Question 6

QUESTION VI.


Whether the soul of Christ comprehends uncreated wisdom itself.

Supposing that the soul of Christ is wise by uncreated wisdom equally and by created wisdom, it is consequently asked whether it comprehends uncreated wisdom itself. And that it does, is shown as follows.

1. John 3: God does not give the Spirit by measure; the Gloss: "To men by measure, but to the Son not by measure; but just as he begot the whole from his whole self, so to the incarnate Son he gave his whole Spirit, not partially and by subdivisions, but generally and universally"; but according to the measure of the spirit given is the measure in the knowledge of truth: therefore if the soul of Christ received the Holy Spirit in an immeasurable way, it knows God in an immeasurable way; and this is nothing other than to comprehend divine wisdom itself: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the thirteenth book On the Trinity, chapter nineteen: "In the Word I understand the true Son of God, in the flesh the true son of man, both conjoined in one person of God and man by the bounty of ineffable grace." The grace of the union, therefore, is ineffable, therefore immense and incomprehensible; but according to the quantity of grace is the quantity of knowledge: therefore if by an incomprehensible knowledge the infinite is comprehensible, then of whatever immensity it may be, it will be comprehended by the soul united to it.

3. Likewise, Hugh says concerning the wisdom of Christ: "The soul of Christ has all things through grace that God has through nature"; but God through nature has comprehension of his wisdom: therefore the soul of Christ has this through grace.

4. Likewise, it is as great or greater to be God than to comprehend God: but the grace of union has the power to make a creature be God: therefore much more strongly will it make a creature comprehend God. But no other creature than the soul of Christ: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, Bernard says to Eugenius that there is a native, a dignative, and a superdignative unity; that dignative unity is not as great as the unity of the Trinity, which is superdignative, and yet greater than native: but in both the native unity and the superdignative unity one of the extremes is comprehended by the other, and conversely: therefore by equal reasoning, and indeed much stronger, it appears to be so in the dignative unity. But according to this the soul of Christ is united with uncreated wisdom: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, Isidore: "The Trinity is known only to itself and to the assumed man," and it is certain that this is not understood of just any knowledge, but only of that knowledge in which the Trinity does not share with a mere creature: but this is nothing other than comprehensive knowledge: therefore the united creature has this.

7. Likewise, Cassiodorus: "soundness of mind understands that inaccessible light above all brilliances"; but the soul united to the Word was most sound: therefore it understood that light above every other brilliance: therefore either it comprehended no other brilliance, or if it comprehended any, then it comprehended that one also.

8. Again, the grace of union exceeds any grace of comprehension whatsoever disproportionately: therefore it disproportionately causes God to be known more clearly; but this is nothing other than to comprehend the divine wisdom: therefore etc. For nothing exceeds every finite thing disproportionately except the infinite.

9. Again, Augustine in the ninth book of On the Trinity says that because the soul is simple, therefore, when it knows itself, it knows itself totally, not according to a part: therefore since the eternal wisdom is simple, if it is known by the soul of Christ, it is known totally: but to know a thing totally is nothing other than to comprehend it: therefore etc.

10. Again, this proposition is self-evidently true: when a simple thing is attained, the whole is attained; therefore a simpler thing is attained more totally, and the most simple thing is attained most totally: but the uncreated Word has the highest simplicity: therefore it is attained most totally. But this is to comprehend it most perfectly: therefore it is most perfectly comprehended by the soul of Christ.

11. Again, the soul of Christ in knowing the Word either has the whole as manifest, or has something of the Word as hidden and something as manifest. If it has it entirely as manifest: therefore it comprehends it entirely; if it has something as hidden and something as manifest: therefore in the Word there is one thing and another thing. But this is unfitting, because there would not be the highest simplicity: therefore etc.

12. Again, if something is hidden, either that thing is God or it is not. If it is not: therefore on account of the hiddenness of that thing it nonetheless comprehends God. If it is God: therefore God is hidden from the soul of Christ; but no soul from which God is hidden is blessed: therefore according to this the soul of Christ is not blessed. But this is absurd: therefore so too is that from which this follows.

13. Again, just as there is truly immensity in God, so too there is truly simplicity in God: but just as it belongs to immensity never to be entirely grasped, so it belongs to simplicity to be grasped totally by whatever grasps it: therefore by the same reasoning that God is called incomprehensible by reason of immensity, he will be called comprehensible by reason of simplicity.

