Question 7

QUESTION VII.

Whether the soul of Christ comprehends all things that the uncreated wisdom comprehends.

It is asked whether the soul of Christ comprehends all things that the uncreated wisdom comprehends. And it seems that it does.

1. Romans 11: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and unsearchable His ways! From which it is gathered that those things which pertain to divine wisdom are more comprehensible than the divine judgments; but in John 5 it is said that the Father has given all judgment to the Son, because He is the Son of man; from which it is gathered that the soul of Christ comprehends the divine judgments: therefore if those are less comprehensible than the others, much more strongly does He comprehend all the others.

2. Likewise, Apocalypse 5: Worthy is the Lamb who was slain to receive wisdom; the Gloss: "The knowledge of all things, just as the Word united to Him"; but the united Word comprehends whatever it knows: therefore so does the soul of Christ.

3. Likewise, Damascene, in the third book: "We affirm that Christ as man knows all things, for in Christ are all the treasures of wisdom ".

If you say that this is understood according to the divine nature: to the contrary: no one knows anything that his soul is ignorant of: therefore if Christ comprehends all things, it is necessary that His soul also comprehend them.

4. Likewise, Gregory, in the Dialogues: "To the soul seeing the Creator, every creature is narrow": therefore if the soul of Christ perfectly sees the Word united to it, every creature is therefore narrow to it; but beyond every creature nothing remains except the immensity of those things which are possible to God: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends all those things.

5. Likewise, the soul of Christ is most perfectly united to the Word, both insofar as it is the Word and insofar as it is the exemplar: but if there were something in the Word or in the eternal exemplar that were hidden from the soul of Christ, a still more perfect union could be conceived: if therefore it is united by the most perfect union, it is necessary that it comprehend all things.

6. Likewise, the soul of Christ knows in the Word: and because by one thing it knows many, therefore it knows many things simultaneously, although from natural cognition it can understand only one thing: therefore since that one thing extends itself not only to many things, but even to infinite things: by the same reason that it knows many things simultaneously, by the same reason it knows infinite things.

7. Likewise, the eternal Word eternally represents whatever it represents, since it is one and uniform: therefore it does not lead to one thing by a different reason than to any other: therefore the soul of Christ either sees nothing in the Word, or if it sees some things, it sees infinite things.

8. Likewise, the soul of Christ is more powerful for knowing through the Word united to it than any soul through a habit given to it; but a soul having the habit of wisdom comprehends all things to which that habit extends: therefore by equal reason the soul of Christ through the eternal Word comprehends all things to which the Word itself extends.

9. Again, the soul of Christ knows the Word itself wholly, since it has the whole [Word] united to itself; but in the Word, power and essence are the same: therefore it comprehends the whole power of the Word. But the power of the Word extends to infinite things: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

10. Again, the soul of Christ is nearer to things themselves as they are in the Word than according as they are in their proper genus: but no thing has being in its proper genus without being known by the soul of Christ, for he knows all things whatsoever that come to pass: therefore much more does he know all things whatsoever are known by the eternal Word.

11. Again, it is equally impossible to know contingent things with certitude as to comprehend infinite things: but the soul of Christ, on account of its union with the Word, has certain knowledge of future contingents: therefore by equal reasoning it has [certain knowledge] of infinite things as well.

12. Again, it is equally difficult to know secrets as to know many things; but the soul of Christ, on account of its union with the Word, knows the most secret things of hearts, however intimate they may be: therefore by equal reasoning it knows however many things there may be: therefore infinite things.

13. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends everything comprehensible by a creature: but every species of number is comprehensible by a creature: therefore it comprehends all species of number. But the species of number, as Augustine says in the twelfth book of The City of God, are infinite: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

14. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends the whole universe, therefore being and all the differences of being: therefore it knows not only the general differences, but also the individual ones, not only being in act, but also being in potency; but any species, as far as concerns itself, has infinite individuals in potency: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

15. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends some finite thing, such as a line, therefore it knows the principle of a line; but the principle of a line is a point: therefore it comprehends a point. But whoever comprehends something knows it according to its whole power: therefore since the potency of a point extends to infinite lines, and the soul of Christ comprehends the whole potency of a point: it is necessary that it comprehends infinite things.

