Question 4

QUESTION IV.


Whether whatever is known by us with certitude is known in the eternal reasons themselves.

Supposing that the eternal reasons are really indistinct in the divine art or knowledge, it is asked whether they are the reasons of knowing in every certitudinal cognition; this is to ask whether whatever is known by us with certitude is known in the eternal reasons themselves. That it is so appears from manifold authority.

1. Augustine, On the Teacher: "Concerning all things which we understand, we consult not the speaker who sounds forth outwardly, but the truth presiding within over the mind itself. Moreover, he who is consulted teaches, he who is said to dwell in the interior man, Christ, the unchangeable power of God and everlasting wisdom, whom indeed every rational soul consults."

2. Likewise, the same, On True Religion: "It is apparent that above our mind there is a law which is called truth: nor should it any longer be doubted that the unchangeable nature which is above the human mind is God. For this is that unchangeable truth which is rightly called the law of all arts and the art of the almighty artificer."

3. Likewise, Augustine, in the second book of On Free Will: "That beauty of wisdom and truth is neither measured out in time nor migrates in place nor is intercepted by night nor shut off by shadow nor lies subject to the bodily senses: to all from the whole world who turn to it and love it, it is near to all, everlasting to all; it is in no place, it is nowhere absent; outwardly it admonishes, inwardly it teaches. No one judges of it, no one judges well without it; and thereby it is manifest that it is without doubt more excellent than our minds, which from it alone are made individually wise, and judge not of it but through it concerning other things."

If you should say that from this it does not follow that we see in the truth or in the reasons, but that we see from the reasons; on the contrary: Augustine, in the twelfth book of the Confessions: "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true: where, I ask, do we see this? Neither I in you, nor you in me, but both of us in that unchangeable truth itself which is above our minds."

4. Likewise, in the eighth book of the City of God, speaking of the philosophers, he says: "These, whom we rightly set before all others, said that the light of minds for learning all things is the very same God by whom all things were made."

5. Likewise, in the eighth book of On the Trinity, chapter three: "When a mind pleases us, so that we prefer it to every corporeal light, it does not please us in itself, but in that art by which it was made. For it is approved as made from the same source where it is seen to have been worthy of being made: this is truth and the simple good."

6. Likewise, in the ninth book of On the Trinity, chapter six: "By altogether other rules, remaining unchangeably above our mind, we are convicted of either approving or disapproving, when we rightly approve or disapprove of something."

7. Likewise, in the same work, chapter seven: "In that eternal truth, from which all temporal things were made, we behold with the sight of the mind the form according to which we exist and according to which we accomplish something by true and right reason either in ourselves or in bodies."

8. Likewise, in the fourteenth book On the Trinity, chapter fifteen: "When the impious see the rules according to which each person ought to live, where do they see them? Not in their own nature, since it is established that their minds are mutable, while these rules are immutable; nor in the habit of their mind, since those rules are rules of justice.

Where does one discern that what he himself does not have ought to be possessed? Where then are they written, if not in the book of that light which is called truth, from which every just law is transcribed?" — If you say that he retracted this: to the contrary: Augustine, in the first book of the Retractations: "It is credible that even those unskilled in certain disciplines can answer truly concerning them, when they are able to grasp the eternal light of reason, where they behold these unchangeable truths — not because they previously knew and afterwards forgot, as it seemed to Plato." — Likewise: "The intellectual nature is connected not only to intelligible things, but also to immutable things, having been made in such an order that, when it moves itself toward those things to which it is connected, or toward itself, to the extent that it sees them, to that extent it answers truly concerning them."

From these authorities of Augustine it is manifestly clear that all things are known in the eternal reasons.

9. Likewise, Ambrose: "Through myself I see nothing except what is vain, fleeting, and perishable": therefore if I see anything with certitude, I see it through something that is above me.

10. Likewise, Gregory, on that passage of John fourteen: He will teach you all things, says: "Unless the same Spirit is present to the heart of the hearer, the speech of the teacher is idle: let no one therefore attribute to the man who teaches what he understands from the mouth of the teacher, because unless there is one who teaches within, the tongue of the teacher labors outwardly in vain."

11. Likewise, the same author in the same place: "Behold, you all equally hear the one voice of the speaker, and yet you do not all equally perceive the meaning of the voice heard. Since therefore the voice is not different, why is the understanding of the voice different in your hearts, unless it is because, through the fact that the voice of the speaker commonly admonishes, there is an interior teacher who specially teaches certain ones concerning the understanding of the voice?"

