Question 4
QUESTION IV.
On obedience.
After the inquiry concerning humility, poverty, and continence, it now remains in the fourth place to inquire concerning obedience. And concerning obedience three things can be asked.
The first is whether it is consonant with natural law that a man be subject to another by obeying.
The second is whether it is consonant with evangelical perfection that one bind himself by vow to obeying another.
The third is whether it is fitting for the Christian religion that all obey one.
ARTICLE I.
Whether it is consonant with natural law that a man be subject to another by obeying.
As to the first, the procedure is as follows. It seems that it is consonant with natural law that man obey man.
1. For natural piety dictates that parents are to be honored; but the honor of parents consists in the showing of reverence, and the showing of reverence consists in complying and obeying: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the law of the Decalogue written in the heart of man dictates through the dictate of nature; but it commands this, namely that parents be honored: therefore that is consonant with natural law. But this is done through the service of obedience: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, Ephesians 6: Children, obey your parents in all things:
but fatherhood and sonship are most consonant with natural law: therefore also that children obey parents.
4. Likewise, the law of nature dictates order: but "order is an arrangement of equal and unequal things assigning to each its proper place," as Augustine says in the nineteenth book of the City of God: if therefore it belongs to order that one be subjected to another, and the law of nature dictates order: it therefore dictates that one ought to be subject to another.
5. Likewise, the law of nature dictates peace among members of a household: but peace in the home is "an ordered concord of commanding and obeying": therefore to command and to obey belongs to the law of nature.
6. Likewise, natural law dictates that rank is to be preserved, "because if all things were equal, all things would not exist"; but where there is rank, there is superiority and inferiority; but if the inferior is not subject to the superior, rank is not preserved: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, the law of nature dictates the hierarchical order, which descends from the supreme hierarchy through the angelic to the human; but it is consonant with hierarchical order that the inferior comply with the superior: therefore etc.
8. Likewise, the law of nature dictates "to render to each what is his own"; but honor is especially owed to man standing, that is, in the state of innocence; but honor is shown to a man when he is obeyed: therefore etc.
9. Likewise, it belongs to the dictate of the law of nature "what is common among all"; but government and command, or subjection and obedience, are common to all: therefore etc.
10. Likewise, it belongs to the dictate of natural law that the whole man obey right reason within himself: therefore by equal reasoning the law of nature dictates that the less experienced and the ignorant be subject by obeying to the more experienced and the knowing: therefore it seems that for man to comply with man is consonant with natural law.
But against this it is objected as follows. 1. Genesis 1: Let us make man in our image and likeness, and let him have dominion over the fish of the sea,
etc.; on which words Augustine says in the nineteenth book of the City of God: "God did not will that rational man, made in the image of God, should have dominion except over irrational creatures"; but it belongs to the dictate of nature that man should preserve the divine institution: therefore it accords with natural right that man should not command man, nor that one should be subject to another by obeying.
2. Likewise, Gregory says: "Nature made all men equal": therefore the law of nature dictates equality; but where there is equality, there is no superiority and inferiority; but obedience implies superiority and inferiority: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, in the twenty-second distinction: "When fault does not require it, we are all equal according to the principle of humility"; but in the state of nature as instituted there would have been no fault: therefore there would have been equality, therefore there would have been no prelacy nor subjection: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, the law of nature dictates that the dignity
of the image is to be preserved; but the image is immediately from God and subject to God alone, because "it is formed by the First Truth with no nature interposed": therefore it seems that for man to be subject by obeying man is against the dignity of the image.
5. Likewise, the law of nature dictates that liberty
is to be preserved: but free will exists equally in all: therefore liberty is to be preserved equally in all. But where there is subjection and obedience, there is not equal liberty: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, the law of nature dictates that charity
is to be preserved; but charity produces union, conformity, and equality: therefore it removes all subjection and superposition: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, what the law of nature dictates always has perpetual existence; but all subjection and obedience will be abolished, because 1 Corinthians 15: When he shall have abolished all principality,
etc.; the Gloss says: "As long as the world endures, men have authority over men": therefore etc.
8. Likewise, if the law of nature dictates one of two correlatives, it dictates the other also: therefore if it dictates that one must obey, it also dictates that one must command: therefore just as one can desire to obey and be subject without sin, by equal reasoning one can also desire to command and have authority. But this is false and unfitting: therefore so is that from which it follows: therefore the law of nature does not dictate commanding, and consequently neither does it dictate obeying.
9. Likewise, the law of nature dictates that the honor due to God is to be rendered to no other; but the honor due to God is shown by obeying and complying: therefore obedience
is to be rendered to God alone, not therefore to man.
10. Likewise, the natural law is an impression made by the eternal law; but that impression moves the soul toward what is lofty, while to subject oneself to another by complying is contrary to what is lofty: therefore etc.
CONCLUSION.
The natural law dictates in a certain generality that the inferior should be subject to the superior by obeying, yet in diverse ways according to the diverse differences of superiority and inferiority: and this accords with the written law and the law of grace.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that, as Augustine says in the book of Eighty-Three Questions, the natural law is an impression made upon the soul by the eternal law; and the eternal law is that by which, while it remains unchangeable, all other things are ordered. Whence Augustine, in the first book of On Free Choice: "That I may briefly explain in words, as far as I am able, the notion of the eternal law which is impressed upon us: it is that by which it is just that all things should be most perfectly ordered." But as is said in the nineteenth book of The City of God, chapter thirteen: "Order is the disposition of equal and unequal things, assigning to each its proper place." If, therefore, it belongs to the superior to preside and to the inferior to be subject, the natural law, which flows from the eternal law, naturally dictates that the inferior should be subject to the superior by obeying: and this indeed it dictates in a certain generality, yet in diverse ways, according as it happens that diverse differences of superiority and inferiority are found.
For one is said to be superior to another either with respect to the origin of nature,
or with respect to the dominion of power
or presidency, or with respect to the governance of providence.
The first superiority belongs to nature itself by reason of itself,
because "nature is a force implanted in things, producing like from like"; the second, however, by reason of vice,
because, as Ambrose says, servitude is the punishment of sin; but the third belongs by reason of remedy,
according to that passage in Numbers twenty-seven: Let the God of the spirits of all flesh provide a man who may be over this multitude, lest they be as sheep without a shepherd.
To the first superiority is owed filial obedience,
to the second servile obedience,
and to the third jurisdictional obedience,
which regards the dignity of prelacy.
Hence it is, therefore, that the natural law dictates filial obedience,
whether according to the state of fallen nature
or according to the state of nature as instituted. -
But it dictates servile obedience
not simply, but in the state of fallen nature
for the punishment of sin, according to the dictate of the law of nations, which flows from reason and the instinct of nature. - But it dictates jurisdictional obedience
according to the state of nature as reparable
or repaired, and this in the state of the wayfarer,
according to that passage in First Corinthians fifteen: When he shall have brought to nothing all principality
etc.; the Gloss: "As long as the world endures, Angels will preside over Angels, and men over men for the benefit of the living: but when all have been gathered together, then all prelacy will cease, because it will not be necessary." - Since, therefore, according to the threefold difference of superiority there is a threefold mode of obeying: the first, nature dictates simply,
because universally and explicitly and according to every state; but the second and third implicitly
and according to a determinate state.
Whence each of the aforesaid obediences accords with the law of nature,
and not only with the law of nature, but also with the law of grace
and the written law.
For since the law of grace
considers the origin, fall,
and remedy
of nature: therefore it belongs to it to approve
the threefold mode and distinction of the obedience mentioned above. For it approves filial
obedience, Ephesians 6: Children, obey your parents in the Lord: for this is just.
It also approves servile
obedience, 1 Timothy 6: Whoever are under the yoke of servitude, let them consider their masters worthy of all honor.
It also praises jurisdictional
obedience, Hebrews last chapter: Obey your superiors and be subject to them: for they keep watch,
etc.
On the contrary, because the written
law was a law of rigor, it not only approves
this threefold obedience, but also punishes
transgressors of this obedience. For it punishes the rebellious son,
Deuteronomy 21: If a man beget a rebellious and insolent son, who does not heed his father's command, and when corrected scorns to obey: they shall seize him and bring him to the elders,
etc.
It also punishes the rebellious servant,
Exodus 21: He who strikes his servant or handmaid with a rod, if he survive for a day or two, he shall not be subject to penalty, because he is his property.
It also punishes the disobedient subject,
Deuteronomy 17: He who acts proudly, refusing to obey the command of the priest, that man shall die.
From what has been said, therefore, it is manifestly gathered that the obedience of man to man is consonant with the law of grace
and the written
law and the law of nature.
Hence the arguments that are adduced for this position are to be conceded.
1. 2. 3. To that, therefore, which is first objected from the authority of Augustine, Gregory, and the canon, it must be said that in those words they do not intend to exclude subjection and obedience, but coerced servitude, which indeed neither existed nor ought to have existed except through the intervention of the guilt of sin as a disease contrary to nature itself; in detestation of which, according to the dictate of right nature, there ought to follow the punishment of servitude, on account of the contempt of divine majesty and the captivation of human liberty and the dishonoring of the dignity of rational nature. Hence, although nature does not dictate this for itself standing upright, it nevertheless dictates it for itself falling from its state, as has been said in the preceding.
