. But it is otherwise with duration, because of duration itself there is never anything except the present and indivisible, even in successive duration. And therefore it is not surprising if in the now the essence of duration can be enclosed, and especially of that duration in which essence and being do not differ, as is the case in eternity.

15. 16. To that which is objected, that the same measure measures the divine being and power and knowledge and foreknowledge; it must be said that this is true by reason of the principal thing signified, but it is not true by reason of the connotation.

And through this the response to the following is clear, which is objected concerning creation: for the intrinsic act is eternal, just as the substance is: but the effect is temporal, because it is a creature.

17. To that which is objected, that it was true before the constitution of the world that the world would exist in the future: it must be said that that proposition, although it is one, nevertheless implies within itself a twofold truth. For if it is said that the world would exist in the future, before the world was made: this is not true except because the world in some way has being in its cause; and with respect to this, that statement is true with eternal truth. Again, for this it does not suffice that the world have being only in its cause; rather, for this proposition to be true, it is required that it at some time have being outside its cause: and because that being, before the world was made, was not yet created but to-be-created: hence it is that with respect to this it was not true with created truth, but with truth to-be-created. And because, when a thing begins to be created, then it ceases to be to-be-created: hence it is that that proposition, which signified a true meaning from eternity, ceases to be true, not on account of a termination in eternity, but on account of a beginning in time, because together with the eternal it gave to understand something temporal.

And through this the response to the foregoing question is clear.

ARTICLE II.

Whether trinity and eternity are compatible.

Next it is asked whether trinity and eternity are compatible. And that they are incompatible is shown as follows.

1. Wherever there is eternity, there is complete simultaneity; but where there is complete simultaneity, there is no order; where there is no order, there is no emanation; where there is no emanation, there can be no personal plurification: therefore from the first, if in the divine being there is supreme and true eternity, it is impossible that there be a true trinity or plurality of persons.

2. Likewise, "a cause is that whose being is followed by another," namely the effect: but it is evident that the effect follows the cause not by reason of diversity, since these can exist simultaneously: therefore by reason of production. Where therefore there is production, there is antecedence and consequence: but where these are, there is no true eternity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if three persons are in the Trinity, either they are equally first, or they are not equally first. If equally first: then one is not from another, and consequently they cannot be in the same nature. If however they are not equally first: then neither are they simply and equally coeternal: therefore the same as before.

4. Likewise, every corruption necessarily posits a final terminus, therefore every production or emanation posits an initial one; but there cannot be a trinity without emanation or production: therefore neither without some beginning. But this cannot stand with eternity: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, eternity is interminable duration: therefore if in the divine there is an eternal trinity, then there is also an interminable production or emanation of persons; but an interminable production or emanation is never perfect, because it is never in a state of having been produced: therefore either the trinity is not perfect, or it is not eternal.

6. Likewise, in God being and enduring are entirely the same, therefore having a principle of being and of enduring is the same: but there cannot be a true trinity without some person having there a principle of existing through production: therefore it cannot be without having a principle of enduring. But this is incompatible with eternity: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, a person is not of greater power or actuality than the essence: but the divine essence cannot produce another essence coeternal with itself: therefore neither can a person produce a person; therefore either in the divine essence there is no trinity of persons, or there is not supreme eternity there.

8. Likewise, every being is either created or uncreated; similarly every being is either from itself or from another: but every created being is a being from another: therefore every uncreated being is a being from itself. But everything eternal is uncreated: therefore everything eternal is from itself, and therefore nothing is eternal that is from another. But there cannot be a trinity without some person proceeding from another: therefore where there is trinity, there is no eternity.

9. Again, whenever any power, whether finite or infinite, exerts itself according to the entire totality of its potency in some act, it is impossible that it simultaneously and at once exert itself in another act; but the paternal power in generating entirely exerts the immensity of its whole power, since the Son is as great as the Father: therefore it cannot simultaneously and at once produce another person. If therefore it produces a third, this will be either before or after: but this does not occur in omniform eternity: therefore either there is no trinity in the divine, or there is no true eternity.