But if our intellect were sufficient of itself for understanding through the light of created truth, it would not need a heavenly teacher: since therefore it does need one, the conclusion is clear, etc.

12. Likewise, Anselm in the Proslogion, chapter fourteen: "How great is the light from which shines forth every truth that gives light to the rational mind! How ample is that truth, in which is everything that is true, and outside of which there is nothing except nothingness and falsehood!" Therefore if truth is not seen except where it is, no truth is seen except in the eternal truth.

13. Likewise, Origen: "Human nature, even if it had not sinned, could not shine by its own proper powers." But to understand is a certain kind of shining: therefore even if it had not sinned, it could not understand by its own powers; therefore it needs a higher agent.

14. Likewise, on that verse of the Psalm: Your hands have made me and formed me; give me understanding: the Gloss says: "God alone gives understanding: for God through himself, who is light, illuminates devout minds."

15. Likewise, Isaac, treating that verse of the Psalm: In your light we shall see light, says: "Just as from the sun proceeds that by which the sun can be seen, and yet what shows the sun does not leave the sun: so in God the light which proceeds from God irradiates the mind, so that it first sees the very radiance itself, without which it would not see, and in that radiance sees all other things." Therefore according to this, all things are seen in the divine light.

16. Likewise, the Philosopher, in the sixth book of the Ethics, chapter three, according to the new translation: "We all suppose that what we know cannot be otherwise; but contingent things, when they fall outside our contemplation, escape our notice as to whether they exist or not. Therefore what is knowable is eternal by necessity; for all things that are by necessity are simply eternal; and eternal things are ungenerated and incorruptible." Therefore in no way can there be certain knowledge without the notion of eternal truth entering therein. But this exists only in the eternal reasons: therefore etc.

Likewise, this same point is shown by arguments, and first by arguments drawn from the words of Augustine, and second by other arguments. For Augustine suggests arguments of this kind in the second book of On Free Choice and in On True Religion and in On the Teacher, in the sixth book of On Music and in the eighth book of On the Trinity.

17. Everything immutable is superior to what is mutable; but that by which something is known with certitude is immutable, because it is a necessary truth; but our mind is mutable: therefore that by which we know is above our minds. But what is above our minds is nothing other than God and eternal truth: therefore that by which there is knowledge is divine truth and the sempiternal reason.

18. Likewise, everything that cannot be judged is superior to what can be judged; but the law by which we judge cannot be judged, while our mind can be judged: therefore that by which we know and judge is above our mind. But this is nothing other than the sempiternal truth and reason: therefore etc.

19. Likewise, everything infallible is superior to what is fallible; but the light and truth by which we know with certitude is infallible, while our mind can be deceived: therefore that light and truth is above our mind. But this is eternal light and truth: therefore etc.

20. Likewise, every light of certitude cannot be confined, because it shows itself to all and presents what is knowable under the same certitude; but a light that cannot be confined is necessarily not a created light, but uncreated, because everything created is limited and finite and is multiplied in diverse things: therefore this light must necessarily be uncreated. But by this light we know with certitude: therefore etc.

21. Likewise, everything necessary is interminable, because it can in no way, nor will it ever be able to, be otherwise: but that by which we know with certitude is a necessary truth: therefore it is interminable. But everything of this kind is above every created thing, since every creature has proceeded from nonbeing to being, and as far as it is of itself, is convertible into nonbeing: therefore that by which we know exceeds every created truth, therefore it is uncreated truth.

22. Likewise, everything created, as far as it is of itself, is comprehensible: but the laws of numbers, figures, and demonstrations, since they increase to infinity, are according to the Philosopher incomprehensible by the human intellect: therefore laws of this kind, when they are seen by the human intellect, must necessarily be seen in something that exceeds every created thing. But this is nothing other than God and the eternal reason: therefore etc.

23. Likewise, when the impious man knows justice, he either knows it through its own presence, or through a likeness received from without, or through something that is above: but not through its presence, since it is not present to him; not through a species received from without, since it does not have a likeness abstractable through sense: therefore it is necessary that he know it through something else, which is above his intellect: and by equal reasoning, all other knowable spiritual things which he knows. Therefore if the impious man knows in the eternal reasons, much more so do others.

If you say that he knows it through its effect, it is objected against this: because what is in no way known, one does not know what is effected by it; for if I do not know what a man is, I never know what is done by a man; therefore if a notion of justice is not first had, it will never be known that this or that is done by it. It remains therefore that it is known in the eternal reason.