4. To that which is objected concerning the dignity of the image, the response can now be clear: because, although this subjection does not befit the formed
image, it nevertheless befits the deformed
image, or even the image to be reformed;
just as we see in the Sacraments, that man who is to be restored is in a certain way subjected to sensible elements, although it befits man standing upright to be subject with respect to God alone.
It can also be said in another way that one can speak of the image in two ways: either in itself, or in relation to the flesh: and although the rational soul by reason of itself has to be infused by God alone and to be subject to Him alone, nevertheless by reason of the flesh, which is propagated through the power of human ministry, it has to be subject to its origin, as offspring to parent, yet in such a way that no prejudice to the dignity of the image is thereby generated.
5. To the objection that the law of nature dictates that the freedom of the will must be preserved, etc.: it must be said that since there is freedom from misery, from fault, and from coercion: freedom from coercion is twofold, namely from sufficient coercion and from inducing coercion. The first, indeed, nature dictates must be preserved altogether absolutely and always. But the second, namely from inducing coercion, it dictates only for that time in which someone abuses freedom: and because this occurs in the state of fallen nature, therefore it dictates for this time that the wickedness of wills be restrained through the commands of presiding authorities.
6. To the objection that the law of nature dictates that charity must be preserved: it must be said that just as for the perfection of a living body there is required an equality of temperament, in which all members are conformed, and a multiformity of organization, in which the members are distinguished and ordered and according to various influence some are set over others; so it must be understood concerning the mystical body of Christ. And therefore the unity of charity does not exclude the multiformity of charisms and the distinction of dignities and offices, according to which one member must be subject to another and be governed by another according to the law of prelacy and subjection.
7. To the objection that what is dictated by nature has perpetual duration: it must be said that this is true of what nature dictates absolutely, but it is not true of what nature dictates for a particular state; just as in the state of innocence it dictated that all things should be held in common, which indeed it does not dictate in corrupted nature. And therefore that proposition is false when understood universally.
8. To the objection that if the law of nature dictates one of two correlatives, it also dictates the other: it must be said that just as the law of nature dictates subjection, so also prelacy. For just as it dictates that one ought to be subject to another in obedience, so it dictates that another ought to be set over another through providence. But from this it does not follow that prelacy ought to be desired there, as subjection is desired. For the desire for subjection accords with humility and reverence, but the desire for prelacy degenerates for the most part into the pride of ambition and arrogance. Therefore, although a position of dignity can rightly be administered according to the dictate of nature, it nevertheless ought not to be desired on account of the attendant mark of pride.
9. To the objection that the honor owed to God must not be rendered to any other: it must be said that honor is owed to God both in His own nature and in His image: for the honor that is shown to a man on account of God is referred to God: and therefore what is proper to God, namely the honor of latria, ought not to be attributed to another. But that which belongs to God operating through a minister, namely governance and kingship and dominion over subjects, it is not unfitting that it be granted to another through God and on account of God and according to God, because the whole is referred to Him according to the right order, which indeed He maintains in governing the world.
10. To the objection that the impression of the natural law moves toward what is arduous: it must be said that there is the arduous of honor and the arduous of virtue: the arduous of honor belongs to the soul according to the state of the fatherland, the arduous of virtue according to the state of the wayfaring life. For one is honored and praised with excellence because he merited this through an arduous and excellent and difficult work of virtue; and because such a work is a work of humility and obedience, which to proud minds is arduous and inaccessible: therefore it is consonant with the law of nature and of grace that man be raised up through the work of humility and obedience to the summit of honor and eternal happiness.
ARTICLE II.
Whether it is consonant with evangelical perfection that one bind himself by vow to obey another.
Second, it is asked whether it is consonant with evangelical perfection that one bind himself by vow to obey another. And it seems that it is not.
1. For the evangelical law is a law of liberty; but to subject oneself to a man by vow pertains to necessity: therefore to bind oneself by vow to obey a man is repugnant to the liberty of the evangelical law.
2. Again, Anselm, in the book Why God Became Man: "God willed to redeem man through Himself, so that He might recall man to his pristine liberty"; but in the state of pristine liberty no one was bound to obey another: therefore one restored to pristine liberty through the Redeemer ought not to be bound to obey anyone.
3. Again, Gregory: "Services, the less they are owed, the more pleasing they are." Therefore, from opposites, the more they are owed, the less pleasing they are; but one who binds himself by vow to obey a man is obligated to obey him: therefore such a one is less pleasing to God. But that through which a man is made less pleasing to God is contrary to evangelical perfection: therefore, etc.
4. Again, the evangelical law is a sweet yoke and a light burden: but it is burdensome for a man to comply in all things: therefore to bind oneself to obey a man does not accord with the lightness of evangelical perfection.
5. Again, the evangelical law, because it is a light burden, does not suffer alongside itself the burden and servitude of the written law: therefore since it is more burdensome to obey indiscriminately the commands of a man than to comply distinctly with the ceremonies and precepts of the old law, it seems that to bind oneself to obey a man cannot coexist with evangelical perfection.
6. Again, it is burdensome to obey divine commands; therefore it is much more burdensome to obey divine and human commands equally. But he who by vow subjects himself to a man binds himself to that man's commands; therefore, etc.
7. Again, Luke 6: Everyone will be perfect if he is like his master.
But it is not read of Christ that he was under another by vow; therefore to subject oneself to another by vow is not perfect, but, as it seems, rather superstitious.
8. Again, if the vow of obedience increases the perfection of the virtue of obedience, since this degree was not in Christ, it seems that one fulfilling this degree would be more perfect than Christ. But this is absurd and unfitting; therefore it is also unfitting to say that subjecting oneself to another by vow increases the perfection of the virtue of obedience.
9. Again, the Apostles possessed evangelical perfection in the highest degree; but they vowed obedience to no one; therefore, etc.
10. Again, it seems that to do this is presumptuous:
because either such a person considers
himself sufficient to fulfill divine commands, or he does not.
If not,
then he acts foolishly, since being already bound to divine precepts he obligates himself to fulfill human commands. But if he considers
himself sufficient to fulfill divine commands, he is presumptuous; therefore to obligate himself further to the commands of a man seems a greater judgment of presumption.
11. Again, if to vow this pertains to perfection, then he who professes this professes himself to be perfect. But this is presumptuous; therefore, etc.
12. Again, to wish to rule over a just and perfect man is pride and presumption; therefore to consent to another and cooperate so that he may rule is to consent to pride and presumption. But he who binds himself to obeying another consents and cooperates with him so that he may rule; therefore, etc.
13. Again, this seems to be dangerous:
because to commit oneself to a man whose knowledge and conscience one is ignorant of is a danger. But he who binds himself by vow to obeying a man frequently does not know whether he is wise or good, or about his knowledge and conscience; therefore, etc.
14. Again, the more and greater things a man is bound to, the greater dangers he is placed in. But he who vows obedience to a man is bound to more things than he was previously bound to; therefore he is exposed to greater dangers; therefore, etc.
15. Again, the evangelical law discourages oath-taking on account of the danger of perjury. But he who vows obedience to a man is in danger of transgressing the vow; therefore such a person offers himself to peril.
16. Again, it is shown that this is imperfect.
For he who sins at the suggestion of another sins less than he who sins at the instigation of his own impulse; therefore similarly he who obeys at the command of another merits less than he who acts spontaneously, or at God's command alone. Therefore he who binds himself by vow to obeying another acts less perfectly than he who does not bind himself. But what diminishes perfection is discordant with the evangelical law; therefore, etc.
17. Again, the more immediately one is borne toward God, the more perfectly one is moved; but he who obeys God alone is borne more immediately toward God than he who subjects himself to a man: therefore, etc.
18. Again, the best kind of monks is that of anchorites, according to what blessed Benedict says at the beginning of his rule; but such men were not bound by vow to obey a man: therefore to subject oneself to another by vow is not of evangelical perfection.
19. Again, he who closes off the way to health for one who is sick does not attend to perfection but recedes from perfection; but he who binds himself by vow to obey another closes off many ways to salvation for himself, since such a person before the vow could be saved in many other ways, which he cannot after the vow: therefore such a person acts most imperfectly.
20. Again, the more persons one is subjected to, the more humbly and perfectly one acts; but he who vows obedience to many acts wrongly: therefore to vow obedience to another is not of humility nor of perfection.
But against this it is objected as follows. 1. Matthew 3: Thus it befits us to fulfill all justice: The Gloss: "Perfect humility has three degrees: the first is to subject oneself to a superior, the second to subject oneself to an equal, the third to subject oneself to an inferior, in which is all justice: and this Christ fulfilled": therefore if perfect justice is to subject oneself to another, and this is done most fully through the vow of obedience, it seems that this is most consonant with evangelical perfection.