16. Again, the soul of Christ loves everything lovable, therefore by equal reasoning it knows everything knowable: but everything that is known by God is knowable: therefore the soul of Christ knows everything that is known by God.

17. Again, the soul of Christ is altogether perfect; but in that which is altogether perfect, everything that is in potency is reduced to act: but the intellect of the soul of Christ is in potency to infinite things, because it never understands so many things that it cannot understand more: therefore since intelligible things in the one understanding them do not crowd one another out, therefore if the whole of its potency is reduced to act, it is necessary that it knows infinite things.

18. Furthermore, if the agent intellect were in full actuality with respect to all things toward which the possible intellect is in potency, anyone would understand infinite things. Therefore, since in the soul of Christ the Word united to it is in full actuality with respect to all things with respect to which the intellect of Christ's soul is in potency, the soul of Christ understands infinite things.

19. Furthermore, the soul of Christ either can learn something or nothing. If it can learn something, then it is not fully perfect in knowledge, and by the same reasoning neither in grace. If it can learn nothing, then it knows so much that it cannot know more; therefore it is necessary that it knows infinite things.

20. Furthermore, the soul of Christ either knows some of those things which God can do but will not do, or nothing. If it knows nothing of them, I ask what prevents this; for either this is because it cannot extend itself to those things, and that is manifestly false; or because God does not wish to reveal them to it, and this is a manifest absurdity, because it would take away from that soul the highest familiarity with the Word united to it. If it knows some of those things which He can do but will not do, there is no greater reason why it should know this rather than that; therefore it seems that it knows all things that are possible to God, therefore infinite things.

21. Furthermore, the soul of Christ either knows finite things or infinite things. If it knows finite things, since more can be thought than all finite things, then some soul could think more things than the soul of Christ knows; but it is absurd that some soul should surpass it in anything; therefore it is necessary to hold that it knows infinite things.

On the contrary: 1. The Psalm: Your knowledge has become wonderful, etc.; the Gloss: "The assumed man cannot be made equal to the divine substance in substance nor in anything else." Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend all things that are comprehended by the eternal wisdom.

2. Furthermore, Augustine, in Book XII of The City of God: "The infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God, which comprehends it." Therefore, if the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things, infinite things are finite to it; but if infinite things are finite to it, since it itself is finite, they are not infinite; therefore if it comprehends finite things, it does not comprehend infinite things.

3. Furthermore, Hugh, On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ: "This one thing I affirm without doubt, that there was no other wisdom in the soul of Christ besides the divine, or if there was any other, it was not equal to it." But it is established that there was another, as is apparent from the foregoing. Therefore, since the wisdom that informs, perfects, and disposes the soul can only be created, that wisdom in Christ will not extend to comprehending all things that the uncreated wisdom comprehends.

4. Furthermore, every created thing is disposed in a certain weight, number, and measure. Therefore the soul of Christ and its wisdom have a certain number and measure; therefore it does not extend to infinite things.

5. Furthermore, to comprehend infinite things is an act passing entirely over the immensity of knowable things: but every such act is infinite: and an infinite act proceeds only from an infinite power, nor is there infinite power except in an infinite substance: if therefore the soul of Christ is finite and limited, since it is a creature, it is impossible that it comprehend infinite things.

6. Furthermore, the simpler a substance is, the more things it is capable of knowing; but the soul of Christ is not elevated either by nature or by grace to divine simplicity: therefore it is not elevated to knowing as many things as divine wisdom knows.