10. Again, wherever there is production, there is reception from another; but nothing receives what it already has: therefore if the Son is produced by the Father, he receives being from the Father: therefore he did not previously have that being. But what receives being not previously had receives a beginning of duration: and nothing of this sort is eternal: therefore eternity does not stand together with production, therefore neither with the trinity.

11. Again, eternity denotes the present; whence the eternal is always present according to its proper nature; but emanations in the divine, and especially generation, are more properly indicated through the past tense than through the present, because it is better said always begotten, always born, than to say being begotten and being born: therefore it seems that these two cannot stand together. If therefore there cannot be a trinity without true production, then it does not stand together with eternity.

But against this there are innumerable authorities in both the old and the new law; but it is shown by reason.

1. For "relatives are simultaneous by nature"; Father and Son are truly relatives, and Spirator and Spirit: therefore they are simultaneous by nature: if therefore any of the persons is eternal, since the others are simultaneous by nature, it is necessary that all be eternal. And that this follows is manifest, because in God relation cannot be an accident nor something coming from elsewhere on account of the supreme simplicity: it is necessary therefore that they have every kind of simultaneity.

2. Again, the paternal mind simultaneously was and understood, because its being is its understanding, nor does anything precede by nature or by any duration; but in the mind, to understand is to take a word from itself: therefore it simultaneously was and begot the Word. But the Word cannot exist except as pleasing and loved, therefore also as connected to the lover: therefore if the divine understanding stands together with eternity, then also eternity with the trinity.

3. Again, it pertains to the nobility of power to produce quickly: whence some things produce in an imperceptible time, some things suddenly, some things simultaneously in duration, though posterior in nature: and all these are found in creatures: if therefore the divine power is most powerful, altogether surpassingly exceeding created power: therefore it is so able to produce and will produce, that what is produced is simultaneous in nature with the one producing.

4. Likewise, the Father can communicate deity and omnipotence to the Son, otherwise He would not be the Son; but deity is eternity itself, nor can one be God unless one is eternal; therefore the first person can communicate eternity to the others; therefore trinity and eternity can stand together.

5. Likewise, uncreated light is more powerful in producing its splendor than created light; but created light is never without its splendor, therefore neither is uncreated light; therefore if the splendor is a produced person, the conclusion is evident, etc.

6. Likewise, the trinity stands together with immensity, and immensity necessarily posits eternity; therefore from the first, the true and perfect trinity exists simultaneously where there is true and perfect eternity; therefore they have no incompatibility.

7. Likewise, the trinity stands together with supreme equality; but equality is not only according to power, but also according to duration, in which nothing can be equal to the eternal unless it is coeternal with it; if therefore it stands with supreme equality, then also with eternity.

8. Likewise, wherever potency and act are the same, if the potency can be eternal, so too can the act, especially when nothing extrinsic or created is connoted; but in the person of the Father, the power to generate and generating are the same; similarly this is true of the power of spirating; if therefore it is necessary that the Father could eternally generate, then it is necessarily posited that He has eternally generated.

9. Likewise, where being and being referred are utterly the same, it is necessary that they be measured by the same measure; but in the Father, being and being referred to the Son are utterly the same, and conversely, because there is no composition there; if therefore being is eternal, then so too is the mutual relation of the persons.

10. Likewise, in the created image, essence and potency exist simultaneously, and each of the three powers is coeval with the others, as is manifestly evident in the soul; therefore since there is greater agreement among the divine persons, much more strongly will one be coeternal with the others;

for as perpetuity is related to the image, so eternity is related to the creative trinity; whence "from the perpetuity of things the eternal Creator is manifestly shown;"

therefore from the perpetuity of the image, the eternity of the trinity is inferred and shown.

CONCLUSION.

The trinity of persons necessarily stands together with eternity.

I respond: It must be said that the trinity and eternity necessarily stand together; and this indeed is gathered from the side of the essential conditions, from the side of the original emanations, and from the side of the personal relations.