Similarly it can be argued concerning any intelligible substantial form, and through this concerning all certitudinal cognition.

24. Likewise, just as God is the cause of being, so he is the reason of understanding and the order of living; but God is so the cause of being that nothing can be effected by any cause without his moving the agent by himself and by his eternal power: therefore nothing can be understood without his immediately illuminating the one understanding by his eternal truth.

25. Likewise, no defective being, as far as it is of itself, is known except through a perfect being; but every created truth, as far as it is of itself, is darkness and deficiency: therefore nothing falls upon the intellect except through that supreme truth.

26. Likewise, nothing is rightly and with certitude known unless it is applied to a rule that can in no way be made crooked: but this rule is none other than that which is essentially rectitude itself, and this is nothing other than the truth and the eternal reason: therefore nothing is known with certitude unless it is applied to the eternal rule.

27. Likewise, since the portion of the soul is twofold, superior and inferior, the inferior reason has its origin from the superior, and not conversely; but reason is called superior insofar as it turns toward the eternal laws, and inferior insofar as it is occupied with temporal things; therefore, knowledge of eternal things inheres in the soul prior to and more naturally than knowledge of temporal things; therefore, it is impossible that anything be known by it with certitude unless it is aided by those eternal reasons.

All these aforementioned arguments are drawn from the words of Augustine in various volumes.

Likewise, the same thing is seen also by other arguments.

28. Knowledge of the same sensible object cannot be had by diverse knowers simultaneously and at once except through something common, and by equal reasoning, knowledge of the same intelligible object; but some one truth in no way multiplied can be understood by diverse knowers, just as it can also be enunciated; therefore, it is necessary that it be understood through some one thing in no way multiplied. But one thing in diverse subjects in no way multiplied cannot be anything other than God; therefore, the ground of understanding each thing is truth itself, which is God.

29. Likewise, as the affection is related to the good, so the intellect is related to the true, and as every good is from the highest goodness, so every truth is from the highest truth; but it is impossible that our affection be directed toward a good without in some way attaining the highest goodness; therefore, it is impossible that our intellect know any truth with certitude without in some way attaining the highest truth.

30. Likewise, the true is not known except by truth, and not by just any truth, but by a known truth, and especially by that truth which is most known; but this truth is that which cannot be thought not to exist; but such is not a created truth, but an uncreated one; therefore, whatever is known with certitude is known in the eternal truth and reason.

31. Likewise, the soul is naturally apt to turn toward the intelligible which is outside, toward the intelligible which is within, and toward the intelligible which is above. But the turning toward the intelligible which is outside is minimally simple; toward the intelligible which is within is more simple; toward the intelligible which is above is maximally simple, because that is more intimate to it than it is to itself. But the more simple something is, the more prior it is; therefore, the turning of the soul toward truth itself, which is intimate to it, is naturally prior to the turning toward itself or toward extrinsic truths; therefore, it is impossible that it know anything unless that highest truth is foreknown.

32. Likewise, every being in potency is reduced to act through something actually existing in that genus; but our intellect is in potency, as the intellect in a child; therefore, for it to become actually understanding, it is necessary that this come about through him who is actually knowing all things. But this is none other than the eternal wisdom; therefore, etc.

If you say that it is the agent intellect: then I ask: either the agent intellect actually understands that which the learner is learning, or it does not: if not: then through it one could not be made actually understanding: if so: then either the one who is learning simultaneously understands and is ignorant of the same thing, or the agent intellect is not something of the soul, but above the soul: it remains therefore that whatever the understanding soul apprehends, it apprehends through something that is above the soul. But above the soul there is nothing except God: therefore etc.

If you say that the agent intellect is not called agent because it actually understands, but because it causes understanding; against this: everything that understands is superior to and better than what does not understand: therefore if the agent intellect is not understanding, since it cannot make something better and superior above itself, it will never make itself or another actually understanding: therefore if something becomes actually understanding, it is necessary that it come about through something that is above it. But there is nothing else to posit than the eternal reason and truth: therefore etc.

33. Furthermore, if all creatures were destroyed, with only the rational spirit remaining, there would remain in it the knowledge of the disciplines, such as of numbers and figures: but this is not on account of the true being that they have in it, nor in the universe; therefore it is necessary that it be on account of the being that they have in the supreme Artisan.