2. Again, 1 Peter 2: Be subject to every human creature for the sake of God: therefore the more efficaciously one does this, the more perfectly one acts; but he who subjects himself to another by vow does this most efficaciously: therefore such a person acts most perfectly.
3. Again, Gregory: "It is greater to relinquish oneself than one's possessions"; but he who relinquishes his possessions for the sake of God acts perfectly: therefore he who relinquishes himself acts more perfectly. But this is done most fully in the abnegation of the will through the vow of obedience: therefore, etc.
4. Again, Anselm: "Just as the will of God is the origin of all good, so one's own will is the origin of all evil"; but he who perfectly removes the origin of all evil acts most perfectly: therefore he who totally abnegates his own will through the vow of obedience acts most perfectly.
5. Again, Hugh: "Obedience is the virtue which, with one's own will set aside, embraces in spirit the things enjoined to be fulfilled in deed"; but he who vows obedience to another sets aside his own will to the greatest degree: therefore, etc.
6. Again, Bernard, Homily 42 on the Song of Songs: "It is a small thing to be subject to God unless you are also subject to every human creature for the sake of God: subject yourself to equals, subject yourself to inferiors: for thus it befits us to fulfill all justice"; but this is done most especially by binding oneself by vow to obey another: therefore, etc.
7. Again, sufficient justice is to keep the divine commandments; therefore abundant justice is to keep, beyond these, human commandments; but this is what he does who subjects himself to obey another.
8. Likewise, humility
is consonant with evangelical perfection: therefore the greatest humility is most consonant with the same; but to bind oneself by vow to obey another is of the greatest humility: therefore etc.
9. Likewise, liberality
is consonant with evangelical perfection; but this is the highest liberality, when a man for the sake of God gives not only his possessions but himself, by setting aside his own will through the vow of obedience: therefore etc.
10. Likewise, conformity to Christ
is consonant with evangelical perfection: but Christ by sheer liberality subjected himself to a human being, Luke 2: And he was subject to them:
therefore to subject oneself to another makes one conformed to Christ. But this is done most of all through the vow of obedience: therefore etc.
11. Likewise, that which most distances us from the world
is most consonant with evangelical perfection; but to bind oneself by vow to obey a man most distances us from the world, because all that is in the world is either the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life,
from which we are most distanced by the vow of obedience: therefore etc.
12. Likewise, that which most distances us from the devil
most pertains to evangelical perfection; but to will to be subject and not to preside most distances us from the sin of the devil, who willed entirely to preside without being subject: therefore etc.
13. Likewise, everything that conforms us to the celestial hierarchy
is consonant with evangelical perfection: but in the celestial hierarchy we see that one Angel subjects himself by obeying another, and the Angels of the lower orders obey without resistance the Angels of the higher orders: therefore in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, that one man subject himself by obeying another conforms us to the celestial order, and thereby is most consonant with evangelical perfection.
CONCLUSION.
To bind oneself by vow to obey another, not in every eventuality, but in those things which are consonant with the evangelical counsels, is constitutive, expeditive, and consummative of perfection.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it should be noted that in two ways someone can bind himself to obey another man: either in every eventuality and all the good pleasures of his will, or in those things which are consonant with the evangelical counsels according to some certain rule of living, derived from the font of the evangelical law. In the first way, it is neither perfect nor consonant with perfection, but rather rash and foolish: in the second way, it is perfect, because this is both constitutive
and expeditive
and consummative
of perfection. For to vow obedience to a man in this way is both a constitutive part
of perfection itself and a preparatory way,
and an ultimate completion. -
A constitutive
part, I say, because it is one of those three evangelical counsels in which the integrity of evangelical perfection principally consists.
The preparatory way
is that those counsels can be observed better, more perfectly, and more readily when one is supported by the fellowship, assistance, and example of others than if one is left to oneself alone. But fellowship does not avail unless it is peaceful; nor can it be peaceful unless it is bound together and ordered; and this cannot be unless through the reduction of many wills to the authority of one, according to whose direction they may be ordered and guided and consequently bound together.
It is also the ultimate completion,
because in it is most fully realized abounding
justice, which is evangelical justice, according to that passage in Matthew 5: Unless your justice shall abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.
For there is a threefold act of justice, namely to rectify, to coordinate,
and to compensate.
For justice is nothing other than a right
will, ordered
and recompensative,
because through it "there is rendered to each one what is his own," according to what befits the rectitude of right
and the dignity of order.
The perfect rectification
of abounding justice is therefore measured according to the conformity of the will to truth; but truth humbles each person, so that one thinks less of oneself than of another. Therefore, that person is perfectly and abundantly rectified who, according to what truth dictates, not unwillingly but voluntarily humbles his will beneath another and in a certain manner reduces and captivates it into a kind of servitude; which indeed is accomplished through obedience rendered to another person, which is most opposed to arrogance and ambition, by which one wishes to set oneself above others. Whence Bernard, in the forty-second homily on the Song of Songs: "Fear God and do not do this most wicked thing, that the will should exalt the one whom truth humbles. Rather, yield to God, and let the will be subject to truth."
The perfect ordering also according to the rule of abundant justice is that not only should the inferior subject himself to the superior, and the equal to the equal, but also that the superior should voluntarily subject himself to the inferior, according to what is said in Matthew 3: Thus it becometh us to fulfill all justice: where the Gloss says: "Thus, by subjecting himself to a servant and an inferior, it becometh him to fulfill all justice, that is, humility, which is all justice. — And this humility has three degrees: the first is to subject oneself to a greater, and this is called sufficient; the second is to subject oneself to an equal, and this is called abundant; the third is to be subject to a lesser, in which consists all justice. This Christ fulfilled." Since therefore a man is then perfectly subjected to another man when he voluntarily binds himself to obey the commands of another in those things that are according to God, especially of one who was not greater than he, but either equal, or sometimes even lesser — for every man surpasses another in some respect, at least according to the soul — hence it is that toward the perfection of the justice that orders according to the way of the dignative order, which runs according to the law of grace, whereby the greater regards himself as the lesser, obedience which is rendered by one man to another both concurs and contributes most greatly.
The perfect recompense likewise of abundant justice is discerned in this, that one should render all to him who gave all. Since therefore Christ the Lord not only gave us to ourselves, but also gave himself to us; and for our sake not only made himself man, but also subjected himself to men: hence it is that, in order that we may recompense according to the measure of our weakness, as far as we can, not only to God but also to man, it is fitting that we subject not only what we have and our members, but also what we are, that is, our will. Whence Bernard, on the Canticles: "It is established that God was emptied by charity, made lower than the Angels by charity, subjected to his parents by charity, bowed beneath the hands of the Baptist by charity, suffered the infirmities of the flesh by charity, made subject at last to death by charity, and stood inglorious upon the cross." From which he concludes that by sheer will, in recompense for these things, a man ought to subject his own will to another man.
And in this perfection truly consists, when one gives the will of his liberty for his sake, which is a good beyond price, than which nothing greater can be given by man: which being given, all things are given. Whence if that is truly called perfect "which lacks nothing," which also "attains its proper power"; in this above all the consummation of perfection is fitting, so that it begins from the renunciation of temporal goods through poverty, advances in the chastification of the bodily members through chastity; and is consummated in the dedication of the interior and mental powers through the abnegation of the will and the vow of obedience, in which a man is properly said to deny himself, according to that word of the Lord, Luke 9: If anyone wishes to come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me: where the vow of obedience is chiefly and above all commended.
From these things, therefore, it is clearly gathered that since there are three evangelical counsels, according to the exterior, inferior, and interior good, which are opposed to the threefold origin of vices, there must be a threefold vow integrative of evangelical perfection, namely of poverty, continence, and obedience, among which obedience, as has already been shown, gives to the whole of evangelical perfection its highest and most noble complement.
Whence the arguments that show this are also to be conceded.
1. To that which is objected first, that the evangelical law is a law of liberty, which is repugnant to necessity: it must be said that necessity is twofold: one is of coaction,
and the other of obligation. The first is repugnant, the second is not. For a precept obliges, just as a vow does, and it does not exclude the liberty of the evangelical law; therefore the law of the Gospel is said to be a law of liberty,
not by the exclusion of obligation
coming from precept or vow, but by the exclusion of the burden of servitude
of the law proceeding from servile fear.
2. To that which is objected from Anselm, that Christ by redeeming man recalled him to his pristine liberty: it must be said that this is understood with respect to the total species, not with respect to any individual whatsoever. For the burden of bodily servitude can stand together with the grace of the Holy Spirit and the Sacrament of baptism; and through this, much more strongly the burden of voluntary subjection, which flows from pure will, is not repugnant to the liberty of grace.
3. To that which is objected, that acts of service, the less they are owed, the more pleasing they are: it must be said that the notion of debt is twofold: one, which comes from a liberal promise; another, which comes from the obligation of a pact and mercantile commerce. The first in no way is repugnant to the graciousness of the service, but only the second. And the reason for this is: because, although the second is founded upon private and mercenary love, the first is founded upon the most liberal love, by which someone wills to offer to God not only the fruit of the tree, but also the trunk and the root. Whence, as Anselm exemplifies concerning two persons, one of whom offers to God the fruit of the tree, reserving the ownership to himself; but the other offers both: and he who offers both is more pleasing: so also in the matter at hand it is to be understood.
