Question 7

QUESTION VII.


Whether the Trinity can be consistent with supreme necessity.

Consequently it is asked whether the Trinity can be consistent with supreme necessity. And concerning this, two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine being is supremely necessary.

The second is whether the Trinity and supreme necessity are simultaneously consistent.

ARTICLE I.


Whether the divine being is supremely necessary.

It is asked, therefore, whether the divine being is supremely necessary. And that it is so, is shown as follows.

1. Everything immutable and eternal is supremely necessary; but the divine being is of this kind: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, it is necessary that everything which pertains to nobility and perfection be posited in God in the highest degree; but it is established that necessity is greater than knowledge: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, everything which so exists that it cannot not be nor be thought not to be is necessary in the highest degree; but the divine being is of this kind: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, everything which has being from itself, through itself, and according to itself is altogether necessary; but such is the divine being, since it is first: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, it is impossible for necessity to exist in an effect except through a cause; therefore, if necessity is not in God, necessity is in nothing; therefore nothing is necessary. But if nothing is necessary, nothing is impossible; therefore all things are possible; therefore it is possible for something simultaneously to be and not to be. But this is absurd: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, it is impossible for necessity to exist in a composite except through necessity existing in a simple; therefore, if the most simple lacks necessity, it is impossible that necessity be posited in any combination or composition. But it is absurd that there should be no necessary argumentation: therefore, etc.

On the contrary: 1. Everything necessary is determined to being thus and not otherwise; everything determined to something is finite; but the divine being is infinite: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, nothing that is indifferent to opposites is necessary; but the divine power, will, and action is indifferent to opposites; therefore it is not necessary. But the divine power, will, and action is the divine being: therefore the divine being is not necessary.

3. Likewise, nothing mutable can be attributed to anything immutable; therefore nothing contingent can be attributed to anything supremely necessary; but something contingent is attributed to God: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, just as impossibility is repugnant to power, so necessity is repugnant to will; but the divine power is so great that all things are possible to it, nor is impossibility posited in God in any way; therefore, since the will of God is most perfect, it seems that it does not admit necessity in the divine being.

5. Likewise, if the cause is necessary, the effect is also necessary; but God is the first, supreme, and immediate cause of all things; therefore, if necessity is in God, all things are necessary.

6. Furthermore, the more contingent something is, the more indifferent it is, and the more indifferent, the more common, and the more common, the more simple: therefore from the first, the more contingent something is, the more simple it is: therefore the most simple is the most contingent, and therefore not necessary.

7. Furthermore, every necessary thing is knowable, just as every probable thing is opinable; but every knowable thing is either a principle of demonstration or something demonstrated: but the divine being is neither: therefore etc.

8. Furthermore, the more necessary something is, the more certain it is, and the more certain, the more known; but the divine being is most hidden: therefore etc.

9. Furthermore, just as one is moved in vain because he desires the impossible, so also because he fears the necessary: therefore if the divine Majesty is necessity, then it is in no way to be feared. But this is false and absurd: therefore etc.

CONCLUSION.


The divine being is necessary with the most perfect necessity of immutability.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it should be noted that there is a threefold necessity: one wholly extrinsic, one partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic, and one wholly intrinsic. The wholly extrinsic necessity is that which has its origin from a principle that is outside, with the patient contributing nothing; and this has being in two ways: either with respect to natural operations or with respect to voluntary ones: and thus there is a twofold necessity, namely of compulsion and of violence.

The necessity that is partly from within, partly from without is that which is in some way from an intrinsic principle, looking toward something outside either in the manner of a moving principle or in the manner of a resting terminus: and thus necessity is spoken of in two ways, namely of inevitability and of indigence.

But there is a certain necessity that is wholly intrinsic, which belongs to a thing from its own nature: and this is the necessity of immutability and independence: and such necessity is found in a qualified sense in creatures, but in an unqualified sense it can be found only in the creative essence. For it alone is that which admits of no dependence: but all other things, since they are created, necessarily depend upon it.

But this necessity is necessarily posited in the divine being, because it is in itself and from itself. Because it is in itself, therefore it lacks a composing principle or a sustaining one: therefore it can neither be changed nor fail.