34. Furthermore, according to all the Saints, God is said to be the teacher of all knowledge; either therefore because He generally cooperates with every intellect, just as with other creatures, or because He infuses the gift of grace, or because the intellect in knowing attains to Him. If because He generally cooperates: then He would be said to teach the sense just as the intellect: which is absurd. If because He infuses the gift of grace: then all knowledge will be gratuitous or infused, and none therefore acquired or innate: which is most absurd. It remains therefore that this is said because our intellect attains to Him as to the light of minds and the reason for knowing every truth.

But against this it is objected first by authority, then by reason: by authority as follows.

1. In the last chapter of First Timothy it is said of God: Who alone has immortality and dwells in inaccessible light, whom no man has seen, nor can see. But everything by which or in which we know is accessible to the knower: therefore that by which or in which we know cannot be the light of eternal reason or truth.

2. Furthermore, Augustine, in the first book of On the Trinity: "The weak gaze of the human mind is not fixed in so excellent a light unless it is cleansed through the justice of faith." Therefore if the light of eternal truth were the reason for knowing all truths, no soul would know truth unless it were purified and holy. But this is false: therefore so too is that from which it follows.

3. Again, in the ninth book of On the Trinity: "The mind itself, just as it gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so it gathers knowledge of incorporeal things through itself." Therefore, it seems that in knowing it is not necessary that whatever it knows it knows through the eternal reasons.

4. Again, Augustine, in the twelfth book of On the Trinity: "It is to be believed that the nature of the intellectual mind has been so established that, subjected to intelligible things in the natural order by the disposition of the Creator, it sees these things in a certain incorporeal light of its own kind, just as the eye of the flesh sees those things that lie about in this corporeal light." Therefore, it seems that just as the created light of corporeal nature suffices for knowing sensible things, similarly a created spiritual light of the same kind as the cognitive power suffices for intelligible things.

5. Again, Gregory in the Moralia: "When the mind is raised up in contemplation, whatever it perfectly sees is not God." But the reason of knowing is perfectly discerned in certitudinal knowledge; therefore, such a reason is not God nor something in God; therefore, etc.

6. Again, Dionysius, in the Epistle to Caius: "If anyone seeing God understood what he saw, he did not see Him, but something of those things that are among beings and things known; for He Himself is established above intellect and substance." Therefore, in knowing, our mind in the present life does not attain to the uncreated truth.

7. Again, the Philosopher in the third book of On the Soul says that "our understanding is with the continuous and with time." But those eternal reasons are entirely above time; therefore, in understanding, our intellect in no way reaches those reasons.

8. Again, in the same place he says: "Just as in every nature there is something by which it makes all things, and something by which it becomes all things, so also concerning the intellect one must understand that there is an agent intellect and a possible intellect." But these suffice for perfect knowledge; therefore, there is no need for the aid of an eternal reason.

9. Again, experience teaches that "from many sensations one memory arises, from many memories one experience, from many experiences one universal, which is the principle of art and science," because, losing one sense, we lose the knowledge of those things that pertain to that sense. Therefore, certitudinal knowledge in the wayfaring state comes from below, but knowledge in the eternal reasons comes from above; therefore, as long as we are in the state of wayfarers, knowledge through the light of the eternal reasons does not befit us.

10. Again, imaginative cognition does not need a higher light; rather, the power of the imaginative faculty alone suffices for imagining something. Therefore, if the intellect is more powerful than the imagination, much more will it suffice of itself without a higher light for knowing something with certitude.

11. Again, certitudinal knowledge can exist in sense without the certitude of the sempiternal reason; therefore, if the intellect is more powerful than sense, much more will it be able to know and understand with certitude without that light.

12. Moreover, for complete cognition nothing more is required than the knower and the knowable object abstracted and the turning of the one upon the other; but all of this can exist through the power of our intellect without the eternal reason: therefore, etc.

13. Moreover, for whatever things a power can do freely, it does not need extrinsic assistance; but "we understand when we will": therefore, in order that we may know something with certitude, we do not need the light of the eternal reasons.

14. Moreover, the principles of being and of knowing are the same: therefore, if the proper and intrinsic principles of being of creatures themselves are nothing but created, whatever is known is known through created reasons: therefore not through eternal reasons and lights.

15. Moreover, to each knowable object there corresponds a proper reason of knowing in order that certitudinal cognition may be had of it: but those reasons of knowing are not perceived distinctly by any intellect of a wayfarer: therefore nothing can be properly and determinately known in them.

16. Moreover, if whatever is known with certitude is known in the eternal reason; but "that on account of which each thing is so, is itself more so": therefore those eternal reasons are also more known to us; which is manifestly false, since they are most hidden from us.

