Question 5

QUESTION V.

Whether the soul of Christ was wise only by uncreated wisdom, or also by created wisdom together with uncreated.

After having treated of the wisdom of Christ insofar as He is the Word, the question concerns the wisdom of the soul of Christ. And first it is asked whether the soul of Christ was wise by uncreated wisdom only, or also by created wisdom together with uncreated. And that it was wise by uncreated wisdom only seems to be the case.

1. Sirach 1: All wisdom is from the Lord God and was always with Him and is before all time; but everything that is before all time is eternal: therefore all wisdom is eternal: therefore if the soul of Christ is not wise except by some wisdom, it is not wise except by eternal wisdom.

If you say that wisdom is said to have been with God as in its cause; by the same reasoning this could be said of any creature, and this does not greatly render wisdom itself praiseworthy.

If you say that all wisdom, that is, perfect wisdom: the following text does not agree with this, because it speaks of that wisdom to the acquisition of which it invites, as is clearly gathered from what follows.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the second book of On Free Choice: "By truth and wisdom, which is common to all, all become wise by adhering to it; but one does not become blessed by the blessedness of another, nor does one become just by the justice of another, but by conforming the mind to those unchangeable rules and lights of the virtues, which live unchangeably in that common truth and wisdom." If therefore the wisdom of all the wise is one, and the blessedness of all the blessed is not one: since, speaking causally, unity can be found in both cases, it is necessary to hold that formally and properly there is one wisdom by which all are wise: and this cannot be created wisdom: therefore if the soul of Christ is wise, it is wise by uncreated wisdom.

3. Likewise, Augustine, in the book of Eighty-Three Questions, in the question on modes of having: "Wisdom, when it comes to a man, is not itself changed, but changes the man, whom it makes wise from being foolish"; but if wisdom designated a created habit, then it would certainly be changed, because it would be brought from non-being into being: therefore it designates only something uncreated: therefore the same conclusion as before.

4. Likewise, Hugh, in the treatise On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ: "There is one wisdom by which all are wise, and yet they are not wise in one way: much more did that soul, which was united to wisdom itself, know by this wisdom, which flourished not by the lot of participation from it, but possessed the fullness by the privilege of union": therefore if the fullness of wisdom is nothing other than uncreated wisdom, it seems etc.

5. Likewise, Hugh argues thus: If wisdom is an accident: since wisdom is that by which the wise become blessed, our blessedness would consist in an accident: but accidents are changeable: therefore our blessedness too would be most changeable.

6. Furthermore, that which gives something to someone in some way possesses it; but wisdom gives the wise person to be wise: therefore wisdom is wise. But if it is wise, it is wise by nothing other than itself: therefore all wisdom by which the wise person is wise is a wisdom that is wise by itself. But such wisdom is nothing other than uncreated wisdom: therefore if the soul of Christ is wise by such wisdom, it is manifest, etc.

7. Furthermore, a perfection is nobler than the perfectible, and the wise is nobler than the non-wise, and the intelligent than the non-intelligent: therefore since wisdom is the perfection of the wise, and a wise wisdom has savor and understands: it is therefore necessary that wisdom be wise and understand. But it cannot be wise except by itself, and such is uncreated wisdom: therefore, etc.

By these reasons and authorities it is shown that the soul of Christ is wise only by uncreated wisdom, and not only it, but also any other that possesses wisdom.

But it is shown more specifically concerning the soul of Christ as follows.

8. Wisdom makes the one to whom it is applied wise: but uncreated wisdom is united to the soul of Christ: therefore the soul of Christ is made wise by uncreated wisdom.

If you say that it is not united except through the mediation of created wisdom, which disposes the soul itself for the union: to the contrary: an intermediate disposition is prior, more immediate, and more essential than that for which it disposes, because it holds the character of an introductive medium: but the soul of Christ is compared more primarily, more immediately, and more essentially to the hypostasis than to any accident that is in it: therefore if the eternal Word and the wisdom of God is the hypostasis and person with respect to the divine and human nature, the soul of Christ has a prior, more immediate, and more essential relation to uncreated wisdom than to created wisdom: therefore, etc.