But because from itself, therefore it lacks a producer and creator: therefore it can neither depend nor begin; and through this it has the highest and most perfect necessity, which excludes all mutability and dependence, inevitability and indigence, coercion and violence, which denote a diminished necessity: and conversely it posits the highest permanence and stability, the highest sufficiency and freedom. For because it is through itself, therefore it is permanent and most stable: because indeed for its own sake, therefore most generous and most sufficient: because indeed it is through itself and for its own sake, therefore it is the alpha and the omega: and therefore all other things are from it, and all other things for the sake of it, whether necessary or contingent. For just as all movable things flow from one first immovable being and are reduced to it; so all contingent things flow from the necessary being and are reduced to it. Therefore the necessity of the divine being is the origin and completion of all being, living and understanding; and all things proclaim that the first principle is necessary, whether they be necessary or contingent.

And therefore the arguments must be conceded on this side.

1. To that which is objected, that everything determined to something is finite; it must be said that determination is twofold, namely by restriction, of which kind is that which comes about through the addition of one thing upon another, as a disposition is added upon the incomplete potency of matter: and there is determination by completion, as the supremely good is determined to doing good, because it cannot fail by doing evil. In the first way, determination is repugnant to infinity, but in the second way it is not repugnant; and this determination indeed belongs to necessity, according as it is in God, and not in the first way.

2. To that which is objected, that nothing indifferent to opposites is necessary: it must be said that the divine power and will and action is called indifferent to opposites not by reason of itself in itself, but by reason of indifference in the effect to be produced. Whence that indifference does not posit any changeableness in the divine power: but it posits one and most simple power, omnipotent over all opposites, such that it cannot be restricted to any of them; and this is more consonant with necessity than repugnant to it.

3. To that which is objected, that nothing contingent can be attributed to anything supremely necessary: it must be said that when something is contingently predicated of God, there is enclosed in that predicate both the principal signification and the connotation: and with respect to the principal signification it is nothing other than God, but with respect to the connotation it is an effect: and by reason of the first, to which the predication belongs, it inheres necessarily; but by reason of the second it is said to inhere contingently, and through this, contingency is not posited as being in God, but rather from God. In predications of this kind, the divine being receives within itself no predication that does not include the most complete necessity.

But as to the claim that the whole statement is said to be contingent, namely that God saves Peter: this is because the nature of a conjunctive whole is such that denomination in it is taken from the less noble part, so that a copulative proposition is called false when one of its parts is false, and contingent when one of its parts is contingent. And the reason for this is that it is easier for a thing to be destroyed than constructed; and a positive state must be unmixed with privation and the denomination thereof; but the denomination of privation operates in the contrary manner, because by necessity of the intellect, the understanding of position and positive state is in some way enclosed within its understanding.

4. To that which is objected, that necessity is repugnant to the will as impossibility is to power: it must be said that this is true of that necessity which is from without, such as the necessity of violence and coercion: but of that necessity which is intrinsic, such as the necessity of immutability, it does not hold true, as is apparent from the preceding.

5. To that which is objected, that if the cause is necessary, so is the effect: it must be said that, as Augustine says in the fifth book of the City of God, some causes are only made; others are making and made; and a third kind are making only. By causes that are only made he means natural causes, which are determined to a single course; by causes that are making and made, free choice and the will; and by causes that are making only, divine providence itself. He says that natural causes are made, not making, not because they produce nothing, but because they produce according to what has been implanted in them, not having dominion over their own act, as free choice does, and such causes are uniform in their parts and consistent; and in causes of this kind the aforementioned proposition holds true. But concerning a cause that is making, which indeed is able to produce and not to produce by the same power on account of its dominion over the action and the consequent effect, it does not hold true. For just as such a cause is not changed on account of the mutability and difference of its effects, so neither is it posited to be contingent on account of the contingency in its effects.

6. To that which is objected, that the more indifferent something is, the more common it is: it must be said that there is a twofold commonality, namely by abstraction, and by indetermination. When therefore it is said that the more indifferent something is, the more common it is: this is understood of commonality by indetermination, in which manner we say that there is a single subject of contraries; which is especially true in those cases where one of the two does not have a determinate cause in relation to the subject. But when it adds that the more common something is, the more simple it is; that is understood of commonality by abstraction; whence from this it is not concluded that contingent things posit simplicity; but rather they include mutability, which excludes supreme simplicity: on account of which supreme simplicity cannot be found except in that which is supremely necessary. Because therefore the divine being is most simple; it is necessary that it be not contingent, but necessary.