17. Moreover, it is impossible to see something in a mirror without the mirror itself being seen: therefore, if whatever is known with certitude is seen in those eternal reasons, it is necessary that the first light and eternal reason be seen. But this is false and absurd: therefore so is the first.

18. Moreover, if by those eternal reasons whatever is known with certitude is known: but those reasons are equally certain with respect to contingent things as with respect to necessary things, and with respect to future things as with respect to present things: therefore we would have certitudinal cognition of contingent things just as of necessary things, and of future things just as of present things; which is false: therefore so is the first.

19. Moreover, if we know in the eternal reasons: but the eternal reasons are the highest causes: and wisdom is the cognition of the highest causes: therefore whoever knows anything with certitude is wise. But this is false: therefore, etc.

20. Moreover, if the cognition of the fatherland is cognition through the eternal reasons, in which the Blessed see whatever they see: therefore, if all certitudinal cognition were through those eternal reasons, all who know with certitude would be blessed, and only the Blessed would know with certitude: but this is false.

21. Moreover, if whatever is known is seen in the eternal reasons: since the mirror of the eternal reasons is voluntary, and what is known in a voluntary mirror is known through revelation: therefore whatever is known would accordingly be known in a prophetic manner or by revelation.

22. Furthermore, if whatever is known is known in the eternal reasons, then either it is known in a veiled manner, or without a veil. If in a veiled manner: then nothing is known clearly; if without a veil: then all see God and the eternal exemplar without any enigma. But this is false according to the state of the wayfarer: therefore etc.

Furthermore, objection is raised against the arguments of Augustine as follows:

23. Because if every unchangeable truth is above the soul and thereby eternal and God, then since every truth of a demonstrative principle is unchangeable, every such truth would be God: therefore nothing would be known except God.

24. Furthermore, if every unchangeable truth is the truth of the eternal art, and that truth is but one, then every unchangeable truth would be but one: but concerning any being whatsoever some unchangeable truth can be found, as is evident: for this is an unchangeable truth: if Socrates runs, Socrates moves; therefore according to this all beings would be one.

25. Furthermore, if everything that is God is to be adored with latria, and every unchangeable truth of a principle is God: then every such truth ought to be adored: therefore the truth of this proposition: two and three are five, ought to be adored.

26. Furthermore, if every unchangeable truth is God: then whoever clearly sees any unchangeable truth clearly sees God: but demons and the damned clearly see some unchangeable truths: therefore they clearly see God. But this is to be blessed: therefore the damned are blessed: but nothing is more absurd than this: therefore it is most absurd that whatever is known is known in the eternal reasons, if it is known with certitude.

CONCLUSION.


For the certitudinal cognition of the intellect, even in the wayfarer, it is required that the eternal reason be attained in some way as a regulating and moving reason, not however as the sole reason and in its clarity, but together with a proper created reason, and as known in a mirror and in an enigma.

I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid, it should be noted that when it is said that everything which is known with certitude is known in the light of the eternal reasons, this can be understood in three ways: in one way, so that it is understood that for certitudinal cognition the evidence of the eternal light concurs as the whole and sole reason of knowing.

And this understanding is less correct, because according to this there would be no cognition of things except in the Word: and then the cognition of the wayfarer would not differ from the cognition of the fatherland, nor cognition in the Word from cognition in its proper genus, nor the cognition of science from the cognition of wisdom, nor the cognition of nature from the cognition of grace, nor the cognition of reason from the cognition of revelation: all of which, since they are false, this way is in no manner to be held.

For from this opinion, which certain ones held, that nothing can be known with certitude except in the archetypal and intelligible world, as the first Academics held, there arose the error, as Augustine says in the second book Against the Academics, that nothing at all could be known, as the new Academics held, because that intelligible world is hidden from human minds. And therefore, wishing to hold the first opinion and their own position, they fell into a manifest error: because "a small error in the beginning is great in the end".

In another way, so that it may be understood that the eternal reason necessarily concurs in certitudinal knowledge with respect to its influence, such that the knower in knowing does not attain the eternal reason itself, but only its influence.

And this manner of speaking is indeed insufficient according to the words of blessed Augustine, who by express words and arguments shows that the mind in certitudinal knowledge is regulated by immutable and eternal rules, not as by a habit of its own mind, but as by those which are above it in the eternal truth. And therefore to say that our mind in knowing does not extend itself beyond the influence of the uncreated light is to say that Augustine was deceived, since in expounding his authorities it is not easy to draw them to this sense: and this is very absurd to say of so great a Father and Doctor, the most authoritative among all expositors of Sacred Scripture.