9. Furthermore, the greater a wisdom is, the more it is knowable and makes one know: but created wisdom is less than uncreated wisdom and makes the soul, to which it is present, to be knowing: therefore much more so uncreated wisdom. But such wisdom was most present to the soul of Christ: therefore, etc.

10. Furthermore, nothing more is required for cognition than the knower, the knowable, and the present ground of knowing; but all of this was in that soul, insofar as it was united to the eternal Word: therefore it was wise by uncreated wisdom, with all created wisdom set aside.

11. Furthermore, "just as the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of the soul," and much more excellently: but the soul by itself can vivify the body: therefore much more so God himself by himself will vivify the soul, and especially that soul to which he is most united: but such was the soul of Christ: therefore, etc.

12. Likewise, if God were to know through something other than himself, his cognition would be degraded, because the ground of knowing would either be nobler or less noble; but on either supposition, the divine cognition would be debased. Therefore, if the soul of Christ knows through something other than itself that is created, its cognition is debased: because that thing is either less noble, and thus it is perfected by what is less noble; or it is more noble, and then the soul of Christ is not the noblest of all creatures. If, therefore, it is the noblest at the summit of all created nobility, it is impossible that it should know anything except through itself or through uncreated wisdom.

13. Likewise, the more immediately any intellect approaches the font of wisdom, the wiser it is. But the soul of Christ is the wisest. Therefore it approaches uncreated wisdom most immediately. Therefore, with every other wisdom set aside, it is wise by that eternal wisdom.

14. Likewise, the soul of Christ is so united to the eternal majesty that it is to be honored with the same honor with which the eternal majesty is honored. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it is so united to the eternal light that it is wise with the same wisdom by which the everlasting light is wise. But this is uncreated wisdom only. Therefore the soul of Christ is wise only by uncreated wisdom.

15. Likewise, where there is fullness of wisdom, it is superfluous to posit what is partial. But in Christ there is fullness of wisdom, because in him it pleased all fullness to dwell, Colossians 1. Therefore, if all created wisdom is partial, it is superfluous to posit created wisdom in Christ or in his soul.

16. Likewise, nature does not do through many what it can do through few, and this pertains to the praise of created nature. Therefore, if whatever praise is attributed to created nature can be attributed to uncreated nature, since uncreated wisdom is of itself most sufficient, because complete and full in every respect, then it seems that created wisdom in Christ would be superfluous. But nothing of this kind should be posited in Christ. Therefore, etc.

17. Likewise, whenever material lights converge upon the same medium such that one exceeds the other, the one obscures the other, not on account of opposition but on account of surpassing excellence. Therefore, if uncreated wisdom surpasses created wisdom far more than any material light exceeds any other however small, uncreated wisdom will obscure the other. But no obscured wisdom should be posited in Christ. Therefore, etc.

18. Likewise, created cognition is more distant from uncreated cognition than opinion is from science, or faith from open vision. But in the same subject there cannot simultaneously be opinion and science, nor faith and open vision. Therefore neither can created wisdom coexist with uncreated wisdom.

But to the contrary: 1. Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace before God and men; but this could not be through uncreated wisdom. Therefore, besides that wisdom he had created wisdom.

2. Likewise, Damascene says that in Christ, on account of two natures, it is necessary to posit that there were two wills in him. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, also two cognitions, therefore also two sciences, therefore also two wisdoms.

3. Likewise, no one is good except by an informing goodness; therefore no one is wise except by an informing wisdom. But uncreated wisdom cannot be the informing form of any creature, but only the exemplar form. Therefore, if the soul of Christ is wise by some wisdom informing it, it is necessary that besides the uncreated wisdom it also have a created wisdom informing it.

4. Likewise, wisdom is accidental to a created wise being, which is not wise by itself. But uncreated wisdom, since it is God, can be accidental to nothing. Therefore it is necessary that besides that wisdom there be posited in the soul of Christ some created wisdom, since wisdom is not essential to it but accidental.