7. To that which is objected, that everything necessary is knowable, and everything knowable is either a principle of demonstration or concluded through demonstration; it must be said that there is the necessary within a genus, and the necessary outside a genus; and this indeed is twofold: either outside a determinate genus, or outside every genus absolutely. The necessary outside every genus absolutely, therefore, exists in God alone, who is above and beyond every genus of being, because he cannot be in a genus, neither per se nor by appropriation; and such a necessary being precedes and surpasses all demonstration, because it can have absolutely no definition.

When therefore it is said: everything necessary is either a principle of demonstration or demonstrated; it must be said that this is understood of the necessary which belongs to a determinate genus, or which can be appropriated to a determinate genus, as are common conceptions of the mind, which, insofar as they are appropriated, enter into demonstration. Whence that argument does not conclude that the divine being is a necessary thing restricted to a determinate genus.

8. To that which is objected, that the more necessary something is, the more certain it is; it must be said that something is said to be more certain or more known than another in two ways: either absolutely, or with respect to us. The first proposition therefore has truth insofar as it is understood of greater certitude absolutely, but not insofar as it is understood of certitude with respect to us, because those things which are most certain and most luminous in themselves appear obscure to us on account of the defect on the part of the created intellect; and therefore the Philosopher says that "as the eye of the owl is related to light, so is our eye to the most manifest things of nature." Nevertheless, although the divine being according to the fullness of its clarity is hidden from us as long as we are in the state of wayfarers, it is most certain to us and indubitable that God exists, as is manifestly apparent from the preceding questions.

9. To that which is objected, that the necessary is not to be feared, just as neither is the impossible to be desired: it must be said that the necessary in outcome or in effect is not to be dreaded, because dread avails nothing where something must necessarily come to pass. But the necessary according to its intrinsic state, which can without any change in itself render either everlasting glory or everlasting punishment—this, I say, is most greatly to be dreaded, both for the sake of acquiring grace and for the sake of avoiding punishment, because such a necessary being does not exclude the liberality of the will and the justice of equity, as will better appear in the following question.

ARTICLE II.


Whether the Trinity and supreme necessity stand together.

Next it is asked whether the Trinity and supreme necessity stand together. And that they are incompatible appears as follows.

1. Augustine, to Orosius: "The Father begot the Son neither by necessity nor by will"; but what is repugnant to generation is repugnant to the Trinity; necessity is of this kind; therefore, etc.

2. Moreover, an agent that has mastery over its own action is nobler than one that does not; but in the Trinity there can be no production except in the noblest manner; yet that which produces necessarily cannot have mastery over its action; therefore, neither can there be necessary production in divine things.

3. Moreover, a communication that is from benignity is nobler than one that is from necessity; therefore, either in divine things there is no communication of the nature itself, or it is not from necessity; but there cannot be a Trinity without communication; therefore, etc.

4. Moreover, everything necessary is absolute; for that which has a relation to something distinct from itself cannot be altogether necessary, and this is what Avicenna holds; but for the Trinity to exist without respect and relation is impossible; therefore, it is likewise impossible that it should stand together with necessity.

5. Moreover, nothing that is from another can be necessary in the highest degree, because its being and its remaining it has only from elsewhere, and thus it is not necessary in itself; but the Trinity cannot exist without some person therein being not from itself; therefore, it does not stand together with supreme necessity.

6. Moreover, nothing is supremely true that can be thought not to exist; therefore, similarly, nothing is supremely necessary that can be believed not to exist; for the necessary presupposes the true; but the Trinity can without doubt be thought not to exist; therefore, etc.

7. Moreover, what is repugnant to evidence is repugnant to certitude, and what is repugnant to certitude is repugnant to necessity; but the Trinity in unity is repugnant to evidence, because this in no way seems intelligible; therefore, it is repugnant to supreme necessity.