4. To that which is objected, that the evangelical law is a sweet yoke: it must be said that the burden is twofold, namely a burden that weighs down,
and a burden that strengthens
and assists, and consequently lightens and supports. Therefore the yoke of obedience, superadded to the evangelical load, is similar to a burden that does not weigh down but strengthens; just as a cart does not increase the weight upon the horse but lightens it, and a multitude of feathers lifts birds upward rather than drags them downward: so also obedience, which subjects a man to one like himself, excludes the weight of pride and arrogance that came from love of one's own sense and one's own will, which was most repugnant to evangelical perfection: therefore it makes one apt and agile for bearing it.
5. To the objection that the evangelical law does not admit alongside itself the servitude of the written law: it must be said that the case is not similar, because the servitude of the ceremonial and judicial precepts is discordant with the new law both on account of the veils of figures and on account of the burdens of afflicting penalties. Therefore the law of the Gospel, which was introduced through Christ, through whom grace and truth came, excludes both kinds of those precepts and the servitude in their observance, not on account of difficulty, but on account of imperfection. Since therefore, although it is difficult for a man to obey, this difficulty is repugnant neither to truth nor to grace nor to perfect virtue, which is "concerned with the arduous and difficult," it is consequently not repugnant to evangelical perfection; indeed, it rather gives complement to it.
6. To the objection that it is burdensome to obey divine commands: the response is already clear, because, as has been shown, the gravity and difficulty of a work is rather consonant with evangelical perfection than repugnant to it; and he is truly perfect who bears heavy things with promptitude of will.
7. To the objection concerning Christ: it must be said that Christ, insofar as was fitting for the redemption of the human race, subjected himself to men, and this with an excellent and perfect will; and because his will was confirmed in the good and was not changeable as ours is, therefore there was no need for it to be bound by a vow.
8. To the objection that the addition of a vow does not contribute to the complement of obedience, which was not in Christ: the response is already clear, because in Christ there was something in place of a vow with respect to obedience as well as poverty as well as chastity, namely a confirmed will, which is more excellent than a vow; and because we approach that confirmed will through the strengthening of purpose and the emission of a vow, hence it is that the vow, by binding us and in a certain way strengthening us, renders us conformed to Christ by its inviolability; and therefore the summit of perfection increases from it, although it was not in Christ according to the emission of a spoken word.
9. To the objection that such a vow of obedience was not in the Apostles: it must be said that one can speak of obedience in three ways, namely with respect to the act and the habit and the mode. There was therefore in the Apostles a promptitude of obeying through a perfect habit; there was also the act, by which they were obedient to Christ even unto death and unto diverse kinds of torments, so that they were obedient not only in carrying out works but also in sustaining sufferings. But the mode of obedience by which one subjects himself to another as to a prelate was not fitting for them except for the time when they were with Christ, because they themselves were prelates of the Church and were moved by the fullness of the Holy Spirit, and being upright they governed others. Nevertheless they themselves were first obedient to Christ himself, and afterward they exhibited due reverence to the Apostle Peter; and therefore from this it cannot and ought not be concluded that obedience should not be vowed especially by those for whom it is fitting to be governed by others.
10. To that which is objected, that it is presumptuous to vow, because one either considers oneself sufficient, etc.: it must be said that to attribute sufficiency to one's own virtues and free will is a matter of presumption with respect to however small a good, since the Apostle says in Second Corinthians 3: Not that we are sufficient,
etc. But to attribute this to divine grace, which one hopes will not be lacking to oneself on account of divine munificence, is not a matter of presumption, but of confidence and of the certainty of hope, by which we believe that God is a helper to the man who wills to adhere to His counsels. On account of which the same Apostle immediately after the aforementioned word adds: Our sufficiency is from God;
and the same, in the last chapter of Philippians: I can do all things in Him who strengthens me;
and by this hope ought he to be sustained who, inspired by the divine Spirit, not only proposes the perfection of the evangelical counsels, but also promises it by vowing.
11. To that which is objected, that to profess oneself perfect is presumptuous: it must be said that there is perfection with respect to merit
and with respect to state.
To profess oneself perfect with respect to merit
is a matter of presumption, not of perfection, since Paul says in Philippians 3: Not that I am already perfect. But to profess oneself perfect with respect to state
is not a matter of presumption, because this places the praise not upon the person
in herself, who can be culpable through her own merits, but upon the common life
and the manner of living approved by the counsel of Christ's own mouth.
12. To that which is objected, that it is pride to wish to be set over a just man: it must be said that one can wish to be set over another in two ways: either because one wishes to be set over simply,
or because one wishes to be set over in a lofty manner
through love of one's own excellence; and thus this will is depraved both in the one who wills it and in the others who consent to him, as it was in Lucifer and the other demons adhering to him.
In another way, someone wishes to be set over so that he may preside usefully,
through love of the commonwealth and the universal Church, stirred by the spirit of heavenly charity; and in this way neither does he himself sin, nor do the others who consent to him, since God has so ordained that the mystical body of Christ is to be governed according to the preeminences of grades, offices, and dignities.
13. To the objection that it is dangerous to commit oneself entirely to an unknown person, it must be said that if someone were to commit himself with no law, no norm, no rule prescribed, but for every eventuality, this would without doubt be foolish. But when someone vows obedience according to an approved form of rule, there is no danger therein, because, since some things are according to
the rule, some things below
the rule, some things above
the rule, and some things against
the rule: to the first he binds himself even without the command of a superior; to the second, however, by command; to the third, however, he is not bound, unless he wishes to act from perfection, as blessed Benedict says, that indeed the perfectly obedient person ought to undertake even what is imposed on him as impossible—which nevertheless is not of necessity but of supererogation, even for the perfect themselves. But what is against the rule,
in no way, by no agreement is one bound through obedience to observe; similarly also what is against the law of God,
such as is everything that tends to the detriment of our salvation or of the divine honor; and therefore one incurs no danger in making a vow according to the aforesaid manner.
14. To the objection that the more and greater the things to which a person is bound, the more he is placed in greater dangers, it must be said that this is true, all other things being equal. But here other things are not equal, because in the making of a vow helping grace is added, the opportunity for sinning is diminished, and the force driving one into danger is weakened; because the more one withdraws from worldly things and draws near to Christ, the less one is entangled in the snares of worldly dangers, and thereby one is raised up more freely and more securely to heavenly things.
15. To the objection that the evangelical law removes the oath, it must be said that this is not analogous, because an oath of itself is close to evil and is of little utility; but the vow of perfection is most close to the good and the best, and thereby of the greatest utility; and therefore it ought not to be forbidden by the law of the Gospel, but rather encouraged.
16. To the objection that it is imperfect because it is done at another's command, just as a sin is lesser which is done at another's suggestion, it must be said that this is not analogous, because the impulse to sin
diminishes the character of sin, since it diminishes the character of the voluntary; but command with respect to the good
does not diminish the character of the voluntary, because command can arise from pure charity and will; whence, with the freedom of the will preserved, it contributes to the fulfillment of the will, and thereby to the summit of the perfection of perfect merit.
17. To the objection that one is moved the more perfectly the more immediately one is moved toward God: it must be said that this holds true in the case of those who are so fully united to God that they have no need of any intermediary leading them, as is the case with the Blessed in the fatherland. But in the case of those who are in the state of wayfaring and need to ascend by degrees, this does not hold true; rather, they climb better and arrive from the lowest to the highest in an orderly fashion through the intermediary degrees of creatures — on account of which we also pray not only to God but also to the Saints, that through them we may be led to God — so also God willed that man should be subject to man, so that through the ministry of man he might be led back to God, and the merit of obedience might be increased.
18. To the objection concerning the anchorites, it must be said that anchorites were chosen through obedience: and indeed this was not granted except to those already so proven in the observance of regular obedience that they were believed without doubt to be suitable for the immediate governance of the Holy Spirit guiding them interiorly; to which they could in no way have arrived unless they had first bound themselves through voluntary subjection to obedience to man.
19. To the objection that through this the way of salvation is closed to the weak: it must be said that this is false:
rather, out of the many ways in which one can wander and even go astray, a certain surer and better way is chosen as a more direct path and a more efficacious remedy.
20. To the objection that to subject oneself to many persons is of greater perfection: it must be said that this is true with respect to reverence and the condescension of benevolence and the showing of honor, but it is not true with respect to the vow of obedience and regular profession, because according to the latter certain persons must be subject to certain definite persons, so that in all things confusion may be avoided and the rectitude of order may be observed.
ARTICLE III.
On the obedience owed to the Supreme Pontiff.
Finally it is asked whether it belongs to the Christian religion that all should obey one person. And that it does is shown both through the Old Testament and through the New and through canon law and through the evidence of reasons.