7. Furthermore, the wisdom of the Word is immense in clarity and in multiplicity: but the soul of Christ never attains to comprehending the immensity of the eternal light according to its complete clarity: therefore it never attains to knowing its complete multiplicity.

8. Furthermore, although the soul of Christ is united to the essence of the Word, it nevertheless never exists in as many things as the Word itself does: but as essence is related to essence, so knowledge is related to knowledge: therefore it never knows all things that the Word itself knows.

9. Furthermore, knowledge includes power, because to be able to know is to be able to do something; but the soul of Christ is not capable of infinite power, such as the power of creating: therefore by equal reasoning neither is it capable of knowledge extending itself to infinite things.

10. Furthermore, infinity in creatures attests to imperfection: if therefore the wisdom of the soul of Christ is most perfect, then it does not admit infinity either on the part of the knower or on the part of the known or on the part of the mode of knowing.

11. Furthermore, no created thing exceeds another created thing infinitely: but if the soul of Christ were to know infinite things, since other souls know only finite things, it would exceed them infinitely: therefore it would pass beyond the genus of created things. But this is manifestly false: therefore so too is that from which it follows, namely that the soul of Christ is comprehensive of infinite things.

12. Furthermore, everything known is in the knower: therefore if the soul of Christ were actually to comprehend infinite things, infinite things would actually be in the soul of Christ; but it is impossible to posit an actual infinite with respect to a created being: therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ be comprehensive of infinite things.

CONCLUSION.

The soul of Christ in the Word does not properly comprehend infinite things; yet insofar as the Word is a factive exemplar, it is borne toward it by comprehending: but insofar as it is an expressive exemplar, it is borne toward the same not by comprehending, but by exceeding.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that one can speak of uncreated wisdom in two ways: either insofar as it is an exemplar that is productive and dispositive, or insofar as it is an exemplar that is expressive or representative. In the first way, there shine forth in the art of divine wisdom those things which are, were, and will be; and these are finite. In the second way, there shine forth all things which God can make and understand; and these indeed are infinite, as was shown in the preceding discussions, and as Augustine expressly says in the twelfth book of the City of God. - The soul of Christ, therefore, is borne toward divine wisdom through cognition in both ways, but differently. For toward it, insofar as it is a productive exemplar, it is borne by comprehending, because those things which are contained and represented in the exemplar as productive and dispositive are finite, and thereby also comprehensible. But toward the exemplar, insofar as it is an expressive or representative exemplar, it is borne not by comprehending, but by exceeding: because, since infinite things are represented in it, they are incomprehensible, namely by a finite substance. And therefore the soul of Christ, since it is a creature and thereby finite, however much it may be united to the Word, does not comprehend infinite things, because it is neither equal to them nor does it exceed them: and therefore it does not in every way grasp them, but rather is grasped, and thereby is not borne toward them by way of comprehension, but rather by way of excess. An excessive mode of knowing, however, I call not one in which the knower exceeds the known, but one in which the knower is borne toward an object that exceeds it in a certain excessive manner, by raising itself above itself. Concerning this mode of knowing, Dionysius speaks in the book On Mystical Theology, and in the seventh chapter of On the Divine Names says thus: "It is necessary to recognize that our intellect has a certain power for understanding, through which it sees intelligible things, but also a union exceeding the nature of the intellect, through which it is conjoined to those things which are beyond itself. According to this, therefore, understanding divine things not according to ourselves, but with our whole selves made wholly outside ourselves and wholly deified; for it is better to be God's and not to be one's own; for thus all things will be credible to those who are with God." - Now this mode of knowing by excess exists both on the way and in the homeland: but on the way partially, whereas in the homeland it exists perfectly in Christ and in the other comprehensors; but in others it exists in a restricted manner, both on the part of the measure of their own grace, and on the part of the divine will, which does not offer itself to just anyone in complete intimacy; but in the soul of Christ it exists most liberally, both because from it he has grace filling his capacity in every way, and because the eternal mirror offers itself to him as manifestable according to complete intimacy.