Furthermore, that influence of light is either general, insofar as God influences all creatures, or special, as God influences through grace. If it is general: then God ought not to be called the giver of wisdom any more than the fertilizer of the earth, nor would knowledge be said to come from him any more than money; if special, of the kind that is in grace: then according to this all knowledge is infused, and none is acquired or innate: all of which are absurd.

And therefore there is a third way of understanding, holding as it were a middle course between both ways, namely that for certitudinal knowledge the eternal reason is necessarily required as regulating and as a moving principle, not indeed as sole and in its complete clarity, but together with created reason, and as in part seen by us according to the state of the wayfarer.

And this is what Augustine suggests in the fourteenth book On the Trinity, chapter fifteen: "The ungodly is reminded, so that he may turn to the Lord as to that light by which, even when he turned away from him, he was in some way touched. For hence it is that even the ungodly think of eternity and rightly censure and rightly praise many things in the conduct of men." Where he also adds that they do this by rules which "are written in the book of that light which is called truth".

That our mind in certitudinal cognition in some way attains those rules and unchangeable reasons is necessarily required by the nobility of the cognition and the dignity of the knower.

The nobility, I say, of the cognition, because certitudinal cognition cannot exist unless there be immutability on the part of the knowable and infallibility on the part of the knower. But created truth is not immutable absolutely, but only by supposition; similarly, neither is the light of a creature altogether infallible by its own power, since both are created and have proceeded from non-being into being. If, therefore, for full cognition there is a recourse to truth altogether immutable and stable and to a light altogether infallible: it is necessary that in cognition of this kind there be a recourse to the supernal art as to a light and truth: a light, I say, giving infallibility to the knower, and a truth giving immutability to the knowable. Whence, since things have being in the mind and in their proper genus and in the eternal art, the truth of things is not sufficient for the soul unto certitudinal science according as they have being in themselves, or according as they have being in their proper genus, because in both respects they are mutable, unless it in some way attains them insofar as they are in the eternal art.

The dignity on the part of the knower likewise requires this. For since the rational spirit has a higher portion of reason and a lower, just as for a full judgment of deliberative reason in matters of action the lower portion does not suffice without the higher, so also for a full judgment of reason in matters of speculation. Now this higher portion is that in which the image of God resides, which both cleaves to the eternal rules and through them judges and determines with certitude whatever it defines: and this befits it insofar as it is the image of God.

For a creature is compared to God under the aspect of vestige, image, and likeness. Insofar as it is a vestige, it is compared to God as to a principle: insofar as it is an image, it is compared to God as to an object: but insofar as it is a likeness, it is compared to God as to an infused gift. And therefore every creature is a vestige that is from God: every creature is an image that knows God: every creature and only that creature is a likeness in which God dwells. And according to this threefold degree of comparison there is a threefold degree of cooperation.

In a work that is from a creature by way of vestige, God cooperates by way of creative principle; in a work, however, that is from a creature by way of likeness, such as a meritorious work pleasing to God, God cooperates by way of infused gift: in a work, however, that is from a creature by way of image, God cooperates by way of a moving reason; and such is the work of certitudinal cognition, which indeed is not from the lower reason without the higher.

Since therefore certitudinal cognition belongs to the rational spirit insofar as it is the image of God, for this reason in this cognition it attains the eternal reasons. But because in the state of the wayfarer it is not yet fully deiform, it does not attain them clearly and fully and distinctly: but according as it approaches more or less to deiformity, accordingly it attains them more or less, yet always in some manner, because the character of image can never be separated from it. Whence, because in the state of innocence the image was without the deformity of fault, yet not yet having the full deiformity of glory, it attained them in part, but not in an enigma. In the state, however, of fallen nature, it lacks deiformity and has deformity, and therefore attains them in part and in an enigma. In the state, however, of glory, it lacks all deformity and has full deiformity, and therefore attains them fully and perspicuously.

Again, because the soul is not entirely from itself wholly an image, therefore together with these it attains the likenesses of things abstracted from the phantasm as proper and distinct reasons of knowing, without which the light of the eternal reason does not suffice for it to know, so long as it is in the state of the wayfarer, unless perhaps by a special revelation it should transcend this state, as in those who are rapt, and in certain revelations of the Prophets.