14. Again, if in a point the essence and power were the same, whatever attained it totally according to essence would attain it totally according to power: but in God his essence and his power are the same, and whatever is essential in him is entirely the same and most simple: therefore either nothing of God is attained, or if something is attained, the whole is attained and totally attained, therefore the whole is totally comprehended: therefore not only does the soul of Christ comprehend the Word, but every soul that knows God in any way whatsoever.

15. Again, Bede says that "nothing less than God can fill the soul"; but if the capacity of the soul could be filled by something finite, something less than God would fill it: therefore the capacity of the soul extends itself to the infinite as infinite. But the soul of Christ comprehends everything to which its capacity extends, since it is fully perfect: therefore it comprehends the infinite.

16. Again, the soul of Christ loves God as much as He ought to be loved; but God ought to be loved without mode and measure: therefore, since it knows as much as it loves, it therefore knows without measure: therefore, etc.

17. Again, it is the nature of the intellect that it is strengthened in understanding the highest intelligible: therefore, the more clearly the soul of Christ understands, the more it is disposed to understand still more clearly: therefore either it will never reach a terminus, or it will totally comprehend the Word united to it.

18. Again, if there were something whose capacity were enlarged by receiving something, either it would never be filled by that thing, or something infinite would be added to it: but the capacity of the soul of Christ is of such a kind: therefore either it remains in some part of itself empty, or it comprehends infinite wisdom.

19. Again, the finite is as distant from the infinite as the created is distant from the uncreated: but the distance of the created from the uncreated does not prevent the intellect from raising itself to know the uncreated under the aspect of the uncreated: therefore by equal reasoning the finite can be raised to know the infinite under the aspect of the infinite. But this is not granted in any other than in the soul of Christ: therefore, etc.

20. Again, as much as finitude is distant from infinity, so much is simplicity distant from composition: but the intellect of the soul of Christ, although it has some composition, nevertheless grasps and knows the Word itself under the aspect of supreme simplicity: therefore likewise under the aspect of supreme infinity. But this is to comprehend the whole wisdom of the Word: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends uncreated wisdom.

On the contrary: 1. Damascene, in the first book, chapter four: "God is infinite and incomprehensible, and this alone is comprehensible of His substance: His infinity and incomprehensibility": therefore that He is called incomprehensible is not by reason of Himself, but in respect of created nature: if therefore the soul of Christ is a creature, uncreated wisdom is incomprehensible to it.

2. Again, Augustine, in the twelfth book of the City of God: "Whatever is known is bounded by the comprehension of the knower"; but the infinite can in no way be made finite by the finite: therefore it is in no way comprehended by the finite. But the soul of Christ is finite, since it is a creature: therefore, etc.

3. Again, every knower knows according to the capacity of the knower; but the knowing capacity of the soul of Christ is finite: therefore whatever it knows, it knows as finite and in a finite manner: therefore it in no way comprehends the infinite.

4. Again, everything that comprehends something totally grasps it within itself, and therefore is either greater than it or equal to it; but the soul of Christ is neither greater than the eternal Word nor equal to it: therefore it in no way comprehends it.

5. Again, of everything that the soul comprehends, something greater can be thought, because, when it reaches its boundaries, its thought can still be extended beyond: but nothing greater than the wisdom of God can be thought: therefore it is necessary that the wisdom of God be apprehended by the soul of Christ incomprehensibly.

6. Likewise, the soul of Christ, although it is supremely united to the Word, nevertheless does not enclose the Word within itself with respect to existence, because the Word exists outside it, and the Word is somewhere where the soul of Christ united to it is not: therefore by equal reasoning neither will the intellect of the soul of Christ totally grasp within itself the divine wisdom: therefore it does not comprehend it.

7. Likewise, to comprehend something is to grasp it fully: but to grasp the infinite fully is possible only through an infinite act: but an infinite act cannot exist unless there is an infinite power: nor can power be infinite unless substance is likewise infinite: if therefore the soul of Christ were to comprehend the divine wisdom, since that wisdom is infinite, the soul would be infinite with respect to substance, power, and operation. But this is false and impossible: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, that which comprehends something according to quantity of mass is coextended with it to an equality of extension: therefore that which comprehends something according to the excellence of clarity is equaled to it according to clarity: but it is impossible for the soul of Christ to be equaled to the divine wisdom according to clarity, since that wisdom is pure light, and the soul itself is darkness insofar as it is a creature: therefore it is impossible for the eternal wisdom of God to be comprehended by the soul of Christ.