Now the mode of comprehension and of excess differs in Christ in multiple ways: first, because in the comprehensive mode the knower grasps the known, but in the excessive mode the known grasps the knower. - Second, because in the comprehensive mode the gaze of the intellect is terminated, but in the excessive mode the appetite of the intellect is terminated. - Third, because in comprehension one becomes actually considering all things past, present, and future; but in excess one becomes ready for considering. - Fourth, because from comprehension attained it comes about that one learns nothing anew; but on account of excess it comes about that one can learn nothing; and therefore, although the knowledge of Christ's soul by way of excess can in a certain manner be said to extend to infinite things, nevertheless comprehensive knowledge extends only to finite things. Hence if according to that knowledge the soul of Christ is said to know whatever the Word knows, this is understood of past, present, and future things which in some way pertain to the integrity of the universe itself, which was fully and totally inscribed in the soul of Christ Jesus from the instant of conception. And to that extent that soul is said to have had all knowledge, not because it comprehends all things that the divine wisdom knows, since that wisdom is infinite and cannot be comprehended by a finite power, as was shown above.

Hence the arguments which show this are to be granted, because they conclude what is irrefragably true.

1. 2. 3. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the soul of Christ comprehends all the divine judgments, and that it has all knowledge just as the Word united to it has: it can be said that those things are said of the assumed man on account of the communication of idioms; or certainly they are said of those things which are, were, and will be, which indeed can be comprehended by the soul of Christ; but it is not true with respect to all things that the divine wisdom understands, since it knows infinite things, as is clear from what has been determined above. - That which is objected, however, that no one can know something that his soul is ignorant of: this holds true when someone knows nothing except through the soul, as is the case with a mere man. But in Christ, who knows not only through the soul but also through the divine nature, that proposition does not hold. And through this the response to the three things first objected is clear.

4. To that which is objected, that for the soul seeing God every creature is narrow: it must be said that this is true of a creature according to the being which it has in its proper genus, but not according to the being which it has in the Art, because that Art is most noble and most perfect, having not narrowness but rather perfection. Hence if the soul were to know the whole universe according to the being which it has in its proper genus, it would not yet be in perfect knowledge and comprehension unless it also knew that Art through which all things are made. And because the soul of Christ most perfectly comprehends all things made in that Art, therefore in it and through it the soul is said to have perfect comprehension.

5. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is most perfectly united to the Word: it must be said that this is true, yet with the limitation of created nature preserved, which the soul of Christ does not lose, because it does not cease to be a creature, and because to comprehend infinite things is repugnant to the limitation of a creature: hence it is that this cannot be inferred from that union, however perfectly it may be understood.

6. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ simultaneously knows many things, because it knows by one means, and that by equal reasoning it ought to know infinite things: it must be said that the cases are not similar, because multiplicity with simultaneity is not repugnant to the limitation of a creature, but infinity with actuality and simultaneity is entirely repugnant: and therefore it is not an argument from similarity, but from great dissimilarity.

7. To that which is objected, that the eternal Word represents equally: it can be said that this claim is false, because to represent designates an act toward another. But God, although He is uniform in Himself, nevertheless illuminates and manifests in manifold ways, and although He knows infinite things, some of them He approves and some He disapproves, some He disposes to do and some He does not at all, some He shows willingly and some He keeps hidden.

Furthermore, granted that as far as it pertains to Himself He knows all things uniformly, still the argument does not conclude, because "everything received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver and not according to the mode of the thing received": and therefore, since the power that grasps is finite, it is impossible, even if the whole is freely offered to it, that it should grasp and comprehend the whole, but only according to what befits it: as appears by example, if the entire Seine offers itself to one bringing a jar, nevertheless the whole is not contained, but only as much and in the manner that the capacity of the jar extends.

8. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is more powerful for knowing through the Word united to it than any other soul through a habit given to it: it must be said that this is true, but from this it does not follow that, if a soul comprehends all things to which a habit extends, the soul of Christ therefore knows all things that it knows through the Word itself: because a soul comprehends the habit itself as proportionate to it and in no way exceeding its capacity; but the soul of Christ does not so comprehend the Word united to it, since it exceeds its capacity infinitely.

9. To that which is objected, that it knows the whole, therefore the whole power: it must be said that this argument does not hold, because whole, said of the Word, designates the privation of part and part or the positing of perfection in every mode: but said of power, because power designates a comparison to possibles, it designates a distribution with respect to all possibles: and thus its meaning varies, and therefore the argument does not proceed.

10. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is nearer to things themselves as they are in the Word than as they are in their own genus: it must be said that although it is nearer, it is not however more proportionate. Comprehension, however, in some way includes in itself the notion of proportionality, and that the known be finite to the knower: and therefore, because in their own genus they are finite and proportionate to that soul, they are therefore comprehensible, but not as they are in the immensity of that art, unless perhaps it be understood according as they are in it as in a productive exemplar. And in this way it can be conceded that they are comprehended by the soul of Christ, but in the other way not, on account of the immensity and disproportionality.

11. To that which is objected, that it is equally impossible to know contingent things with certitude as to comprehend infinite things: it must be said that this does not hold true: because, although to know contingent things with certitude is impossible according to natural cognition, it nevertheless becomes possible through an illumination above nature, which elevates the soul to knowing things in the eternal art, in which both contingent and necessary things exist immutably: but to comprehend actually infinite things is impossible not only by natural cognition, but also by gratuitous cognition, because both are created and limited, and on this account do not extend to actually infinite things.

12. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of secrets and infinite things, it must be said that the case is not similar, as is clear from what has been said: because the perception of a secret, however hidden, does not imply anything incompatible with the nature of the created intellect itself. It is not so with the comprehension of the infinite, which implies infinity in act, and thereby in substance and power: which no creature admits in any way, neither through grace nor through glory.

13. To that which is objected, that anything comprehended is comprehensible by a creature: it must be said that although it can be conceded of each thing individually that it is comprehensible by a creature, because each thing is finite, nevertheless all taken together are infinite, and therefore incomprehensible. And therefore that argument does not proceed, because it proceeds from the parts taken separately to the same as they are gathered into one. Whence just as this argument does not hold: this house can contain any individual man by himself, therefore it can contain all men: so neither does that one hold.

14. To the objection that the soul of Christ comprehends all the differences of being, and that the potency of any species extends to infinite individuals: it must be said that the potency toward infinite things can be understood in two ways, namely as active potency and as passive potency. Active potency toward infinite things exists only in the creative essence, which is actually infinite. But if a potency with respect to infinite things is posited in a creature, it is only a passive potency, which is rooted in something finite, yet has a relation to an infinite active principle, according to what is said in the Book of Causes: "All infinite powers are dependent upon one infinite principle, which is the power of powers." Accordingly, infinite potency in a creature can be understood, known, or comprehended in two ways: either with respect to that upon which it is rooted in the creature—and because that is actually finite, it is therefore comprehensible—or with respect to the active principle outside, which is actually infinite. In the first way, the soul of Christ comprehends all the differences of being, both in genera with respect to species and in species with respect to individuals; in the second way, insofar as it is referred to the infinite active potency, it indeed knows, yet not by way of comprehensive cognition, but of excessive cognition, as was shown above. And through this the response is clear.

15. 16. To the objection concerning the point and concerning the lovable and the knowable, it must be said that it is true that it comprehends every lovable and knowable thing according to the being that it has in its own nature; but according to the being that it has in the infinite first cause, in this way it is said to be knowable and comprehensible only to an infinite power: because, although according to mode it may seem to denote something created, nevertheless according to reality it denotes nothing but the power of the efficient cause, which, since it is infinite, can be comprehended by no finite being.