On the part, I say, of the essential conditions: because the trinity stands with the supreme unity, simplicity, and immensity of essence, as has been shown in the preceding: whence the divine persons have being that is one, most simple, and immense: but eternity regards being itself, which in the trinity can neither be numbered nor composed nor limited: it remains therefore that in the three persons there is true eternity on account of immensity, there is supreme eternity on account of simplicity of every kind, there is unique eternity on account of the unity of essence: therefore eternity does not exclude the trinity, because the trinity necessarily includes eternity.

On the part also of the original emanations, the same thing is gathered, both by reason of the one producing, and by reason of the one produced, and by reason of the mode of producing. The one producing is in complete actuality of power on account of supreme perfection: the one produced is in complete equality on account of supreme assimilation: the production is in complete necessity on account of natural diffusion or communication. If therefore the person producing is eternal, it is necessary that the act of producing be eternal, and the one produced himself, and the mode of producing. It is evident therefore that eternity and trinity not only do not conflict, but wonderfully harmonize and necessarily stand together.

On the part indeed of the personal relations, the same thing is gathered. For the divine persons are distinguished by their relations—relations, I say, not extrinsic but intrinsic; not adventitious but abiding; not diminished but most complete . Since moreover an intrinsic relation, not adventitious but perfect, coexists simultaneously with its supposit, and a relation and its correlative are simultaneous by nature: necessarily relations of this kind posit in the divine persons supreme simultaneity, nor do they introduce terminability, because they stand with supreme infinity. Since therefore nothing more is required for eternity than simultaneity with interminability of every kind, and supreme interminability with simultaneity of every kind; necessarily the trinity stands together with eternity, and eternity with the trinity, because the trinity does not exclude but includes eternity. Whence Augustine, in the eleventh book of the City of God, chapter twenty-eight: "God, to whose image we are created, is true eternity, eternal truth, eternal and true charity; and He Himself is the eternal and true and beloved Trinity." Just as therefore eternity does not conflict with charity and truth, so also it does not conflict with the trinity, nor conversely.

And therefore the arguments which show this are to be granted.

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected to the contrary, that where there is eternity, there is complete simultaneity: it must be said that the simultaneity of eternity excludes the order of prior and posterior, but not the order of origin. When, however, it is said that the Trinity posits an order, this is not understood of an order of priority and posteriority, but of an order of origin and natural emanation, according to what Augustine says, that "there is an order there, not by which one is prior and the other posterior, but by which one is from the other."

2. To that which is objected, that an effect follows a cause not by reason of diversity, but of production: it must be said that neither of those is the total sufficient and perfect cause, but one together with the other: for an effect follows its cause because it flows from it, in such a way that it differs from it according to essence; and on account of this it is neither as noble as the cause, nor is it equal to it in duration or in complete equality of power. But it is otherwise in divine production, where the one producing and the one who is produced have one and the same essence, and through this complete equality in duration alike and in power.

3. To that which is objected, that either the persons there are equally first, or not: it must be said that with respect to the privation of prior and posterior they are equally first, but with respect to the order of origin they are not equally first. But from this it does not follow that they are not equally coeternal, because, as was shown above, the nobility of those most perfect emanations by reason of simplicity and immensity posits the coeternity of those producing and those produced.

4. To that which is objected concerning corruption, which posits a final terminus: it must be said that it is not similar: because corruption always indicates a defect and a process from the complete to the incomplete; but generation is not so: because some generation is through the eduction of something from potency into act, and thus by reason of incompleteness it necessarily indicates an initial terminus; but some generation is through the most actual communication according to the complete perfection of the one producing and the one produced, and of that from which it is produced, and of the mode according to which it is produced. And such generation is posited concerning God, and this, because it indicates no incompleteness, posits no initial terminus.