9. Likewise, eternity is compared to aeviternity as a greater circle to a lesser: but it is impossible for a greater circle to be comprehended by a lesser: therefore it is impossible for an eternal substance to be comprehended by an aeviternal substance. But the wisdom of God is eternal, and the soul of Christ is not eternal but aeviternal: therefore etc.

10. Likewise, that which comprehends something knows it most perfectly: therefore if the soul of Christ comprehends the eternal wisdom, it is necessary that it be supremely wise, and therefore consequently supremely blessed: therefore it is equal to God in blessedness and goodness, and therefore lacks a beginning and an end: therefore it is neither a creature nor a soul. If therefore these are absurdities, and many others which can follow from this, it is impossible for the divine wisdom to be comprehended by the soul of Christ.

CONCLUSION.


The soul of Christ cannot properly comprehend uncreated wisdom.

I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid, it must be noted that, as was established from the preceding question, for the perfect and certain knowledge of any creature there concurs not only the presence of the eternal light, but also the influence of the eternal light: not only the uncreated Word, but also the word conceived within: not only the eternal wisdom, but also the knowledge impressed upon the soul: not only the truth that causes, but also the truth that informs. Since therefore the soul of Christ and any soul that knows God knows according to the measure of the influence of the Word and of the knowledge inwardly informing the mind: but such a word and knowledge, since it has created being, and thereby also limited being, cannot be equal to the divine wisdom, since that wisdom is in every way infinite: it must be admitted that the uncreated wisdom cannot be comprehended by the soul united to it nor by any other creature whatsoever, insofar as something is said to be comprehended when the one comprehending grasps the whole totally and according to every mode within itself, according to what Augustine says to Paulina, in On Seeing God: "No one ever comprehends the fullness of God, not only with the eyes of the body, but not even with the mind itself: for it is one thing to see, another to comprehend the whole by seeing, since that is seen which is somehow perceived as present; but that is wholly comprehended which is so seen that nothing of it is hidden from the one seeing, or whose limits can be surveyed." But for such a vision it is necessarily required that the one comprehending, according to act, habit, and power, either be equal to the thing comprehended or exceed it: and this can in no way be the case in the soul of Christ, or in any creature in comparison to the eternal wisdom; since the former is infinite, but the latter finite, and therefore the former exceeds the latter beyond all proportion. And this is what Augustine says in the ninth book of On the Trinity, chapter eleven: "Insofar as we know God, we are like him, but not like him to the point of equality, because we do not know him as much as he knows himself." And afterwards:

"When we know God, although we are made better than we were before we knew him, especially when that same knowledge, being pleasing and worthily loved, is a word: that knowledge becomes a certain likeness of God, yet it is inferior, because it exists in an inferior nature: for the mind is a creature, but God is the Creator." Since therefore the soul of Christ cannot, in knowing the eternal Word, beget a word equal to it, it is manifest that it cannot comprehend it, taking comprehension in its proper sense.

Hence the arguments for this position are to be granted.

For the understanding of the objections to the contrary, since they proceed from a threefold path, namely from the immensity of the grace of union, from the simplicity of the Word and the wisdom of God, from the capacity and the quieting of the desire of the knowing soul itself: it must be understood that, although the divine nature and the human nature are distant by the finite and the infinite, they can nevertheless be united, with the property of each nature preserved, in the unity of the hypostasis. Nevertheless, the divine nature itself never becomes finite, nor does the human become infinite. Whence, although God is man and man is God on account of the unity of person and hypostasis, the operations of each nature are nonetheless preserved and unconfused, although they are mutually predicated on account of the communication of idioms.

Again, although the divine Word is simple, it is nonetheless infinite, not by a quantity of mass, but by a quantity of power: because the simpler something is, the more its power is united: and "a power more united is more infinite than a power multiplied": and therefore the divine Word, by the very fact that it is most simple, is also most powerful: and therefore, although it is wholly wherever it is, it is nevertheless never circumscribed nor comprehended by any creature.

Finally, although the intellect and the affection of the rational soul never rest except in God and in the infinite good, this is not because it comprehends that good, but because nothing suffices for the soul unless it exceeds its capacity. Whence it is true that both the affection and the intellect of the rational soul itself are borne toward the infinite good and true, and toward it as infinite; but to be borne toward it can be in six modes, namely by believing, by reasoning, by wondering, by gazing, by exceeding and by comprehending. The first mode is of imperfection and of the way; the last mode is of the highest perfection and is proper to the eternal and infinite Trinity; the second and third modes pertain to the progress of the way; the fourth and fifth to the consummation of the fatherland. For on the way we can contemplate the divine immensity by reasoning and by wondering: but in the fatherland by gazing, when we shall have been made deiform, and by exceeding, when we shall be wholly inebriated: on account of which inebriation Anselm says at the end of the Proslogion that we shall enter more into the divine joy than the divine joy shall enter into our heart.