8. Moreover, nothing altogether necessary is perfectly praiseworthy; therefore, if the person of the Father necessarily produces the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, He is not praiseworthy in any of the aforesaid; but nothing in God is more praiseworthy; therefore, no praise is owed to God. But this is impious to say; therefore, etc.

9. Furthermore, nothing is altogether necessary that is simply voluntary; the production of persons in the divine is simply through will: therefore not through necessity. The major is proved, because necessary things belong naturally, and nature is by its very nature divided against will. The minor is proved: because that is most delightful, acceptable, and joyful: therefore most voluntary.

On the contrary: 1. Everything necessary is immutable, and conversely; but the Trinity stands together with supreme immutability, as is evident from what was just shown: therefore etc.

2. Furthermore, everything that is supremely one is altogether necessary, and conversely: but the Trinity and supreme unity stand together: therefore etc.

3. Furthermore, the production of one person from another is of greater connection than that of splendor and light; but these are necessary: therefore etc.

4. Furthermore, it is impossible for supreme power to be absent from the Omnipotent, and its presence is necessary; but supreme power is in the production of persons: therefore etc.

5. Furthermore, every act that has God as its principle and terminus is necessary in every respect: but the production of a person from a person is of this kind: therefore etc.

6. Furthermore, everything that is indistinct from the supremely necessary is altogether necessary: but the whole Trinity is the divine essence: therefore etc.

CONCLUSION.


The divine being, necessary and most liberal, stands together with the trinity of persons.

I respond: It must be said that the divine being is both necessary and nonetheless most liberal: and the blessed Trinity itself stands together with necessity and will, if they are taken according to a fitting mode. For as was touched upon regarding necessity, not every necessity belongs to the divine being nor indeed to the blessed Trinity, but only that of immutability and independence: similarly, not every mode of willing. For there is an acceding will, that is, one newly arriving: and this is not in God, neither with respect to himself nor with respect to the created, on account of God's immutability and necessity. Again, there is an antecedent will; and this is in God, but not with respect to himself, but with respect to the created, which he precedes by nature and eternity. Third, there is a concomitant and accepting will; and this is in God with respect to himself and with respect to the created: for the divine will approves and accepts every good, whether created or uncreated, whether contingent or necessary.

Therefore, with necessity and will spoken of in a threefold way, the third mode of each belongs to the supreme Trinity.

namely accepting will and the necessity of immutability: will, I say, accepting on account of the supreme charity in the one producing and the supreme goodness in the one produced, which two necessarily enclose within themselves a will of complacency; the necessity however of unchangeability is on account of the indifference of the essence and the independence of the person. For since in the three persons there is an essence altogether indifferent, therefore there is one quiddity or entity, one truth, and consequently one necessity. For since the first person is from itself, it is altogether necessary, and consequently so are the second and third.

Furthermore, since in the three persons the essence is indifferent, the relation distinguishing the trinity does not signify a reference to something outside: and therefore there is no dependence of one person upon another, and so they are equally fixed and standing of themselves: and therefore if one is necessary, so are all. - Therefore these three stand together, as has now been shown, namely trinity, necessity and will: nor is there in them any repugnance, but the highest consonance, just as there are simultaneously consonant the supreme unity, truth and goodness.

For the supreme unity is that which is undivided in many, and this posits trinity: the supreme truth, which is infallible and most certain, and this posits necessity: the supreme goodness, which is lovable and loving, and this posits will. Therefore the supreme unity, truth and goodness necessarily requires that trinity, necessity and will stand together.

Since therefore in the triune God there is simultaneously necessity with will, and will with necessity; hence it is that he is supremely good through essence. Because in him there is supreme delight through will and supreme security through necessity and supreme felicity through both; hence also it is that he is supremely beatifying through influence: because our affection does not rest except in what is supremely lovable by attending to it, and the intellect does not rest except in what is supremely infallible and certain: and consequently we can be beatified only in that which is simultaneously necessary and voluntary, which alone is by nature most delightfully loved, most certainly known, and most securely possessed.

Since therefore the most blessed Trinity is not only blessed, but also beatifying; hence it is that it is supremely consonant with the most noble necessity and in no way repugnant to it; and likewise with the most liberal will.

Whence also the arguments adduced for this position are to be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary from the authority of Augustine and Hilary, it must be said that each of those authorities is understood concerning necessity according to the first and second mode, not according to the third, as is apparent from what has been said above.