First, then, it is shown through the Old Testament as follows.
1. Deuteronomy 17: If you perceive that the judgment before you is difficult and ambiguous, and you see the words of the judges to vary: arise and go up to the place which the Lord your God has chosen. But the man who acts proudly, refusing to obey the command of the priest, that man shall die: there the Gloss says: "Here he grants the faculty of appeal." From this text and Gloss it is gathered that in the old law there was a supreme Pontiff, to whom recourse was to be had in judgments, and whom all were bound to obey. If therefore this was so in the law of the figure, much more does it seem that it ought to be so in the law of grace. And this for a threefold reason: first, because there is greater unity now than then: therefore much more ought there be one Pontiff. — Likewise, the pontificate is now more worthy and lofty: therefore much more ought all now be subject to one Pontiff than in the time of the law of Moses.
Finally, because here there ought to be a greater obedience and a more ordered hierarchy. From all of which it is gathered that if one supreme Pontiff was to be obeyed in the time of the law of Moses, much more so in the time of the law of Christ.
2. Likewise, the Psalm: He established them as princes over all the earth:
it is established that this was said of the Apostles: therefore all the earth is under the principate of the Apostles: but this principate is a stable principate, according to that word of the Psalm: Their principate has been exceedingly strengthened:
but it is not stable unless it is united, because every kingdom divided against itself shall be brought to desolation:
nor is it united unless it has one principal prince: therefore according to the prophetic testimony all the earth ought to be subject to one who is the prince of all.
3. Likewise, what Bernard says in the third book to Eugenius serves to confirm this: "He would have to leave the world who perhaps wished to discover what does not pertain to your care. Your forebears were sent forth, not to subdue certain regions, but the world itself: and indeed their sound went forth into all the earth
" etc. And afterwards: " Their principate has been exceedingly strengthened: they have been established as princes over all the earth.
You have succeeded to his inheritance, thus you are the heir, and the world is the inheritance." From this therefore it is apparent that according to the prophetic testimony universal obedience of all is owed to one.
Likewise, this same thing is shown through the New
Testament.
4. Matthew sixteen: You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church
etc., up to that point: it shall be loosed in heaven also;
but it is established that he who can loose and bind all must be obeyed by all: therefore God so instituted the Church that one would be obeyed by all. But the Church is to be ruled and governed as it was instituted by the Lord: therefore, etc.
5. Likewise, in the last chapter of John: Feed my sheep,
was said to Peter: but the sheep of Christ are all who walk by the way of salvation: therefore Peter was set as prelate over all such: therefore one was the shepherd of all the sheep of Christ according to the foundation of the Church: therefore also according to its progress and consummation, one must be obeyed by all.
6. Likewise, Bernard, treating the aforementioned words, in the second book to Eugene says thus: "You are the one to whom the keys have been handed over, to whom the sheep have been entrusted. There are indeed other doorkeepers of heaven and shepherds of flocks: but you so much more gloriously, inasmuch as you have more distinctly than the rest inherited both names. They have flocks assigned to them, each one his own; to you alone all have been entrusted, one flock to one shepherd. Not only of sheep, but also of shepherds, you alone are the pastor of all. How shall I prove this, you ask? From the word of the Lord: If you love me, Peter, feed my sheep.
Which sheep? The peoples of this or that city, or region, or kingdom? My sheep,
he says. To whom is it not plain that he did not designate some,
but assigned all?
Nothing is excepted where nothing is distinguished." And afterwards: "Your privilege stands unshaken, both in the keys and in the sheep entrusted to you, namely the sign of the singular pontificate of Peter, through which he undertook to govern not one ship, as each of the others his own, but the world itself: thus, since each of the others has his own, to you one most great ship has been entrusted, made from all of them, the universal Church herself, spread throughout the whole world."
From this it is manifestly held that according to divine institution, all must obey one, namely the Supreme Pontiff.
7. Likewise, Augustine, to Optatus: "In the Roman Church the primacy of the Apostolic See has always flourished"; but this is not said solely by reason of the city itself, because thus it could be said of other places and other bishops: therefore it is said with respect to the whole world: therefore according to this, the whole world must obey the Roman Pontiff as the prince of the world and universal ruler.
8. Likewise, Jerome, to Pope Damasus: "We desire to be corrected by you, who hold both the See and the faith of Peter: but if this our confession is approved by the judgment of your apostleship, whoever wishes to blame me will prove himself unskilled, or malevolent, or even not catholic, but a heretic": therefore, according to Jerome, all must abide by the judgment and correction of one Supreme Pontiff, for no other reason than because he holds the See of Peter and the authority which the Lord gave to him.
9. Likewise, Gelasius, distinction twenty-one: "Although the catholic Churches established throughout the world are one bridal chamber of Christ, nevertheless the holy Roman Church has been set above all others not by any synodal decrees, but obtained the primacy by the evangelical voice of our Lord and Savior: You are,
the Lord said, Peter, and upon this rock
" etc.
10. Likewise, Nicholas, in the twenty-second distinction: "The Roman Church instituted all the dignities of every order, but He alone founded it and erected it upon the rock of the faith then being born, He who entrusted to the blessed keyholder of eternal life the rights of both the earthly and the heavenly kingdom. Therefore not any earthly decree, but that Word by which heaven and earth were fashioned, by which indeed all the elements were created, founded the Roman Church: it surely enjoys His privilege, it is supported by His authority: and whoever attempts to take this away, he without doubt falls into heresy. And below:
Whence also St. Ambrose himself professes that he follows in all things the holy Roman Church as his teacher."
11. Likewise, Anacletus, in the same place: "The most holy Roman Church obtained the primacy not from the Apostles, but from our Lord and Savior Himself, as He said to the blessed Apostle Peter: Thou art Peter
." And shortly after: "Among the blessed Apostles there was a certain distinction of power: and although all were Apostles, nevertheless it was granted to Peter by the Lord — and they themselves willed this same thing among themselves — that he should preside over all the remaining Apostles: and they handed down this same form to be maintained by their successors and the remaining bishops: and this was so not only in the New Testament, but also in the Old."
From these things it is manifestly gathered that according to the testimony of both
Testaments, all must obey one.
Likewise, this same thing is shown through canon law:
12. Because the one whose role it is to judge all others and to be judged by no one,
he must be obeyed by all; but such a one is a certain individual, namely the Supreme Pontiff: therefore he must be obeyed by all. The major
premise is manifest in itself: the minor
premise is proved through multiple laws.
In Cause nine, question three, Pope Nicholas says: "It is indeed clear that the judgment of the Apostolic See, than whose authority there is nothing greater, is to be reversed by no one, nor is it permitted for anyone to judge concerning its judgment." - Likewise, Pope Innocent, in the same place: "No one shall judge the first Apostolic See, which desires to administer justice; for neither by the Emperor, nor by the whole clergy, nor by the people shall the judge be judged." - Likewise, Pope Anterus, in the same place: "The deeds of subjects are judged by us, but our deeds are judged by the Lord." - Likewise, Pope Gelasius to all bishops, in the same place: "The whole Church throughout the world knows that the most holy Roman Church has the right of judging concerning all, nor is it permitted for anyone to judge concerning its judgment. For indeed appeal must be made to it from any part of the world, but from it no one is permitted to appeal." - Likewise, the same to the bishops established throughout Dardania, in the same place: "The whole Church throughout the world knows that the See of blessed Peter has the right of rescinding the judgments of any pontiffs whatsoever by which it has been bound, inasmuch as it has the right of judging concerning the whole Church."
From these things, therefore, it is manifestly gathered that it belongs to the Supreme Pontiff to judge all others and to be judged by no one, and that on this account he must be obeyed by all.
13. Likewise, he whose office it is to establish decrees to be observed by all
must be obeyed by all; but this is the Supreme Pontiff: therefore he must be obeyed by all. The major
is self-evident; the minor
is proved in many ways. First, in Distinction 19, Pope Agatho says: "All the ordinances of the Apostolic See are to be received as if confirmed by the divine voice of the blessed Apostle Peter himself."
Likewise, in the same Distinction, Stephen V: "Indeed, since the holy Roman Church, over which Christ willed that we should preside, has been set before all as a mirror and example, whatever she has established, whatever she has ordained, must be observed perpetually and inviolably." - Likewise, Pope Gregory, in the same: "It is lawful for no one either to wish or to be able to transgress the precepts of the Apostolic See." And afterward: "Let whoever has wished to oppose the decrees of the Apostolic See therefore be prostrate with the grief of his own ruin: since he is not doubted by anyone to have already been condemned by the holy Synod and the apostolic Church for his disobedience and presumption." - Likewise, in Distinction 20, Pope Nicholas: "If you do not have the decrees of the Roman Pontiffs, you are to be charged with neglect and carelessness; if you have them and do not observe them, you are to be rebuked for temerity." - Likewise, Cause 25, Question 1, Pope Hilary: "Let it be lawful for no one to violate the divine constitutions or the decrees of the Apostolic See without peril to his own standing." - Likewise, in the same, Pope Adrian: "By a general decree we establish that whoever among kings or bishops or powerful men shall hereafter believe or permit the censure of the decrees of the Roman Pontiffs to be violated in any matter, let him be subject to an execrable anathema and let him stand always guilty before God as a transgressor of the Catholic faith." - From all these it is manifestly shown that it belongs to the Supreme Pontiff to establish decrees to be observed by all, and from this, obedience is to be rendered to him by all.