And since that soul united to the Word is both more made deiform and more inebriated on account of a grace not merely sufficient, but also superexcellent: therefore it gazes upon the divine wisdom and by gazing exceeds into it, although it does not comprehend it. And for this reason wonder has a place not only on the way, but also in the fatherland: not only in the Angels, but also in the soul assumed by God, so that it says: Your knowledge is become wonderful from me; it is strengthened, and I cannot reach unto it as the Gloss expounds concerning the man assumed by the Word, that "he cannot be made equal to Him in wisdom nor in anything else."

Having seen these things, one easily responds to the objections.

1. 2. 3. 4. To that which is first objected from the Gloss, that grace was given to Christ not by measure; and from the authority of Augustine, that that grace is ineffable; and from the authority of Hugh and from that argument which he adduces, that that grace brings it about that man is God; to all these it must be answered that all these things are true and are to be understood according to the concurrence of two natures in one person: from which it follows that on account of the immensity of that person and of that union, the grace is called immense and ineffable, and on account of the unity of the person, God and those things which are of God can be predicated of the man: nevertheless it does not follow from this that the soul itself, or its power and habit, or its act, loses its created being, and consequently its finite and limited character. And therefore it does not follow that a comprehensive act of the eternal wisdom belongs to it, since that act is infinite and proceeds from infinite power.

5. To that which is objected from the word of Bernard concerning that threefold union or unity, it must be said that the case is not similar: because in native and superdignative unity the extremes are proportional, for each is a connatural unity: but in dignative unity it is otherwise, because that unity is of condescension and grace alone; and therefore it is not necessary that there be mutual comprehension on this account.

6. To that which is objected from Isidore, that the Trinity is known to itself alone, etc.; it must be said that he does not say this except on account of the communication of idioms, or on account of the most intimate mode of revelation of his secrets communicated to that soul united to him, as will be more clearly evident in the following question.

7. To that which is objected from Cassiodorus, concerning the inaccessible light, that it is understood by a sound mind above all clarities; it must be said that this is true, taking soundness for perfect deiformity. But from this it does not follow that it is comprehended, because the other clarities are lesser and comprehensible, while that one is greater; and therefore, although it is known more limpidly by the soul than the other clarities, it nevertheless does not follow that it is comprehended.

8. To that which is objected, that the grace of union excels every grace of comprehension; it must be said that this is true: but this is not because the grace of union gives to the soul of Christ itself an infinite power, since it does not take away from it the being of a creature, but because it places it in an infinite hypostasis. Now an operation proceeding from a power is measured according to the greater or lesser power of that power itself: and therefore the grace of union and the grace of comprehension are not of the same genus. On this account, although they are disproportionate, it does not follow from this that the grace of union elicits from the soul an infinite act; just as it does not follow that a line is actually infinite, although it disproportionately exceeds a point.

9. To that which is objected from Augustine, that the soul, because it is simple, therefore, when it knows itself, totally, etc.: it must be said that this is because the soul has a limited simplicity, from which follows finitude and impartibility; and therefore, when it knows itself, it knows itself wholly and totally. But the simplicity of divine wisdom, as was shown above, is conjoined with infinity, and therefore, although it can be reached and apprehended by a creature, it can never be comprehended or circumscribed by a creature.

10. To that which is objected, that this is per se true: that what is simple, when it is reached, is reached as a whole: it must be said that concerning the finite simple this holds true; but concerning the infinite simple, in a certain way it holds true and in a certain way it does not. If it is understood thus, that the whole is reached, that is, not according to part and part, it holds true; but if it is understood that the whole is reached, that is, according to every manner of its fullness and perfection, such that it does not exceed the one comprehending, it is false. And therefore it has been commonly said and from antiquity that although the whole is reached, it is not however reached totally; because whole, since it is a noun, designates a disposition on the part of the subject or object according to itself; but totally, since it is an adverb, designates a disposition of the verb and thereby posits every manner of perfection and equality in the act of the one comprehending with respect to the comprehended, which cannot obtain in the finite with respect to the infinite.