It must therefore be conceded, as the reasons show and the authorities of Augustine expressly assert, that in every certitudinal cognition those reasons of knowing are attained by the knower, although in one way by the wayfarer and in another way by the comprehensor, in one way by the one knowing and in another way by the one possessing wisdom, in one way by the one prophesying and in another way by the one commonly understanding, as has already been made clear and will be made clear in the solutions to the objections.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first, that he dwells in unapproachable light: it must be said that he speaks of that approach which is to that light in the fullness and splendor of its clarity, in which way one does not approach it through the power of a creature, but through the deiformity of glory.

2. To that which is objected, that the weak gaze of the human mind is not fixed in so excellent a light, etc.: it must be said that in order for it to know through the eternal reasons, it is not necessary that it be fixed in them, except insofar as it knows wisely. For the wise person attains those reasons in one way, and the one knowing in another: the one knowing attains them as moving, but the wise person as quieting: and no one arrives at this wisdom "unless he is first cleansed through the justice of faith."

3. To that which is objected, that the mind has knowledge of incorporeal things through itself: it must be said that just as in the works of creation the cooperation of the Creator is not excluded, so in the created reason of knowing the uncreated reason of knowing is not excluded, but rather is included in the same.

4. To that which is objected, that one sees in a light of its own kind: it can be said that light of its own kind is said broadly of every incorporeal light, whether created or uncreated; or if it is understood of created light, uncreated light is not thereby excluded; nor does it follow that we do not know in the eternal truth, but that we do not know in it alone, but also in the light of created truth; and this indeed is true and does not conflict with the position stated above.

5. 6. To that which is objected from Gregory and Dionysius, it must be said that neither denies that that true light, which enlightens every man coming into this world, is attained by our minds, but that in this life it is not yet fully seen.

7. 8. 9. To that which is objected from the Philosopher, that we understand with the continuum and time, and that we have a possible intellect and an agent intellect, and from the experience of human cognition: it must be said that this posits that the light and reason of created truth concur in our understanding; but nevertheless, as was said in the preceding, the light and reason of eternal truth is not excluded, because it is possible that the soul according to its lower portion attains those things which are below, while the higher portion nonetheless attains those things which are above.

10. To that which is objected concerning imaginative cognition, it must be said that the case is not similar, because it does not have certitude, and therefore does not have recourse to the immutable.

11. To that which is objected concerning sense, it must be said that the case is not similar regarding the certitude of sense and of intellect. For the certitude of sense comes from the binding of a power operating by way of nature, determined to something particular. But the certitude of the intellect cannot come from this source, since it is a power free to understand all things; and therefore it must come through something having not binding but freedom without the defectibility of mutability and fallibility; and such is the light and reason of sempiternal truth: and therefore recourse is had to it as to the font of all certitude.

12. To that which is objected, that for cognition nothing more is required than the knower and the knowable and the turning of the one upon the other: it must be said that this turning includes judgment; but certain judgment is not made except through a certain and unjudgeable law, according to what Augustine says in the book On True Religion and in the book On Free Choice, that "no one judges concerning truth, and without truth no one judges well"; and therefore the reason and eternal truth is here included.

13. To that which is objected, that we understand when we will, and therefore we do not need extraneous aid: it must be said that extraneous aid is twofold:

one kind that is always at hand, and another that is absent and distant. That argument does not conclude regarding the first kind of aid, but regarding the second, as is evident: because if corporeal light were always present to the eye, just as spiritual light is always present to the mind, we would see when we willed, just as we understand when we will.

14. To that which is objected, that the principles of being and of knowing are the same: it must be said that just as the intrinsic principles of being do not suffice without that first principle from without, which is God, for being, so neither do they suffice for knowing fully. Whence, although those principles are in some way a ground of knowing, they do not on that account exclude that first ground of knowing from our cognition, just as neither do they exclude it in the act of being from creation.

15. To that which is objected, that to each knowable thing there corresponds its own proper ground of knowing: it must be said that because we do not see those grounds entirely distinctly in themselves, they are therefore not the whole ground of knowing; but together with them there is required the created light of principles and the likenesses of known things, from which the proper ground of knowing is had with respect to each thing known.

16. To that which is objected, that "on account of which each thing is such, that itself is more so": it must be said that, as is already clear, the eternal ground does not alone move to knowing, but together with the truth of principles, not specifically of itself, but generally in the state of the wayfarer; and therefore it does not follow that it is known to us according to itself, but insofar as it shines forth in its principles and in its generality: and thus in a certain way it is most certain to us, because our intellect can in no way think that it does not exist—which indeed cannot be said of any created truth.