14. Likewise, he without obedience to whom the unity of the Church cannot be preserved
must be obeyed by all; but such a one is one, namely the Supreme Pontiff: therefore, etc. The major
is self-evident; the minor is proved. Cyprian, Cause 24, Question 1: "That He might manifest unity, He by His own authority arranged the origin of the Church's unity as beginning from one."
Likewise, the same, in the same Question: "He is an alien, he is profane, he is an enemy; he cannot have God as Father who does not hold the unity of the universal Church."
Likewise, Jerome, on the same question: "I speak with the successor of the fisherman and the disciple of Christ. I, following no reward except Christ, am joined in communion with your blessedness, that is, with the Chair of Peter; upon that rock I know the Church is founded. Whoever outside this house shall eat the lamb,
he is profane; if anyone shall not have been in the ark of Noah, he shall perish when the flood reigns." And afterward: "Whoever does not gather with you scatters, that is, whoever is not of Christ is of the Antichrist." — Likewise, Bede, on Matthew, on the same question: "Whoever in any way separate themselves from the unity of faith or the fellowship of Peter the Apostle, such persons can neither be absolved from the bonds of sins nor enter the gate of the heavenly kingdom." — Likewise, in the ninety-third distinction, Cyprian says: "He who abandons the Chair of Peter, upon which the Church is founded, let him not trust that he is in the Church."
Therefore, he who withdraws from obedience to him who sits in the Chair of Peter cannot be within ecclesiastical unity. Likewise, the same is shown by the evidence of reasons.
15. The Church of God is one body, in which there is a diversity of members; but so it is in the material
body, that all members are subject to and obey one principal member, namely the head: therefore so it will be in the spiritual
body, that all spiritual members ought to be subject to one as to the principal head. But this is accomplished through obedience: therefore, etc.
16. Likewise, the Church has order according to ministries,
just as also according to charisms and gifts of graces;
but the inflowing of charisms and graces
is from one head, namely Christ: therefore also the derivation of ministries and jurisdictions
ought to be from one head, namely the Supreme Pontiff. But this cannot be without the obedience of all with respect to one: therefore, etc.
17. Likewise, the Church is one hierarchy: therefore it ought to have one preeminent and supreme hierarch, since the unity of the principate ought to descend from the unity of the prince; but the one and supreme hierarch must be obeyed by all: therefore, etc.
18. Likewise, the Church is conformed to the heavenly hierarchy; but all spirits minister and obey one supreme Spirit: therefore also all men in the Church ought to obey one man. But this is the Supreme Pontiff: therefore, etc.
19. Likewise, the union in the being
of grace is greater than in the being
of nature; but all men have one bodily father: therefore they ought to have one spiritual father. But a father must be obeyed by all his children: therefore, etc.
20. Likewise, in the lesser world
it is so, that all inferior powers ought to obey one, namely reason or free will: therefore also in the ecclesiastical order all ought to obey one man; but this is the Supreme Pontiff: therefore, etc.
21. Likewise, in the greater world we see that all movable things and all movers are regulated according to the first mover and the first mobile: therefore similarly in the ecclesiastical order all principalities and powers ought to be regulated according to some one and sole principal mover: but this is done by obeying the Supreme Pontiff: therefore etc.
22. Likewise, the Church is one bride, therefore she ought to have one bridegroom; but all particular Churches are reduced to one Church: therefore all bridegrooms established in the place of Christ, namely the bishops, ought to be reduced to one, who principally holds the place of Christ. But she would not have one bridegroom unless one were to be obeyed by all: therefore etc.
23. Likewise, every temporal controversy must be terminated by one temporal judge; but if there were two or more who were to be obeyed equally, judgments could not be terminated: therefore it is necessary, for the termination of judgments in the Church, that there be one to whom obedience is owed by all.
24. Likewise, "in any genus there is one first thing, by which all things that are in that genus are measured and to which they are reduced": therefore in the genus of human powers one supreme and principal power is to be posited, according to which all other powers are measured and regulated: but this is done by obeying and complying with it: therefore etc.
But to the contrary: 1. Matthew twenty: Whoever will be greater among you, let him be your minister: and whoever will be first among you, shall be your servant: therefore it belongs to the first and greater to serve rather than to command: therefore he ought rather to obey all than all obey him, according to the dictate and command of the evangelical law.
2. Likewise, Matthew twenty-three: Call none your father upon earth: it is clear that he does not mean the carnal father, therefore he means the spiritual father: therefore it is against the dictate of the evangelical law that one should be called father by all, and that the rest should obey him as a father.
3. Likewise, Galatians two: I withstood him to the face: the Gloss says: "as an equal." "For he would not have dared to do this unless he knew himself not to be unequal": therefore Paul was equal to Peter; by equal reasoning the other Apostles also: therefore the successors of the Apostles are also equal to the successor of Peter according to the institution of the Lord's law: therefore it does not belong to the Christian religion that all should obey one.
4. Likewise, Cyprian says, and it is found in Causa twenty-four, question one: "The other Apostles were what Peter was, endowed with an equal share of both honor and power": if therefore all the Apostles are equal, then also all the successors of the Apostles: therefore one is not more bound to obey another than conversely: therefore it is not of divine law that all should be under one head.
5. Furthermore, that same thing which is said to Peter in Matthew 16, I will give to you the keys, and whatsoever you shall bind upon earth, etc., is also said to the other Apostles in Matthew 18: Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth, etc. Therefore it seems that the power of Peter and of the other Apostles was equal; therefore according to the dictate of the evangelical law it is not necessary that all be reduced to one head, whom they are bound to obey.
6. Furthermore, on that passage in Matthew 16, Whatsoever you shall bind, etc., the Gloss says: "The other Apostles indeed have the same judiciary power, to whom after the resurrection he says: Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall remit," etc. If therefore the same judiciary power exists in the other Apostles, then it does not seem that it principally resides with one person.
7. Furthermore, in Distinction 93, Jerome writes to Evangelus the priest: "If authority is sought, the world is greater than the city. Wherever a bishop may be, whether at Gubbio or at Rome, he is of the same merit and priesthood." Therefore all bishops, according to Jerome, are of equal dignity; therefore it is not necessary according to the dictate of God's law that all obey one.
8. Furthermore, the governance of the ecclesiastical hierarchy is divided into royal power and priestly power; but it is not necessary for salvation that all kings obey one king; therefore by equal reasoning it seems that it is not necessary that all obey one priest.
9. Furthermore, he who has ordinary power and jurisdiction can entirely commit it to another; but when the Supreme Pontiff establishes bishops, he grants them ordinary power throughout the world; therefore it now seems that he has transferred jurisdiction to others; therefore it does not seem that it is necessary to obey him any further.
10. Furthermore, all priests are equal in the power of consecrating; therefore by equal reasoning also in the power of binding and loosing; therefore it does not seem that all are subject to one.
11. Furthermore, after Peter, universal power cannot exist in anyone except through an election made concordantly by many; therefore the power of Peter has devolved more immediately to the college than to one person; therefore it does not seem that according to the derivation of that power all must be subject to one.
12. Furthermore, either Peter, the first pastor of the Church, had in himself the fullness of authority and power, or he did not. If he had it fully, then the Supreme Pontiff writes superfluously that he acts as he does by the authority of the Apostles Peter and Paul, since the fullness of authority was in Peter alone; but if it was not in Peter, much less is it in his successors.
13. Furthermore, if all must obey one, then that one must provide for all; but to provide for all is not within human power, but within divine power alone; if therefore to provide for all belongs to God alone, all ought not to obey any one except the Lord alone.
14. Furthermore, if all ought to obey one person, it is either as an immediate prelate or as a mediate one. If as an immediate prelate: then the others are superfluous; if as a mediate one: but in every genus, the immediate is more powerful and more excellent than the mediate: therefore according to this, the authority in that one person will be minimal or none, and the others are least bound to comply with him.
15. Furthermore, if all are bound to obey one person as a prelate, then he seems to be as it were a common prelate, and therefore a universal one: but a universal cause cannot produce an effect except through a particular one, just as the sun cannot produce a man except through a man: therefore according to this, if there is one Supreme Pontiff, it seems that he can do nothing except through others: therefore it seems that the others are least bound to be subject to one person.
16. Furthermore, the celestial hierarchy does not have any one person to whom it is subject through obedience except God alone: therefore it seems that neither should the terrestrial or ecclesiastical hierarchy have any one person except only the mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ.
CONCLUSION.