11. 12. To that which is objected: either the whole is hidden, or the whole is manifest, etc.: the response is already clear, because the whole is hidden, and the whole is manifest. For the whole is manifest to the one apprehending, since it does not apprehend according to part and part; the whole also lies hidden with respect to comprehension, because nothing of the Word can be comprehended by the created intellect; for the whole is infinite, and therefore it is simple. And therefore that very thing which is apprehended is not comprehended. Just as the eternal Word, the same and whole and according to the same, is in some creature and is beyond that creature: so it is grasped by some intelligence, and yet is not comprehended by it, because it exceeds it. — And through this the response to the following is clear, in which it is objected that if something were hidden, the intellect would not be blessed: for as has already been said, it is not called incomprehensible on account of the hiddenness of some part, but on account of the immensity of its simplicity.

13. To that which is objected, that just as He is truly infinite, so He is truly simple: it must be said that this is true. — To that which is further objected, that just as incomprehensibility belongs to the infinite, so comprehensibility belongs to the simple: it must be said that this is false. Because the infinite, by the very fact that it is infinite, denotes a disproportionate excess with respect to anything finite; but the simple, by the very fact that it is simple, does not denote adequation or limitation, neither absolutely in itself nor in comparison to another; because, as was shown previously, the most simple, by the very fact that it is most simple, must necessarily be infinite. For since there is a twofold quantity, namely of mass and of power, in the quantity of mass the simple and the infinite are founded upon diverse things, but in the quantity of power they are founded upon the same thing, because the greatness of simplicity contributes to the unification and magnification of power: and therefore on account of supreme simplicity, comprehensibility is not communicated, but rather incomprehensibility and immeasurable power.

14. To that which is objected concerning the point, that if essence and power were the same in it, etc.: it must be said that the eternal Word is not comprehended, neither according to essence nor according to power, by any creature, because both power and essence have an immensity infinitely exceeding every created power. And therefore the comparison with the point does not hold, whose essence is circumscribed.

15. To that which is objected, that nothing less than God can fill the soul: it must be said that this is true, as was touched upon, because the soul is not satisfied by any good that it grasps and comprehends, since nothing of that sort is the highest good; but by a good of such kind and greatness that it grasps and apprehends through vision and affection, and by which it is grasped through supereminence and excess.

16. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ loves as much as it ought: it must be said that this is true; but nevertheless it does not follow from this that it loves God as much as God Himself loves Himself, because the love by which God loves Himself is eternal and immeasurable and coequal with the beloved; but the affection, because it proceeds from Christ's will, cannot be other than finite.

And as to what is said, that the manner of loving God is to love without manner: this is not because that love lacks unity and measure, since that is common to every creature, but that the affection in loving ought not to fix for itself a constraining limit and boundary, but rather in an exceeding manner, with the whole striving of the mind, be carried toward that most powerful goodness.

17. 18. To that which is objected, that the intellect is strengthened in understanding the greatest intelligible, and that its capacity grows in grasping the greater: it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: in one way, that from the fact that it understands the highest intelligible and grasps it, it is more vigorous and more powerful with respect to those things which are below it; and this is true. In another way, so that it be understood that it is still capable of greater light and truth than it has grasped: and this is false, because the capacity of the soul is measured according to the quantity of its power, which is rooted in a finite substance; and therefore it is finite in act and sufficiently completable through a finite deiformity, which, by assimilating it to God according to its every possibility, makes it reach out to the infinite good, and through this gives it perfection and rest. 19. 20. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ attains to the uncreated and most simple, although it is created and composite, therefore by equal reasoning to the infinite, insofar as it is infinite, although it itself is finite: it must be said that the conclusion can be granted, that it attains to the infinite just as to the uncreated and most simple. For just as it does not attain to the infinite by comprehending, but by apprehending and exceeding, so also not to the uncreated and most simple.

It could nevertheless be said that the comparison does not hold on both sides: because to know the simple as simple and the uncreated as uncreated includes nothing other than an assimilation of the knower to the known: but to know the infinite as infinite signifies not only assimilation, but also a certain adequation; for the infinite as infinite names a quantity; and therefore the aforementioned argument does not follow: just as it does not follow that, if a creature can be assimilated to God, on this account it can be made equal to God.

We confess, however, that the soul of Christ is deiform, but not equal to God: and therefore we grant and hold that, although it apprehends the very wisdom united to it clearly and perspicuously, it does not nevertheless totally comprehend it.