5. Likewise, there is a perfection of being and of well-being. But God is not the perfective form of any creature with respect to being; therefore neither with respect to well-being. But wisdom is the perfective form of the soul of Christ as wise with respect to well-being. Therefore such wisdom cannot be uncreated wisdom; therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, the soul of Christ is not wise through its essence, since it is wise through something other than itself. Therefore, if it is wise, it is wise through participation. But it does not receive a part of eternal wisdom according to essence, since that wisdom is simple. Therefore it is necessary that it receive according to influence. But such an influence is created. Therefore it is necessary that the soul of Christ be wise through a created wisdom.

7. Likewise, the soul of Christ is of the same nature as other souls. But no soul fully attains to the font of eternal wisdom unless it is deiform. But it cannot be deiform except through something given to it that informs it and conforms it to God. But such is grace and created wisdom. Therefore it is necessary that the soul of Christ be wise through a created wisdom.

8. Likewise, God, since He is light and wisdom, is known in diverse ways by diverse beings, and by the soul of Christ more excellently than by others. Therefore this is either by reason of God Himself as known, or by reason of the knowing power, or by reason of some disposing factor. Not by reason of God Himself, since He has no variety in Himself; nor by reason of the knowing power alone, because then those who had better natural endowments would be wiser and better, which is false. Therefore this will be by reason of some intermediate disposing habit. But such a habit is nothing other than created wisdom; therefore, etc.

9. Likewise, the uncreated wisdom of God is through its essence most present to all intellects. Therefore, if by its presence alone it made them wise, every intellect would be wise. But since this is manifestly false, therefore beyond its presence there is necessarily required its influence. Therefore, if the soul of Christ is wise, the conclusion is evident, etc.

10. Again, the Word of God, which is wisdom, is united to the eye, and yet the eye is not wise: therefore, for the soul to be wise, union in the hypostasis does not suffice for it: therefore it is necessary that it be united as a knower to the knowable. But every such union is through assimilation; and every assimilation is according to some quality: therefore it is necessary that a created spiritual quality be given to the soul itself, through which it may be fit for knowing. But this we call created wisdom: therefore, etc.

CONCLUSION.

The soul of Christ, since it is a creature, was wise with both wisdoms, namely created and uncreated.

I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid, it should be noted that, as is apparent from the preceding question, for certitudinal cognition the influence of the eternal light does not suffice without its presence, because nothing created can establish the soul in perfect certitude until it attains to the immutable truth and infallible light. So it is to be understood that for sapiential cognition the presence of that eternal light does not suffice without its influence, not because of a defect on its part, but because of a defect on our part, because created intelligence does not attain to that fontal wisdom unless it has been made deiform, and through this elevated and disposed: elevated above itself, and disposed in itself. Therefore it is necessary that something be given to it coming from above, which is nevertheless proportionate to it and inhering in it; and this we call the influence of the eternal light: and because it disposes the soul for wisdom, it is called created wisdom. Yet because this influence itself neither disposes nor elevates unless it is continued with the eternal light as with a moving principle and a directing rule and a quieting end; therefore it does not obtain the character of wisdom from itself, but by reason of that from which it flows, according to which it directs, and toward which it leads: and this is uncreated wisdom. - And therefore, according to those wise ones to whom it has been given to ascend above themselves, the name of wisdom is principally and properly attributed to fontal and uncreated wisdom alone; but according to those who speak and understand commonly, it is attributed not only to it, but also to its influence, which is dispositive of the human mind for perfect cognition. And according to this it must be granted that the soul of Christ, since it is a creature, was wise with both wisdoms, created namely and uncreated: uncreated as principally moving and regulating and quieting; created however as informing, disposing, and elevating, so that it might fully attain to that uncreated wisdom.