Although diverse men are bound by many bonds to the subjection of obedience to diverse persons, according to the diversity of ranks, offices, and powers: nevertheless this variety ought to be reduced to one supreme and first Bishop, in whom the universal sovereignty over all principally resides: and not only to Christ himself, but also by divine right to his Vicar: and this indeed most fittingly, since the order of universal justice, the unity of the Church, and stability in both require this.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it should be noted that although diverse persons are bound to diverse others by many bonds to the subjection of obedience, according to what the Apostle says: Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, Romans 13, and this according to the diversity of ranks, offices, and powers: nevertheless all this variety must be reduced to one supreme and first person, in whom the universal sovereignty over all principally resides: not only to God himself and Christ, the mediator of God and men, but also to his Vicar; and this not by human statute, but by divine statute, by which Christ established Peter as the prince of the Apostles, whom he established as princes over the whole earth. Moreover, Christ did this most fittingly, because the order of universal justice, the unity of the Church, and stability in both required this.
For the order of universal justice required this both with respect to natural justice and with respect to civil justice and with respect to celestial or spiritual justice.
Natural
justice, by which the elements of the world
and the whole machine of the universe are ordered, requires that among locating
bodies there be one first locating body, among mobile
things one first mobile, among luminous
things one principally radiating, among movers
one first mover, and universally "in any given genus
there be one first thing, by which all things contained in that genus are measured."
Natural justice in the lesser world
also requires that there be one principal member,
from which the rest receive influence according to truth,
as the heart, according to evidence,
as the head; that there also be one power
principally governing all the powers of the soul and of the whole man, namely free choice.
Civil
justice
also requires that there be one principal judge,
by whom the final decision of cases is made; also one principal leader
and ruler, by whom legislation is enacted, lest on account of a division of heads schism and division arise in the body of the republic, and with equal judges contradicting each other, if there be no supreme judge, litigation would never be resolved.
The celestial
order
also has this, that all spirits are most orderly arranged under the obedience of one supreme Spirit, whom they behold face to face.
Since therefore this lower hierarchy accords with the natural
order and the moral
and the celestial,
because it perfects nature and adorns morals and emanates from the heavenly Jerusalem: hence it is that it must be reduced according to the principle of obedience to one first and supreme. For just as there is no order of priority and posteriority
except through reduction to the first, so there is no complete order according to below and above
except through reduction to the supreme.
Whence there alone is the most perfect
order, where there is perfect reduction to the supreme, which is the supreme absolutely,
of which kind is God; and this is in the heavenly Jerusalem, where there is full justice. — But where there is reduction to the supreme in the genus
of men, of which kind is the Vicar of Christ the Supreme Pontiff: there is a perfect
order, insofar as befits the perfection of the present Church, which is formed after the likeness of the heavenly Jerusalem.
Hence Bernard, in the third book to Eugenius: "Do not consider this form, which is on earth, to be base: it has its form in heaven. He who said the following had seen this: I saw the holy city descending from heaven, prepared by God.
For I consider it said on account of the likeness, that, just as there the Cherubim and Seraphim and all the rest down to the Archangels and Angels are ordered under one head, God: so here also under one Supreme Pontiff the primates or patriarchs, archbishops, bishops, priests or abbots and the rest are arranged in this manner. It is not to be made little of that it has God as its author and draws its origin from heaven." — Thus therefore there ought to be one to whom universal subjection is referred: and this because, as has been shown, the order of universal justice so required.
The unity of the Church itself also requires this. For since the Church itself is one hierarchy,
one body and one bride;
it is necessary that it have one preeminent hierarch,
one head,
and one bridegroom:
and since this unity is not only in the Church according to the interior influence
of charisms, but also according to the exterior dispensation
of ministries: hence it is that the preeminent hierarch, head, and bridegroom of the Church itself is not only Jesus Christ Himself, who interiorly
rules, vivifies, and makes fruitful the Church itself; but also exteriorly
there ought to be one preeminent minister, holding the place of the first hierarch,
the head,
and the bridegroom,
so that the Church may be preserved in unity not only interiorly,
but also exteriorly.
And this is what Cyprian says, and it is found in Causa twenty-four, question one: "The Lord speaks to Peter: I say to you, that you are Peter, and upon this rock
etc. Upon one He builds the Church, and the beginning proceeds from unity, so that the Church of Christ may be shown to be one: the episcopate is one, of which a part is held by each one in its entirety: and the Church is one, which extends more broadly in multitude the increase of its fruitfulness. As there are many rays, but one light, and the branches of a tree are many, but the strength is one, founded on a tenacious root: and as from one fountain many streams flow, and although the multiplicity may seem diffused by the bounty of overflowing abundance, yet unity is preserved whole in the origin: so also the Church of God, suffused with light, extends its rays through the whole world: yet it is one that is diffused everywhere, nor is the unity of the body separated." Cyprian therefore intends that because the Church is one dove, one episcopate, one body, it ought to have been founded upon one preeminent pastor, namely Peter, as upon one bishop and head and bridegroom. The solidity of both also requires this.
For, as the Philosopher says, "power, the more it is united, the more it is infinite"; which is indeed true both with respect to permanence
and with respect to influence
and with respect to preeminence.
As to permanence:
because, just as division begets destruction, so greater union gives firmness and strength, whence also the entire firmness of the Church itself principally flows from the solidity of the one Rock and of the one Peter, who is the Vicar of the Rock; as a sign of which thing it was said to Peter: And upon this rock I will build my Church; it was also said to him: I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not:
nor was this prayer in vain. Whence Jerome, and it is found in Causa twenty-four, question one: "The Holy Roman Church, which has always remained immaculate, by the Lord's providence and by the blessed Apostle Peter bearing aid, shall in the future remain without any assault of heretics, and shall persist firm and immovable for all time." Therefore this unity of the Supreme Pontiff contributes to the solidity of the Church itself as to permanence.
Also as to influence:
because power more united is more potent, and the more potent it is in efficacy, the more powerful is its influence in effect; whence the fullness of power ought to have been placed in one Pontiff alone. Whence Pope Leo, in Distinction nineteen: "The Lord willed that the sacrament of this office should pertain to the duty of all the Apostles in such a way that He placed it principally in the most blessed Peter, the supreme prince of all the Apostles, so that from him, as from a certain head, He might pour forth His gifts as into the whole body, so that whoever should dare to withdraw from the solidity of Peter might understand himself to be without share in the divine mystery." - Lastly, it also contributes as to preeminence:
because power more united is less subject to another,
and through this is more free; because also the more united it is, the more it holds the character of the first and the highest,
just as the ark was completed in a cubit; whence the unity of the Supreme Pontiff alone is what confers upon the whole Church the preeminence of dignity. And through this, just as in the head, for the adornment of the whole body, the collection of all the senses is gathered together, so in the Supreme Pontiff himself there ought to be the collection of all dignities. And this is what Bernard says to Eugenius: "Let us inquire, come, let us inquire still more diligently, who you are, what person namely you bear for the time being in the Church of God. Who are you? The great Priest, the Supreme Pontiff; you are the prince of bishops, you the heir of the Apostles, you are Abel in primacy, Noah in governance, Abraham in patriarchate, Melchizedek in order, Aaron in dignity, Moses in authority, Samuel in judgment, Peter in power, Christ in anointing."
From these things, therefore, it is openly gathered that the unity of the Supreme Pontiff remains by the law of God, since the order of universal justice demands this,
both natural
and civil
and also celestial;
since also the unity of the Church demands this,
as one hierarchy,
one body,
and one spouse;
since also the stability and sublimity of both demands this,
both in the permanence of duration
and in the influence of power
and in the preeminence of dignity.
Whence, although this has flowed from the law of grace,
which is the law of Jesus Christ, it nevertheless accords with the law of nature
and the written law, with pontifical law
and canon law:
it accords with visible things,
it accords with invisible things:
it also accords with the piety
of all the faithful and with the right understanding of all minds: just as the arguments set forth above also show, whence they are also to be granted.
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that whoever wishes to be greater must be a servant, it must be said that servant
is said in two ways: either by obligatory subjection,
or by perfect humility.
The first is repugnant to supreme
authority, and no one can simultaneously be bound in subjection to others and preside over governance. The second, however, is not repugnant but most consonant: and it is of this that the Lord speaks, because He teaches the one supremely set over others to imitate Christ above all, who left to others an example of humility especially to be imitated: in sign of which the Supreme Pontiff also writes himself servant of the servants of God.
Whence Bernard, in the second book to Eugenius, speaking of humility: "No more splendid gem in all the adornment especially of the Supreme Pontiff; for the more exalted he is above the rest, the more illustrious it appears, even beyond itself."
2. To that which is objected, that we ought not to call anyone father
upon earth, it must be said that father
means one who communicates nature, and master
means one who communicates knowledge; and since God alone is He who principally bestows nature and infuses knowledge, therefore both names, namely of father
and of master, ought to be attributed to Him as the principal source of both knowledge and nature, inasmuch as they denote principal authority,
and not to another.
But because God in these things also works outwardly through human ministry,
therefore both names, insofar as they denote ministry,
can be communicated to a human being, not as to a principal agent, but as to a steward.