5. To that which is objected, that eternity is interminable duration: it must be said that the terminus of production is spoken of in two ways: one is principal, namely the having been produced, the other is conjoined, namely no longer being produced, and this conjoined terminus obtains in those things in which being produced and having been produced differ. When, therefore, it is asked whether generation in the divine persons is terminated, or not: it must be said that if it is understood of the terminus in the first way, it is terminated, because the Father so generates the Son that the Son is generated; but if in the second way, then it does not hold true, because the Son is always generated and is always being generated, because in him being produced and having been produced are the same on account of the perfection of simplicity and supreme actuality.

6. To that which is objected, that in God being and enduring are the same: it must be said that principle of enduring is said in two ways: in one way through the production and communication of duration, in another way through the inception of duration. If principle is taken in the first way: just as the Father is the principle of being to the Son, so also of enduring: for just as He gives Him being, so He gives Him being always. If however it is understood in the second way, then it does not hold true, nor does that argument conclude, on account of the diverse acceptation of principle .

7. To that which is objected, that the person is not of greater power nor actuality than the essence: it must be said that the case is not similar, because the divine essence cannot produce another essence from itself nor from any other coeternal with it and equally first: and through this it is necessary that it produce from nothing: and hence it is that it is necessary for that essence so produced to have being after non-being, and to begin to be, since it has proceeded from non-being into being. But it is otherwise in the production of a person from a person: because the producing person and the produced person share in essence and nature: therefore it is not necessary that there be any inception there by reason of the production of one person from another, on account of the one and undivided essence.

8. To that which is objected, that every being is either created or uncreated, and similarly every being is either from itself or from another: it must be said that being from another is said in two ways: either from another essentially, or from another personally. Taking it in the first way, according to essential otherness, it corresponds to the other division, which is of being into created and uncreated, which indeed are extremes differing essentially. In the second way it does not correspond; rather, if one proceeds from one division to the other, a figure of speech arises from a change in the mode of predication, because what is changed into who, and such a mode of predication does not hold in divine things.

9. To that which is objected, that when an infinite power according to the totality of its potency exerts itself into some act, it cannot simultaneously and at once go forth into another: it must be said that this holds true when it totally exerts itself both as to the producing power and as to the mode of producing; but then the assumption is false: because, although the Father produces the Son according to His immense power, He nevertheless generates, not spirates: and therefore according to another mode of producing, which is through spiration, there is simultaneously with the Son the production of another person, for the reason that those productions are not repugnant but naturally co-connected. Just as it is evident in the mind that the actual consideration of the intellect does not impede but rather induces the affection to be borne toward the known and seen good: so neither does the generation of the Word proceeding from the mind impede the spiration of the love embracing both.

10. To that which is objected, that where there is production, there is reception from another: it must be said that just as there is a certain production, in which to be produced and to have been produced differ: and a certain production, in which they are entirely the same: similarly reception is also twofold: in one way, in which to receive and to have received differ, and another, in which they are entirely the same: the first corresponds to the first production, the second to the second. Concerning the first, the objection holds true; concerning the second, it does not: and in this way the Son receives being from the Father. For He has always received and always receives, because the Father always begets Him and has always begotten Him, as is manifestly gathered from what has been said above.

11. To that which is objected, that eternity denotes the present, and generation is better expressed through the past tense: it must be said that that eternal generation is always most actual and most complete: although the actuality of any act is better expressed through the present tense, the completion and perfection of an act is most fully expressed through the past tense. Hence that eternal generation cannot be sufficiently expressed through any single tense; rather, it is necessary to employ diverse tenses for its expression, because it is above all time and has in itself whatever completeness can be signified through any tense. Hence by reason of completion the past tense befits it, by reason of actuality the present tense befits it, by reason of continuation and unceasingness the future tense befits it.

But by that reason by which all these are one in it, it is sufficiently expressed through no word whatsoever: for it is no wonder if the clamor of temporal words does not suffice to express that most quiet silence of eternity and of eternal generation, which is better understood than spoken: better believed in the present than understood: and will be better seen in the future than it is now believed: for, as the Savior says, this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent: to which we can in no way attain unless our intellect is more fully elevated above the variations of time and above the cloudiness of phantasms into the freedom of supercelestial rest.