And that both concur simultaneously is evident from what Augustine says in the ninth book of On the Trinity, chapter seven: "In that eternal truth, from which all temporal things were made, we behold with the vision of the mind the form according to which we exist and according to which we work something either in ourselves or in bodies by true and right reason, and thence we have a conceived true knowledge of things as a word within us, and by speaking inwardly we beget it, nor does it depart from us by being born." From which it is apparent that for wisdom there concurs both eternal truth and the knowledge of truth conceived within us, which indeed is informative of our very soul.

1. To the first objection, that all wisdom is from the Lord God, it must be said that wisdom there is not taken as the habit by which the soul of the wise is informed and by which it is disposed for knowing, but as the unchangeable ground of knowing. Now every such ground is in the divine art, because it is sempiternal, and without it there cannot be created wisdom, as was shown above. Hence from that authority it cannot be concluded that created wisdom ought not to be posited.

2. 3. To the objection raised from the twofold authority of Augustine, it must be said that both are to be understood of uncreated wisdom, which nevertheless, as is evident from the foregoing, does not exclude created wisdom. Nevertheless Augustine, when speaking of wisdom, always or for the most part directs his understanding to that uncreated wisdom, because in comparison with it he does not consider created wisdom worthy of the name wisdom; or because in the manner of an inflowing it depends entirely upon it, whence it is more of a being than a being in its own right, and is more to be called an effect and irradiation of wisdom than wisdom itself. - And if you ask why the same cannot be said of beatitude, since it flows entirely from eternal beatitude, it must be said that eternal beatitude denotes an affection inhering in the supreme good, but wisdom denotes a cognition contemplating the supreme good: now affection denotes something proceeding from the soul, but cognition something coming to the soul; and therefore, because diverse affections have diverse origins, formally and originatively diverse beatitudes are posited. But it is not so with wisdom, which, as far as it is in itself concerned, regards one origin, namely the sempiternal light, from which and according to which is all certain cognition.

4. 5. To that which is objected concerning Hugh, it must be said that the words of Hugh agree with the words of Augustine, because he, as a man who is transcendent and wise, bears his intellect most powerfully toward the very font of wisdom. — Whence also what he objects, that our beatitude cannot consist in accidents, he does not mean that we are not disposed toward beatitude through some accident, but that whatever is an accident has rather the character of a way leading to another than of that which gives rest and brings to completion. And in this way we posit created wisdom in the soul of Christ and in any other soul whatsoever, not as that in which that blessed soul rests, but as that by which it is led back and disposed toward uncreated wisdom, by which it is principally and most powerfully made blessed.

6. 7. To that which is objected, that wisdom gives to savor, and that wisdom is nobler than the one who is wise: it must be said that created wisdom itself is not properly said to give to savor, but rather uncreated wisdom itself gives us to savor in itself, by disposing us through that created wisdom; and therefore it does not follow concerning that created wisdom that it is wise or has the act of savoring, because it does not hold the character of a complete being, but rather the character of a way and of a certain dispositive medium, as is manifestly held from what has been said above.

8. To that which is objected, that wisdom makes the one to whom it is united wise: it must be said that wisdom can be united to something in multiple ways, either as a hypostasis is united to a nature substantiated in it, or as the principle and light of knowing is united to the knower illuminated through it. In the first way it does not make one wise, because then the body of Christ, since it is united to wisdom, would be wise; but it does in the second way. In this way, however, it is not united to the soul of Christ except through the mediation of the gift of created wisdom, which is like a light informing the soul itself, rendering it deiform and apt for contemplating the light of uncreated wisdom.

9. To that which is objected, that wisdom, the greater it is, the more knowable it is and the more it makes one know: it must be said that this is true by way of inflowing: but by way of informing it is not true, unless it is such a wisdom as is naturally suited to inform and to perfect and to be united to another by way of a form. Such, however, is not uncreated wisdom but created, and therefore that argument does not conclude.

10. To that which is objected, that nothing more is required except the knower and the knowable and the principle of knowing: it must be said that the knower can designate the power of knowing, or the power together with a habit. If the power together with a habit: it is true, and then created knowledge is included there, which renders the soul apt. But if it designates the power alone: then that is false, and one must respond by denial to the aforementioned argument.