17. To that which is objected concerning the mirror, it must be said that this is true of a mirror that has the character of representing properly and distinctly, and that together with the character of representing has the character of terminating: as is clear in this material mirror, which distinctly and properly represents the visible species and terminates sight. These conditions, however, belong to the eternal mirror with respect to the comprehensors, as is clear from what has been said above.

18. To that which is objected, that those grounds are equally certain with respect to contingent things as with respect to necessary things: it must be said that this argument would conclude well if those grounds were the whole ground of knowing, and if one saw fully in them: but now it is not so according to the state of the present time, because together with them we need proper likenesses and determinately apprehended principles of things, which indeed are not found in contingent things, but only in necessary ones.

19. To that which is objected, that if we know in those reasons, then every knower is wise: it must be said that this does not follow, because to attain those reasons does not make one wise unless one rests in them and knows that one attains them, which indeed pertains to the wise. For reasons of this kind are attained by the intellects of those who know as guiding, but by the intellects of the wise as leading back and bringing to rest. And because few there are who attain them in this manner, therefore few are wise, although many are knowing; few indeed are those who know that they attain those reasons: indeed, what is more, few are those who are willing to believe this, because it seems difficult to an intellect not yet elevated to contemplate eternal things that it should have God so present and so near, even though Paul says in Acts, chapter seventeen, that He is not far from each one of us.

20. To that which is objected concerning the knowledge of the homeland, the response is already clear, because there is a great difference between knowledge that is in part and in an enigma, and that which is perfectly . and distinctly, as was said above.

21. To that which is objected, that the mirror of the eternal reasons is voluntary, etc.: it must be said that, as the Apostle says in Romans, chapter one, that which is known of God is manifest in them: although God is simple and uniform, nevertheless that eternal light and that exemplar represents certain things as it were exteriorly and openly, but certain things more profoundly and hiddenly. The first are those things which come about according to the necessary ordering of the divine art; but the second are those which come about according to the disposition of the hidden will. And that which is called a voluntary mirror — this is not with respect to exemplified things in the first way, but in the second: and therefore in the eternal reasons, natural things are known by the natural judgment of reason, but supernatural and future things only by the gift of supernal revelation; and therefore that argument does not conflict with the position set forth.

22. To that which is objected, that whatever is known in those reasons is known either with a veil or without a veil: it must be said that in the state of the wayfarer, things are not known in those eternal reasons without a veil and enigma on account of the obscuration of the divine image. From this, however, it does not follow that nothing is known with certitude and clearly, for the reason that created principles, which are in some way means of knowing — although not without those reasons — can be seen perspicuously and without a veil by our mind. — If, however, it were said that nothing in this life is known fully, this would not be a great absurdity.

23. 24. 25. 26. To that which is objected against the arguments of Augustine, that if immutable truth is God, then the truth of a demonstrative principle would be God, and that all truths would be one, and that they ought to be adored, and that demons would see God: to all these it must be said that immutable truth is spoken of in two ways, namely, absolutely and on supposition. When, however, it is said that immutable truth is above the mind and is God, this is understood of truth which is immutable absolutely. But when it is said of the truth of a demonstrative principle that it is immutable: if that truth designates something created, it is evident that it is not immutable absolutely, but on supposition, because every creature begins from non-being and is convertible into non-being.

And if it is objected that that truth is absolutely certain to the soul through itself: it must be said that although a demonstrative principle, insofar as it expresses something complex, is created, nevertheless the truth signified by it can be signified either insofar as it exists in matter, or insofar as it exists in the soul, or insofar as it exists in the divine art, or indeed in all these ways simultaneously. For truth in an exterior sign is a sign of the truth which is in the soul, because "words are signs of those affections which are in the soul"; but the soul according to its highest part has a relation to higher things, just as according to its lower part to these lower things, since it is a mean between created things and God: and therefore truth in the soul has a relation to that twofold truth, as a mean to two extremes, such that from the lower it receives certitude in a qualified sense, but from the higher it receives certitude absolutely. And therefore truth of this kind, as immutable absolutely, is above the soul, as the arguments of Augustine show. But the arguments to the contrary proceed from truth that is immutable on supposition, which the demonstrator properly considers, which is multiplied in diverse things and is not to be adored, and is able to be beheld by demons and the damned. For that truth which is absolutely immutable cannot be seen clearly except by those who can enter into the innermost silence of the mind, to which no sinner attains, but only he who is the supreme lover of eternity.