17. To the objection that the soul of Christ is altogether perfect, and that nothing remained in potency that was not reduced to act: it must be said that this is true of a potency that is altogether reducible to act; but a potency toward infinite things can never be reduced to act according to its totality, but only according to a part. Whence it is impossible that God should bring it about that a continuum is altogether divided into everything into which it can be divided; for this is repugnant to the perfection of the potency of the agent itself and to the completion of the creature, which is naturally constituted to exist in finitude; and such is the potency of the possible intellect.

18. To the objection that if the agent intellect were in act with respect to all things toward which the possible intellect is in potency, then the soul would understand infinite things, etc.: it must be said that the case is not similar:

because, if the agent intellect were in act with respect to infinite things, insofar as it is a power of the soul, then the soul by its own power would extend itself to infinite things. But it is not so in a soul united to eternal wisdom, because that wisdom, even though it extends to infinite things, is not something belonging to the soul itself, but is above the soul; and therefore it does not follow from this that it belongs to the soul itself to know infinitely. Moreover, the possible intellect is proportionate to the agent, but uncreated wisdom is not thus proportionate to the understanding soul itself.

19. 20. 21. To the objection concerning the soul of Christ—whether it can learn anything, and whether it knows any of those things which God is not going to do but can do, and whether it knows only finite things or also infinite things—the response is clear through the distinction made above: because, since the soul of Christ has comprehensive knowledge with respect to all things whatsoever that come to be in the universe, and exceeding knowledge with respect to all things that are contained in the divine art, and since that excess consists in the totality of the knowing power and in the highest intimacy with respect to the mirror that represents, it is necessary that, although the soul of Christ does not comprehend all things that divine wisdom comprehends, yet because it exceeds into all those things, its entire appetite is therefore terminated: so that, just as nothing further can be added to its grace, so nothing further can be added to its wisdom, because as much has been given to it as can be granted to any creature.

From these things, therefore, which have been said and predetermined concerning the wisdom of Christ, both with respect to the divine nature and with respect to the human, there can appear the mode of knowing both in the knowledge of the Creator and in the knowledge of the creature, not only in the state of the fatherland, but also in the state of the way. For, to speak to one point, it must be acknowledged that God knows infinite things—knows, I say, by Himself, not by a likeness; and by a likeness not received from without, but by the very truth itself, expressing and exemplifying all things, in respect of which many likenesses and expressions are spoken of, not on account of multiplicity and distinction in themselves, but according to the rationale of understanding: now these likenesses, or rather eternal reasons, are that from which all certitude of created knowledge flows, both in the soul of Christ and in other created spirits; nor are these alone the reasons of knowing, but together with them also likenesses received from without: according to the state of the way and according to the state of the fatherland, not only is the presence of the eternal light required, but also the influence of the eternal light, not only the uncreated Word, but also the word inwardly conceived; which, since it is finite, neither the soul of Christ nor any other soul can be comprehensive of the eternal Word nor of infinite knowable things, although it must be borne toward them by way of excess: which excess is indeed the ultimate and most noble mode of knowing, which Dionysius praises in all his books, and especially in the book On Mystical Theology. Concerning which also, mystically, almost all of divine Scripture speaks, and concerning which Apocalypse 2: I will give him a stone, and on the stone a new name written, which no one knows except he who receives it: because this mode of knowing one scarcely or never understands unless one has experienced it, nor does one experience it unless one is rooted and grounded in charity, so that one may comprehend with all the Saints what is the length, the breadth, etc.; in which also experiential and true wisdom consists, which is begun on the way and consummated in the fatherland: for the circumlocution of which negations are more fitting than affirmations, and supereminent expressions than positive predications; for the experience of which interior silence avails more than the exterior word. And therefore here an end of words must be had, and the Lord must be entreated, that He may grant us to experience that of which we speak.