11. To that which is objected, that God is the life of the soul just as the soul is the life of the body: it must be said that the soul is called the life of the body in two ways, namely either by way of informing, or by way of influencing, because the soul is compared to the body in two ways, namely by way of perfection and by way of a mover. When therefore it is shown that the soul in vivifying is likened to God: it must be said that this is understood of it insofar as it is a mover, not insofar as it is a perfection. Now the soul moves the body through a power and through a disposition of the body, which renders the body suitable for the soul's influence; and in this way the divine light and love moves and vivifies the soul itself through grace and wisdom infused into it.

12. To that which is objected, that if God knows through something other than himself, his knowledge would be degraded: it must be said that the case is not similar, because God, since he is most noble, can have nothing nobler than himself, neither absolutely nor in a certain respect, neither with respect to being nor with respect to well-being, because being itself is for him well-being: but the soul of Christ, although it is nobler than all other creatures by reason of the grace of union, nevertheless being and well-being, substance and accidental disposition differ in it. And because through that disposition it acquires a certain completion, therefore it is not repugnant to its nobility in the genus of creature that it should have something nobler than itself, at least in a certain respect: for the ultimate completion and perfection at which the appetite of that soul terminates is uncreated wisdom, and it is disposed toward that through created influence, as is clear from what has been said above.

13. To that which is objected concerning the intellect approaching the font of wisdom immediately: it must be said that there is a disposing medium and a leading medium. The first is intrinsic, the second extrinsic: the first causes greater approximation, while the second causes distance. Now the aforesaid proposition holds true of a leading medium: but created wisdom, which is posited in Christ, holds the character of a disposing medium, so that he may perfectly and immediately draw from the font of eternal wisdom. And thus it is clear that that argument does not proceed.

14. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is adored with latria on account of the union with the majesty, etc.: it must be said that the case is not similar, because adoration is an act that is owed to the nature itself by reason of the person. For the honor that is shown to Christ is shown neither to the soul by itself nor to the body, but to the person in whom those two subsist: but knowledge is an act proceeding from the power of the soul itself. And just as the divine and human natures in Christ are distinct, so they have diverse powers and operations, and thereby diverse wisdoms and cognitions, but not thus diverse honors. And therefore the case is not similar.

15. To the objection that where there is fullness of wisdom, it is superfluous to posit what is partial: it must be said that this is true in the same subject and according to the same respect. But when it is said that Christ had the fullness of wisdom, this is according to His uncreated nature, if it is understood of fullness simply and beyond any genus; if however it is understood of fullness within a genus, then it can belong to the created nature, and this is in a certain way partial (ex parte) in relation to fullness simply speaking; nor is it superfluous, because it is more proportioned to the soul itself, since the soul by itself could not nakedly grasp that immensity of uncreated wisdom.

16. To the objection that nature does not act through many means, etc.: it must be said that this is true if something is done equally well and in an orderly manner through one means as through many; but this is not the case here, and this is not on account of a defect in the illuminating wisdom itself, but on account of the nature of the receiving soul itself, as is clear from what has been said above.

17. To the objection concerning material lights, it must be said that the case is not similar, because one of those lights does not dispose toward the other; rather, each has its own proper and distinct being in itself, and therefore the operation of one appears less than the operation of the other, which on account of its excellence claims dominion for itself. But it is not so in the matter at hand, because created wisdom disposes toward uncreated wisdom, nor does the created shine except through the uncreated, nor is the uncreated attained except through the disposing action of the created.

18. To the objection concerning the distance between created and uncreated knowledge, and between opinion and knowledge: it must be said that the case is not similar, because opinion and knowledge are in the same subject and according to the same respect and with regard to the same object, having diverse and opposed conditions; but created and uncreated wisdom, although they differ in nature, do not nevertheless inhere according to the same respect, nor do they have conditions that are so opposed and incompossible; rather, their conditions are necessarily concomitant, because nothing created subsists except through the uncreated. And thus the response to all the objections is clear.