3. 4. To that which is objected concerning Paul, that he was equal to Peter: it must be said that the authority of the apostolate has a twofold comparison, namely to him by whom it is conferred, and to those over whom it is conferred: because an apostle
is called one sent by someone and to some persons. According to the first
comparison, the Gloss says that Paul is made equal to Peter, because each was immediately sent by Christ. Whence Paul also says that he is an Apostle,
not from man nor through man, but through Jesus Christ.
But according to the second
comparison, he is not made equal to him; for Peter is called the prince of the Apostles,
which is never said of Paul, because according to this comparison he was inferior to Peter. Whence the Gloss also says there: "Peter himself furnished an example to posterity, so that the greater ones would not disdain, if perchance they had departed from the path of rectitude, to be corrected even by their inferiors."
And through this the following objection is clear, which he raises concerning the authority of Cyprian.
5. 6. To that which is objected, that that word was said to the Apostles which had previously been said to Peter: it must be said that it was said far differently to them and to Peter. For to Peter it was said separately and singularly,
because in him the fullness of power was to be placed principally and singularly: but to the others it was said collectively; Whatsoever you shall bind,
etc., because they were called "into a share of the solicitude." Whence although they had a similar
power, they did not however have an equal
one: and therefore that word had to be said to the Apostles and to Peter: not however at the same time nor under the same context, but in one way and another.
And through this the response to the following objection concerning the Gloss is clear; because the Apostles are said to have the same judiciary power, that is, a similar
one: but from this it does not follow that they had an equal
one, but it is a figure of speech
from a change of the predicate, because similitude consists in quality,
but equality in quantity
.
7. To that which is objected from the authority of Jerome, that a bishop, wherever he may be, is of the same priesthood: it must be said that Jerome is speaking to the effect that the magnitude of riches and the multitude of subject people does not cause a man to be a more excellent prelate on that account; nor is the Pope said to be more excellent than others on account of his being the bishop of the City, which has the greatest population; but because he is the successor of Peter, upon whom was conferred the fullness of power, not by the statute of man, but of God and of Christ.
8. To that which is objected, that it is not necessary for all kings to obey one person, it must be said that the case is not similar, because the scepter of the king does not proceed from the statute of the evangelical law in the same way as the key of the Pontiff does. For the evangelical law is spiritual, whence Christ too, the bearer of that law, directed the eyes of His mind to the spiritual pontificate, not to carnal dominion. —Nevertheless, it could be said that in truth both powers converge in one person in the Supreme Pontiff. For since he himself is the high priest according to the order of Melchisedech, who was king of Salem and priest of the most high God, and Christ possessed both: the Vicar of Christ on earth received both powers from Christ, whence both swords belong to him. Whence Bernard, in the fourth book to Eugenius: "Both are of the Church, namely the spiritual sword and the material; but the latter indeed is to be drawn for the Church, the former by the Church; the former by the hand of the priest, the latter by the hand of the soldier, but assuredly at the nod of the priest and at the command of the emperor." From which it is openly gathered that both powers are traced back to him as to the one first and supreme hierarch.
9. To that which is objected, that whoever has ordinary power can commit it to another, it must be said that jurisdiction exists in a threefold distinction: one kind is semi-complete and wholly descending from another source, and this cannot be committed on account of its imperfection; another kind, on the contrary, is most full, and this, because it is supreme, cannot exist except in one person at one and the same time, and therefore it cannot be committed to another—whence the Pope cannot make other Popes; but there is a middle kind, which is ordinary, yet is not supreme: and this indeed, because it is in a certain way perfect and capable of being multiplied, can be committed to another; nor is it lost even when it is given, insofar as it is a spiritual power, because in this spiritual things differ from corporal things: that corporal things, when they are given, are possessed less wholly, but spiritual things, when they are distributed, are then possessed more fully, as is also manifestly seen in the gift of knowledge. Whence, although the Supreme Pontiff communicates jurisdiction to others, he does not on that account suffer any detriment, because he never so commits nor can commit it that he exempts anyone from his own power.
10. To that which is objected, that all priests are equal in the power of consecrating, it must be said that the case is not similar, because the power of consecrating is essential to the character, and therefore, just as the character is not received in different persons to a greater or lesser degree, so neither is that power. This is not so regarding the power of absolving, because that power follows the sacerdotal character as something annexed to it.
The reason for this is that the first power is an absolute power, but the latter is related to another, namely to the persons of subjects; and therefore it must be diversified according to the diversity of powers and degrees that constitute the order in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
11. To that which is objected, that the fullness of power flowed immediately from Peter into the college, it must be said that power is said to be in someone in two ways: either as in a sustaining subject, or as in one who confers it. In the first way, the fullness of power never is nor ever was except in one person: first indeed in Christ, second in Peter, and thereafter in his successor, namely the Roman Pontiff. But because the subject of that power is a mortal person, therefore Christ and his Spirit so ordained that this power should be conveyed from one to one, not by the way of the flesh but of the spirit, which indeed is election, in which the Holy Spirit ought to work in the conformity of minds to establish one person. And because it principally resides in one, therefore the obedience of all is principally directed to one, short of whom it has neither standing nor completion.
12. To that which is objected, that if the Supreme Pontiff has the fullness of authority from Peter, he ought not to join together the authority of Peter and Paul at the same time: it must be said that the fullness of authority was principally and singularly in Peter. But since Paul, by the fullness of his wisdom and learning, was most efficacious in the conversion of unbelievers and most prudent in the governance of the Church itself, such that in certain respects he seemed to be more preeminent than the other Apostles, lest contention should arise among the successors, by the direction of the Holy Spirit this was brought about: that both should come to one city, in which, dying together, they might establish the pontificate of one Church in the city of Rome, so that from this every scruple of controversy might cease. Whence Paul added nothing to the Supreme Pontiff with respect to the fullness of power, which was in Peter, but with respect to evidence, that the mouth of those speaking iniquity might be stopped, and especially of the Greeks, who wished to contend on equal terms with the Roman Church. On account of which, by the just judgment of God, those thinking less rightly about the unity of the head and badly preserving the unity of the Church have been blinded, so that they think less rightly about the unity of the Holy Spirit, who as the love of the Father and the Son proceeds from both. Whence Paul, coming to Rome to live under the wings of Peter until death, did nothing other than admonish that the Church of the Greeks is subject to the Roman Church until the end, lest it lose the unity of the Holy Spirit. Because, therefore, the Supreme Pontiff ought to express in his letters the fullness of power not only universally but also evidently, not only sufficiently but also abundantly, therefore he expresses the authority of both.
13. To that which is objected, that if all ought to obey one, then that one ought to provide for all: it must be said that even though all ought to obey one, nevertheless not one alone,
because neither can one be everywhere, nor can one provide for individuals everywhere. Therefore divine providence has provided that there be many intermediate and distinct superiors, through whom the power of provision might descend from the highest to the lowest. Whence Bernard, to Eugenius in the third book: "Not yours alone is the power from the Lord: there are also those of middle rank, there are also those of lower rank: and just as those whom God has joined
are not to be separated, so neither are those whom He has subordinated
to be equated." On account of which, just as it belongs to particular prelates to attend to particular care, so also it belongs to the Supreme Pontiff himself to attend to the general state of the Church. Whence Bernard adds in the same place: "It remains that your consideration attend generally to the whole state of the Church."
14. To that which is objected, that if all ought to obey one, this is either as to a mediate or an immediate prelate: it must be said that immediate prelate
is said in two ways: either according to degree,
or according to power.
It must be said therefore that the one and supreme Pontiff, although he is most distant from the lowest members according to degree,
because there are many intermediate degrees between him and the lowest people: nevertheless according to the influence
of power he is most immediate. For he is not obeyed on account of the authorities of others, but others are obeyed on account of his authority: just as the king is not obeyed on account of the bailiff, but rather the bailiff on account of the king. Whence his authority is like a proximate and immediate cause, which ought to move all and each to render obedience to their superiors.
15. To that which is objected, that if all are bound to obey one, then that one is a common prelate: it must be said that a universal
cause is twofold: one which is entirely of another genus and power
than the particular,
just as the sun is of another genus than man: and this cannot produce its proper effect except through a proper cause. Another is a universal
cause which has in itself all the power
that a particular
cause has: and in this way God can be called the universal cause of things, and concerning such a universal cause what is objected does not hold; but the Supreme Pontiff is not likened to a universal cause in the first way, but in the second,
because he holds the place of Christ on earth; whence even if he alone existed, and all things in the Church were destroyed, he could restore all things: and therefore that argument does not conclude.
16. To that which is objected concerning the hierarchy of that supernal Jerusalem: it must be said that the comparison does not hold, because they as Blessed ones always have God present, whence they always see the face of the true Solomon.
But we in the state of pilgrimage, as little ones,
because we neither see God nor can have immediate recourse to Him in human affairs, we need the guidance and governance of a man who is a wayfarer, who as a shepherd may lead and bring us back to the sheepfold
of the supreme Pastor.