2. To the objection that the agent which dominates its own action is nobler: it must be said that this is true of an action which is distinguished by a difference from the agent. But concerning that action which, on account of supreme simplicity, is altogether undifferentiated from the agent, the aforesaid proposition neither has nor can have truth, for nothing can dominate itself. Since, therefore, production in the divine persons is through supreme simplicity, in which the producer and its production cannot differ according to a real difference, in such a case the citation of the aforesaid proposition has no place.

3. To the objection that a communication which is from benignity is nobler than one from necessity: it must be said that this is true of that necessity which excludes benignity. But such is not the necessity which is posited in the divine persons. It is also understood of a communication which is of a gift essentially different. But such is not the case in the emanation of the divine persons. And therefore that argument does not conclude, because it includes within itself a twofold defect.

4. To the objection that everything necessary is absolute: it must be said that perfect absoluteness does not exclude an intrinsic relation, because such a relation, since it is to what is undifferentiated in essence, posits no dependence, and accordingly does not conflict with necessity; and such is the relation in the divine persons. But if it excludes a relation, this is with respect to what is outside and to a thing essentially different. Hence, although God is signified by certain names as having a respect to things, that respect on the part of God is posited only according to the mode of understanding, to which a true respect corresponds on the part of created being; and the aforementioned argument proceeds concerning this respect.

5. To the objection that nothing which is from another can be necessary in the highest degree: it must be said that this holds true when it is from another essentially different, and has a different being than the very being of the one giving. For then it cannot have the full character of necessity, because it depends on another being and another essentially different nature. But this is not so with the divine persons, because the produced person does not differ in essence from the producer, nor does it have a different being. Hence, since it has one being and the same essence and the truth of one essential unity, it follows that it incurs no dependence from this, but he who is produced has altogether the same firm necessity of permanence and necessary firmness as he who produces.

6. To that which is objected, that nothing is supremely necessary which can be thought not to exist: it must be said that this holds true when that necessary thing appears as it is, but not when it lies hidden. Hence, although the most blessed Trinity can now be both believed and thought not to exist, because it does not yet appear to us as it is: nevertheless, when it shall have appeared as it is, then it will in no way be able to be thought not to exist. That therefore it is now either believed or thought not to exist; this is not on account of any defect of its certitude and truth in itself, since it is a being always and everywhere and supremely: but on account of a defect of light on our part.

7. To that which is objected, that what is repugnant to evidence is repugnant to certitude: it must be said that there is certitude on the part of the thing and on our part; and similarly evidence. When therefore it is said: what is repugnant to evidence and certitude is repugnant to necessity; this is true of certitude and evidence on the part of the thing, but it is not true of certitude and evidence on our part, because, as was touched upon before, the same thing can be both most certain in itself and hidden from us.

Moreover, although the Trinity may seem to be repugnant to certitude, it is nevertheless most consonant with it, because the Father declares Himself by His Word, and the Father and the Son also most certainly manifest themselves to us through the Holy Spirit. Hence, although imaginative reason flees from the understanding of the Trinity, illuminated reason nevertheless sees that the Trinity alone as Trinity is the fullest ground of knowing every truth, through which it comes about that every known truth is held in memory, what is retained in memory is understood more clearly, and what is understood is pleasing and loved.

8. To that which is objected, that nothing altogether necessary is perfectly praiseworthy: it must be said that praise is twofold: one, in which something of honor and dignity accrues to the one praised, and this praise is measured according to progress from an imperfect state to a perfect one: and this properly belongs to wayfarers, who, since they can transgress and do not transgress, are deservedly praised by God and also rewarded. There is also another praise, by which the good itself, because it is good, is said to be commendable: and this belongs more to the good by essence than by participation, and thereby more to the unchangeable good than to the changeable, and to the necessary than to the contingent; and with this praise God the Father is praised in the production of the Son, and the Father and the Son in the production of the Holy Spirit in the mutual love of themselves and the diffusion of every good with respect to whatever is created.

9. To that which is objected, that nothing simply voluntary is altogether necessary, the response is plain from those things which were touched upon above in the principal solution: and therefore one need not linger longer on these matters.